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This thesis consists in a legal analysis of the involvement of the European Union (EU) in 
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in its policies directed at Israel and the Palestinians helps fostering, entrenching or 
decreasing the commission o f violations o f international law which result from the 
occupation o f the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
After having offered an in-depth analysis of the content o f Common Article 1 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the obligation to cooperate to put an end to a violation 
arising under a peremptory norm o f international law, the obligation not to recognise and 
the obligation not to aid and assist, the thesis offers a legal framework based on an 
empirical approach to international law in order to explain how international actors can 
contribute to the commission or the perpetration o f violations o f international law. It 
further details the objectives of the EU in its external relations to promote respect for 
international law and human rights.
The thesis proceeds with an investigation o f the diplomatic involvement o f the EU in the 
resolution o f the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the relations between the EU, Israel and the 
Palestinians taken individually. It analyses how violations o f international law which 
derive from the occupation o f the Palestinian Territories interfere in the implementation 
o f these relations and how the EU reacts to this interference.
The thesis concludes that the EU is incrementally acquiescing in the violations of 
international law which result from the occupation of the Palestinian Territories, is giving 
incentives to the perpetuation o f this situation, and is also breaching its commitment to
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base its relations with Israel and the Palestinians on respect for human rights. It ends by 
offering recommendations for a better-directed involvement o f the EU with Israel and 
the Palestinians.
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Introduction
1. Setting the Scene.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a meta-conflict: there is no agreement between the 
parties on what the conflict is about.1 The international community has now accepted 
that this conflict presented two competing claims of self-determination and that the 
solution to this conflict would be for the Palestinian people to exercise its right to self- 
determination over the West Bank and Gaza.2 However, the principal impediment to this 
objective is the occupation o f these territories which has been ongoing for more than 
forty years and which presents a claim for non-compliance with rules o f international 
law. Since its beginning in 1967, this occupation has been characterized by violations o f 
human rights and humanitarian law.3 From 1967 until now, the occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories has been placed at the service of a policy which some refer to as 
“an annexationist agenda”.4 Since 1967, the State of Israel has continuously established 
settlements o f its civilian population in the territories it occupies in contravention of the
1 C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights, (Oxford 2003), p. 15.
2 Ibid., p. 78.
3 The international law, human tights and humanitarian law violations which derive from the Israeli- 
Palestinian issue have been documented extensively by human rights organisations from the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories, Israel and Western countries, U N  bodies and among them, the Special Rapporteur o f  
the Commission o f  Human Rights on the Situation o f  Human Rights in the Occupied Territories 
Occupied Since 1967. For a sample o f the documentation o f  the violations o f  international law, human 
rights and humanitarian law in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, see A1 Haq, www.alhaq.org: Amnesty 
International, www.amnesty.org: B’Tselem, www.btselem.org: Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org: 
Machsomwatch, www.machsomwatch.com: the Palestinian Centre for human rights, www.pchrgaza.org 
and Peace Now, www.peacenow.org. This dissertation is not covering violations o f  human rights by the 
State o f  Israel against its own citizens. For this issue, see Adalah, www.adalah.org: Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel, www.acri.org.il and Hamoked, Centre for the rights o f  the Individual, www.hamoked.co.il 
and Mossawa Centre, www.mossawacentre.org.
4 O. Ben-Naftali, A. Gross and K. Michaeli, “Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory” (2005) 23 Berkeley Journal o f International Law, 551- 614.
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provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and hence, according to the ICJ, has de facto 
annexed those areas o f the Palestinian territories.5
The ongoing violence which derives from the occupation, the annexation and absence 
of protection have fomented frustration and anger and has led some extremist factions 
inside the Palestinian population to commit illegal acts o f violence against Israeli 
civilians.6
Furthermore, the structure o f the occupation has remained unchanged and Israeli 
settlement policy has continued unabated, despite the negotiation process in the 1990s 
and a clause in the Declaration of Principles (DoP)7 urging the parties to the negotiation 
to respect rules o f international law.8 The only change brought about by the interim 
agreements negotiated between Israel and the PLO is the superposition o f the structure 
of the Palestinian Authority below the structure o f the occupation with a limited 
governance in certain zones (A and B) o f the West Bank and control over Gaza.9
5 Advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ICJ 
Rep. 2004, p. 180 (para. 120). Chapter seven o f this dissertation gives an overview o f  the political and legal 
aspects o f  the Israeli setdement policy in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. See pp. 256-258 below.
6 As formulated by Shehadeh in 1993: “But it must not be forgotten that fundamentalism develops in 
nations that feel the depth o f historical injustice done to them only because o f then* weakness. In such a 
situation purism and narrow determinism appear the only way to win back usurped rights”, R. Shehadeh, 
"Can the Declaration o f  Principles Bring About a ‘Just and Lasting Peace’?” (1993) 4 EJIL 555-563, p. 563. 
On the contravention o f Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians with provisions o f international 
and humanitarian law, see Erased in a Moment. Suicide Bombing Attacks against Israeli Civilians (Human 
Rights Watch), (November 2002),
7 The Oslo Accords or the Declaration o f  Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements were 
signed between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the State o f  Israel on 
13 September 1993 in Washington. The Accords were the outcome o f  secret negotiations between the 
PLO and Israel under the auspices o f  Norway. They set up a framework that governed the relations 
between die parties for five years and which should have lead to the negotiations o f  a permanent 
agreement. The full text o f the agreement is available on the website o f the Israeli Ministry o f  Foreign 
Affairs, at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/M FA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Principle 
s.htm (last visited 15 December 2008).
8 In Article XIX o f  the Declaration o f Principles, Israel and the PLO undertook to give “due regard to 
internationally-accepted norms and principles o f human rights and the rule o f law”.
9 At the time o f  the peace process, the question whether the peace agreements ended the occupation 
provoked an academic debate. For instance, for Benvenisti the Declaration o f Principles would only end 
the occupation over Jericho and Gaza. E. Benvenisti, “The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration o f Principles: A
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There exists a consensus among the international community that the creation of a 
Palestinian State is the principal solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.10 However, 
there is also a growing realisation on the ground that Israel’s settlement policy is 
diminishing day after day the chances o f the creation o f a viable Palestinian State as well 
as impeding the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination.11 
Many are raising their concerns on the present human rights situation o f the Palestinians 
in the Occupied Territories. Some have already drawn an analogy between the 
occupation o f the Palestinian Territories by Israel and the Apartheid regime of South 
Africa.12 Haaretz reported that in a private conversation, US Secretary of State, 
Condoleeza Rice compared the situation o f the Palestinians to the one o f the African- 
Americans during the 1960s.13 Furthermore, politicians in Israel are questioning the 
viability o f the ongoing occupation. As stated by Ehud Barak himself:
Framework for Future Settlement” (1993) 4 EJIL 542-554, p. 54S. According to Shehadeh, the main 
arrangements imposed unilaterally by Israel in the past 26 years relating to land, water and Israeli 
settlements have been left intact throughout the negotiation o f the DoP, and the jurisdiction o f the 
Palestinian Authority has been restricted to exclude Israeli setdements. R. Shehadeh, note 3 above, p. 556- 
561 On this topic, see also C. Campbell, A Problematic Peace: International Humanitarian Law and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, In C. Campbell, Karl Schulze and M. Stokes (eds,), Nationalism, Minorities 
and Diasporas; Identities and Rights in Middle-East, (London, N ew  York 1996), pp. 39-54.
10 The Road Map, the peace plan launched by the Quartet, -the informal diplomatic group gathering the 
United States, the United Nations, the Russian Federation and the European Union and in charge o f the 
Middle-East Peace Process- in April 2003 and which planned the creation o f  a Palestinian State by 2005 
can be cited as one example o f die existing consensus among the international community for the necessity 
o f the creation o f  a Palestinian State.
11 I^egal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Temtoty, ICJ Rep. (2004), p. 184, 
para. 122.
12 L. Farsakh, Israel: An Apartheid State?, Ee Monde diplomatique, (November 2003): A. Schocken, 
Citizenship Law Makes Israel an Apartheid State, Haaretq, (26 June 2008); The U N  Human Rights Council 
rapporteur on Palestinian Occupied Territories, John Dugard employed this analogy in his reports. See 
Human rights situation in Palestine and other Arab territories, Human Rights Council, seventh session, 
A /H R C /7 /17 , 21 January 2008. One o f  the most prominent advocate o f  this analogy is former US 
president Jimmy Carter who published, a book where he draws a comparison between the two regimes. J. 
Carter, Palestine, Peace N ot Apartheid, (New York 2006).
13 “In private conversations - and as she said in Annapolis - Rice tends to compare the Israeli occupation in 
the territories to the racial segregation that used to be the norm in the American South. The Israel Defense 
Forces checkpoints where Palestinians are detained remind her o f the buses she rode as a child in Alabama, 
which had separate seats for blacks and whites”. A. Benn and S. Rosner, What’s the Hurry?, Haaretq, (27 
December 2007).
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“Any type o f full control by Israel over the whole area from the 
Mediterranean to the Jordan... means inevitably either a binational State, 
if it is democratic and so-non-Jewish; or an apartheid State, which is non- 
democratic”.14
His statement was echoed by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who, more recendy 
acknowledged that:
“If  the day comes when die two-State solution collapses, and we face a 
South African style struggle for equal voting rights (also for the Palestinians 
in the territories), then, as soon as that happens, the State o f Israel is 
finished”.15
In the European Security Strategy, die European Union stated diat “the resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was a strategic priority for Europe” .16 Throughout the past two 
decades, the European Union has increased its diplomatic involvement in the Middle- 
East and has deployed a strategy directed towards Israel and die Palestinians in order to 
bring peace between them. This strategy focuses on three aspects which are analysed 
throughout this dissertation:
14 Barak E. “Remarks by Foreign Minister Barak to the International Press Institute, 27, March 1996”, cited 
in R. del Sarto, “Israel's Contested Identity in the Mediterranean” (2003) 8 Mediterranean Politics 27-58, p. 
37.
15 Interview o f  PM Ehud Olmert, Haaret^ (29 November 2008). Available at 
http://www.baaretz.com /hasen/spagesZ929439.html (last visited 15 December 2008).
16 A  Secure Europe in a Better World\ European Security Strategy Document, 12 December 2003, Brussels, p. 8. 
This dissertation uses the generic term European Union and does not enter into the complexities o f the 
attribution o f  competences in external relations between the different pillars o f the European Union and 
the multiplicity o f  institutional actors and agencies. A  reference to the European Community or to a 
specific EU institutions or agencies is made only in obvious cases when, for instance, this dissertation is 
referring to the period before the creation o f  the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
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State-building, i.e. building the structure and institutions for a future Palestinian 
State in order to prepare the ground if the negotiation process proves to be 
successful and maintaining an institutional structure that is able to pursue a form 
o f “dialogue” with Israel.
Creating the conditions for the socio-economic developments in the Palestinian 
Territories in order to reduce violence and maintain peace on the ground if the 
negotiation process attains its objective.
Applying its own model of peace-building by creating space for dialogue, 
common projects and instruments o f cooperation between the parties to the 
conflict and in the region in general.
The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the impact o f the implementation 
of the EU policy towards Israel and the Palestinians in light o f standards o f participative 
responsibility taken from public international law, i.e. to analyse whether the European 
Union helps to foster or decrease the perpetuation o f violations o f internadonal law 
which derive from the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories.
2. A Research Journey.
The initial aim of this dissertation was to investigate whether the European Union was 
breaching international law in its relations with Israel and the Palestinians. In this respect, 
initially, three parallel research projects were conducted. I was looking at, first of all, the 
involvement of the European Union in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
second, the prescriptions of international law in relation to the obligations o f third parties 
to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and third to the European Union’s human rights policy. 
My methodology was mostly library-based. I came across primary and secondary
16
literature on State responsibility, European external relations and EU external human 
rights policy. From October 2004 until September 2006, I conducted several short 
periods of fieldwork in Brussels where I met regularly with Kirsten Sorensen, the Middle- 
East policy officer o f APRODEV, the association o f Protestant, Orthodox and Anglican 
European development and humanitarian agencies and Charles Shamas and Susan 
Rockwell o f the Mattin group which have undertaken together law-based advocacy work 
directed at the institutions of European Union on the question o f human rights and 
international law violations deriving from the Israeli-Palestinian issue. I am extremely 
grateful to them to have allowed me to attend several meetings with EU officials and 
members o f the European Parliament. Furthermore, I conducted two periods of 
fieldwork in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and in Israel (june-July 2006 and June- 
September 2007). During those stays in the Middle-East and in Brussels I met with and 
interviewed members o f Israeli, Palestinian and European NGOs, members of the PLO 
Negotiation Support Unit, EU officials (civil servants and MEPs) and UN and World 
Bank civil servants which I contacted directly without having met them previously or 
who I met before during conferences or other public meetings. For the purpose of this 
study, the semi-structured interview was the method chosen. Questions were prepared in 
advance but as the interview progressed, other relevant questions were inserted into the 
flow of the discussion.17 The interviews I conducted with several o f them allowed me to 
obtain information and analysis which were not in the public domain and helped me 
refining my arguments.
However, during the course o f this research, it became more and more evident that the 
framework offered by international law on obligations o f States vis-a-vis violations of 
international law that do not directly injure them and which are detailed by the
17 A list o f  the 23 people interviewed can be found at p. 304-5 o f this dissertation.
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International Law Commission (ILC) in its Articles on State Responsibility, was too 
limited to explain how the EU “engaged” with die violations o f international law which 
result from the occupation o f the Palestinian Occupied Territories. This was not because 
the European Union is not a State and does not have a legal personality and therefore 
one can question whether the EU has to comply with the prescriptions o f international 
law for States vis-a-vis violations o f international law that do not directly injure them.18 It 
was principally because the framework offered by the ILC does not take into account the 
variety of positive and negative acts by a third party which can influence positively or 
negatively the perpetuation and consolidation of violations o f international law. 
Therefore, it became evident that it was necessary to rethink the approach o f the role of 
“third parties”, i.e. “those defined as outside a bilateral relationship whether formally 
created or occurring through events”19 outside of the framework offered by the 
International Law Commission. In this respect, this dissertation looked into international
18 Because this dissertation is no longer concerned with the issue whether the European Union is breaching 
international law in its relations with Israel and the Palestinians, it is not entering the academic debate on 
the legal personality o f  the European Union or the international responsibility o f  international 
organisations. On the responsibility o f  international organizations, see C. Amerasinghe, Principles of 
Institutional I m w  of International Organisations, (Cambridge, New York 1996); M. Hirsch, The Responsibility of 
International Organisations Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles, (Dordrecht, London 1995); P. Klein and 
P. Sands (eds.), Bowett's law of International Institutions (London 2001) and I. Scobbie, International 
Organizations and International Relations, In R.-J, Dupuy (ed.), A  Handbook of International Organisations, 2d 
ed., (The Hague 1998), pp. 886-896. See also the reports o f Giorgio Gaja on the responsibility o f  
international organisations for the International Law Commission from 2002 to 2007. Available at 
http://untreatv.un.org/ilc (last visited 15 December 2008). On the possession or absence o f  legal 
personality by the European Union see P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union. Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations, (New York 2004). p. 154-160; J. Klabbers, Presumptive Personality: the 
European Union and International Law, In M. Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European 
Union, (The Hague 1998), pp. 231-253; V. Lowe, Can the European Community Bind the Member States 
on Questions o f  Customary International Law?, In M. Koskenniemi (ed.), International I . m w  Aspects of the 
European Union, (The Plague 1998), pp. 149-168; P. Palchetti, Reactions by the European Union to 
Breaches o f Erga Omnes Obligations, In E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International 
Relations, (The Hague 2002), pp. 219-230; S. Talmon, Responsibility o f International Organizations: Does 
the European Community Require Special Treatment?, In M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today, 
Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter, (Leiden 2005), pp. 405-421; T. Tilikainen, D oes Europe Need a 
Common Identity?, In M. Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European Union, (The Hague 
1998), pp. 19-25; C. Tomuschat, The International Responsibility o f the European Union In E. Cannizzaro 
(ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, (The Hague 2002), pp. 177-191; R. Wessel, 
"Revisiting the International Legal Status o f the EU" (2000) 5 EFA Rev. 507-537 and B. White, 
Understanding European Union Foreign Policy, (New York 2001), pp.22-23. It is important to note that the 
Treaty o f  Lisbon expressly abolishes the pillar structure and confers legal personality to the European 
Union. See article 47 o f the Treaty o f Lisbon: “The Union shall have legal personality”.
19 Dictionnaire de la Terminologie du Droit International, (Paris 1960), p. 603. Cited in C. Chinkin, Third Parties in 
International Law, (Oxford 1993), p. 7.
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jurisprudence and concepts of international law in order to detail several situations o f 
participative responsibility, i.e., when an international actor participates in the commission of 
a violation o f international law by another international actor or helps to maintain an 
illegal situation created by another international actor. It does so outside o f any formal 
legal framework by analysing how situations emerge from the international scene and by 
being guided by several concepts of international law, especially the notion o f 
acquiescence. Such an approach helped to shed light on the commitments undertaken by 
the European Union in the formulation of its human rights policy.
Therefore, this dissertation researches the influence of die European Union in the 
implementation o f its policy and engagement with Israel and the Palestinians in the 
context of the occupation o f the Palestinian Occupied Territories against standards of 
participative responsibility. In furtherance o f this aim, it charts the entire policy o f the EU in 
relation to Israel and the Palestinians in all its aspects, identifies cases where violations o f 
international law interfere in the implementation o f its relations and also the possible 
leverage the EU can exercise on the parties. The research conducted for this PhD 
dissertation stops in November 2008. Any event regarding the EU ’s involvement in the 
Middle-East Peace Process or the relationships between the EU and Israel and the EU 
and the Palestinians occurring afterwards is not taken into account.
3. Chapter Outline.
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters.
In  its first chapter, this dissertation gives an account o f the advocacy work undertaken by 
some Palestinian N G O s in the 1980s and 1990s, especially the reading o f Article 1 of the
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1949 Four Geneva Conventions provided by these organisations which was the central 
point of their arguments. Further, it analyses the scope and the content of this article in 
relation to contemporary academic literature and State practice. It concludes that the 
obligation set out in Article 1 o f the Geneva Conventions can be better understood if 
looked at in relation to the legal regime o f States responsibility for violations of 
international law that do not directly injure them.
The second chapter provides an in-depth analysis o f the three obligations set out in 
Article 41 o f the ILC Articles on State Responsibility which embody the idea of a 
differentiated responsibility for the breach o f violations of certain obligations of 
international law which deserve more protection than others. Article 41 establishes that 
States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means to any serious breach of 
an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of international law. It also states that no 
State shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach o f an obligation 
arising under a peremptory norm of international law, nor render aid and assistance in 
maintaining such a situation.
The third chapter analyses emerging customary obligations, case-law and concepts of 
international law in order to demonstrate that there exists a wide range o f attitudes, 
actions and inactions of an international actor that can contribute to the commission or 
the perpetuation o f violations o f international law committed by another international 
actor. In this respect, the third chapter analyses the possible implementation o f the duty 
o f due diligence extra-territorially. It researches whether the Soering case offers any 
principle in international law not to provoke the commission of a violation o f 
international law. It raises the case of Dutchbat at Srebrenica and questions whether any
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principle of international law can be inferred from this case. Finally it researches the 
content o f the duty not to encourage and the notion of acquiescence in international law.
The fourth chapter enquires into the European Union’s commitment to uphold rules of 
international law, human rights and humanitarian law in the conduct o f its foreign 
relations. It gives an account of the implementation of this objective in relation to its 
involvement with Israel and the Palestinians. As such, it details the declaratory policy of 
the European Union on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and investigates the content of the 
human rights clause contained in the EU-Israel Association Agreement and EC-PLO 
Interim Association Agreement.
The fifth chapter gives a broad account of the EU’s involvement towards Israel and the 
Palestinians through a summary or compilation o f the academic literature on the topic. It 
explains the political reasons for the limited diplomatic involvement o f the EU as a third 
party. Second, it offers a summary o f the EU’s diplomatic actions in relation to the 
Middle-East Peace Process. Thirdly, it recounts the EU’s strategy deployed towards both 
parties through their inclusion in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. It finally gives an account o f the recommendations and criticisms 
formulated in the current literature on the EU policy on the Middle-East.
The main operational links between the EU and the Palestinians are the EU-PLO 
Interim Association Agreement, the humanitarian aid provided to the Palestinian 
population and the EU State-building policy. The sixth chapter analyses how violations 
o f international law which derive from the Israeli occupation o f the Palestinian 
Territories disrupt the implementation of these instruments and policies, how the EU 
reacts to these interferences in the three aspects of its policy directed towards the
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Palestinians and whether the EU ’s attitude towards these interferences helps or hinders 
the perpetuation o f these violations of international law.
Although the relationships between Israel and the EU have been very heated, the 
cooperation between them has progressively expanded at the demand of Israel 
principally. Chapter seven demonstrates that it is impossible to detach the status of Israel 
as a trading entity and a scientific partner from its status as an Occupying Power in the 
context o f this relationship. Violations o f international law, notably the settlement policy, 
have constrained EU economic and commercial relations with Israel. This chapter details 
the case o f the export of products coming from the settlements under preferential 
treatment in accordance with the EU-Israel Association Agreement in light o f the duty of 
non-recognition.
Chapter eight reiterates the findings o f each chapter and advocates for an engagement of 
the European Union based on international law, humanitarian law and human rights in 
its relations with Israel and the Palestinians.
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Chapter One
The U se o f the Political Logic and Protective Potential of the Law:
Recall and Analysis o f the Advocacy Work of Palestinian Organizations in
Addressing Third Parties.
During a conversation I took part in, in July 2006, the same day of the visit to Ramallah 
o f Condoleeza Rice, the US Secretary o f States, Sha’wan Jabarin, the general secretary of 
A1 Haq commented: “There is no such thing as the Road Map, the only Road Map to 
peace is respect for international law”. Jabarin’s assertion reflected a common and 
widespread belief on the Palestinian side that international law supports the interests of 
the Palestinian people.1 This belief is fuelled by a sense of morality and the profound 
conviction o f legal and moral wrongdoing on Israel’s part.2 It is reinforced by the fact 
that the entire international community acknowledges that Palestinians in the West Bank, 
Gaza and Jerusalem are under occupation and therefore, that the law applicable is 
international humanitarian law whose aim is to regulate the conduct o f war and limit 
human suffering.
The creation o f a Palestinian legal narrative dates from the 1970s and was developed by 
Palestinian human rights organisations, A1 Haq being one o f the first of these. The 
Palestinian legal narrative is, in the words o f Raja Shehadeh, one of the founders of A1 
Haq, “the story of the Palestinian people’s right to a land, using the symbolic language of 
the law”. Human rights organizations developed a common language to evaluate and 
describe Israeli actions and other developments which took place in the territories and
1 O. Dajani, At the Shadow’s Edge, Sir Joseph Hotting Seminars on Haw Human Rights and Peace Building in the 
Middle-East, (School o f Oriental and African Studies, London 2005).
2 R. Falk and B. Weston, The Relevance o f  International Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in the West 
Bank and Gaza, In E. Playfair (ed.), International Haw and the Administration of Occupied Territories, (Oxford 
1992), pp. 125-149, p. 126.
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this was shared by other organisations both inside and outside Palestine. It was also 
shared with progressive Israelis.3 This legal narrative is rooted in international human 
rights law and humanitarian law. It combines the rhetorical aspect o f international law 
with its protective components and emphasises Israel’s lawless conduct in the Occupied 
Territories. By developing this legal narrative, Palestinian human rights organisations 
have provided a new framework for the discourse on the Israeli Palestinian issue and for 
the nationalistic agenda o f the Palestinian people which was an alternative to official 
politics.4
Increasingly, their efforts to demonstrate the absence of effective protection of the 
Palestinian population from human rights abuses was accompanied by a call to the 
international community to ensure respect for the provisions o f the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. As such, Palestinian N G O s used international law as a strategic way to 
internationalize the conflict by urging the involvement of the international community. 
By grounding their argument on Article 1 o f the Geneva Conventions which urges High 
Contracting Parties to ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances, they 
instigated a renaissance of this provision of international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
entered into pioneering advocacy work directed at third parties to the Israeli-Pale stinian 
issue.5 This latter work was conducted first by the Enforcement Project which was 
hosted by A1 Haq until 1993 and then by the Centre for International Human Rights 
Enforcement (CIHRE).
3 R. Shehadeh, The Weight o f Legal History: Constraints and Hopes in the Search for a Sovereign Legal 
Language, In E. Cotran and C. Mallat (eds.), The Arab-Israeli Accords: l^egal Perspectives, (London 1996), pp. 3-
20, p. 18.
A Ibid. at p. 26.
5 Common Article 1 o f  the Geneva Convention reiterated in the 1977 Protocols: “The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”.
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The present chapter aims to introduce these efforts. First of all, it gives a brief historical 
account o f A1 Haq’s Enforcement Project and CIHRE. Secondly, it presents the 
arguments on which their advocacy work was grounded. Thirdly, it offers an analysis of 
the extent o f the duty to ensure respect by taking into account recent jurisprudential 
developments and academic writings on the topic.
1* The Enforcement Project and CIHRE: Addressing Third Parties 
and Recalling Their Legal Obligations.
In 1985, at the initiative o f Charles Shamas, the Enforcement Project (EP) began its 
existence inside the human rights organisation A1 Haq. The ambit o f its work was to 
develop legal arguments defining third parties’ obligations to intervene in order to ensure 
the implementation o f international humanitarian law in the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories and to remind them of these obligations. Its creation was the result of the 
assessment of the general lawlessness in the Palestinian Occupied Territories whose 
investigation had been conducted by the organisation A1 Haq. Third party intervention 
was urgently needed to ensure the protection o f the Palestinian population as this was 
not being provided by the Occupying Power itself as it should have done in accordance 
with the provisions o f international humanitarian law. The EP was, in essence, a 
continuation and an extension of the initial work conducted by A1 Haq. Its work was 
avant-garde-, it consisted o f an attempt to depoliticise the Palestinian nationalistic discourse 
by utilising and reviving prescriptions o f international humanitarian law.
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1.1. The Enforcement Project: A Natural Prolongation in A1 H aq’s 
Work.
A1 Haq was founded in 1979 by three men: Jonathan Kuttab, Charles Shamas and Raja 
Shehadeh. Its name means law, right or truth in Arabic. It is also called “Law in the 
Service o f the Man”. A1 Haq’s first main objective was to undertake systematic 
investigation of the system o f government in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in the 
1980s. A1 Haq’s raison d’etre was a response to the ongoing occupation on the ground 
where respect for the rule o f law was absent. The normative system in force was very 
opaque and the incoherence of its operation created the fertile ground within which 
many human rights abuses took place. However, the Israeli occupation o f Jerusalem, the 
West Bank and Gaza enjoyed internationally the widespread image o f being a benign 
occupation,6 There was, thus, a real need to detail the legal picture o f the Israeli 
occupation and to combat this preconceived idea. Raja Shehadeh and Jonathan Kuttab 
set out and laid the foundation for this development. In 1980, they published The West 
Bank and the Rule of Law: A. Study7 which was the first attempt to describe the arbitrary 
legal environment within which the Palestinian Occupied Territories were governed at 
the time. This book was followed by a defensive report by the Israeli branch of the 
International Commission of Jurists which set out to demonstrate how the rule o f law 
had never been better served and implemented than by affording the rights and remedies 
Israel had made available to the residents o f the territories it administered8 As a rebuttal to 
this second report, Raja Shehadeh wrote Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Banff which 
focuses on the incompatibility of Israel’s rule on the West Bank and Gaza with standards
6 F. A'zzam, A1 Haq in 2004: A Twenty Five Year Retrospective, In A l  Haq, 25 Years Defending Human 
Rights, Waiting For Justice, (2004), p. 4.
7 J. Kuttab and R. Shehadeh, The West Bank and the Rule o f Law: A Study, (Geneva 1980).
8 The Rule o f  Law in the Areas Administered by Israel (Israel National Section o f  the International 
Commission o f Jurists), (Tel Aviv 1981).
9 R. Shehadeh, Occupieds Haw: Israel and the West Bank, (Washington 1988).
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and principles o f international law. Occupier’s Law demonstrates how law is used as an 
instrument by the Occupying Power to serve an agenda of annexation.
After having focused on the description o f the Israeli occupation, A1 Haq engaged in 
activities aimed at challenging the illegal practices pursued in this occupation. The 
organisation listed and denounced the violations of human rights and humanitarian law 
in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Before the creation o f A1 Haq, violations o f the 
human rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories had only been raised 
sporadically inside UN forums. A1 Haq was the first independent organisation to present 
international organisations, governments, international NG Os with thorough 
documentation o f the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law on 
the ground.10 Another objective o f A1 Haq was to create and spread an awareness based 
on the rule of law in Palestine, and this in the expectation of the creation o f a Palestinian 
State after negotiations with Israel. In furtherance o f that aim, it provided free legal 
advice to Palestinian victims o f abuses by the Israeli army, including helping those 
victims o f abuse to take their case before Israeli courts.11
Nevertheless, no effective legal redress was available for Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories. This resulted from the plethora o f contradictory bodies of legislation which 
were applicable in the Occupied Territories, the disregard o f the doctrine o f precedent by 
the military courts, the inevitable strong ties between the prosecution and the judges and 
finally the refusal to take into account the Fourth Geneva Convention by the same 
courts.12 As put by George Bisharat, the legal system as a whole came to be viewed as an
10 Interview with Raja Shehadeh, Palestinian lawyer and writer, Glasgow, May 2006.
11 Ibid.
12 L. Hajjar, “Human Rights in Israel/Palestine: The History and Polidcs o f a Movement” (2001) 30 
Journal o f  Palestinian Studies 21-38, p. 24 and M. Rabbani, “Palestinian Human Rights Activism under 
Israeli Occupation: The Case o f A1 Haq” (1994) 16 Arabic Studies Quarterly 27-54, p. 30.
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important bystander to, or worse, as an active participant in the execution of Israel’s 
design in the region.13
The Enforcement Project came about as a result o f the assessment described above. It 
took the view that if local remedies are ineffective, any protection for the population 
must come from outside. Enforcement is the third stage in the sequence of A1 Haq’s 
work, which follows the documentation o f violations and the definition o f the 
responsibility o f the stakeholders in those violations. The Enforcement Project called for 
a redirection o f A1 Haq’s efforts towards researching the ways to ensure that pressure for 
the observance o f the rule of law could be exerted by actors located outside the 
Occupied Territories.14 The aim of this project was to develop legal arguments for 
international protection on the basis o f third parties’ legal obligations. In this respect, the 
enforcement team identified obligations for third states and explored the ways and means 
available for powerful third parties to discharge these obligations in order to ensure in an 
indirect way that the humanitarian protection o f the Palestinian people was provided.15
1.2. Overview o f the Activities o f the Enforcement Project and CIHRE.
The main objective o f the EP and CIHRE was to create among European political and 
academic circles a consensus on the doctrine o f third States’ responsibility. In 
furtherance o f that aim, they organised seminars and conferences which focused on third 
States’ obligations to uphold the enforcement o f humanitarian law. These were held in 
London (1989), Dublin (1990), The Hague (1991), London (1992) and Jerusalem (1994), 
when a conference co-organised with Pax Christ! International was convened entitled
13 G. Bisharat, Palestinian Lawyers and Israeli Rules: I^atv and Disorder in the West Bank, (Austin 1989), p. 21.
H M. Rabbani, note 12 above, p. 36,
15 L. Welchman, The Enforcement Project, In A l  Haq, Celebrating Twenty Years of Human Rights Activism, A l  
Haq Annual Report, (1999), p. 19.
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“International Human Rights Enforcement: The Case of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories in the Transitional Period”.16 The EP and CIHRE involved academics in their 
work and engaged with parliamentarians to spread knowledge o f international 
humanitarian law in European political circles. They also worked in collaboration with 
other European organisations on the drafting of parliamentary questions and 
amendments to European legislative instruments related to the conduct o f international 
relations o f the European Union. Notably, the advocacy efforts o f CIHRE led to the 
inclusion of a reference to the obligations o f the High Contracting Parties to ensure 
respect for humanitarian law in the declaration of the European Council in Dublin in 
1990.17 In addition, the EP and CIHRE attempted to popularise humanitarian law among 
members o f the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). However, as stated by Shamas, 
the PLO culture proved to be a big obstacle to this endeavour.18 The main reason for the 
PLO’s disinclination to utilise the processes o f international humanitarian law was its 
reluctance to draw a clear legal distinction between the lands controlled by Israel before 
and after June 1967.19
CIHRE’s activities culminated with the advocacy work it conducted at the time of the 
ratification o f the EU-Israel Association Agreement in the national parliaments o f the 
member States o f the European Union. This aspect of CIHRE’s work will be described 
in more detail in the fourth chapter o f this dissertation.
16 International Human Rights Enforcement. The Case for the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the 
Transitional Period, International Human Rights Enforcement. The Case for the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the 
Transitional Period, 0erusalem 1996).
17 Conversation with Pr Lynn Welchman (School o f Oriental and African Studies, University o f  London), 
Ramallah, July 2006. Declaration o f  the European Council on the Middle East in Dublin, 25-26 June 1990, 
Annex V, p. 29-30.
18 Interview with Charles Shamas, senior partner o f the Mattin Group, Ramallah, July 2006. On the failure 
o f the PLO to adopt a legal strategy during the negotiations. See R. Shehadeh, note 3 above, p. 7-10.
19 C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights, (Oxford 2003), p. 75.
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CIHRE stopped its activities in 1997. Since then, its work has been continued by the 
Mattin Group which undertakes with the collaboration of several European NG O s such 
as the Euromed Network on Human Rights and APRODEV, an advocacy project which 
directs its actions to the European Union’s institutions.
1.3 Using- the Language of Law to Get the Debate on the Israeli-1 —    ' '   i. i ........... . i   —. ..—.I... 
Palestinian Issue Out o f Politics.
Welchman stated, in describing the Enforcement Project, that one o f its strategies was 
‘'making the law and complex legal arguments meaningful to politicians, without 
engaging [...] in politics”.20 Indeed, one aspect of the novelty o f the work o f the EP and 
CIHRE is the use of a legal discourse in addressing third States. The advocacy work 
conducted by the EP and CIHRE endeavoured to move the focus o f the debate on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict out o f politics and to give it brand new clothes. This strategy 
presents several interesting elements that can be analysed retrospectively. First o f all, the 
call for respect o f international law by the EP and then CIHRE can be seen as a tool to 
create a consensus among the various political actors they addressed because 
international law enjoys universality as a body of law that everyone had agreed to. The 
claim that international law is a universal system has experienced heavy criticism.21 
Nevertheless, the universal image conveyed by international law is crucial for the 
defenders o f the rights of an oppressed people. It is a way to address their case 
worldwide in a language which is assumed to be understood by everyone and which is 
associated with the idea o f tights and protection.22
20 See L. Welchman, note 15 above, p. 20.
21 See for instance M. Koskenniemi, “International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal” 
(2005) 16 European Journal o f  International Law 113-124, p. 113.
22 J. Beckett, “Rebels Without a Cause: Martti Koskenniemi and the Critical Legal Approach” (2007) 7 
German Law Journal 1045-1088, p. 1086.
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Furthermore, international law offers accurate tools to evaluate and assess the 
responsibilities of international actors. International law, unlike politics, carries an image 
o f objectivity because law is associated with a method which encompasses scientific 
principles, and science draws on what is —once again- universal, not 011 what is 
particular.23
Nonetheless, juridification is always an imperfect depolitisation.24 Behind any legal 
arguments stand the intentions o f their authors and it is crucial to identify their 
disposition in order to estimate the weight to be given to an argument.25 The role of the 
Enforcement Project and then o f CIHRE has been to expose methodologically the 
historical developments o f humanitarian law and to establish that States have an 
obligation to use any means at their disposal to ensure that international humanitarian 
law is respected. As do all parties using and speaking the language o f international law, 
\h.e.y played with its indeterminacy to build a chain o f legal arguments in which their claims 
equated with the prescriptions of international law.26 This process maps the inevitable 
fate of anyone using the language o f international law: what matters is the persuasiveness 
of their legal demonstration.
23 M. Koskenniemi, “Letters to the Editor” (1993) 93 American Journal o f  International Law 351-361, p. 
353.
24 S. Sur, Id interpretation en droit international public, (Paris 1974), p. 51.
25 I. Scobbie, Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law, In M. Evans 
(ed,), International Law, (Oxford 2006), pp. 83-114, p. 90.
26 por indeterminacy the dissertation means “the claim that law can produce diametrically opposed answers 
to any question o f  legality”, see J. Beckett, note 22 above, pp. 1051-1052.
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2. Third States are Under a Duty to Uphold International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations.
The Enforcement Project was born at the time of the first Intifada (1987-1990). The 
uprising of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories after 20 years of 
occupation was followed by a repression of the Israeli government at the time. The 
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin announced a policy of “might, force and beatings” to 
repress the revolt which gave rise to systematic brutal behaviour towards the Palestinian 
civilian population by Israeli soldiers.27 Furthermore, the Israeli army regularly had 
recourse to collective punishments. Repression over organisational activities and 
Palestinian infrastructures, notably, the closure o f educational establishments was a 
constant pattern.28
According to Palestinian human rights NGOs, law had to be respected in order to get 
out of this situation. It was thus urgent to obtain the enforcement o f the protection 
provided by international humanitarian law and especially the 1949 Fourth Geneva 
Convention on the Protection o f the Civilian Population, to which the Palestinians were 
entitled. Third parties were thus seen as the only recourse for Palestinian organisations 
which wished to ensure the enforcement o f humanitarian law.
2.1 The Urgent N eed  for Third Party Intervention.
The applicability o f the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories has been a consensus among the international community. For instance, it has
27 L. Benedikt, Yitzhak Babin: The Battle for Peace, (London 2005), p. 120.
28 Punishing a Nation. Human Rights Violations during the Palestinian Uprising (Al Haq report), (Dec 
1987-Dec 1988).
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been recalled several times by several UN Security Council resolutions29 and UN General 
Assembly resolutions.30 The International Committee o f the Red Cross naturally has 
followed the same trend.31 During the first Intifada, the declarations and resolutions of 
international institutions and especially the UN emphasised the applicability o f 
humanitarian law in the Occupied Territories. For instance, in 1988, at the height o f 
violence in the Occupied Territories, the Security Council adopted resolution 605 which 
called Israel to “abide immediately and scrupulously” with the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and asked the Secretary General o f the UN, then Javier Perez de Cuellar to 
report to it “the need to consider measures for impartial protection of the Palestinian 
civilian population under Israeli occupation...” . The Secretary General issued his report 
on the 21st o f January 1988 and stated that the most effective method o f protection 
“would be for Israel to apply in full the provisions o f the Fourth Geneva Convention”.32
Nonetheless, this general consensus was not followed by the most concerned actor, 
Israel, the Occupying Power. More specifically, the official view o f the Israeli 
government was —and still is- to agree on the de facto but not de jure applicability of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention only 
applies to territories which were placed under the authority of a sovereign prior to their 
occupation. The Palestinian Occupied Territories are considered by Israel to be 
“administered territories” and not “occupied territories”. Israel has always stated its
29 See for instance UNSC resolution 237 o f  14 June 1967 “recommending to the governments concerned 
the scrupulous respect o f  the humanitarian principles governing die treatment o f  prisoners o f  war and the 
protection o f  civilian persons in time o f  war contained in the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949” or 
UNSC resolution 446 o f  22 March 1979 calling “once more upon Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide 
scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention”.
30 Among the numerous UNG A resolutions calling for the enforcement o f the Fourth Geneva Convention 
in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, see for instance Resolution 36/147 o f 16 December 1981 and 
Resolution 43/21 o f  8 November 1988.
31 Resolution o f  the Twenty Fourth International Conference o f  the Red Cross, Manila, 1981 cited by P.-Y. 
Fux and M. Zambelli, “Mise en oeuvre de la Quatrieme Convention de Geneve dans les territoires 
palestiniens occupes: historique d’un processus multilateral (1997-2001)” (2002) 84 International 
Committee o f  the Red Cross Review 661-695, p. 662.
32 “Report submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary General in accordance with resolution 605 
(1987)” U N  Doc. S / 19443, 21 January 1988, para. 29.
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willingness to conform to the “humanitarian provisions” o f the Fourth Geneva 
Convention although it has never specified which provisions it considered to be o f a 
humanitarian character.33 Therefore, Israel dismisses the widely-accepted argument which 
sees the primary purpose o f the Fourth Geneva Convention as the protection o f the 
civilian population and the object o f the second paragraph o f Article 2 o f the same 
Convention “not to restrict the scope o f the Convention”.34 Its view gave rise not only to 
the commission o f violations of international law on the ground but also, as stated 
above, to the absence o f any proper legal redress in the Israeli judicial system.35
In the face o f this situation, third party intervention was seen by the Al Haq and CIHRE 
as the only possible means to set a balance in the relationships between the Occupying 
Power and the occupied population and to bring the Occupying Power to an attitude of 
compliance with international law. More precisely, they advocated that third parties’ 
intervention was not only needed but dictated by international humanitarian law.
The work conducted by the Enforcement Project at the time and up to the present is 
unique in its style. Fateh Azzam36, in Al Haq’s 25 years anniversary’s report said that the 
Enforcement Project has had some impact in reinvigorating discussion and development 
o f international humanitarian law, where it contributed to and stimulated new studies and
33 Before it became the official position o f  die Israeli government, this legal statement was first formulated 
by Meir Shamgar. M. Shamgar, “The Observance o f International Law in the Administered Territories” 
(1971) Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights 262-277. See on this issue, A. Roberts, Prolonged Military 
Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories 1967-1988, In E. Playfair (ed.), International I mw and the 
Administration of Occupied Territories (Oxford 1992), pp. 25-85, pp. 44-45.
34 Article 2 o f  the Fourth Geneva Convention: “The Convention shall also apply to all cases o f  partial or 
total occupation o f  the territory o f  a High Contracting Party, even if  the said occupation meets with no 
armed resistance”. See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep. (2004), pp. 174-176 (para. 94-101). Hereinafter “Advisory Opinion on the Legality 
of the W all\
35 Tire analysis o f  the jurisprudence o f Israeli Courts in relation to violations o f  human rights and 
humanitarian law occurring in the Palestinian Territories is not the topic o f  this dissertation. For a 
thorough treatment o f the jurisprudence o f the Israeli High Court vis-a-vis the Israeli occupation o f  the 
Palestinian Territories, see D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: the Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied 
Territories, (Albany 2002).
36 F. Azzam entered Al Haq as an administrator in 1987 and resigned as director in 1995.
34
challenging interpretations.37 The original aspect o f it at first consisted in the renaissance of 
international humanitarian law by highlighting the obligations of third States in this field.
These aspects were principally expressed in two publications edited by Marc Stephens38 
and Lynn Welchman39 and during interventions before European politicians and at 
conferences.
2.2 Article 1 o f the Fourth Geneva Convention: The Keystone o f the
Arguments o f the Enforcement Project a n d  CIHRE.
CIHRE and Al Haq stressed that the laws o f war specifically recognise and detail the role 
o f third States in protecting the civilian population against the violations of the 
Occupying Power. First o f all, these obligations are to be met in the institution of the 
Protecting Power40 and the obligation for the High Contracting Parties to repress any 
grave breaches o f the Conventions and Additional Protocols.41 Secondly, the Geneva 
conventions contain a more general obligation, Article 1, which obliges the High 
Contracting Parties to ensure respect for the Fourth Geneva Convention. CIHRE and Al 
Haq emphasised that Article 1 is not a redundant statement of the former institution and 
obligation (Protecting Power and obligation to repress) but imposes a specific duty on 
third States to exhaust all the means at their disposal to ensure that the Occupying Power 
complies with its obligations.
37 See F. Azzam, note 6 above, p. 17.
38 M. Stephens, Enforcement o f  International Law in the Israeli Occupied Territories (Al Haq), (1989).
39 L. Welchman, The Role o f the International Community In Annual Report on Human Rights in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, A  Nation Under Siege, (1989), pp. 643-667.
40 Articles 9 ,11 , 55, 143 o f  the Fourth Geneva Convention. On the institution o f  the Protecting Power, see
H. Coulibaly, Le role des Puissances Protectrices au regard du droit diplomatique, du droit de Geneve et du 
droit de La Haye, In F. Kalshoven (ed.), Implementation of International Humanitarian Lam, (Dordrecht, 
London 1989), pp. 69-78. and F. Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War, (Geneva 1987), pp. 62-63 and 
127-128.
41 Articles 146 and 147 o f  the Fourth Geneva Convention.
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Article 1 o f the Fourth Geneva Convention was the cornerstone of the advocacy work of 
Palestinian N G O s.42 As “interested parties”, in the words o f Kalshoven,43 Palestinian 
NG Os offered an extensive interpretation of the obligation “to ensure respect o f the 
Convention in all circumstances” (emphasis added). In this respect, they were inspired by 
Sean MacBnde, one o f the founders o f Amnesty International and Nobel Peace Prize 
Winner (1974). 44 At the time he was the Secretary General o f the International 
Commission o f Jurists, Macbride chaired die Tehran Conference on Human Rights in 
1968. He was a supporter o f an interpretation of Article 1 which provides positive 
obligations on third States to ensure that States involved in armed conflicts respect 
international humanitarian law. He introduced his ideas at the Tehran Conference where 
the participants to the conference adopted unanimously resolution XXIII which states 
that governments and the UN “must ensure, that [the Geneva Conventions] are known 
to all and respected in all circumstances”.43
Although the last section o f this chapter provides a detailed analysis o f the content o f 
Article 1, the present section provides a brief summary of the interpretation o f Article 1 
by Al Haq and CIHRE in the 1980s and 1990s.
Al Haq and CIHRE’s reading o f Article 1 departed from the traditional one from the 
travaux preparatoires o f the Geneva Conventions. According to the travaux, the obligation 
“to ensure respect” entails an obligation for a State signatory of the Geneva Conventions
42 See L. Welchman, note 15 above, p. 19.
43 F. Kalshoven, “The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seeds 
to Ripening Fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook o f  International and Humanitarian Law 3-61, p. 6.
44 Interview with Charles Shamas, Ramallah, July 2006.
45 Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Resolution XXIII adopted by the International Conference on 
Human Rights, Tehran, 12 May 1968.
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to make sure that not only its organs, officials and armed forces respect the Conventions 
but also its whole population.46
Furthermore, Al Haq and CIHRE offered a more extensive reading than the one 
provided by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case which saw in Article 1 a negative obligation. 
According to the ICJ, the United States, the respondent in this case, was under the 
obligation “not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to 
act in violation of the provisions o f Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva 
Convention”.47 For Al Haq and CIHRE, Article 1 not only entails an obligation not to 
encourage but also imposes a positive duty for third States to ensure that the parties to a 
conflict respect humanitarian law obligations.48 As such, they are under a duty to 
intervene in order to prevent or react to violations of humanitarian international law. 
This view was supported at the time by Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli.49
This reading o f Article 1 was also supported by the ICRC whose interpretation evolved 
throughout the years. In its 1952, 1956 and 1958 commentaries on Convention I, IV and 
III respectively, it referred to the fact that other Contracting Parties “may and should” or 
just “should”, “endeavour to bring [the Power failing to fulfil its obligation] back to an
4G Final Record o f the Diplomatic Conference o f Geneva o f  1949. Cited in F. Kalshoven, note 43 above, p. 
28.
47 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua p. United States of America), ICJ Reports 
(1986), p. 114 (para. 220).
48 M. Stephens note 38 above; L. Welchman note 39 above. See also F. Azzam, “The Duty o f  Third States 
to Implement and Enforce International and Humanitarian Law” (1997) Nordic Journal o f International 
Law 55-75.
49 L. Boisson de Chazournes and L. Condorelli, Quelques remarques a propos de l’obligation des Etats de 
‘respecter et de faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’, In C. Swinarsld 
(ed.), Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanita 'm et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en I'bonneur de Jean 
Pictet, (Geneva 1984), pp. 17-35, pp. 26-35;
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attitude o f respect for the Convention”. In 1985 it went one step further and referred to 
a “duty” in the Commentaries o f the 1977 Protocols.50
Elements o f State practice also supported the assertion that Article 1 encompasses more 
than a moral principle. Azzam, Condorelli, Boisson and Stephens cite, among other 
examples, the solemn diplomatic declaration in 1968 at the Tehran Conference on 
Human Rights mentioned above and they acknowledge that the reiteration o f the same 
article in the 1977 Protocol acts as a confirmation of the determination o f the High 
Contracting Parties to ensure the enforcement o f the rules of international humanitarian 
law.51 Examples drawn from the early 1990s confirm this position. For instance, 
resolution 681 o f the UN Security Council o f 20 December 1990 included a direct call to 
the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure Israel’s respect 
for the Convention in accordance with Article 1 after Israel deported four Palestinians 
from the Occupied Territories in contravention o f its obligations under international 
humanitarian law. The Dublin Declaration o f the EU member States in June 1990, which 
reiterated the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention to ensure 
respect while referring to the situation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, is also a 
relevant example.52
50 See F. Kalshoven, note 43 above, p. 52. Nonetheless, according to Kalshoven, there is nothing in the 
records o f the drafting o f  the Conference that supports this assertion, Ibid. p. 54
51 F. Azzam, note 48 above, p. 58; L. Boisson de Chazournes and L. Condorelli, note 49 above, p. 26 and 
M. Stephens, note 38 above, p. 9.
52 Declaration o f  the European Council on the Middle-East in Dublin, 26-27 June 1990, cited by L. 
Welchman, International Protection and International Diplomacy: Policy Choices for Third-Party States in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, International Human Rights Tinforcement. The Case of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories in the Transitional Period, (Jerusalem 1994), pp. 225-277, p. 244.
38
Furthermore, according to Al Haq and CIHRE —still supported by Boisson de 
Chazournes and Condorelli-, this interpretation of Article 1 is in accordance with the 
object and purpose o f the Convention. As put by Stephens:
“It is submitted that a reading o f article 1 which excluded inter-states 
obligation and enabled Israel to avoid the provisions o f the Fourth 
Geneva Convention simply by denying its applicability would be to 
deny its main object as described in the title o f the Convention itself, 
namely the protection of civilians in time of war”.53
This argument is corroborated by the objective character of humanitarian protection. 
Humanitarian obligations are not synallagmatic obligations, i.e. obligations o f State vis-a- 
vis another State, but a commitment which each State takes and fulfils before the other 
High Contracting Parties. The ICRC in its commentaries qualifies the motives o f the 
Convention as an “imperative call on civilisation”.54 Therefore, Article 1 establishes a 
direct obligation for the States which are party to the Convention to respect the 
provisions of the Convention,
However, the difference between Boisson, Condorelli and the ICRC, on the one hand, 
and Al Haq and CIHRE, on the other, lies in their interpretation o f the extent of the 
obligation. Whereas the latter see Article 1 as establishing an obligation o f result, the 
former consider that it is an obligation of means. Boisson, Condorelli and the ICRC
53 M. Stephens, note 38 above, p. 18.
54 Commentaries o f the Convention (TV) relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War. 
Geneva, 12 August 1949. Available at http: / / www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRESPOpenView (last visited 
15 December 2008).
39
describe this obligation as a duty “to take all possible steps”55 to ensure that die rules o f 
international humanitarian law are respected by the parties to the conflict or as a duty to 
endeavour to bring the Occupying Power that fails to fulfil its obligations back to an 
attitude o f respect o f the Convention.56 However, for Welchman, “under Article 1, High 
Contracting Parties have not undertaken to attempt to ensure respect, but to ensure 
respect”.57 Therefore, their responsibility is not over until die Occupying Power has 
complied with its obligations under the Convention. Azzam similarly qualifies Article 1 
as an obligation o f result: “while the State has the freedom to choose the means, the 
obligation is to achieve the desired result (respect for the Conventions and Protocol)”.58 
In a similar vein, Stephens sees in Article 1 an absolute and unconditional obligation as 
opposed to a qualified and progressive obligation, because it is phrased in terms that 
require a strong reaction from the State parties when faced with a violation of the 
Convention.59
2.3. The Failure o f the H igh Contracting Parties to Fulfil their 
Obligations under International Humanitarian Law.
Having highlighted the various obligations incumbent upon third States in relation to the 
Israeli occupation o f the Palestinian Territories, the members o f the enforcement team 
outlined the non-compliance o f the same third States with these obligations.
55 L. Boisson de Chazournes and L. Condorelli, “Common Article 1 o f the Geneva Convention Revisited: 
Protecting Collective Interests” (2000) 82 International Committee o f the Red Cross Review 67-87, p. 69.
56 Commentaries o f die Convention (TV) relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War, 
Geneva, 12 August 1949. Available at http://www.icrc.orp-/ihl.nsf/CONVPRESPOpenView (last visited 
15 December 2008).
57 L. Welchman, note 39 above, p. 652.
58 F. Azzam, note 48above, p. 73.
59 M. Stephens, note 38 above, p. 22.
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2.3.1. The Non-Compliance o f Third States with Their 
Obligations under International Humanitarian Law 
During the First Intifada.
From the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the 
mechanisms of implementation internal to the Convention have remained inoperative. 
To take the example o f the Protecting Power institution, Israel, while refusing to apply 
the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Palestinian Occupied Territories, has consequently 
not appointed any Protecting Power, nor has it requested any neutral State or impartial 
international organisation to act as such/’0
Furthermore, until the end of the first Intifada, the actions o f third States were limited to 
malting public criticisms o f Israel’s actions in the Occupied Territories through 
diplomatic channels and inside UN forums. Most of the time, these attempts were 
sporadic and frustrated by the paralysis o f the UN Security Council because o f the use or 
threat o f veto by the USA.61
Therefore, for Al Haq, given the fact that the High Contracting Parties are under the 
obligation to search for any other means available under international law to make Israel 
comply with its obligations as an Occupying Power, and that they cannot absolve
60 Al Haq notes that in an unprecedented development, foreign consular officials attempted to establish a 
physical presence in locadons where human rights violations were in progress, such as during the six-week 
siege o f  Beit Sahour. Annual Report on Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, A Nation 
Under Siege (Al Haq report), A l  Haq Annual Report, (1989), p. 3. It is important to point that in 1971, the 
ICRC announced its willingness to assume the functions o f  the Protecting Power to the U N  institutions. 
However, the General Assembly did not consider its call. See T. Van Boven, “Fact Finding in the Field o f  
Human Rights” (1973) 3 Israel Yearbook o f Human Rights 93-117, p. 114.
61 For an extensive review o f the positions and actions taken by key third party States relating to 
international humanitarian law from 1987 to 1994, see L. Welchman, note 52 above.
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themselves to fulfil this obligation by invoking the complexity o f international relations, 
third States were considered to be in breach o f their obligation to ensure respect.62
2.3.2. The Non-Com pliance o f Third States with Their
Obligations under International Humanitarian Law 
at the Tim e o f the Middle-East Peace Process.
In 1991, the US convened with Russia, a Middle-East peace conference in Madrid. The 
UN and the EU, then European Community were invited as observers only. This event 
was followed by an encounter between Israel and the PLO in Oslo which agreed on the 
Declaration o f Principles (DoP). The DoP gave rise to a number of agreements signed 
between the same parties requiring inter alia Israel to transfer to the newly created 
Palestinian Authority, certain powers and responsibilities exercised by its military 
authority in the prospect of the creation o f a Palestinian State.
The beginning of the Middle-East Peace Process (MEPP) marked a brutal stop in what 
some have perceived as the beginning o f a law-based involvement in the Israeli- 
Palestinian issue by the international community. At the time, the sensitivities o f the US 
regarding Iraq’s violations o f humanitarian law in Kuwait had the effect o f increasing the 
pressure on Israel to abide by humanitarian law. This shift mostly came from the fact 
that several Arab States participated in the international coalition against Iraq. As a 
consequence o f this, when Israel announced the deportation o f four Palestinians from 
Gaza, the Security Council adopted resolution 681 (1990) underlying the responsibility of
62 L. Welchman, note 39 above, p. 652.
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the Occupying Power as well as the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions 
for ensuring the protection o f the Palestinian civilian population.63
The United States’ views on the place of international law in the M EPP prevailed. 
Although the US has always taken the position that the Fourth Geneva was applicable to 
the Palestinian Occupied Territories, it was firmly opposed to any reference to 
international humanitarian law which it considered as an impediment to the good process 
o f the negotiation.64 Third parties then concentrated their efforts in maintaining the 
negotiation process as the ultimate end rather than an aim to achieve a just peace 
between Israel and the Palestinians. Their interventions in the negotiations and on the 
ground were devoid o f any reference to international humanitarian law or human rights 
standards. Therefore third parties dismissed their obligations to ensure “international 
protection”, i.e., as defined by Welchman as “the law-based action o f third-party States in 
ensuring that the protections established in the law itself are actually implemented”.65
The discourse of the Palestinian N G O s adapted to this new context. They emphasised 
the critical connection between upholding the rules of international humanitarian law and 
human rights standards and the prospects for promoting and sustaining a peace process 
aimed at a just and durable resolution of the conflict. In line with several academic 
authors, they criticised the absence of any reference to international law in the MEPP 
and therefore questioned its long-term viability.66
63 L. Welchman, The Middle East Peace Process and the Rule o f Law: Irreconcilable Objectives?, In E. 
Cotran and M. Yamani (eds.), The Rule of Law in the Middle East and the Islamic Worlds (London 2000), pp. 51- 
65, pp. 55-56.
64 A. Abrash, Human Rights Related Policy, Policy Instruments and Roles: The United States, International 
Human Rights Enforcement. The Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the Transitional Period., (Jerusalem 
1994), pp. 105-107.
65 See Welchman, note 52 above, p. 226.
66 For a non-exhaustive literature review on this issue: C. Campbell, A Problematic Peace: International 
Humanitarian Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, In C. Campbell, Karl Schulze and M. Stokes 
(eds.), Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas; Identities and Rights in Middle-East, (London, N ew  York 1996), pp.
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When it came to the obligations o f third parties, the members of the enforcement team 
emphasised their obligations to uphold the rules of international humanitarian law and 
human rights in the Peace Process and in their involvement on the ground in order not 
only to discharge themselves o f their obligations to ensure respect for the Convention 
but also to increase die prospects for peace and reconciliation. They highlighted the fact 
that reference to international humanitarian law with respect to this theatre has been 
placed out o f bounds in the diplomacy of virtually all third States. In the words of 
Shamas, they endeavoured to challenge “the human rights collateral impacts” o f the 
international diplomacy.67
3. What is Behind the Obligation to Ensure Respect in All 
Circumstances?
As detailed in the previous section, in the 1980s and 1990s, Palestinian N G O s, supported 
by some authors and the ICRC gave a progressive and extensive reading o f common 
Article 1 o f the Four Geneva Conventions. Are their views at the time prevalent 
nowadays? The present section analyses the current debate on the nature and extent of 
the obligation to ensure respect. It then presents several arguments in favour o f 
examining the obligation to ensure respect in the light of the general regime of State 
responsibility.
39-54; R. Falk, Some International Law Implications o f the Oslo/Cairo Framework for die PLO/Israeli 
Peace Process, In S. Bowen (ed.), Human lights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, (1997), pp. 1-23; J. Quigley, The PLO-Israeli interim arrangements and the Geneva Civilians 
Convention, In S. Bowen (ed.), Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, (1997), pp. 25-46 and R. Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories, (London 1997).
67 C. Shamas, Putdng Human Rights in the Realpolitik o f  Third States: Giving a Destination to Political 
Transition, International Human Rights Enforcement. The Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the Transitional 
Period, 0erusalem 1994), pp. 160-167.
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3.1. Overview of the Academic Literature on Article 1.
It is now generally agreed that the obligation to ensure respect set out in Article 1 does 
not set a mere legal interest but a proper legal obligation. This obligation has usually been 
confined into an upper and lower limit in order to describe the minimal negative 
obligation States must respect and possible positive action they can undertake in order to 
fulfil the obligation to ensure respect.
3.1.1. A “Legal Obligation”.
Article 1 has experienced recent judicial attention. It was expressly referred to by the 
International Court o f Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the Wall. In paragraph 
159 o f the opinion, the Court recalls three obligations incumbent upon third States in 
relation to the construction o f the Wall; the obligation to cooperate to put an end to the 
violation, the obligation not to aid and assist and not to recognise the violation. It states 
that, “in addition”, all the States party to the Geneva Conventions are under an 
obligation to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as 
embodied in that Convention.68
Judge Kooijmans dissented from this paragraph of the dispositif as he was sceptical about 
the ruling. He acknowledged that he did not know if the scope given by the Court to this 
article was a correct statement of positive law. Judge Kooijmans could only envisage 
diplomatic demarches as a kind of positive action resulting from this obligation.69 He 
refers in his opinion to the writing o f Kalshoven who is one o f the few authors who 
cannot see the slightest element in States’ practice and in the travaux preparatoires of the
68 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Wall, p. 200 (para. 159).
69Advisory Opinion on the legality of the Wall, Separate Opinion o f Judge Kooijmans, pp. 233-234 (para. 50),
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1949 Convention and its 1977 Protocols in favour of an obligation directed to third 
States to a conflict. Kalshoven, however, still believes that Article 1 encompasses a moral 
incentive when it comes to its effects beyond the internal sphere that “implies that in 
weighing the admittedly many factors involved in the process o f decision making, the 
moral duty to ‘ensure respect’ for international humanitarian law carries particular weight: 
the graver the ‘situation o f apparent disregard’, the heavier the weight o f this factor”.70
Despite Judge Kooijmans’ comments and Kalshoven’s views, it is now generally accepted 
that Article 1 contains a proper legal obligation and not just a mere moral principle. To 
cite some recent practice, the existence of this obligation was stated by the High 
Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions in the Final Declaration of the 
International Conference for the Protection of War Victims in 1993:
We affirm our responsibility, in accordance with Article 1 common to the 
Geneva Conventions, to respect and ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law in order to protect the victims o f war. We urge ail States 
to make every effort to: [...] Ensure the effectiveness of international 
humanitarian law and take resolute action in accordance with the law, 
against States bearing responsibility for violations o f international 
humanitarian law with a view to terminating such violations.71
Before the ICJ ruling, the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
described Article 1 as “a legal entitlement [for each and every member o f the
70 F. Kalshoven, note 43 above, p. 60.
71 Final Declaration o f  the International Conference for the Protection o f War Victims, ICRC, September- 
October 1993. See http: /  / www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57TMVS (last visited 15 December 
2008).
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international community] to demand respect for such obligations” - i.e. humanitarian law 
obligations.72
Furthermore, at the more recent 30th Conference o f the Red Cross and the Red Crescent 
in 2007, the States participating in the Conference reaffirmed the obligation o f all States 
and parties to an armed conflict to respect and ensure respect for the provisions of 
humanitarian law.73
3.1.2. The Upper and Lower Limits o f the Obligation to 
Ensure Respect.
The studies on the scope o f Article 1 have generally classified two sets o f obligations 
defined by the duty: a negative obligation or lower obligation and a positive one or upper 
obligation. Levrat was the first author to have used this classification. He analysed the 
extent o f the obligation to ensure respect only with regard to the provisions o f the 
Geneva Conventions and found what he considered to be a very unsatisfactory result. He 
considers that Article 89 o f Additional Protocol One is the only provision which 
concerns obligations o f third States to ensure respect.74 However, according to Levrat, its 
application is limited because it only concerns grave breaches to obligations of 
humanitarian law and its implementation is subject to the respect o f the rules o f the UN 
Charter. He thus concludes that the limits the Convention sets to the enforcement of the 
obligation to ensure respect are not clear enough for determining the content of the
72 The Prosecutor v, Zoran Kuprehkic ctnd others, ICTY, Judgement, 14 January 2000, Case N o. IT-95-16-T., para. 
517. See also L. Boisson de Chazournes and L. Condorelli, note 55 above, p. 76.
73 “Reaffirmation and Implementation o f  International Humanitarian Law. Preserving Human Life and 
Dignity in Armed Conflict”. 30th International Conference o f the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, 
Geneva, 26-30 November 2007.
74 Article 89, Additional Protocol One: “In situation o f serious violations o f die Conventions or o f  its 
Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the 
United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter”.
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obligation.75 Such a conclusion seems nonetheless unduly restrictive and later ICRC 
studies and conference and academic works have helped to clarify the content 
concerning the nature of the limits to the scope of Article 1.
In 2003, the ICRC organised a series o f regional expert seminars whose topic was 
“Improving Compliance with Humanitarian Law”. The objective of the seminars was to 
focus on ways in which common Article 1 could be operationalised and how the 
potential o f Article 89 o f Additional Protocol One could be better utilised. A final report 
was submitted during the ICRC 28th Conference in December 2003 and this report 
defines the scope of Article 1. According to the findings o f the seminars, common 
Article 1 means that States must neither encourage a party to an armed conflict to violate 
international humanitarian law, nor take action that would assist it in such violation. 
Furthermore, seminar participants acknowledged a positive obligation on States not 
involved in an armed conflict to take action against States that are violating IHL, in 
particular to use their influence to stop the violations. Article 1 is viewed as an obligation 
of means on States to take all appropriate measures possible, in an attempt to end IHL 
violations.76 All participants affirmed that this positive action is at minimum a moral 
responsibility and that States have the right to take such measures- with the majority of 
participants agreeing that it constitutes a legal obligation under common Article l .77
75 N. Levrat, Les consequences de l'engagement pris par les Hautes Parties Contractantes de “fane 
respecter” les Conventions humanitaires, In F. Kalshoven (ed.), Implementation of Humanitarian Haw, 
(Dordrecht, London 1989), pp. 263-296, p. 291.
76 ICRC report to the 28th ICRC Conference “International Humanitarian Law and The Challenges o f  
Contemporary Armed Conflicts”, Annex III, (2003). Available at 
http:/ Avww.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5XRDCC/$File/IHLcontem p armedconflicts FIN  
AL ANG .pdf (last visited 15 December 2008) Hereinafter “Annex III”. See also, J.-P. Lavoyer, “Should 
International Humanitarian Law be Reaffirmed, Clarified or Developed?” (2004) 34 Israel Yearbook o f  
Human Rights 35-58.
77 Annex III, Ibid., p. 47
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Finally, the enforcement o f this duty is limited by die principle o f non-interference in the 
internal affairs o f another State and is not an entidement to use force.78
Furthermore, in its recent study on customary rules o f internadonal humanitarian law 
conducted by Louise Doswald-Beck and Jean-Marie Henckaerts, die ICRC 
acknowledged the existence of an obligation o f States to ensure respect for rules of 
international humanitarian law.79 The extent o f the obligation is twofold: it implies a 
negative and positive duty. On the one hand, States may not encourage violations of 
humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. On the other hand, they must exert 
their influence, as far as possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law. 
The ICRC bases its arguments on the existence of treaty provisions, national practice 
(military manuals, legislation and national case-law), practice o f international 
organisations and conferences and practice o f the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent movement all o f which relate to the obligation to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law that it details in the second part of its study.80 A very 
similar formula was used at the 30th Conference of the ICRC in 2007 to describe the 
obligations set in Article 1. In the final declaration, States stressed the obligation of all 
States to refrain from encouraging violations of international humanitarian law by any 
party to an armed conflict and to exert their influence, to whatever degree possible, to 
prevent and end violations, either individually or through multilateral mechanisms, in 
accordance with international law.81
78 Ibid.
79 L. Doswald-Beck and J.-M. Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Haw. Volume 1: Rales, 
(Cambridge 2005), p. 509.
80 L. Doswald-Beck and J.-M. Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Haw. Volume 2: Practice, 
(Cambridge 2005), pp. 3289-3302.
8t “Reaffirmation and Implementation o f  International Humanitarian Law. Preserving Human Life and 
Dignity in Armed Conflict”, 30th Conference o f the ICRC, Geneva, 26-30 November 2007.
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Finally, according to Kessler, who wrote the latest study dedicated essentially on the 
obligation to ensure respect, Article 1 sets two minimal negative and positive 
obligations.82 On the one hand States should abstain from acts that would contribute to a 
violation of the four Geneva treaties. O n the other hand, States have to observe the 
other parties1 compliance with their duties under the Convention and in some, albeit rare, 
cases, they must take positive action in order to stop severe violations of these treaties.83 
Interestingly, for Kessler, the legal structure o f the Convention advocates that States can 
take countermeasures in addition to protests and measures o f retorsion.84 The obligations 
set out in the Geneva Convention are et'ga omnes contractantes, as the Conventions are not 
being performed in a bilateral way towards only one State, but every State is obliged 
towards the community o f the Contracting Parties. Furthermore, for Kessler, it is 
generally admitted that erga omnes obligations can be enforced by third States using 
repressive measures. Therefore, for Kessler, considering the similarity between rules erga 
omnes and rules erga omnes contractantes, it follows that the rules set in the Geneva 
Convention can be enforced by countermeasures.85 Nonetheless, according to her, the 
adoption o f countermeasures is only a possibility and is not a legal obligation because to 
imply a duty to react against a breach o f humanitarian law would entail that the States
82 B. Kessler, “The Duty to ‘Ensure Respect5 Under Common Article 1 o f  the Fourth Geneva Convention: 
Its Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflict” (2001) 44 German Yearbook o f  
International Law 498-516, p. 499.
83 Ibid., p. 506
84 Countermeasures consist in an illegal and unilateral reaction by an international actor directed to another 
one or several others to an act that it considers contrary to international law and this, in order to procure 
its cessation and to achieve reparation for the injury. J. Combacau and S. Sur, Droit international public, 7th 
ed. (Paris, 2006), p. 520. The use o f countermeasures has been supported by States practice, judicial 
decisions. For instance, in the Gabftkovo-Nagywaros Project case, the ICJ accepted that countermeasures 
might justify otherwise unlawful conduct “taken in response to a previous international wrongful act o f  
another State and ... directed against that State5’, provided certain conditions are met (Case Concerning the 
Gabktkovo-Nagymaws Prv/ect (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Rep. (1997), p. 55 (para. 83). Countermeasures or 
reprisals are circumstances excluding the illegality o f  an international act. They have been tackled by the 
ILC project on State responsibility in this respect. See “Article 22. Countermeasures in respect of an internationally 
wrongful act.
The wrongfulness o f an act o f a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another 
State is precluded if  and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter 
State in accordance with chapter II o f  part three55. See ILC Report, 2000, 52d session A /5 5 /1 0 , p. 72-95.
85 Ibid., pp. 500-501.
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which are under a duty to ensure respect, would automatically be responsible for the acts 
o f the States which have infringed their obligations under humanitarian law.86
The report submitted by the ICRC at the 28th ICRC Conference in December 2003 also 
suggests that States can take lawful reprisals or countermeasures to hold a State 
responsible for its violation under humanitarian law.87 However, one unidentified 
participant questioned the lawfulness o f third States taking reprisal action, referring to 
article 54 o f the Draft Articles on Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts.88 Based on Article 54, the participant argued that the formulation o f “lawful 
measures” excludes reprisals.89 The doubts that surround the possibility o f States taking 
countermeasures to ensure respect of the provisions of humanitarian law when they have 
not been injured by a violation of IHL are genuine. They call for a study o f Article 1 in 
the light o f the regime of international law on State responsibility, notably the obligations 
o f States not injured by a violation o f international law.
Nonetheless, as a final remark to end this section, the range o f measures which States are 
entitled to take to abide by their obligation to ensure respect is wide. The participants to 
the ICRC regional seminars in 2003, by demonstrating creative thinking, have come up 
with a long list of possible measures States might undertake to fulfil their duty. One 
finds, for instance, the scrutiny by States of all intended sales o f armaments to ensure 
their export is not contrary to the provisions o f humanitarian law, the possibility for
86 Ibid., p. 505. The following chapter o f this dissertation dedicates a long development on the possibility o f  
States by a violation o f international law to take countermeasures in reaction to violations o f  international 
law that do not injure them. See pp. 69-72 below.
87 Annex III, note 76 above, p. 51.
88 Article 54. Measures taken by States other than the Injured State: “This chapter does not prejudice die right o f  
any State, to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation o f  the breach and reparation in the 
interest o f the injured State or o f the beneficiaries o f  the obligation breached”.
89 Annex III, note 76 above, p. 51. See also, I. Scobbie, “Smoke, Mirrors and Killer Whales: the 
International Court's Opinion and the Israeli Barrier Wall” (2004) 5 German Law Journal 1107-1131, p. 
1 1 2 1 .
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States, in conflict to engage in confidential and discreet negotiations where they may 
have some influence, the making of public denunciations of violations o f humanitarian 
law, e tc ...90 Before the seminars, Palwankar and Azzam offered an extensive account of 
the measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for IHL.91 
Finally, Kessler classified the measures States can take in order to fulfil their obligation 
under Article 1 into four different means of enforcement: (1) repressive action against 
any violation of the Convention, (2) help by one State to enable another State to fulfil its 
duties under the Conventions, (3) control and (4) prevention.92
3.2. Analysing the Nature and Extent of the Article 1 Duty in the 
Light o f the Current Developments o f State Responsibility in 
International Law.
There exist a number of different regimes o f reactions by lion-injured States in response 
to a violation o f international law. Cassese has shown that there are diverse categories of 
responses by third States which differ dependent upon whether they are facing a 
violation o f the prohibition o f the use o f force, an infringement o f the right to self- 
determination, a human rights violation or an infringement of a rule o f international 
humanitarian law.93 However, this dissertation contends that Article 1 does not suggest 
such a potentially differentiated regime of responsibility and that the differences of 
reactions to these categories o f violations lie essentially in the institutional mechanisms 
designed for the response of non-injured States by their violations. Article 1 addresses
90 Annex III, note 76 above, pp. 50-52.
91 F. Azzam note 48 above, (1997) and U. Palwankar, “Measures Available to States for Fulfilling their 
Obligation to Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law” (1994) 298 International Committee o f  
the Red Cross Review 9-25.
92 B. Kessler, note 82 above, p. 499.
93 A. Cassese, Remarks on the Present Regulation o f Crimes o f  States, In A. Cassese, M. Spinedi and J. 
Weiler (eds.), International Crimes of States, (Berlin, N ew  York 1989), pp. 200-213.
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States other than, the ones involved in a conflict and is, therefore, the manifestation o f 
the erga omnes nature o f obligations of international humanitarian law. As stated by 
Scobbie in relation to the Advisory Opinion on the Tegality of the Walt, it is possible that 
considerations pertaining to the implementation o f the obligation set in Article 1 lie 
behind the Court’s otherwise oblique assertion of the erga omnes nature o f the rules of 
international humanitarian law.94
Therefore, the issues posed by the enforcement o f Article 1 parallel the issue posed by 
the mechanisms o f enforcement o f erga omnes obligations or, put differently, Article 1 
recalls the etga omnes nature o f the obligations of international humanitarian law. 
International humanitarian law was avant-garde in the trend towards, what is in the words 
o f Frowein, a constitutionalisation o f international law or of the international community.95 
Jean Pictet, himself, in his commentaries on the Fourth Geneva Convention spoke about 
the erga omnes nature o f the provisions set in the Convention in 195896, twenty five years 
before the ruling o f the International Court o f Justice in the Barcelona Traction case.91 For 
Meron, the language to ensure respect was a conventional precursor o f the erga omnes 
principle enunciated for the first time by the International Court o f Justice in the 
Barcelona Traction case.98 In 1996, the ICJ asserted the erga omnes nature o f a “great many 
rules o f humanitarian law” in its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
94 I. Scobbie, note 89 above, p. 1121.
95 The constitutionalisation o f  international law could be described as the process by which international 
law departs from a traditional bilateral relationship between the violator and the victim State to envisage a 
relationship between the violator and all other States and the possibilities for the former States to take 
actions against it. See J. Frowein, “Reaction by N ot Directly Affected States to Breaches o f  Public 
International Law” (1994) IV Collected Courses o f  The Hague Academy o f  International Law 349-437.
96 “The spirit which inspires the Geneva Conventions naturally makes it desirable that they should be 
applicable etga omneF ; in J. Pictet, The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Commentary (Geneva 1958), p. 48, cited by M. Stephens, note 38 above, p. 35.
97 Barcelona Traction, Tight and Power Company, Limited, (Belgium v, Spain), I.C.J. Rep. (1970), p. 32 (para. 33). At 
the time, the Court did not include rules o f  humanitarian law in the category o f  etga omnes obligations but 
gave as examples obligations deriving from “the outlawing o f  acts o f aggression and o f  genocide, as also 
from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights o f  the human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination”. Ibid. para. 34.
98 T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary International Law, (Oxford 1989), p. 29.
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Weapon/ 9 and formulated the same statement in die Advisory Opinion on the legality of the 
Wall in 2004.100 Meanwhile, academic writers established the link between the obligation 
set in Article 1 and the erga omnes nature of the obligations of international humanitarian 
law. Boisson de Chazoumes and Condorelli made this connection in their study of 
Article 1 in their 1984 article in order to conclude that the specificity o f the obligations of 
humanitarian law can exercise an important influence on the qualifications o f the breach 
to these obligations and the conditions o f enforcement of the international responsibility 
o f States.101 This was at the time where the International Law Commission (ILC) was still 
formulating the distinction between “crimes” and “delicts” in its draft articles on State 
responsibility.102
Finally, the ICRC in its 2005 study on customary international law refers to the etga omnes 
character o f the obligations o f humanitarian law when it qualifies the enforcement of 
Article 1 as “Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law Etga OmneA and uses 
this expression as the tide of the section related to Article 1 on the volume relating to 
State practice.103 It also refers to the erga omnes character o f rules o f humanitarian law in 
an indirect manner when it cites the rulings o f the Trial Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia in the Funmdififa and Kupreskiif cases which affirmed 
the etga omnes nature of these rules.104 Nonetheless, surprisingly, the ICRC study on 
customary international law does not make reference to the rulings on Article 1 o f the 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Wall. Moreover, when listing the international practice
99 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep. (1996), p. 257 (para. 79).
100 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Wall\ p. 199 (para. 157).
101 L. Boisson de Chazournes and L. Condorelli, note 49 above, p. 33.
102 “Comments on Article 19 (international crimes)” Yearbook o f the International Law Commission 1976, 
vol. II, part Two, p. 113, (para. 70), cited in L. Boisson de Chazournes and L. Condorelli, ibid., p. 33. The 
second chapter o f  this dissertation details the distinction between international “crimes” and “delicts”. See 
pp. 60-63 below.
103 Doswald-Beck and Henckaerts, note 80 above, pp. 3288-3302.
104 The Prosecutor v. Anto Furund^ija, ICTY, Judgment, 10 December 1998, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 151 
and The Prosecutor p. Zoran Kuprefk.it and others, ICTY, Judgment, 14 January 2000, Case N o. IT-95-16-T, 
para. 519 at Ibid., pp. 3298-3299.
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and instruments referring to Article 1, it cites Article 16 of the ILC Articles on States 
Responsibility on “Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act” which deals with the responsibility o f a State in connection with the act of another 
State105 and not to Article 41 which refers to the obligations of States vis-a-vis a violation 
o f “an obligation arising from a peremptory norm of international law” or to put it 
differently an erga omnes obligation.106 However, Crawford, in his Commentaries on the 
ILC Articles on State Responsibility, insisted on the difference between the obligation 
not to aid and assist as stated in Article 16 and in Article 41. Although the elements of 
the aid and assistance are to be read in connection with Article 16, it extends beyond the 
commission o f the serious breach itself to the maintenance o f the situation created by 
that breach, and it applies whether the breach is a continuing one.107 Moreover, the two 
articles deal with two separate regimes o f responsibility: Article 16 is concerned with 
“plain violations” of international law whereas Article 41 deals with violations of an 
obligation arising from a peremptory norm of international law.
4. Conclusion.
A1 Haq and CIHRE managed to place the duty set in Article 1 at the centre of the 
political and legal debate on the involvement o f third parties in the resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue. Almost sixty years after its adoption, it is now generally
105 “Article 16. A id  or assistance in the Commission of an internationally wrongful act
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission o f an internationally wrongful act by the
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge o f  the circumstances o f the internationally wrongful act
(b)the act would be internationally wrongful if  committed by that State”.
106 “Article 41. Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning o f  
article 40.
2. N o  State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning o f article 
40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this part and to such further 
consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law”.
107 J. Crawford, The International Taw Commission' Articles on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, (Cambridge, N ew  York 2002), p. 252.
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acknowledged that Article 1 establishes an obligation addressed to third States to a 
conflict. This article entails a minimum duty not to encourage and to aid and assist 
violation o f humanitarian law. If  actively enforced, it is undisputable that Article 1 can 
offer a proper regime of protection or even the last remedy for an occupied civilian 
population against the unlawful practices of the Occupying Power as advocated more 
recently by A1 Haq.108
Nonetheless, the scope and the content o f Article 1 are beset with ambiguities. The 
object of die next chapter is to examine the law of State responsibility and with special 
consideration o f the duties o f third States in respect to a violation o f international law 
which does not injure them. This study sets out to clarify the regime o f Article 1 and the 
nature o f the obligation it imposes particularly on issues of institutional enforcement or 
the possibility of adopting countermeasures. At the same time it is possible that the 
ambiguities attached to the obligation remain unresolved
108 In Need o f Protection (A1 Haq report), (2001), p. 230.
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Chapter Two
Overview and Critical Analysis o f the Obligations Set in Article 41 o f the 
International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility.
In the Aidpisory Opinion on the legality of the Wall o f 9 July 2004, the International Court o f 
Justice extended its ruling to the legal consequences o f the construction o f the wall for 
third States. It reiterated its previous case-law by stating that the right o f people to self 
determination, human rights and humanitarian law obligations were erga omnes and 
therefore their violations entailed obligations for third States that were actually the same 
obligations as the ones listed in Article 41 o f the International Law Commission Articles 
on State responsibility.1 Commentators have criticised the meagreness o f the discursive 
justification and the absence o f elaboration o f die rules and principles o f international 
law at issue in this passage.2 However, the decision of the majority o f the judges to insert 
in the Opinion a section on the obligations of third States amounts to a reiteration by the 
Court o f the existence o f a specific regime of responsibility for third States when 
particular norms have been violated. The trend towards the determination of 
fundamental rules of international law and hence a differentiated regime of responsibility 
for their breach had been initiated some forty years ago. It is the result o f the aggregation 
of the specific provisions and obligations for third States or non-injured States as well as 
institutional response to breaches of international law in various branches of public 
international law. As detailed in the previous chapter, international humanitarian law sets
1 Legal Consequences o f  the Construction o f  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep, (2004), 
pp. 199-200 (para. 155-159). Hereinafter, “Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f  the Wall”. The advisory 
opinion on the has given rise to a plethora o f  academic publications. To cite only a few, the American 
Journal o f International Law dedicated the first volume o f its 2005 publication to comments to the 
decision. The Palestine Yearbook o f International Law did the same in its XUT1' volume (2004-5). For 
other writings, see for instance, A. Gross, “The Construction o f a Wall between The Hague and Jerusalem: 
The Enforcement and Limits o f  Humanitarian Law and the Structure o f Occupation” (2006) 19 Leiden 
Journal o f International Law, 393-440 and R. O ’Keefe, “Legal Consequences o f  the Construction o f a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Commentary” (2004) 37 Revue Beige D e Droit International, 
92-149.
2 See for instance, I. Scobbie, “Smoke, Mirrors and Killer Whales: the International Court's Opinion and 
the Israeli Barrier Wall” (2004) 5 German Law Journal 1107-1131, p. 1114.
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a specific obligation for the High Contracting Parties o f the Fourth Geneva Convention 
to ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. The Convention on the 
Prevention and the Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide obliges die parties to this 
convention to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. For some, this trend marks the 
beginning of a process which shapes international law into a more “socially conscious 
legal order as opposed to a neutral, morally uncommitted law left to governments”.3
The International Law Commission initiated in 1956 a work o f codification on State 
responsibility which started under the title “responsibility for injuries to aliens and 
property” . By 1976, the ILC introduced the notion o f crimes of States —as opposed to 
international delicts- in this work and thus was giving shape to the idea that there exist 
international obligations that are more important than others and while these norms 
deserve more protection, they affect the regime o f State responsibility and involve 
obligations for non-injured States, In the final draft, the notion o f crimes o f States was 
deleted but the idea o f a differentiated regime of responsibility remains. It is embodied in 
Article 41 which provides in its first two paragraphs:
“ 1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any 
serious breach within the meaning o f article 40.
2. N o State shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious 
breach within the meaning o f article 40, nor render aid and assistance in 
maintaining that situation”.4
3 P. Allott, The Health of Nations, (Cambridge 2002), pp. 418-419; B. Simma, D oes the U N  Charter Provide 
an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or Collective Responses to Violations o f  Obligations Erga Omnes?, 
In J. Delbriick (ed.), The Future of International Law Enforcement; New Scenarios- New Law?, (Berlin 1993), pp. 
147-153, p. 129; M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Etga Omnes, (Oxford 1997), p. 183 and P. 
Weil, “Vers une normativite relative en droit international” (1982) 86 Revue Generate de Droit 
International Public 5-47, pp. 16-17.
4 Article 40 provides: “Application of this chapter
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After having offered a broad overview of the work of the ILC on obligations of non­
injured Sates and explained the reasons for choosing this work as a starting point for the 
research on obligations of third States in relation to violations o f international law that 
do not injure them, the present chapter details the object and extent of, first o f all, the 
obligation to cooperate to put an end to a violation of an obligation arising from a 
peremptory norm of international law, then the obligation not to recognise and finally, 
the obligation not to aid and assist a State in the commission o f such a violation.
1. Entering the Realm of the Regime of Responsibility for Breach of a 
Fundamental N orm  of International Law.
Article 41 o f the ILC Articles on State responsibility is not a codification o f existing 
prescriptions of international law. Instead, in this Article, the ILC has tried to grasp the 
role o f erga omnes obligations and peremptory norms in relation to State responsibility and 
has attempted to outline the obligations flowing from the emergence o f these new types 
o f obligations in public international law. As stated by the rapporteur, the provisions in this 
article are still subject to progressive development.5 However, it constitutes to date the 
most comprehensive attempt to spell out the legal consequences flowing from erga omnes 
breaches and to define the position o f States affected by such breaches.6
1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a State o f  
an obligation arising under a peremptory norm o f  general international law.
2, A breach o f such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible 
State to fulfil the obligation.”
5 J. Crawford, The International han> Commission' Articles on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, (Cambridge, New York 2002), p. 38.
6 C. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Etga Omnes in International Earn, (Cambridge 2005), p. 13.
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1.1. Revisiting the Role o f Third Parties and the Traditional Bilateral 
Framework of International Law.
In 1976, Roberto Ago, the special rapporteur o f the ILC work on State responsibility at the 
time, introduced the concept of crimes of States. The overall objective was to reinforce 
international legality through a specific regime o f responsibility when a fundamental 
norm o f international law has been breached.7
With the introduction o f the concept o f crimes o f States, the ILC was echoing article 53 
o f the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on jus cogens or peremptory norms 
o f international law which provides:
“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For die purposes o f the 
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community o f States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.”
The inclusion o f this provision was novel and established a hierarchy of norms between 
peremptory norms and others. The text of the Vienna Convention was drafted by the
7 “Report o f  the International Law Commission on its 28th Session”, Yearbook o f  the International Law 
Commission 1976, vol. II, part Two, p. 75.
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ILC which stated that the existence o f a category of rules and principles from which 
States cannot derogate existed at the time it was preparing the draft o f the Convention.8
In addition, the concept o f crimes o f States was giving shape in the field of State 
responsibility to the idea expressed by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case that some 
obligations because of their fundamental importance are owed etga omnes as opposed to 
being reciprocal obligations for the purposes o f diplomatic protection. In an oft-cited 
dictum, the Court ruled that:
“In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations o f a State towards the international community as a whole, and 
those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By 
their very nature the former are the concern o f all States. In view o f the 
importance o f the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes \ 9
Therefore, the inclusion o f the notion o f crimes in the ILC project transformed the role 
of third parties in international law —those defined outside a bilateral relationship whether 
formally created or occurring through events.10 By granting rights and obligations to non­
injured States by virtue o f a violation o f international law, the notions o f crimes o f States
8 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, P. Dailler and A. Pellet, Droit International Public, (Paris 1999), p. 201. The inclusion 
o f this provision was however one o f the main reason why many States refrained from ratifying the 
Convention. See G. Gaja, “Jus Cogens beyond the Vienna Convention” (1981) III Collected Courses o f The 
Hague Academy o f  International Law 271-316, p. 279.
9 Barcelona Traction, Ught and Power Company, Umited, (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Rep. (1970), p. 32, (para. 33). The 
passage o f  the judgement on etga omnes obligations is to be interpreted against the background o f the 
controversy about the 1966 decision in the South West Africa case (South West Africa case (Ethiopia v. South 
Africa and Uheria v. South Africa), ICJ Rep. (1966), p. 6). This decision provoked the mistrust o f the 
developing countries for the Court because it rejected the idea o f  an action popularis, that is, o f  a right o f  
every member o f the international community to invoke violation o f a special interest. The dictum o f the 
Barcelona Traction case aimed at appeasing the tensions created by this former decision. See on this point, B. 
Simma, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest” (1994) VI Collected Courses o f  The Hague Academy 
o f International Law 217-384, p. 295 and C. Tams, note 6 above, p. 15.
10 See note 19 o f  the Introduction Chapter o f this dissertation, p. 18 above.
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and erga omnes obligations have altered the traditional bilateral framework o f international 
law. Their effect is the creation of a hierarchy o f internationally wrongful acts in which 
different third parties’ rights and obligations in response to the acts determine their 
ranldng in hierarchy: at the lowest level, the violation o f reciprocal obligations does not 
entail any rights and duties for third parties; at the medium level, the violations of 
provisions of a multilateral treaty which grant a legal interest in the implementation o f 
the provisions o f the treaty only to the parties to the treaty; finally, at the highest level, 
the violation o f an international crime or erga omnes obligations gives rights and 
obligations to the member o f the international community.11
The idea of the existence in international law of norms that deserve a special protection 
due to the fundamental values they embody and whose violation is the concern of all 
States is now widely accepted. The ICJ, after 1970, made several references to erga omnes 
obligations in its case-law.12 Despite an initial scepticism, the concept o f erga omnes 
obligations has been accepted in doctrinal writings of international law. It is been 
referred to more rarely by international organisations and in the case-law o f international 
and national tribunals alike which prefer the notion of jus cogens,13 Be as it may, there 
exists a trend towards what some calls a “publicisation” of international law14 or the
11 C. Chinidn, Third Parties in International Law, (Oxford 1993), p. 292 and T. Meron, “International Law in 
the Age o f  Human Rights: General Course on Public International Law”, (2003) Collected Courses o f The 
Hague Academy on International Law 9-489, p. 259-264.
12 See for instance, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Rep. (1995), p. 102 (para. 29) on the rights o f  
people to self-determination; Case Concerning Application of the Convention of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), ICJ Rep. (1996) p. 616 (para. 31) on the rights and obligations enshrined by the 
Convention on the Prevention and the Repression o f the Crime o f Genocide, and Advisoty Opinion on the 
Legality of the Wall, p. 199 (para. 155-157) on the obligation to respect the right to self-determination, and 
certain obligations under international humanitarian law.
13 “Fragmentation o f  International Law: Difficulties Arising from die Diversification and Expansion o f  
International Law”, International Law Commission, Fifty-Eight session 2006, A /C N .4/L .682, para. 377.
14 B. Simma, note 3 above, p. 129.
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emergence o f a community interest15 or even a “constitutionalisation” of the 
international law.16
1.2. Article 41 o f the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
In 2000, the ILC excised the notion o f crimes o f States and its associated regime from its 
draft Articles on State responsibility and replaced it with the concept o f peremptory 
norms of general international law. Chapter Three of the final version o f the 2001 
Articles on States Responsibility refers to “Serious Breaches o f Obligations Under 
Peremptory Norms of General International Law”. Within this Chapter, Article 41 
details the obligations o f those States not injured by these serious breaches. The rapporteur 
of the ILC explained that this article is a compromise accepted by the members of the 
Commission: Article 19 -the article referring to crimes o f States- would be deleted but 
certain special consequences would be specified as applicable to a serious breach of an 
obligation owed to the international community as a whole.17 The objective o f the ILC in 
deleting “crime” was to free the draft o f a concept of criminal responsibility inspired by 
domestic law because of the embryonic state practice in the area and the inconsistency of 
the previous draft which had failed to establish a legal system specifically tailored to 
international crimes.18 The notion o f “State crime” was then replaced by “serious 
breaches o f obligations under peremptory norms of general international law”. The ILC 
did not use the term “erga omnes obligations”. However, the rapporteur specified that 
peremptory norms and erga omnes obligations coincide although there exists a difference
15 B. Simma, note 9 above, p. 234.
16 J. Frowein, “Reaction by N ot Directly Affected States to Breaches o f Public International Law” (1994) 
IV Collected Courses o f  The Hague Academy o f  International Law 349-437, pp. 355-366.
17 J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 36.
18 J. Crawford, S. Olleson and J. Peel, “The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility o f  States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: Completion o f  the Second Reading” (2001) 12 EJIL 963-991, p. 977; E. Wyler, “From 
‘State Crime’ to Responsibility for ‘Serious Breaches o f Obligations under Peremptory Norms o f General 
international law’” (2002) 13 EJIL 1147-1160, p. 1148 and “Interim Conclusion o f  Draft Article 19”, 
Yearbook o f the International Law Commission 1998, vol. II, part Two, p. 77.
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o f emphasis between the two: “While peremptory norms of general international law 
focus on the scope and priority to be given to a certain number of fundamental 
obligations, the focus of obligations to the international community as a whole is 
essentially on the legal interest o f all States in compliance”.19 Basically, as stated by 
Kadelbach, the effect of a ju s cogens or peremptory norm is to make a treaty void whereas, 
the concept of an erga omnes obligation is connected to State responsibility.20 However, 
whatever emphasis is preferred, it is widely admitted that there exists a substantial 
overlap between the two concepts and that, actually, the rules that belong to jus cogens and 
erga omnes obligations are basically the same.21 The object of this dissertation is not to 
analyse the ontological differences between erga omnes and jus cogens. It adopts the 
approach of the ILC which attempted to combine the two sets o f obligations ad mum  22 - 
albeit that attempt might be subject to criticism.
1.3. Any Alternative Route?
The existence o f obligations which are the concern o f all States and o f peremptory 
norms has been the subject o f long and intense debate in the academic world for the past 
forty years. In this respect, this dissertation is opening a door which gives access to an 
immense edifice not yet finished. Some suggest that it is possible to tackle the issue of 
third States obligations without engaging in this debate. As stated by Judge Higgins in her 
individual opinion in the A.dvisory Opinion on the legality of the Walk “I do not think that the
19 J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 244.
20 S. Kadelbach, Jos Cogens, Obligations Etga Omnes and other Rules - The Identification o f Fundamental 
Norms, In C. Tomuschat and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order, 
(Leiden, Boston 2006), pp. 21-40, p. 27.
21 C. Tams, note 6 above, p. 148 and A. Orakhelashvili, “International public order and the International 
Court’s advisory opinion on legal consequences o f  the construction o f a wall in the occupied Palestinian 
territory” (2005) 42 Archiv des Volkerrechts 240-256, p. 253. On this topic in general, M. Byers, 
“Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Etga Omnes Rules” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of  
International Law 211 -239.
22 A. Gattini, “A Return Ticket to ‘Communitarisme’, Please” (2002) 13 EJIL 1181-1199, p. 1184.
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specified consequences o f the identified violations of international law have anything to 
do with the concept of erga omnes obligations”.23 According to Higgins, the dictum of the 
Barcelona Traction was directed at a specific issue of jurisdictional locus standi and the 
concept o f erga omnes has nothing to do with imposing obligations on States. She backs 
up her argument on the commentaries o f the ILC Articles on State Responsibility by 
emphasising a difference between “obligations” and simple “legal interest” . Higgins had 
earlier expressed her rejection of a hierarchical or weighted normativity. She believes 
instead that some norms are identified by some authors as jus cogens because their 
violations will never affect their validity. It is not their qualification or their hierarchical 
superiority, that renders them unalterable but the fact that if  a State breaches an 
obligation o f that kind, it still believes in the necessity o f its existence as a norm.24
Nonetheless, although Higgins’ arguments are attractive because they offer an alternative 
route, it is almost impossible to carry out research on the obligations of third parties in 
respect o f violations of international law that do not injure them by overlooking the 
plethora o f literature that has been covering the subject of erga omnes obligations and jus 
cogens norms. As stated by Prosper Weil, who certainly has not been the strongest 
supporter of the existence o f fundamental obligations in international law, the concept is 
one of the “pieces maitresses du droit international d’aujourd’hui” - “one o f the 
keystones o f today’s international law”.25 Erga omnes obligation is a concept in today’s 
international law whose implications are still unclear but which cannot possibly be 
ignored. Erga omnes is the main door which needs to be opened if one is to research the 
regime of third States’ obligations towards a violation o f international law that does not 
injure them, although the chapter might conclude that the fundamental importance of
23 Advisoty Opinion on the legality of the Wall,, Separate Opinion o f Judge Higgins, p. 216 (para. 37 and 38).
24 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Earn and How We Use It, (Oxford 1994), p. 22.
25 P. Weil, “Le droit international en quete de son identite” (1992) VI Collected Courses o f  The Hague 
Academy o f  International Law 9-370, pp. 286-287.
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some international obligations is not relevant for detailing a specific regime for third 
States.
Therefore, the present chapter details the obligation set out in Article 41 i.e. the 
obligations o f non-injured States in the face of a serious violation o f an obligation arising 
under a peremptory norms o f general international law.26
2. An Obligation to Cooperate To Put an End to a Violation of International Law 
Arising from a Peremptory Obligation.
The obligation to cooperate to put an end to a serious violation o f international law has 
been formulated in the 1970 Declaration of Principles on Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation of States.27 It is referred to in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility since 
the introduction of the notion o f crimes o f States as a response o f States to the 
commission o f a crime. The obligation to cooperate is said to be in line with the Grotian 
tradition of solidarity in the international community.28 However, given the many 
theoretical issues revolving around this obligation, it is very unlikely that it has reached 
the threshold for being a customary obligation. The main crux o f the obligation is about 
its mechanisms of enforcement. Furthermore, the obligation poses broader issues as to
26 The dissertation is limited to the study o f  obligations o f non-injured States vis-a-vis a violation o f  an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm o f general international law. It does not tackle the issue o f  
invocation o f  responsibility or the distinction between “injured states” and “other states entitled to invoke 
responsibility” as reflected in articles 42 and 48 o f the ILC Articles, On this issue see, A. de Hoogh, 
Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A  Theoretical Inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of the 
International Responsibility of States, (The Hague 1996), pp. 27-37, T, Meron, note 11 above, p, 280-286 and I. 
Scobbie, “The Invocation o f  Responsibility for the Breach o f  ‘Obligations under Peremptory Norms o f  
International Law5” (2002) 13 EJIL 1201-1220.
27 In Paragraph Four “Duty o f  States to Cooperate with one another according to the Charter.
(a) States shall cooperate with other States in the maintenance o f international peace and security;
(b) States shall co-operate in the promotion o f  universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all, and in the elimination o f  all forms o f  racial discrimination and all 
forms o f  religious intolerance”.
28 A. Gattini, note 22 above, p. 1185 and J. Charney, “Third State Remedies in International Law” (1989) 
10 Michigan J ournal o f  International Law 57-101, p. 61.
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which entity or institution can determine the fundamental character o f a norm and who 
are the addressees o f the erga omnes obligations.
2.1. D oes This Obligation Require an Institutional Enforcement?
The major issue which underlies the obligation to cooperate to put an end to a violation 
o f a peremptory norm o f international law is whether its enforcement can be permissible 
outside the framework o f an international organisation with global membership and 
general competence, i.e., the United Nations, and then whether it implies the 
permissibility o f countermeasures o f general interest.
2.1.1. Is the U N  the Guarantor of the Respect of Erga Omnes 
Obligation?
The acknowledgement o f a differentiated regime of responsibility which entails a move 
from a bilateral to a multilateral framework raises the question o f the necessity of an 
institutional structure for its enforcement. The question whether the international 
community possesses an institutional representation or “representation organique”29 able 
to act for the protection and preservation of its system, has arisen since the ILC 
undertook to design a regime of responsibility for a breach o f a fundamental norm of 
international law. Whereas Ago did not tackle the issue o f the mechanisms of 
enforcement o f the regime of responsibility for crimes, Riphagen, the special rapporteur 
after him acknowledged that the violations of erga omnes obligations when they amount to 
international crimes, must be implemented by the mechanisms o f the United Nations.30
29 P. Weil, note 3 above, p. 32.
“Third Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees o f International Responsibility”, Yearbook 
International Law Commission 1982, vol. II, part One, p. 48, para. 4 and P. Klein, “Responsibility for
67
Because o f its universal character, the United Nations was identified as the only 
eligible organisation which was in the position to enforce erga omnes obligations towards 
the international community. However, this interpretation presupposed a transfer of a 
right o f representation of the international community to the United Nations which can 
be inferred neither from state practice nor from opinio ju ris t Furthermore, regarding the 
competences mtione materiae set by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even if there can be 
an overlap between a violation o f an erga omnes obligation and a threat to peace, it cannot 
be deduced from the Charter that the actions taken by the Security Council shall replace 
the measures destined to implement State responsibility.32 Finally, the political nature of 
the Security Council (SC) resolutions and the questionable legitimacy o f the SC as a body 
acting in the name of the international community can raise questions as to whether the 
UN is the proper organisation for the implementation o f the mechanism o f protection of 
peremptory norms of general international law.33
In order to respond to these issues, Arangio-Ruiz, when he was rapporteur to the ILC 
designed a complex system which had the advantage of bringing in the three principal 
organs of the UN in combined fashion “each bringing into play the role that matched its 
own characteristics”.34 However, the ILC in the final Articles reduced to the minimum 
the reference to institutional enforcement for aggravated responsibility. The commentary 
on Article 41 indicates that “cooperation could be organised in the framework of a 
competent organisation, in particular the United Nations”.35 Suffice it to say that this
Serious Breaches o f Obligations Deriving from Peremptory Norms o f International Law and United 
Nations Law” (2002) 13 EJIL 1241-1255, p. 1245.
31 C. Annacker, “The Legal Regime o f  Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law” (1994) 46 Austrian 
Journal o f Public and International Law 131-166, pp. 158-159.
32 Ibid., p. 157.
33 P. Klein, note 30 above, pp. 1248-1249 and B. Simma, note 9 above, pp. 264-274.
34 “Summary Presentation o f  the 7th Report by Atangio-RuL”, Yearbook International Law Commission 
1995, vol. II, part Two, at 46, para. 245 and P. Klein, ibid., p. 1251.
35 Italics added. J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 249 and “Debate on Countermeasures”, Yearbook o f the 
International Law Commission 2001, vol. II, part Two, p. 23.
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passage, and especially the expression “within the framework”, does not give a clear 
answer to the issue whether international law prescribes institutional cooperation for 
States and require them to abide by the obligation to cooperate to put an end to a serious 
violation o f international law. This is corroborated by the wording o f Article 59 of the 
Articles which provides that the ILC Articles are without prejudice to the Charter of the 
United Nations.
2.1.2. The Admissibility o f Countermeasures of General Interest.
The uncertainty revolving around the requirement of institutional cooperation to put an 
end to a violation o f a peremptory norm raises the question whether States can 
justifiably act outside an institutional framework. The possibility for States to take acts 
o f retorsion and use force does not pose the same types o f questions. Retorsions do not 
constitute a violation of international law and therefore do not need to be justified and 
the use o f collective self-defence and the authorisation to use force are expressly 
governed by the Charter o f the United Nations (Chapter VII).36 The taking o f collective 
reprisals or countermeasures o f general interest is of importance in this context.37 This is 
the case because it allows the possibility for States individually or jointly to depart from 
their obligations under international law in order to force a State violating international 
law to cease its breach of the law. They could do so by claiming a right to this action
36 Talcing a measure o f  retorsion consists in an adopting an “unfriendly” act against an international actor 
in response to an initial act o f the same character. Retorsion does not involve a violation o f  international 
law and therefore the responsibility o f  the actors concerned. J. Combacau and S. Sur, Droit international 
public, 7th ed. (Paris, 2006), p. 215. Self defence is the right to o f any State to use force in response to an 
armed attack. The right to self defence is enshrined in article 51 o f  the U N  Charter (Chapter VH) which 
provides: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right o f individual or collective self- 
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member o f the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise o f  this right o f self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility o f the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”.
37 For a definition o f  the notion o f  countermeasure, Chapter One o f this dissertation, p. 50, note 84 above.
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without being directly affected by the breach o f international law.38 The permissibility of 
the adoption o f countermeasures o f general interest by third States under the remit o f 
international law remains an open issue.
The possibility for States to take countermeasures o f general interest has always been 
acknowledged by the ILC since the adoption o f the notion o f crimes o f States.39 
Countermeasures o f general interest were envisaged as a natural consequence for the 
commission o f a crime or serious breach o f a peremptory norm. As stated by Alland, 
“with a combination of an extended notion of injured states and the concept of 
international crime, mechanically, the institution o f actio popularis was arrived at”.40 This 
express authorisation was excised from the draft a few weeks before its submission. The 
rapporteur explained this deletion as being necessary because of the uncertainty of the 
current state o f international law on this issue and the sparcity of State practice which 
involves only a small number of States.41 Instead, the ILC left the issue open by malting 
what looks like an indirect reference to countermeasures of general interest in Article 54. 
This Article states that the Chapter on Countermeasures o f the ILC Articles does not 
prejudice the right o f any State other than the injured State to take “lawful measures” 
against the responsible State. However, Article 54 leaves some ambiguity. It refers to 
lawful measures when countermeasures are intrinsically unlawful and Article 22 of the 
Articles refers to the wrongfulness o f an act when describing the act as a
42countermeasure.
38 J. Frowein, note 16 above, p. 416 and C. Hillgruber, The Right o f Third States to Take Countermeasures, 
In J.-M. Thouvenin and C. Tomuschat (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International JLegal Order, (Leiden, 
Boston 2006), pp. 265-293, p. 266,
39 C. Tams, “All’s Well That Ends Well? Comments on the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility” (2001) 
Zeitschrift fur auslandisches Recht tmd Volkerrecht 759-796, p. 789.
40 D. Alland, “Countermeasures o f General Interest” (2002) 13 EJIL 1221-1239, p. 1229.
41 J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 305.
42 D. Alland, note 40 above, p. 1133.
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However, the silence o f the ILC on this issue does not preclude a possible tolerance of 
international law for countermeasures o f general interest. In this area, the arguments 
supporting the legality o f the practice would carry as much weight as the opposite 
arguments. It is certainly an issue where the factual assessment o f the bulk o f State 
practice and legal justification surrounding it can be used to support either way.43 For 
instance, Tams makes his own factual assessment to demonstrate that countermeasures 
o f general interest are permissible under international law.44 A different assessment is 
possible especially if one evaluates the interplay between institutional and decentralised 
responses in each case where countermeasures o f general interest have been adopted. 
Hillgruber, for instance, examines on the one hand, the international treaties which allow 
third States to take countermeasures or reprisals to respond to their violations and their 
related practice and, on the other hand, State practice in relation to countermeasures 
adopted by third States outside the framework of a treaty or an agreement. He concludes 
that reprisals by third States are generally adopted when there exists an agreement 
between the State violating international law and the States taking reprisals, and that 
States practice in relation to reprisals taken on the basis o f customary international law is 
too limited and does not include enough States, therefore not permitting the inference 
that reprisals by third States are permissible under customary international law.45
Finally, some commentators regret that the legal analysis on countermeasures o f general 
interest has often been obstructed by what might be labelled the problem of 
politicisation and the replacement o f legal arguments by policy arguments.46 This thesis 
contends that arguments of political considerations add relevance to the analysis o f the 
legality o f countermeasures of general interest. Countermeasures are a mechanism of
43 C. Tams, note 6 above, p. 234.
^ Ibid., pp. 198-249.
1,5 C. Hillgruber, note 38 above, p. 284, 285 and 287.
46 C. Tams, note 6 above, p. 199.
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“private justice” and they all bear one common feature: self assessment that an obligation 
of international law has been violated.47 This assessment and, more importantly the 
decision to adopt a countermeasure, are inevitably surrounded by many political 
considerations. The same political considerations have also led States to adopt this 
option extremely cautiously as well as to use the mechanisms offered by the UN Charter 
when responding to a grave violation o f international law.48
2.2. Issues on Erga Omnes Obligations in Relation to the Obligation to
The issues raised by the enforcement o f the obligation to cooperate to put an end to a 
violation o f a peremptory norm go beyond its institutional enforcement. They tackle 
indirectly broader issues related to the readiness o f international law to welcome and 
enforce a system of aggravated responsibility or the implications o f determining the 
existence o f fundamental norms in the present international legal system.
2.2.1. Who Is to Assess the Erga Omnes Character o f an 
International Obligation?
Erga omnes obligations protect values o f community interests and since the Second World 
War, there has been a growing trend to recognise and respect these values as 
indispensable to the international community.49 Therefore, these obligations presuppose 
a universal agreement for the protection o f certain values, or the universal recognition
47 D . Alland, note 40 above, p. 1134.
48 B. Simma, note 3 above, p. 136; J. Chamey, note 28 above, p. 97 and L. Boisson de Chazournes and L. 
Condorelli, “Common Article 1 o f  the Geneva Convention Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests” 
(2000) 82 International Committee o f the Red Cross Review 67-87, pp. 80-82.
49 C. Annacker, note 31 above, p. 136.
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that these rules prescribe values which are no longer at the discretion o f individual 
States.50 The ICJ however has failed to provide helpful guidance to determine which 
obligations in international law bear the qualification erga omnes. In this respect, it always 
followed or reiterated the criteria set out in the Barcelona Traction case, i.e., the protected 
value must be o f fundamental importance to the international community, and erga omnes 
obligations must be seen in opposition to reciprocal obligations like those in the field of 
diplomatic protection. The Court in its case-law has given examples o f obligations etga 
omnes'. the right o f people to self-determination, the rules o f humanitarian law embodying 
“elementary considerations o f humanity”51 and the prohibitions against racial 
discrimination, aggression, slavery52 and genocide,53 The Court has always been reluctant 
to determine jus cogens norms, while other international courts have demonstrated more 
readiness to identify rules o f jus cogens
However, the determination o f the erga omnes or jus cogens nature o f a norm remains 
subject to the self-assessment of, for instance, an international judge, a national judge or 
a political body. Anyone will determine what a fundamental value is from his or her own 
perspective, from his or her own prism. It is an expression o f political pluralism 
internationally55 and at the same time, one of the consequences o f the decentralised
50 B. Simma, note 3 above, p. 130 and B. Simma, note 9 above, p. 291.
51 East Timor'case and Advisory Opinion on the Wall, see note 12 above.
52 Barcelona Traction case, note 9 above, p. 32 (para. 34)
53 Ibid. and Case Concerning Application of the Convention of the Crime of Genocide, see note 12 above.
54 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recognised that the prohibition o f  
torture was a norm o f jus cogens. The Prosecutor v. Atrto Furundjja, ICTY, Judgement, 10 December 1998, 
Case N o. 1T-95-17/1-T., para. 153-157. The European Court o f  Human Rights did the same in A l  Adsani 
v. United Kingdom, judgement 21 November 2001, (2002) 34 EHRR 11, para. 60 and 62. See P. Tavernier, 
L'identification des regies fondamentales - un probleme resolu?, In C. Tomuschat and T. Jean-Marc (eds.), 
The Fundamental Rules of the International I-Jgal Order, (2006), 1-20, pp. 8-10.
55 The expression is taken from Martti Koskenniemi in relation to the proliferation o f jurisdiction in the 
international system in M. Koskenniemi, “Fragmentation o f  International Law? Post-Modern Anxieties” 
(2002) 15 Leiden Journal o f International Law, 553-579, p. 553.
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structure o f international law. As pointed out by Brownlie, “more authority exists for the 
category o f jus cogens than exists for its particular content”.56
2.2.2. Who Is/A re the Adressee(s) of These Obligations ?
According to the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, the right to have erga omnes obligations 
respected is vested in the international community as a whole. Erga omnes obligations are 
thus owed to the international community as a whole.57 However, the existence o f an 
independent entity which could be referred to as the international community remains 
problematic and uncertain. A public law construction would require the personification 
o f such a community and this is not possible due to the contemporary structure of 
international law which is still very much State-centric. However, legal norms alone do 
not make a community, a “societal consensus” is still needed as a precondition for the 
formation and respect for legal rules.58 In the present circumstances, none can pretend 
that the solidarity between States is solid enough to impose on them a positive duty to 
cooperate to put an end to a serious violation of an obligation o f international law. The 
structure o f the international society is made of juxtaposed sovereignty, and the 
obligation to cooperate mentioned in Article 41 corresponds to the timid progresses of 
international solidarity.59
If  an internationally community does not exist legally and in a societal way, who 
therefore are or is the addressee(s) of the obligation to cooperate? States taken ut singuB 
This may well be the only foreseeable option at the moment.60 Does that mean that
56 I. Brownlie, Principles of International Lsnv, 6th ed., (Oxford 2003), p. 490.
57 C. Annacker, note 31 above, p. 138.
58 B. Simma, note 3 above, p. 131 and B. Simma, note 9 above, p. 245.
59 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, P. Dailler and A. Pellet, note 8 above, p. 802.
60 C. Annacker, note 31 above, p. 120.
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States can act individually? Although a very limited State practice supports the possibility 
o f States acdng individually,61 collective enforcement is preferable not only to prevent 
the risk o f abuses but also to preserve the rationale behind the respect for erga omnes 
obligations, which requires a high degree o f solidarity among States. This is also because 
most o f the time, only collective action of States will put an end to a violation of 
international law. In this respect, an individual action by a particular State is not likely to 
have the same impact as a collective action.
The many issues revolving around the enforcement o f the obligation to cooperate and 
the determination of whose breach o f which can trigger its enforcement are impediments 
to its emergence as a positive obligation of international law. However, despite the 
difficulties posed by the obligation to cooperate, the ILC kept this obligation as one o f 
the obligations o f States not injured by a serious breach of a violation o f a norm arising 
of peremptory international law because it reflects and strengthens the existing 
mechanisms o f cooperation for States to respond to a breach, notably the UN system.62
3. The Duty N ot to Recognise As Legal a Serious Violation of  
International Law.
The duty not to recognise as lawful a serious breach of an obligation arising under a 
peremptory norm of international law is one o f the obligations o f non-injured States 
required by Article 41 o f the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. According to the 
rapporteur o f the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the duty o f non-recognition 
represents the “minimum necessary response” by States to these breaches.63 However,
61 C. Tams, note 6 above, p. 240. For an opposite opinion, see A. Gattini, note 22 above, p. 1187.
62 J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 249.
63 Ibid., p. 251.
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the content of the obligation of non-recognition is difficult to grasp and its practical 
consequences, at first, are hardly intelligible to the extent that one may wonder with 
Judge Kooijmans whether the duty of non-recognition does amount to “an obligation 
without real substance” .64 After having briefly introduced the origin o f the duty not to 
recognise, the following section examines its ambit, whether this obligation is to be 
enforced collectively, and finally the scope o f the duty not to recognise as legal a 
violation o f international law.
3.1. A Customary Obligation.
Contrary to the obligation to cooperate, the duty not to recognise as lawful a situation 
arising under a serious breach o f an international obligation forms part o f customary 
international law since it combines both elements o f international customary law which 
are effective practice and opinion jm is. The existence o f this obligation as a customary 
obligation is amply supported by State practice and the case-law of the ICJ. The duty of 
non-recognition finds its origin in the Stimson doctrine. In 1932, after the declaration of 
independence o f three north-eastern provinces o f China known as Manchuria, earlier 
occupied by Japan, the Assembly o f the League of Nations, pursuant to an initiative of 
the American Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Henry Stimson, declared that it was 
incumbent upon the members of the League not to recognise any situation, agreement or 
treaty that might have arisen under a breach of the Covenant of the League or the Pact 
o f Paris.65
M Advisoty Opinion on the L^egality of the Wall, Separate Opinion o f Judge Kooijmans, p. 232 (para. 44).
65 On Manchuria/Manchukuo see D. Turns, “The Stimson Doctrine o f  Non-Recognition: Its Historical 
Genesis and Influence on Contemporary International Law” (2003) 2 Chinese Journal o f  International 
Law, 105-143, pp. 107-113.
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Since then, the obligation not to recognise has acquired the status o f a customary 
obligation. The UN Security Council called for the non-recognition o f situations arising 
out o f a violation o f international law in several instances. For instance, it called upon 
member States not to recognise as legal the State of Rhodesia, the South African 
Banthustans and the Turkish Republic o f Northern Cyprus,66 the annexation by Israel of 
Jerusalem,67 the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq,68 the legality o f the presence and 
administration o f South Africa over Namibia69 and the organs established by elections in 
Namibia.70
The ICj referred to this duty for the first time in 1971, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia. The Court ruled that member States of the United 
Nations were under the duty to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with 
the Government of South Africa implying recognition o f the legality o f South Africa’s 
presence in Namibia.71 The same duty was reiterated by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality on the Wall in which the Court stated that given the importance o f the rights 
and obligations involved, all States were under an obligation not to recognise the illegal 
situation resulting from the construction o f the wall.72
The obligation is also to be found in a number of international instruments such as for 
instance, the 1949 Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties o f States (Article 11), the
66 On practice o f non-recognition o f  States created pursuant a breach o f  international law. J. Crawford, The 
Creation of States in International Lair, (Oxford 2006), pp. 157-173; J. Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations, 
(Cambridge 1987) pp. 81-170; V. Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Lam, 
(Dordrecht, London 1990), pp. 273-319 and C. Warbrick, States and Recognition in International Law, In 
M. Evans (ed.), InternationalLnv, (Oxford 2006), pp. 217-275.
67 Security Council resolution 478 (1980), 2 August 1980
68 Security Council resolution 662 (1990), 6 August 1990
69 Security Council resolution 283 (1970), 29 July 1970
70 Security Council resolution 554 (1985), 17 August 1984.
71 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africaj 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Rep. 1971, pp.55-56 (para.123-124).
12 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Wall, p. 200 (para. 159).
1970 Declaration on Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations, the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act o f the Conference o f Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is 
today acknowledged that the obligation arises without the need for a prior authoritative 
finding by the UN Security Council that a serious breach has occurred.73
3.2. The Ambit o f the Duty o f Non-Recognition.
The rationale o f the duty not to recognise an unlawful situation can be better understood 
when it is contrasted with the purpose and effects of the act o f recognition in 
international law. Recognition may be defined as a discretionary act by which a State or 
an international organisation accepts the opposability for its own legal system of the 
existence o f a situation and hence respects the legal consequences arising from this 
situation.74 The breach of the duty o f non-recognition has logically the same 
consequences as the discretionary act o f recognition. The State which recognises an 
illegal situation endorses the legal consequences o f the unlawful act and gives to this 
illegal situation the rights that its own law requires it to give. Concretely speaking that 
means for the recognising State a waiver o f its own rights to contest the illegality of the 
act or situation.75
73 S. Talmon, The Duty N ot to “Recognise as Lawful” a Situation Created by the Illegal Use o f  Force or 
Other Serious Breaches o f  a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation without real Substance?, In J.-M. 
Thouvenin and C. Tomuschat (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order, (Leiden, Boston 
2005), pp. 99-125, p. 121.
74 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, P. Dailler and A. Pellet, note 59 above, p. 550.
75 D. Anzilotti, Co/m de droit international, (French translation by Gidel), (Paris 1929) cited in I. McGibbon, “The 
Scope o f Acquiescence in International Law” (1954) 31 British Yearbook o f International Law 143-186, p. 
145, note 2 and V. D. Degan, Opposable Situations in International Law, In M. P. Gonzales (ed.), Hacia an 
nuevo orden intemacional y  emvpeo: estudios en homenaje al Prvfesor Don Manuel Diey de Velasco, (Madrid 1993), pp. 
231-243, p. 238.
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According to Dugard and Orakhelashvili, the doctrine of jus cogens provides a doctrinal 
coherence to the doctrine o f non-recognition. 76 Those authors take the view that the 
ambit of the obligation not to recognise is to nullify or invalidate the violation o f a norm 
o f jus cogens. By analogy with the provision of the Vienna Convention o f the Law of 
Treaties, a factual situation arising out o f a violation of a peremptory norm is null and 
void.77 To take such a stance, one must acknowledge that it is doubtful that in 
international law, prescription could create rights out of a situation brought about by an 
illegal act and especially a violation of a jus cogens norm.78 However, this latter proposition 
is less convincing. Given the paucity o f the enforcement mechanisms in international 
law, it is far from being unusual that illegalities perpetuate to the extent that it is 
impossible to reverse their effects. Thus, the notion o f fa it accompli as formulated by the 
Court in relation to the construction o f the wall plays a crucial role in the ambit o f the 
duty o f non-recognition.79 In this case, the illegality might not create rights for the 
violator but gives rise to a legitimate claim for the acceptation o f the irreversible effects 
o f the violation on the ground. Charles de Visscher, in 1967 stated that a prolonged 
tension between fact and law has to be ended for the benefit of effectiveness and the 
acceptation o f the fait accomplif Therefore, to avoid this situation, the enforcement of the 
obligation o f non-recognition is crucial: States are under a duty to deny all the ordinary 
consequences that normally arise from such an international act. In this respect, the 
objective of the duty of non-recognition is to prevent the consolidation o f an illegal
76 J. Dugard, note 66 above, p. 132 and A. Orakhelashvili, note 21 above, p. 251.
77 Ibid.
78 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Im w , 6th ed., (Oxford 2003), pp. 149-150 and S. Talmon, note 
73 above, p. 107. For an opposite opinion - non-recognition removes the danger o f  having the violation o f  
international law becoming a source o f  legal right, see H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 
(Cambridge 1947), p. 427.
19 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the Wall., p. 184 (para. 121).
80 C. de Visscher, Les effectivites du droit internationalpublic, (Paris 1967), pp. 25 and 37-38.
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claim. It does not mean necessarily going back to the status quo ante because in certain 
cases, it is not desirable and would entail other international legal issues.81
3.3. An Obligation to Be Enforced Collectively?
The obligation not to recognise amounts to denying the legal claims arising from an 
illegal situation in order to counteract the effects brought about by this situation. For this 
reason, it is preferable to have a collective enforcement o f the duty not to recognise 
because a collective non-recognition is more likely to nullify the illegal effects created by 
a violation o f international law. It is the way it was envisaged originally during the 
Manchukuo crisis. In a note addressed to China and Japan on the 7th o f February 1937, 
Stimson states:
“I f  all the other governments in the world would come to a similar 
decision and adopt the same position, it would result in a sanction for 
non-compliance for any similar act, sanction, that to our mind, would 
render impossible for the future the legality of any title and right that 
would have been obtained by means o f pressure or violation o f a treaty 
and as it was demonstrated in the past, would restore China in its rights 
and titles it had been deprived o f ’.82
Although the rationale of the duty o f non-recognition would demand a collective 
enforcement, it is to be noted that an individual enforcement is also crucial because the 
violation o f the duty of non-recognition entails grave consequences for the non­
81 C. Talmon, note 73 above, pp. 146-147.
82 Cited in M. Radojkovic, La non-reconnaissance des actes contraire au droit, In Melanges offerts a Jttraj 
Amlrasy, (The Hague 1968), pp. 225-236, p. 227, note 2.
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complying State. As stated above, for the non-recognising entity, non-recognition 
operates as the denial o f the legal claim or the refusal of the opposability o f the rights 
and obligations arising from the violation o f international law.83
3.4. Scope o f the Duty of N on  Recognition.
The duty of non-recognition is enforced vis-a-vis situations which can be the object of 
recognition. However, recognition is usually conceived as applying to objective facts in 
international law that present legal claims such as for instance recognition o f States and 
governments. The question remains whether the duty applies to these situations only and 
if it has to be enforced vis-a-vis any legal consequences arising from an unlawful 
situation.
3.4.1. D oes the Duty N ot to Recognise Apply to Any Violations o f  
International Law?
Christalds and Talmon have questioned how the duty not to recognise is to be enforced 
in relation to a genocide or slavery, for instance, when these instances do not give rise to 
legal consequences which are capable o f being denied by other States.84 According to 
them, a serious violation of international law is not sufficient to trigger the duty o f non­
recognition and, practically, the situations which do so are the annexation o f a territory, 
the establishment o f a new government or new State pursuant an act o f aggression or the
83 J. Dugard, note 66 above, p. 135; V. Gollwand-Debbas, note 66 above, pp. 237-258 and A. 
Orakhelashvili, note 21 above, pp. 250-251.
84 T. Christakis, L’obllgatlon de non-reconnaissance des situations creees par le recours illicite a la force ou 
d’autres actes enfreignant des regies fondamentales In Jean-Marc Thouvenin and C. Tomuschat (eds.), The 
Fundamental Rules of the International Fegal Order. Jus Cogens and Obligations Etga Omnes, (Leiden, Boston 2005), 
pp. 126-166, p. 128 and S. Talmon, “The Constitutive versus the Declaratory Doctrine o f  Recognition: 
Tertium N on Datur?” (2004) 75 British Yearbook o f Internadonal Law 101-181, p. 134.
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violation of the tight to self-determination.85 In a similar vein, Judge Skubiszewski stated 
in his dissenting opinion in the East Timor case that the prohibition o f the acquisition of 
territory by force and the respect for the right to self-determination have transformed the 
discretionary nature o f the act of recognition of States and governments into an 
obligation not to recognise.86 Interestingly, he took the view that the discretionary nature 
o f the act of recognition is transformed into an obligation not to recognise when the 
situation which is the object of recognition has arisen pursuant a violation o f 
international law.
It is true that formal recognition usually follows the creation of a new State, extra­
constitutional changes o f government, changes o f territorial possession and claims of 
belligerent status by insurgent movements within a recognised State.87 However, 
recognition can also be defined as the reception in one legal system of the consequences 
of any legal or illegal act. As such it does not necessarily apply to these situations only. 
The recent decision o f the House of Lords on evidence obtained by torture is a case in 
point. In this decision, the Lords stated that evidence obtained under torture was 
inadmissible in UK courts.88 Even if it was not expressly stated, one o f the bases for 
taking this decision was the implementation of the duty of non-recognition to which 
Article 12 and 15 o f the Torture Convention give effect.89 Admitting evidence obtained 
under torture would amount to receiving in the UK legal system and accepting as legal 
the consequences o f an unlawful act. As stated by Lord Bingham:
85 T. Christakis, Ibid,
86 East Timor case, Dissenting Opinion o f  Judge Skubisaewski, p. 264 (para 129).
87 T. Grant, “East Timor, the U N  system, and Enforcing Non-Recognition in International Law” (2000) 33 
Vanderbilt journal o f  International Law 273-310, p. 296, note 85.
88 A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary o f  State for the Home Department (Respondent) 
(2004) and A  and others (Appellants) (FC) and others v. Secretary o f  State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) (Conjoined Appeals), [2005] UKHL 71.
89 Article 15 o f  the Torture Convention: “Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is 
established to have been made as a result o f torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, 
except against a person accused o f torture as evidence that the statement was made”.
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There is reason to regard it as a duty o f states, save perhaps in limited and 
exceptional circumstances, as where immediately necessary to protect a 
person from unlawful violence or property from destruction, to reject the 
fruits of torture inflicted in breach o f international law.90
If  the breach o f the duty o f non-recognition amounts to the endorsement o f the legal 
consequences arising from an illegal act, this dissertation takes the view that the scope of 
this duty extends to any violations of international law. The case-study presented in 
chapters six and seven o f this dissertation will demonstrate this point.
3.4.2. The Exceptions to the Duty.
One legal issue remains concerning the implementation of the duty of non-recognition. 
Does it apply to any legal consequences arising from the illegal situation brought about 
by a violation o f international law? The landmark case with regard to the scope of the 
duty o f non-recognition is the Advisory Opinion o f the International Court o f Justice on 
the Yjigal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia. The ICJ 
stated that the existence o f a general duty o f non-recognition was a consequence of the 
non-compliance o f South Africa with the terms of its mandate on Namibia. This duty 
entailed the obligation upon member States o f the UN “to abstain from entering into 
economic and other forms of relationships or dealings with South Africa on behalf or 
concerning Namibia which may entrench its authority over the Territory” .91 However, as 
an exception to the principle, “the invalidity cannot be extended to those [official] acts, 
such as, for instance, the registration o f births, deaths and marriages, the effects o f which
90 Per Cord Bingham, para. 33.
91 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, note 71 above, pp. 55-56 
(para. 124).
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can be ignored only to the detriment of die inhabitant of the territory”.92 The raison d’etre 
o f this exception is perfectly understandable. The scope of non-recognition was to 
prevent the legality o f any South African claim and title over Namibia. The non­
recognition o f those acts referred to by the Court is removed from the ambit o f the non­
recognition duty. This is because it clashes with another competing imperative which is 
the respect and the acknowledgement of the existence and interests other than economic 
o f the inhabitants of the territory.
When interpreting the exceptions to the duty o f non-recognition, Talmon considers that 
any form o f administrative cooperation does not fall into the scope o f the principle of 
non-recognition. Only intergovernmental cooperation is relevant for the purpose of non­
recognition, i.e. cooperation at ministerial level, as well as all form o f cooperation that 
requires the existence o f diplomatic relations.93 However, when Talmon cites several 
examples taken from State practice to corroborate his argument, he does not differentiate 
between State practice in relation to the non-recognition of situations that have been 
brought about after a violation o f international law and non-recognition as a political and 
discretionary act. I f  the enforcement o f the duty o f non-recognition is to prevent the 
legal consolidation of an unlawful claim, one has to look at any act that can help to 
consolidate the claim or render the situation opposable to third States outside the divide 
between intergovernmental and administrative cooperation.
In some instances, as in the Namibia case, other considerations or interests will over-ride 
the requirement for the enforcement o f the duty. In this case, one has to look at what are 
the other international obligations at stake are and assess whether they prevail over the
92 Ibid. p. 56 (para. 125).
93 S. Talmon, “The Cyprus Question Before the European Court o f Justice” (2001) 12 EJIL 727-751, p. 
749.
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duty o f non-recognition.94 The case of Manchukuo can provide an interesting example to 
illustrate this argument. China was a party to the International Opium Conventions. 
Under these treaties, export authorisation for opium and other dangerous drugs may only 
be issued on receipt o f an import certificate, issued by the “government” or the 
“competent authorities” of the importing countries. The question arose as to who should 
issue the required import certificates in case o f export of narcotic drugs to Manchukuo. 
The Special Advisory Committee which was appointed by the Assembly o f the League of 
Nations to advise its member States on all questions related to the non-recognition o f 
Manchukuo was asked for advice on this issue. It recommended that import certificates 
should be issued in accordance with the Opium Convention in case o f exports of 
narcotic drugs to Manchukuo. It thereby assumed that import certificates should be 
issued by the Manchukuo government. The Committee only added that governments 
should refrain from sending a second copy o f the export authorisation to “Manchukuo” 
since this action might be interpreted as a de facto recognition of “Manchukuo” . This 
example has lead Talmon to conclude that administrative cooperation with unrecognised 
governments does not imply international recognition.95 This dissertation contends that 
the rationale o f the decision of the Advisory Committee has to be looked for elsewhere. 
The object and purpose o f the Opium Conventions was to combat international 
trafficking and abuse o f dangerous drugs, i.e. objectives of public health. The Committee 
found that these considerations prevailed over the non-recognition duty.
The practical aspects entailed by the enforcement o f this duty and the competing 
interests sometimes involved will be the object of chapter six and seven o f this 
dissertation when the involvement o f the attitude of the European Union towards the 
violations o f international law entailed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be assessed,
94 For a similar argument, T. Christakis, note 84 above, p. 161.
95 S. Talmon, note 93 above, p. 744-746.
85
4. The Obligation N ot to Aid and Assist.
The obligation not to aid and assist a State in the commission and maintenance of a 
breach o f a peremptory norm of general international law is the second negative 
obligation listed in Article 41 o f the ILC Articles on State Responsibility after the duty 
not to recognise as lawful the breach of a peremptory norm. The enunciation of this 
obligation is redundant: the obligation not to aid and assist is already to be found in 
Article 16, under Chapter IV “Responsibility of a State in connection with the act of 
another State” .96 According to the rapporteur,; Articles 16 and 41 were the articles that 
were the most difficult to have accepted by the States to which they were submitted.97 
This controversy is mostly due to the fact that the “derived” nature o f the responsibility 
which the breach o f this obligation entails, places on States the risk of having their 
responsibility engaged because of the conduct o f another State. The following sections 
describe in the first place, the components o f the obligation not to aid and assist and, 
secondly, give an account o f the nature of the intention requirement.
4.1. The Scope o f the Obligation N ot to Aid and Assist.
The ILC first mentioned the possibility for one State to have its responsibility engaged 
because of its participation in the commission of a violation of international law by 
another State in 1971.98 In 1978, it offered its first findings.99 At the time, the obligation
96 “Article 16. A id  or assistance in the Commission of an internationally wrongful act
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission o f an internationally wrongful act by the 
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge o f  the circumstances o f the internationally wrongful act
(b)the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State”.
97 J. Crawford, Holding International Organisations and their Member States to Account Fifth Steinkraus- 
Cohen Lecture, (School o f  Oriental and African Studies, London 2007). Available at 
www.law.cam.ac.uk/docs/view.phpPdoc—4135 (last visited 15 December 2008).
98 “The Internationally Wrongful Act o f  the State, Source o f International Responsibility”, Yearbook o f the
International Law Commission 1971, vol. II, part One, p. 203.
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not to aid and assist had already been expressed in connection with aggression and 
genocide and according to the ILC, the obligation had already emerged as a customary 
norm.100
The obligation not to aid and assist found in Article 16 (1) and Article 41 are cases of so- 
called "derived responsibility”. They cover a situation in which the responsibility of one 
State is engaged because of its participation in the violation o f international law 
committed by another State. The result of the aid and assistance must be a violation of 
international law committed against a particular group of States, a subject o f international 
law other than a State or the international community as a whole. Most of the time, the 
act of the assisting State will not be unlawful per se if carried out in other circumstances. 
The aid and assistance can be o f any kind- e.g. it can be monetary or material, it can 
consist of a State offering the use of its own territory, or in the signing o f a treaty in view 
o f the commission o f the violation o f international law for instance.
Similar to the notion o f complicity in any system of municipal law, the fundamental 
condition for the responsibility o f the assisted State to engage the responsibility of the 
assisting State is the causal link between the aid and the violation o f international law.101 
The aid or assistance must be directly connected to the violation. This condition has 
been reiterated by the European Commission of Human Rights in the case Tugar v. Italy. 
In this case, the applicant, Tugar, had been severely injured by the explosion of an anti­
personal minefield sold to Iraq by an Italian arms seller. He complained that Italy lacked
1)9 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., 
Supp. N o 10, U.N. Doc., A /3 3 /1 0  (1979), reprinted in “Report o f the International Law Commission on its 
Thirtieth Session” Yearbook o f the International Law Commission 1978, vol. II, Part One, p. 52-60. 
p. 52-60, [hereinafter ILC Report 1978\.
100 The GA resolution defining aggression stated in article that allowing its territory to be used by a State to 
violate the prohibition on aggression constituted aggression itself (see GA Resolution Defining Aggression, 
A /R E S/3314 (XXIX)). The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Clime of 
Genocide in its third article punishes the act o f complicity o f  genocide.
101 J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 147.
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efficient procedures to issue licences, and hence had failed to ensure the protection of his 
right to life according to Article 2 o f the European Convention o f Human Rights. The 
Commission rejected his request. It ruled that:
“The applicant’s injury cannot be seen as a direct consequence o f the failure 
of the Italian authorities to legislate on arms transfers. There is no immediate 
relationship between the mere supply, even if not properly regulated, of 
weapons and the possible ‘indiscriminate’ use thereof in a third country, the 
latter’s action constituting the direct and decisive cause of the accident which 
the applicant suffered” .102
The assisting State is only responsible to the extent that its conduct has directly 
contributed to the commission of the violation o f international law by the assisted 
State.103 The acting State remains primarily responsible. Therefore, the responsibilities of 
both States are differentiated and if engaged, they will entail different legal consequences, 
notably in matters o f reparation and compensation. However, according to the 
commentaries on the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, for the responsibility of the 
assisting State to be engaged, the aid does not need to have been indispensable to the 
commission o f the unlawful act, it just has to be substantial.104 The commentaries remain 
silent on potential cases where one State has not contributed substantially to a violation 
of international law, but its own contribution cumulated with the aid and assistance of 
another or other States to allow the commission by another State(s) of a violation of 
international law. For instance, one can legitimately wonder whether the responsibility of
102 Tugar v. Italy, 18th October 1995, request n° 2869/93 (unpublished). Cited in A. Boivin, “Complicity 
and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer o f Small Arms and Light Weapons” (2005) International 
Committee o f  the Red Cross Review 467-496, p. 480.
103 J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 148.
104 Ibid., p. 147.
the States on whose territory CIA aircrafts stopped to refuel and connected to a rendition 
circuit in the affairs o f the rendition flights of the United States, can be engaged on the 
basis of the prohibition not to aid and assist.105
Finally, the responsibility o f the assisting State cannot be engaged if it is not bound by 
the obligation breached by die assisted State. This exception to derived responsibility 
finds its raison d'etre in the respect of the principle stated in Article 34 o f the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which a treaty cannot create either 
rights or obligations for a third State without its consent.106
The obligation not to aid and assist has been reiterated in Article 41. Tams questions 
whether there is a difference of content with the obligation not to aid and assist set in 
Article 16 and whether the distinction between categories of breaches in relation to the 
duty not to aid and assist is relevant.107 For the rapporteur; the obligation extends beyond 
the commission o f the serious breach itself to the maintenance of the situation created by 
that breach and applies whether or not the breach is a continuing one.108 It would 
therefore mean that the simple assistance in the maintenance in the commission o f a 
violation of international law would entail the responsibility of the aiding State. 
Furthermore, the rapporteur states that the knowledge requirement is not restated because 
it is difficult to conceive that a State would not have noticed the commission of a 
violation o f a peremptory norm of international law.109 Therefore, one can assume that 
the intention has to be presumed in case o f a violation of a peremptory norm of
105 See D. Marty, Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-State transfers involving Council o f  Europe 
member States (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly o f the Council o f  
Europe), A S  j  Jar (2006) 16 Part II, (Strasbourg 7 June 2006).
106 j. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 149.
107 C. Tams, note 39 above, p. 774.
108 j. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 252.
109 Ibid.
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international law. Interpretation of this area o f international law is not straightforward, 
given the heated debate that surrounds the intendon requirement in reladon to Article 16 
and will be developed in die next section. Furthermore, it is important to note that in the 
commentaries on the ILC work on State responsibility, the examples which illustrated the 
obligation not to aid and assist were about violations of a peremptory norm of 
international law, e.g. aggression.110
4.2. The Intention Requirement.
The element o f intention represents the most troublesome aspect o f the obligation not to 
aid and assist.111 Article 16 only speaks about knowledge of the circumstances which 
equates to awareness. This reference, at first sight, marks an evolution o f die work o f the 
ILC in 1978 where the intention element was specified in Article 27-the article on 
derived responsibility at the time- and the commentaries made clear that an intention 
element was required, thus putting to the test the objective nature o f State responsibility 
in international law.112 The aid and assistance had to be rendered with a view to its use in 
committing the principal internationally wrongful act (emphasis added).113
110 For the prohibition o f  aggression to be considered as jus cogens norm, see: J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 
246 and Military and Paramilitaries Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ 
Rep. (1986), pp. 100-101 (para. 190).
111 K. Nahapetian, “Confronting State Complicity in International Law” (2002-2003) 99 UCLA J. Inti Law 
& Foreign Affairs 99-127, p. 105.
112 According to the theory o f objective responsibility as opposed to the notion o f  subjective responsibility, 
the responsibility o f a State is engaged when it has breached an international obligation. One does not need 
to prove a fault, negligence or intention on its part The theory o f objective responsibility has been 
endorsed by most authors, tribunals and the ILC in its work on State responsibility. I. Brownlie, System of 
the Lam of the Nations, State Responsibility, Part I, (Oxford, 1983) and J. Crawford, S. Olleson and J. Peel, note 
18 above, p. 459.
113 ILC  Report 1978, p. 104, para. 17.
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In his commentaries, Crawford reiterates the intention element which is added to the 
necessity for the assisting State to have been aware o f the circumstances.114 However, the 
relationship between awareness and intent appears questionable. Why are the two 
conditions specified independently when there cannot obviously be intent without 
awareness? Possibly the ILC intended to reassure some States which were eager to 
emphasise the intention requirement in the obligation not to aid and assist. However, for 
some authors, the combination of awareness and intent had the effect o f increasing 
rather than decreasing confusion.115 Possibly the ILC intended to find a compromise on 
this issue because the range of opinions on the obligation not to aid and assist covered 
the non-existence of the obligation (Switzerland116) to its existence even in cases o f mere 
negligence (Netherlands and Denmark117) with, in the middle, the supporters of the 
obligation with an intention requirement. Nonetheless, one can legitimately wonder 
whether State responsibility can still be engaged when the aiding State had no intention 
to contribute to the act but was only aware of the circumstances.
Nonetheless, the academic literature on the subject unanimously emphasises the 
irrelevance of the intention requirement. Quigley, who wrote the first article on 
complicity in relation to the work o f the ILC on State responsibility, advocates the 
inappropriateness o f a too stringent culpa requirement because it is often difficult to 
determine the state of mind of a State and furthermore, in most situations where a 
receiving State commits an international violation, the aiding State does not desire the 
illegal result.118 Contrary to Quigley, Graefrath argues that the intent requirement should 
be demonstrated for plain violations o f international law whereas intention should be
114 J. Crawford, note 5 above, p. 149.
115 K. Nahapetian, note 111 above, p. 106.
116 Comments and Observations Received From Governments: Report of the International Lain Commission to the General 
Assembly, F if thy Third Session, (1998), U.N. Doc. A /C N .4/488 , p. 76.
117 Comments and Observations received From Governments: Report of the International Taiv Commission to the General 
Assembly, Fifthy Third Session, (2001), U.N. Doc. A /C N .4/515, p. 27.
118 J. Quigley, “Complicity in International Law: A N ew  Direction in the Law o f State Responsibility” 
(1986) 57 British Yearbook o f  International Law 77-131, p. 111.
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presumed in cases o f commission o f a crime. More precisely, when an organ of the 
international community, and principally an organ o f the UN, has established that an act 
poses a danger to international peace, assistance to the perpetrators o f this act is an act of 
complicity although the aiding State proves that it had not acted intentionally or that its 
assistance has been given for purely humanitarian reasons.119 Nahapedan advocates the 
incorporation o f a rebuttable presumption of intent in the ILC Articles.120 To 
corroborate her arguments, she cites the criticisms in the General Assembly Sixth 
Committee which noted that requiring “knowledge o f the circumstances” in Article 16 
seemed inappropriate because of the objective nature o f State responsibility in 
international law; second, that the intent requirement is almost impossible to prove; and 
finally, that it does not make sense in cases o f serious violations o f international law 
when the international community is fully aware of the circumstances.121 Furthermore, 
she claims that States can still be held accountable for separate treaty violations of the 
International Covenant on Civil Political Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the UN 
Charter and the Genocide Convention not only because o f the obligations o f the States 
party to these treaties not to defeat the object and purposes o f these conventions, but 
also because o f specific provisions in these treaties requiring a positive conduct of States 
in the conduct o f their foreign policies. Finally, Boivin dismisses the intention 
requirement stating that the objective o f this requirement is to ensure that the aid had 
effectively contributed to the commission of the violation of international law.122 She 
rightly states that the formulation of an intention requirement is not realistic because it 
would fall foul o f the fact that in the case o f arms trade, the motivations o f States are 
most o f the time financial and not political.
119 B. Graefrath, “Complicity in the Law o f  International Responsibility” (1996) Revue Beige de Droit 
International 370-380, pp. 376-377.
120 K. Nahapetian, note 111 above, p. 111.
121 Ibid., p. 110.
122 A. Boivin, note 102 above, p. 467.
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The replacement o f the intent requirement with awareness is a realistic solution. With a 
too strident intention requirement, only a few cases could fall into the scope o f aid and 
assistance i.e., straightforward cases where the intent requirement is inevitably present 
like the ones envisaged by the ILC in 1978 and then in 2001 (sale of arms and use of 
territory for an act o f aggression). The increasing interdependence o f States’ relationships 
and actions with one another increases the likeliness of cases o f derived responsibility. It 
is crucial to define correctly and realistically the obligation not to aid and assist and in 
general the concept of complicity in international law —as the next chapter demonstrates.
5. Conclusion.
This chapter has offered a detailed overview of the obligations spelled out in Article 41 
of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. While the existence o f an obligation to 
cooperate is subject to progressive development, the obligation not to recognise and the 
obligation not to aid and assist form part o f customary international law. The minimum 
obligation in the words o f Crawford is that the obligation not to recognise aims at 
preventing the consolidation o f an illegal situation. However, to be really efficient, the 
enforcement o f the duty not to recognise must be accompanied by parallel initiatives in 
order to put an end to a violation o f international law. In this respect, the obligation to 
cooperate finds its relevance. The combination o f the two is an efficient means to put an 
end to an illegal act.
However the analysis of the content o f the obligations set in Article 41 raises several 
questions. First o f all, one can legitimately wonder whether the characterisation of an 
obligation as peremptory or erga omnes justifies the establishment o f a differentiated
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regime o f responsibility. As seen in this chapter, the rationale o f the obligation not to 
recognise is to bar the entrenchment o f an illegal situation. The qualification of the 
nature o f the violation does not have much importance. The obligation not to aid and 
assist in Article 41 is the replica o f the obligation of Article 16 which applies to plain 
violations of international law. Finally, the difficulties surrounding the enforcement of 
the obligation to cooperate to put an end to a violation o f an obligation arising from a 
peremptory norm of international law questions the feasibility of a differentiated regime 
of responsibility. It can be contended that the categorisation o f the three obligations as a 
compulsory response to a violation o f an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of 
international law is a way to emphasize priority in the respect o f some legal obligations. 
The nature o f the obligation is not necessarily the source of a differentiated regime of 
responsibility. Erga omnes and jus cogens are concepts that echo the use o f the prescriptions 
o f international law as a call for solidarity. They reflect a vision o f what international law 
should be, o f the world we should be living in because they place emphasis on some 
values.123
Secondly, the conclusion o f the second chapter questioned whether the prescription of 
the law o f State responsibility could shed light on the content o f common Article 1 of 
the Geneva Conventions. Undoubtedly, common Article 1 must be read in light o f the 
three obligations listed in Article 41. The obligation to ensure respect entails an 
obligation not to aid and assist and not to recognize. The obligation set in Article 89 
substantially poses the same issue as the obligation to cooperate. However, the study of 
the obligations set in Article 41 did not shed light on the obligation not to encourage the
123 Criticisms on the existence o f erga omnes or jus cogens obligations have been sometimes harsh. For 
instance, for Koskenniemi, jus cogens and erga omnes obligations are “two latin expressions which have no 
clear references in this world but evoke a nostalgia for such reference and create a community out o f such 
a nostalgia”. M. Koskenniemi, “International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal” (2005) 16 
EJIL 113-124, p. 122.
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commission o f a violation o f humanitarian law. This obligation certainly does not equate 
with the obligation not to aid and assist which has been defined in very narrow terms. 
Incitement in the commission o f a violation o f international law was explicitly set aside 
from the study o f the ILC.124
This last remark leads to the final point. When the ILC intended to codify the obligation 
not to aid and assist, it delimited the scope of the obligation in very narrow terms. It 
wilfully left aside other cases of involvement o f a State in the commission o f a violation 
o f international law by another State. The next chapter demonstrates that breaches o f the 
obligation not to recognise and not to aid and assist are not the only instances where a 
State participates, reinforces and gives incentives for the commission and the 
perpetuation o f an illegal act committed by another State. It offers an account of other 
situations o f derived responsibility not covered by this article and as such tests the 
framework o f third States obligations offered by the International Law Commission.
m  ILC  Report 1978, pp. 54-55.
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Chapter Three
The Contribution of Third States to the Commission o f a Violation of 
International Law or the Perpetuation of Other Violations o f International Law: 
Going Beyond the Framework of the ILC.
The previous chapter established that from the obligations listed in Article 41 o f the ILC 
Articles on State responsibility, both the duty not to recognise and the obligation not to 
aid and assist, are customary obligations. However, one can wonder whether the 
framework offered by Article 41 grasps the entire ranges of attitudes, actions and 
inactions of States to contribute to the commission or the perpetuation o f violations o f 
international law committed by another State. In the commentaries, as well as in the 
second report on State responsibility, the rapporteur lists other cases o f derived 
responsibility, or participation o f another State in the commission o f a violation of 
international law which are not limited to issues of aid and assistance.1 Some o f these 
omissions have already been tackled by the Commission in the Articles, such as, for 
instance direction, control and coercion which are covered by Articles 17 and 18 of the 
ILC Articles on State Responsibility.2 Furthermore, in his commentaries, the rapporteur 
mentions two cases o f derived responsibility or participation of another State in the 
commission o f a violation of international law which were not taclded in the draft. They 
are the duty o f due diligence and the obligation emerging from the Soering case.3 The
1 Second report on State Responsibility, International 'Law Commission, Fifty First session, 1st April 1999, 
A /C N .4 /4 9 8 /Ackl.l, p. 3 (hereinafter Second report on State Responsibility, Fifty First Session) and J. 
Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and Commentaries, 
(Cambridge, N ew  York 2002), pp. 145-146.
2 “Article 17. Direction and control exercised over the commission of an internationally wrongful act.
A State which directs and controls another State in the commission o f an internationally wrongful act by 
the latter is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) That State does so with knowledge o f the circumstances o f the internationally wrongful act; and
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if  committed by that State”.
“Article 18. Coercion of another State
A State which coerces another State to commit an act is internationally responsible for that act if:
(a) The act would, but for the coercion, be an internationally wrongful act o f  the coerced State; and
(b) The coercing State does so with knowledge o f the circumstances o f the act”.
3J. Crawford, note 1 above, p. 146 and Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment 7 July 1989, (1989) 11 EHRR 
439.
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present chapter gives an account o f both and it investigates whether the non-inclusion of 
these situations in the draft leaves the door open to the possibility o f the existence of 
other situations o f participative responsibility. As such it offers an account o f the emergence 
o f the obligation, in the context o f arms sales, to enquire about the human rights records 
of the addressee State. The chapter also raises the case of the controversy o f the Dutch 
battalion at Srebrenica and questions whether any principle o f international law can be 
inferred from this case. Finally, it offers a brief account of the content o f the duty not to 
encourage the commission o f a violation of international Jaw as stated by the 
International Court o f Justice in relation to Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions in the 
'Nicaragua case. Finally, the present chapter intends to establish a link between these 
different cases by offering a central role to the concept of acquiescence in international 
law.
The object of the present chapter is not to offer a non-exhaustive list o f cases of 
responsibility o f States in the formal sense of the term, i.e., the legal relationship that 
arises under international law from the wrongful act of a State and which involves legal 
consequences such as cessation, non-repetition or the adoption of counter-measures.4 It 
is an invitation to envisage cases and situations where a State can contribute to the 
commission and the perpetuation o f a violation o f international law committed by 
another State.
1. Due Diligence in International Law.
Rapporteur Crawford considered the Soering and Corfu Channel cases to be connected as 
relating to participative responsibility and put these two cases under the same heading
4 J Crawford, ibid., pp. 79-80.
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“Independently wrongful conduct involving another State”? Both involve cases of due diligence in 
the sense that both relate to die obligation of a State to prevent a violation of 
international law or an act that would harm the interests of another State because it is in 
a position to do something. Its disregard for the illegal conduct o f another State or for 
what can infringe the interests of another State might engage its own international 
responsibility. After having given an overview of the duty o f due diligence in 
international, the present section analyses the Soering case in the light o f the principle of 
due diligence and examines how an obligation o f scrutiny of the human rights record of a 
third State is emerging in the context o f arms trade.
1.1. Overview o f the Duty o f Due Diligence.
The duty o f due diligence is the obligation to prevent the commission o f a violation of 
international law or a lawful activity which harms the interests o f another State. The 
breach of the duty o f due diligence is established when a State fails to act against such a 
lawful or unlawful act when it is reasonably expected that this State could, in the words 
o f Pisillo, have used its apparatus to prevent it commission from happening.6 The most 
cited case on due diligence is the Corfu Channel case. In this case, the ICJ decided that 
Albania was responsible for not taking action to prevent the damage caused to British 
ships by landmines that it did not lay itself.7 The same rationale is to be found in the 
Hostages case where it was adjudged that Iran had failed to take the requisite steps to 
prevent and stop an attack on the US embassy and the taking o f 63 diplomats and three
5 Second report on State Responsibility, Fifty First Session, note 1 above, p. 4.
6 R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, “The D ue Diligence Rule and the Nature o f  the International Responsibility o f  
States” 35 German Yearbook o f  International Law 9-51, p. 27.
7 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), ICJ Rep. (1949), p. 4.
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additional U.S. citizens hostage inside the American diplomatic mission in Tehran by 
Iranian students.8
The ILC, at the time Garcia Amador was rapporteur (1956-1961), considered including the 
due diligence duty in the draft Articles on State responsibility. It was dealt with in relation 
to injuries caused to aliens. It was excised from the draft because it was considered to be 
a primary rule and the ILC decided to limit strictly the draft Articles to secondary rules.9 
In 1978, Roberto Ago, the rapporteur at the time (1962-1979), stated explicitly that due 
diligence did not cover a case of complicity although it remained a case o f participation 
of a State in the unlawful conduct of another State.10 The same statement is to be found 
in the 2001 commentaries with an indirect reference to the Corfu channel case.11
The duty of due diligence is actually a hybrid obligation. It puts to the test the divide 
between primary and secondary obligations and hence, the methodology of the ILC as 
well as the objective nature o f State responsibility as enshrined in the Articles.12 In this 
respect, according to Garcia Amador, it is per excellence the expression o f the theory of 
fault. The responsibility o f one State will not be engaged unless proof o f manifest 
negligence in not taking some measures which could reasonably have been expected to 
be taken in the same circumstances is demonstrated.13
8 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), ICJ Rep. 
(1980), p. 31 (para. 63). In this case, Iran was also held responsible because the students were considered 
agents o f the State since Iran endorsed their actions a posteriori. Ibid, p. 35 (para. 74).
9 H. Blomeyer-Bartenstein, Due Diligence, In R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Earn, 
(Amsterdam, London 1992), pp. 1110-1115, p. 1113. Primary norms regulate the behaviour o f subjects o f  
international law while secondary norms regulate the primary rules like the creation, modification, 
extinction, interpretation and operation o f a norm. The distinction has its origin in Hart’s legal theory. 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Earn (Oxford 1961). See A. Marschik, “Too Much Order? The Impact o f Special 
Secondary Norms on the Unity and Efficacy o f  the International Legal System” (1998) 9 EJIL 1998 212- 
239, p. 212
10 Second report on State Responsibility, Fifty First Session, note 1 above, p. 53.
11 J. Crawford, note 1 above, p. 146.
12 For a definition o f the objective theory o f State responsibility, see Chapter Two o f this dissertation, p. 
90, note 112 above.
13 H. Blomeyer-Bartenstein, note 9 above, p. 1113.
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Recently, the content o f the duty o f due diligence has been revisited by Pisillo who 
provides an analysis o f the obligation outside the classic theoretical divides 
primary/secondary obligation, objective/subjective responsibility.14 According to Pisillo, 
the concept o f diligence serves to establish an objective standard of behaviour required 
from the State in fulfilling its duty to protect.15 More precisely, it serves as a criterion for 
establishing die exact fulfilment o f a particular category of obligations whose execution 
objectively presents an important risk for the obligator. In other words, the addressee of 
this obligation is not bound to guarantee a certain objective result but only to make a 
diligent effort to seek to reach the result.16 The concept o f due diligence is to be 
measured according to several variables such as the degree of effectiveness o f a State’s 
control over certain areas o f its territory, the importance of the interest to be protected, 
and the degree o f predictability o f the harm. Therefore, due diligence is naturally to be 
found in fields of international law such as environmental law, diplomatic law, the 
protection o f the marine environment, and the treatment o f aliens.17 They are areas of 
the law where States exercise a form of control but where this control is subject to limits 
which are outside its decision-making power.
1.2. The Socniii? Case or the Obligation to Refrain from Facilitating a Human       — —   “            ©  ^   -
Rights Abuse.
The second case o f participative responsibility raised by the 2001 commentaries is the 
Soering case, judged before the European Court o f Human Rights.
14 R. Pisillo, note 6 above.
15 Ibid., p. 44.
lfi Ibid., p. 30.
17 M. Flemme, Due Diligence in International Law, Master Thesis, (Lund, 2004), p. 41.
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Jens Soering, a German citizen was accused o f having killed the parents o f his girlfriend 
in their homes in Virginia (US) and was arrested and detained in the United Kingdom. 
Both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) requested his 
extradition. In 1988, the British Secretary o f State for the Home Department signed the 
order to extradite Soering to the United States where he risked being condemned to 
death. Jens Soering appealed this decision. The case was decided by the European Court 
o f Human Rights on the 7th o f July 1989.18
After having examined the rigour o f the detention regime in the State o f Virginia, the 
special regime o f the “death row corridors”, the length of time between • the 
condemnation and execution o f the sentence, the circumstances o f the case, notably the 
extradition request formulated by the F.R.G. and the age o f the plaintiff, the European 
Court o f Human Rights held that the UK would be in violation o f Article 3 o f the 
European Convention on Human Rights if it extradited Jens Soering.19 The Court 
considered that it was likely that when extradited and judged in the United States, Jens 
Soering would be condemned to death and hence exposed to the “death row 
phenomenon” i.e. spending several years waiting for his sentence to be carried out, 
which in his case, given his mental health condition would amount to a treatment going
beyond the threshold set by Article 3, i.e. would constitute a cruel and inhumane
20treatment.
In  this case, Article 3 o f the ECHR was interpreted in the light o f the 1984 United 
Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment which expressly prohibits the extradition of a person where
18 Soering, note 3 above.
19 Article 3 o f  the European Convention o f Human Rights: “N o one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”,
20 Soering, para. 111.
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there are substantial grounds for believing that he would face the danger o f being 
subjected to torture (Article 3).21 Furthermore, the judgment of the Court is the result of 
a combined implementation o f Articles 1 and 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights: the High Contracting Parties to the ECHR have the obligation to protect anyone 
within their jurisdiction from a predictable danger o f inhuman or degrading treatment.22
However, Soering can also be analysed in the light o f the duty o f due diligence. The 
obligation behind this case contains similar variables as the ones o f due diligence: the 
exercise o f control by a State over its territory and the jurisdiction it exercise over its 
citizens and residents, the importance of the interest to be protected and the likelihood 
of the commission of the human rights abuse. The extra-territorial nature of the 
commission of the violation o f human rights highlights an important element in the 
obligation contained in this case: the exercise of scrutiny over the human rights record of 
an another State. According to the ILC rapporteur, Soering differs from an aid and assisting 
situation because there is no causal link between the extradition and the violation o f 
human rights.23 In Soering, the UK was under the obligation to refrain from an action 
which might have had, as a consequence, the violation of an obligation o f international 
law. In this case, the violation of international law was not actual but potential and the 
UK authorities could not possibly ignore it. According to the Soering case and the 
following jurisprudence o f the Court, State authorities have to anticipate possible 
violations of international law by scrutinising the human rights record o f the State
21 Soering, para. 88.
22 Article 1 o f  the European Convention o f  Human Rights: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I o f this Convention”. E. 
Decaux, P.-H. Imbert and L.-E. Pettiti (eds.), Lm Convention Europeenne des Droits de / ’Homme, Commentaire 
Article par Article, 2d ed., (Paris 1999), p. 156 and F. Julien-Laferriere, L’application par ricochet de Particle 
3 CEDH. L’exemple des mesures d’eloignement des etrangers, In C.-A. Chassin (ed.), Ea Portee dc lArticle 3 
de la Convention Eutvpeenne des Droits de IHomme, (Bruxelles 2006), pp. 141-155, p. 154.
23 Second report on State Responsibility, Fifty First Session, note 1 above, p. 4, footnote 360.
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requesting the extradition, its political regime and the personal situation o f the plaintiff.24 
As such, these cases invite to envisage the obligation of due diligence as an obligation to 
refrain from facilitating the commission o f human tights abuse.
In this respect, a similar obligation is emerging in the context o f the arms trade. In this 
situation, one State is in die capacity to prevent the commission o f an illegal act when it 
has reasonable grounds to believe that its failure to act would increase the likelihood of a 
violation o f international law which will occur extra-territorially.
1*3. The Em ergence o f an Obligation of Due Diligence Entailing the Exercise 
o f a Scrutiny over the Likelihood of the Commission of H um an Rights 
Abuse by Another or Other States in the Context o f the Arms Trade.
In 1998, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Code o f Conduct for Arms 
Exports which is a non-binding instrument.25 The code invites member States o f the EU 
to adopt a licensing regime for the arms trade that gives due regard to the level o f respect 
for international law in the countries o f destination. Under Criterion 2, a license 
application will be refused if there is a clear risk diat the proposed export will be used for 
internal repression.26 According to Criterion 4 o f the EU Code, licence applications
24 J.-F. Renucci, Traite de Droit Europeen des Dtvits de / ’Homme, (Pads, 2007), 131. The rationale o f the Soering 
case have been extended to cases o f  expulsions (Cms  ^ Varas and Others v. Sweden, judgment o f 20 March 
1991, (1991) 14 EHRR 1) and refoulement (Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, judgment o f 30 October 1991, (1991) 
14 EH RR  248) and this in line with Geneva Convention relating to the Status o f  Refugees, 28 July 1951 
(Article 33 (1) o f the Convention: “N o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refonle/*) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers o f  territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account 
o f his race, religion, nationality, membership o f  a particular social group or political opinion”. However for 
the principle to apply, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that there exist substantial grounds to believing that 
the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk o f being subjected to a treatment contrary to 
Article 3 in the receiving country (Chahal v. United Kingdom, judgment 15 November 1996, (1996) 23 EHRR 
413).
25 Available at http: /  / www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs /cm sllpload/08675r2en8.pdf (last visited 15 
December 2008). Hereinafter “the code”.
26 “CRITERION TWO. The respect o f  human rights in the country o f final destination
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should be refused where there exists a clear risk that the recipient would use the 
proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial 
claim.27 Therefore, the possibility o f a potentially serious violation o f international law 
exhorts member States o f the EU to enquire into the final use o f the weapons which they 
allow out o f their territory.
The implementation of the code by EU countries varies from one country to another. 
Some countries have incorporated the prescriptions of the code in their own legislation.28 
However, the non-uniform implementation o f the prescriptions o f the code poses certain 
issues and several discrepancies in the enforcement of individual embargoes. The 
European Parliament called repeatedly for the code to be made legally binding but the 
Council never adopted the code as a Common Position that would have rendered its 
provisions obligatory, given the will o f some member States to lift die arms ban on 
China.29 At present, a confidential annual report on exports and implementation of the 
code is to be circulated by each EU member State to the other EU states. Following this, 
a public report on the basis o f the individual States’ submissions is produced. However,
Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international 
human rights instruments, Member States will:
a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal 
repression.
b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account o f  
the nature o f  the equipment, to countries where serious violations o f human rights have been established 
by the competent bodies o f the U N , the Council o f Europe or by the EU [...]”
27 “CRITERION FOUR
Preservation o f regional peace, security and stability
Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use 
the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.
When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into account inter alia:
a) the existence or likelihood o f  armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
b) a claim against the territory o f a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or 
threatened to pursue by means o f  force;
c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and 
defence o f the recipient;
d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.”
28 For instance, the United Kingdom has given effect to the provisions o f  the Code through the Export 
Control Act 2002.
29 See resolution o f the European Parliament, 13 March 2008, P6„TA(2008)0101. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubR ef~-//EP//TEX T+TA +P6-TA-2008-
0101+0+D Q C +X M L+V 0 / /E N  (last visited 15 December 2008).
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this document does not disclose the complete details of actual arms exports made by EU 
States but only lists the values o f licences issued and deliveries made. It does not mention 
what specific weapon sale was denied, nor to whom.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the code encourages States to investigate the 
end-use o f the weapons they transfer. In this sense, it is the expression o f the exercise of 
a scrutiny for violations of international law occurring outside the boundaries o f a State. 
The ICRC and several human rights non-governmental organisations are pressing States 
to adopt and enforce such an obligation o f due diligence in the context o f the arms trade.
Initially, the code inspired an initiative from the ICRC, which, in 1999, called for the 
development o f national and international codes of conduct limiting arms transfers 
according to the level o f respect for international humanitarian law by the recipient 
State.30 The ICRC suggested that licensing States should assess the extent to which 
recipient States are committed to respecting norms of international humanitarian law. 
This obligation is said to derive from common Article 1 o f the Geneva Conventions. 
Hence, it is an expression o f the duty to ensure respect for the conventions in all 
circumstances. Therefore, according to the code, licensing States should deny the 
granting o f a licence not only when they are destined for States that are responsible for 
serious violations o f humanitarian law, but also for States that fail diligently to implement 
preventive and enforcement measures for the respect of humanitarian law within their 
jurisdiction.31
30 Arms Availability and the Situation o f  Civilians in Armed Conflict, A Study Presented by the ICRC, 
(Geneva 1999), p. 65. Available at h ttp;// www.icrc.org/W eb/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htm l/p0734 (last visited 15 
December 2008)
31 A. Boivin, “Complicity and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer o f  Small Arms and Light 
Weapons” (2005) International Committee o f the Red Cross Review 467-496, p. 479.
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Finally, in 2004 a coalition o f non-governmental groups, namely Oxfam, Amnesty 
International and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), prepared a 
draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers which would, among 
other things, establish an international registry o f small arms transfers and ban the 
transfer o f arms to any countries likely to use those arms to violate human rights or 
international humanitarian law.32 In a briefing paper, Amnesty, Oxfam and the Control 
Arms campaign note that “the objective o f such a treaty is to consolidate states’ existing 
and emerging obligations under international law into one framework convention. It is a 
simple, clear document, which does not contain new substantive legal obligations but 
provides an unambiguous universal standard for international arms transfers”. The treaty 
“defines the criteria against which any proposed cross-border transfer (export, import, 
transit, or transhipment) o f conventional arms should be permitted” and “it requires 
states to incorporate diese criteria into their national laws and to make regular public 
reports to an international registry of all arms transfers”.33
Article 3 o f the current version o f the Draft Framework Convention is entitled 
“Limitations Based on Use” and reads as follows:
“A Contracting Party shall not authorise international transfers o f arms 
in circumstances in which it has knowledge or ought reasonably to have 
knowledge that transfers o f arms o f the kind under consideration are 
likely to be:
32 The text o f the Draft Framework Convention is available at 
http://www.iansa.org/documents/2004/att 0504.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008).
33 Towards an Armed Trade Treaty. Next Steps Towards the U N  Programme for Action (Amnesty 
International, IANSA and Oxfam), (2005). Available at
http: /  Avww.amnesty.org/es/library/ in fo /P O L 34/007 /2005/en (last visited 15 December 2008),
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a. used in breach o f the United Nations Charter or corresponding rules 
of customary international law, in particular those on the prohibition on 
the threat or use o f force in international relations;
b. used in the commission of serious violations o f human rights;
c. used in the commission o f serious violations of international 
humanitarian law applicable in international or non-international armed 
conflict;
d. used in the commission o f genocide or crimes against humanity;
e. diverted and used in the commission of any of the acts referred to in 
the preceding sub-paragraphs of this Article” .34
In June and July 2005, the UK government tried to obtain the backing o f the Draft 
Framework Convention from other G8 participants.35 On 6 December 2006, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution seeking an arms trade treaty establishing 
common international standards for the import, export and transfer o f conventional 
arms.36 Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General invited Member 
States to submit their views on an arms trade treaty (ATT). Over 90 States have provided 
submissions. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has 
undertaken a two-part study involving an in-depth analysis o f States’ views on an A T T.37 
The UNIDIR research found that most governments are urging respect for human rights
34 Draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers, Control Arms Campaign, 25 May 2004, 
note 32.
35 “The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, publicly confirmed the UK government’s commitment to work for 
an international Arms Trade Treaty and to ‘use its unique position, as the president o f the G8 this July, to 
do everything in its power to get an international treaty on political agenda’”. “Campaigners Welcome 
Straw Commitment on Arms Trade Treaty and Urge Swift Action”, Press Communique, Amnesty 
International, 15 March 2005 cited in A. Boivin, note 31 above, p. 492, note 109.
36 Sixty-first General Assembly, Resolution A /R E S /61 /89 . 153 states voted in favour.
37 S. Parker, Analysis o f States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty (United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research), (Geneva 2007). See also S. Parker, Implications o f States’ Views on an Aims Trade Treaty, 
(United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research), (Geneva 2008). Both available respectively at 
http://www.unidii~.ch/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-l-92-9045-008-A-en.pdf and 
http: /  / www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf3-act349.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008).
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when decisions are made about arms transfers. There is also strong support by a majority 
o f governments for provisions to respect international humanitarian law such as the 
Geneva Conventions and Protocols and a ban on arming terrorist groups.38 Other criteria 
cited by many governments for the new treaty include the prevention o f arms transfers 
where there is a clear risk of diversion, such as to violate international arms embargoes, 
and if there is a danger that the arms will be used in serious crime or have a negative 
impact on sustainable development. In February 2008, a group o f government experts 
coming from 28 countries started to weave the governments’ submissions into a draft 
future ATT. Their work was presented before the UN General Assembly's First 
Committee in October 2008 where a total o f 116 countries co-sponsored a resolution 
calling for further work in 2009 in the UN towards an ATT and 147 countries voted in 
favour (18 abstained and 2 voted against).39
These three examples confirm the emergence o f an obligation o f due diligence for States 
for violations o f international law occurring outside their own territory at least in the field 
o f the arms trade. This obligation involves the exercise of a form of scrutiny over 
violations by foreign States o f their commitments and obligations under international law 
and human rights. It corresponds to the necessity to adopt precautionary measures in 
order not to provide aid and assistance to the commission of grave violations of 
international law. Interestingly, in this case, the likelihood o f the occurrence o f the 
violation deprives the obligation not to aid and assist of the intention requirement. It is 
only because a violation o f international law is likely to happen that States have a duty of 
vigilance. I f  they do not enquire into the level of respect for human rights and
38 62/70 States in favour o f a human rights transfer criterion, 58/70 in favour o f  a humanitarian law 
transfer criterion and 51/70 in favour o f  a terrorism transfer criterion. S. Parker (2007), ibid., p. 10.
39 h ttp ;//www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/counter-terrorism/weapons/arms-trade-treaty/ (last visited 15 
December 2008). For the latest developments on this topic, visit www.controlarms.org (last visited 15 
December 2008).
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humanitarian law of the State where the arms are supposed to be sent, they increase the 
likelihood o f the commission o f violation o f international law.
2. “N on  Assistance to an Endangered Population”: Dutchbat in Srebrenica.
Can silence and inaction amount to complicity? The complex issue o f the Dutch 
Peacekeeping forces in Srebrenica still resonates not only because o f the unease it 
provokes but also because it raises the question whether complicity by abstention or an 
obligation o f assistance to an endangered population exists in international law.
In July 1995, around eight thousand Muslim Bosnians were murdered while the city of 
Srebrenica was declared to be a “safe area” and protected by the Dutch battalion, 
Dutchbat, which operated under the egis o f the United Nations Protection Force, 
UNPROFOR. The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIWD) was 
instructed one year later by the Dutch government to release a report on the events that 
surrounded the fall o f Srebrenica and the massacre. It concluded, among other things, 
that the mandate given to the troops was unclear, Dutchbat was insufficiently prepared, 
there was a failure in intelligence-sharing, and the air support requested by Dutchbat 
came too late.40 After the report was released, in 2002, the Dutch government of Prime 
Minister Wim Kok resigned and a Parliamentary Committee o f Inquiry was formed in 
June 2002 whose conclusive report is in line with the one o f NIW D.41
40 Available with Dutch and English versions at http: /  / www.srebrenica.nl/en /a index.htm (last visited 15 
December 2008). For a summary o f  its content: N . Keijxer, “Netherlands Correspondents’ Reports” (2002) 
5 Yearbook o f International Humanitarian Law 574-575.
41 Available at www.overheid.nl/op/index.html (last visited 15 December 2008). For a summary o f  its 
content: N . Keijzer, “Netherlands Correspondents’ Reports” (2003) 6 Yearbook o f  International 
Humanitarian Law 547-549.
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Parallel to these national inquiries, the Secretary General of the United Nations also 
published a report on the fall of Srebrenica.42 Its comments on the role o f Dutch 
peacekeeping forces leave the issue unanswered. It states: “it is not possible to say with 
any certainty that stronger actions by the Dutch would have saved lives, and it is even 
possible that such efforts could have done more harm than good”.43
Years after the massacre, the case remains a hotly-debated issue. In November 2003, 
families o f the victims sued the Dutch government and the UN at the Court of First 
Instance o f The Hague for failing to protect the enclave. The arguments revolved 
essentially on issues o f attribution o f responsibility between the United Nations and the 
Dutch forces. The Court finally rejected the appellant’s request by pointing out that a 
number of witnesses the claimants proposed to hear had already been heard in the 
context o f the NIW D research.44 On 16 June 2008, the District Court at The Hague 
heard another action brought against the Dutch State by relatives o f the victims of 
genocide at Srebrenica. The plaintiffs' lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld argued that the Dutch 
government and the Dutch command within UNPROFOR were responsible for the 
gross negligence shown by Dutch troops in protecting the population o f Srebrenica.45 
The Hague District Court held that the Dutch peace-keeping forces were acting under 
the aegis of the United Nations and hence that it had no jurisdiction in a suit against the 
United Nations because o f the principle o f UN immunity from prosecution, even when 
genocide is involved. 46
42 “Report o f the Secretary-General pursuant to GA Res. 53/35: the fall o f  Srebrenica”, UN Doc. 
A /5 4 /5 4 9 ,15 November 1999.
43 Ibid., p. 105.
44 Udrn^enja Gradana ‘Zene Srebrenice’ Tusfa v. The Netherlands (Court o f First Instance o f  The Hague, 27 
November 2003), LJN- N o. N897S, Case No. 03.531. Available at www.rechtspraak.nl/flashed.asp. (last 
visited 15 December 2008). For a summary o f  the case: E. V. Sliedregt, “Netherlands Correspondents’ 
Reports” (2003) 6 Yearbook o f International Humanitarian Law 549-551.
42 More details at http://srebrenica-genocide.blogspot.com (last visited 15 December 2008).
4fi Association of Citizens ‘Mothers of Srebrenica” et al v. The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations (District 
Court in The Hague, 10 July 2008), LJN BD6796, 295247 /  HA ZA 07-2973. Judgment in the incidental
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Apart from determining whether the UN or the Netherlands would be the legal entity 
responsible, the case presents several unresolved questions. Could Dutchbat have 
reasonably expected that the Serbs would commit such atrocities which amounted to an 
act o f genocide?47 If  they had fought to defend Srebrenica, could they have prevented the 
wide-scale massacre?
Beyond these issues, the case of Dutchbat at Srebrenica still resonates today because it 
questions the existence for an international actor of a duty to intervene in circumstances 
where it has the capacity to prevent a major violation of international law. This case is 
controversial because it presupposes the responsibility of a State or an international actor 
which has the political and material means to intervene in a situation o f serious breach of 
international law. More generally, this case addresses the necessity for the international 
community to protect any population under the threat of a wide-scale violation o f human 
rights.48
proceedings. The text o f  the judgment is available in English at 
http;// www.vandiepen.com/upload/file/srebrenica/Judgement.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008).
47 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Monteneg/v), Statement to the Press by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President o f the International 
Court o f Justice, 26 February 2007, point 7. Available at www.ici- 
cij.org/search/index.php?p2=2&pg=4pl&str=bosnia (last visited 15 December 2008).
48 The massacre o f  Srebrenica - along with the tragedies o f  Rwanda, Kosovo and Somalia - revived the 
debate on "humanitarian intervention" by tragically highlighting the failures o f  die international 
community to intervene in cases o f wide-scale violations o f human rights. In an address to the 54th session 
o f the UN General Assembly in September 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected upon “the 
prospects for human security and intervention in the next century,” Following this, in September 2000 the 
Government o f  Canada announced the establishment o f  an independent International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It released its report in December 2001: The Responsibility to 
Protect, (ICISS), (2001). The report defined the existence o f a new “norm”, the responsibility to protect. It 
suggested an obligation for any State in cases o f  genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing to protect its own population. Should the State find itself unable or unwilling to do so, it would 
then be incumbent upon the international community to protect die population in danger, even if that 
meant resorting to the use o f military force. The responsibility to protect enjoys wide recognition. It was 
endorsed by U N G A  World Summit Outcome Document in 2005 (UNGA Resolution 60/1 , 16 September 
2005) and subsequent Security Council Resolutions (UNSC Resolution 1674, 28 April 2006 and UNSC  
Resolution 1706, 31 August 2006) reaffirmed the Outcome Document. It seems nonetheless that this 
“norm” has not yet passed the threshold necessary to become a customary international obligation. Much 
has been written about the responsibility'' to protect. See for instance: G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: 
Rinding Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for A ll, (Washington, 2008); R. Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and
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The role, or rather the non-involvement, o f the Dutch peace-keeping forces raised many 
questions because they were stationed around Srebrenica at the time of the commission 
of the massacre. They had knowledge of the situation, they had the means to intervene 
and to stop the massacre: they were in a position to do something. Even if they had not 
engaged in combat, they could have alerted United Nations higher authorities of what 
was happening.
However, this is not to say that these types o f circumstances are totally unknown in law. 
For instance, French law has criminalised silence when knowledge o f a situation of 
maltreatment of a vulnerable person or a person under 18 is not reported to die relevant 
authorities.49 The situation o f the person convicted in this case is not one of an 
accomplice. It is not only the knowledge of the situation which offers the possibility to 
act to prevent harm to the victim but the proximity to the circumstances which includes 
him or her in the criminal sphere. A parallel can be made with the case o f the Dutch 
peacekeeping forces at Srebrenica: because of their proximity to the violation of 
international law, their status was changed and they were not longer a mere third party to 
this violation o f international law. Their presence on the ground created a form of 
involvement to the circumstances where mere silence and inaction had direct 
consequences. The same rationale is to be found behind la loi du silence and also in cases 
o f non-assistance to an endangered person in general where there is a legitimate 
expectation that a person would have reacted.
Security: From Collective Security to the 'Responsibility to Protect, (Cambridge 2006). This dissertation is principally 
concerned with issues o f active and passive complicity. Further research on the responsibility to protect is 
thus beyond its remit.
49 The Act is known as la loi du silence. Article 434-3 o f  the French “Code Penal”: "Le fait pour quiconque 
ayant eu connaissance de mauvais txaitements ou privations infliges a un mineur de quince ans ou a une 
personne qui n'est pas en mesure de se proteger en raison de son age, d'une maladie, d'une infirmite, d'une 
deficience physique ou psychique ou d'un etat de grossesse, de ne pas en informer les autorites judiciaires 
ou administratives est puni de trois ans d'emprisonnement et de 45000 euros d'amende”.
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It is, however, still doubtful whether these situations, such as at Srebrenica constitute a 
ground for international responsibility. However, as they strike at our conscience, it is 
important to analyse them outside o f the a priori divide between morals, politics and law, 
as well as outside the strict legal framework o f international complicity, just by giving 
importance to the way they emerge and occur.
3. Encouraging the Com m ission of a Violation o f International Law.
In 1978, when codifying the obligation not to aid and assist, the ILC set aside the case of 
incitement to commit a violation o f international law.50 According to the ILC, the 
decision o f a sovereign State to adopt a certain course o f conduct is its own decision, 
even if it has received suggestions and advice from another State, which it was at liberty 
not to follow.51 Nonetheless, between mere incitement, or advice and suggestions, and 
aid and assistance, there exist different degrees o f participation in the violation of 
international law by another State. Encouragement is one o f them. For Kessler, the term 
encouragement has never been defined in international law and is therefore rather 
vague.52 Nonetheless, even if the obligation not to encourage has never attracted the 
attention o f academic writers, a few elements in the case-law of the International Court 
o f Justice exist in order to draw the outlines o f this obligation.
As stated in the first chapter o f this dissertation, in its recent study on customary rules of 
international humanitarian law, the ICRC acknowledged the existence of an obligation of
50 “We do not know o f  any cases in which, at the juridical level, a State has been alleged to be 
internationally responsible solely by reason o f  such incitement. Nor do we know o f  any cases in which 
States have agreed to absolve from its responsibility a State which, although it might have been incited by a 
third State, nevertheless, o f its own free will, breached an internadonal obligation binding it to another 
State”. Yearbook o f the International Law Commission 1978, vol. II, Part One, pp. 54-55.
51 Ibid., p. 55.
52 B. Kessler, “The Duty to ‘Ensure Respect’ Under Common Article 1 o f  the Fourth Geneva Convention: 
Its Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflict” (2001) 44 German Yearbook o f  
International Law 498-516, p. 503.
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States to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law.53 This obligation 
entails a duty not to encourage violations o f humanitarian law by parties to an armed 
conflict. The obligation not to encourage violations of humanitarian law was reiterated at 
the 30th Conference o f the ICRC in 2007.54 This obligation is to be found in UNGA 
resolution “Declaration on Principles o f International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” .55 
It was formulated by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case in relation to 
the publication and the diffusion by the United States of a manual on psychological 
warfare among the Nicaraguan guerrilla movement.56 In this case, it was considered that 
encouragement is different from “aiding and assisting” because there did not exist any 
causal link between the publication of the military handbook and the commission o f the 
violation o f international law.57 In this respect, encouragement does not contribute 
significantly to the commission o f the violation o f international law, as in the case o f aid 
and assistance, but fosters or facilitates its accomplishment. It is not material to the 
commission o f the violation o f international law.
53L. Doswald-Beck and J.-M. Heckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian I^aw. Volume 1: Kales, 
(Cambridge 2005), p. 509.
“Reaffirmation and Implementation o f  International Humanitarian Law. Preserving Human Life and 
Dignity in Armed Conflict”, 30th Conference o f  the ICRC, 26-30 November 2007.
55 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, A /R E S/25/2625. “Every State has 
the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization o f irregular forces or armed bands, 
including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory o f another State” and “Nothing in the foregoing 
paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any acdon which would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity o f  sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle o f equal rights and self-determination o f  peoples as described 
above [...!•” The purpose for which the General Assembly adopted the declaration was the codification and 
progressive development o f the major principles deemed to be part o f  the law o f  die United Nations as it 
was at the time o f  the coming into force o f the Charter and as it had developed in the meantime. G. 
Arango-Ruiz, The United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of Sources of International Lam, 
(Alphe aan de Rijn, 1979), p. 89.
56 M ilitay and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Rep. 
(1986), p. 114, (para. 220).
57 N. Levrat, Les consequences de l'engagement pris par les Hautes Parties Contractantes de “faire 
respecter” les Conventions humanitaires, In F. Kalshoven (ed.), Implementation of Humanitarian Law, 
(Dordrecht, London 1989), pp. 263-296, p. 263.
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When the Court found the United States responsible for encouraging violations of 
international humanitarian law, it was material to consider “whether that encouragement 
was offered to persons in circumstances where the commission of such acts was likely or 
foreseeable”.58 Therefore, the judgment of the Court leads to the view that the likelihood 
o f the occurrence of the violations of international law and the awareness o f the possible 
occurrence are factors to take into consideration in order to establish the responsibility 
o f one State for encouraging a violation of international law. According to Chinkin, the 
tests o f likelihood and foreseeability were applied subjectively to “those responsible” for 
the publication and dissemination of the Manual.59 In this sense, it was the awareness of 
the United States o f the impact o f the publication on the conduct of the Contras that led 
to the decision o f the judges to hold the US responsible for encouraging a conduct 
contrary to the laws of war. In the circumstances o f the case, the aid provided to the 
Contras had the effect of fostering, giving incentives and facilitating the commission of a 
violation o f humanitarian law.
Even if it is disputable whether the duty not to encourage has reached or not the status 
o f a customary obligation, encouragement is undoubtedly counted as a significant 
contributing factor when a third State participates in the violation of an obligation of 
international law committed by another State or a non-State actor.
4. Giving Incentives to the Commission and the Perpetuation o f a Violation of 
International Law: the Case o f Acquiescence.
Encouragement involves the commission o f a positive action from the State which 
encourages. However, can encouragement or incentive for the commission o f a violation
58 Nicaragua case, note 56 above, p. 130 (para 256).
59 C. Chinkin, Third Parties in International Lair, (Oxford 1993), p. 298.
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of international law be induced from silence and inaction from a third party? This 
question is the object o f the last investigation o f this chapter. The analysis of the 
importance o f silence and inaction in fostering and encouraging the development and 
entrenchment o f illegal situations requires one to envisage international law not as a set 
o f rules but in an empirical manner, i.e., by analyzing the process o f creating rights and 
obligations in international law.60 In such an analysis, the process o f acquiescence is 
central to understanding the influence which States can exercise on the commission and 
entrenchment of illegal situations.
4.1. Approaching International Law as a Process not As a Set o f Rules.
International law should not be seen as a set o f prescriptions only, in the same way that 
learning music is not only about learning how to read a musical score and practice an 
instrument but is also about experiencing the interactions between the musicians of an 
orchestra or a smaller ensemble if it is performed collectively, as well as conveying 
emotions, interpreting a piece, understanding what the arrangement is, etc. In 
furtherance of that aim, situations which emerge from the international sphere should be 
viewed outside of the strict legal framework of international third State responsibility 
offered by the ILC, by giving importance to the way these situations emerge from the 
international sphere and by looking at the degree of contribution o f third States to 
specific violations o f international law.
When writing about the law of the sea, McDougal stated that it was a process of 
continuous interaction, o f continuous demand and response, in which the decision­
makers o f particular nation States unilaterally put forward claims o f the most diverse and
60 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford 1994), p. 1.
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conflicting character.61 A similar commentary could be applied to public international law 
which also has to do with competing claims formulated by its actors, whether they be 
assertions o f rights or promises as well as claims for exceptional circumstances, i.e., 
claims to depart from international law. Such a claim for exceptionality is expected to be 
followed by a reaction. In this sense, Judge Higgins stated that international law is a 
system of normative conduct, that is to say, conduct which is regarded by each actor and 
by the group as a whole as being obligatory and for which violation carries a price.62 The 
reactions from States to a violation o f international law by another State range from a 
countermeasure by the injured State, a collective or/and institutional response which may 
involve the use o f force, and an adjudication to international justice, among many others. 
They all constitute means to restore legality but they all also amount to an objection to 
the acts or omission o f the perpetrator as well as a process o f shaming the violator o f 
international law, especially when they take the form of a collective response. In 
international law, reputation has its importance and a bad reputation for violating 
international law carries a high cost in international politics.63 Therefore, when it is 
impossible for the injured State to react to the violation of international law and ask for 
reparation, the absence o f objection from third States constitutes a tacit assent to the 
claim of the responsible State of a departure from international law and a tacit incentive 
to commit more violations o f international law.
61 M. McDougal, “The Hydrogen Bomb Test and the International Law o f  the Sea” (1955) 49 American 
Journal o f International Law 356-361, p. 357. See also I. McGibbon, “Customary International Law and 
Acquiescence” (1957) 33 British Yearbook o f  International Law 115-145, p. 116.
62 R. Higgins, note 60 above, p. 1.
63 Y. Onuma, “International Law In and With International Politics: The Functions o f  International Law in 
International Society” (2003) 14 EJIL 105-141, p. 128.
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4.2. The Process of Acquiescence.
The statements made in the previous sections come from empirical observations and 
they are to be deduced by analogy to a concept well-grounded in international law, die 
notion of acquiescence “which is of the most delicate and o f the greatest practical 
importance”.64
Acquiescence has been described by McGibbon as follows:
“Acquiescence takes the form o f silence or absence o f protest in 
circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction”,65
Acquiescence implies a tacit agreement and the disclaimer of rights. Although for 
McGibbon, the function of acquiescence may be equated with that o f consent,66 Byers 
claims that acquiescence does not constitute consent but rather ambivalence or apathy.67 
The domains o f international law as to which acquiescence applied have been very 
diverse. The main field o f application o f the concept of acquiescence has been in 
territorial disputes.68 The concept of acquiescence occupies also a major place in the law 
o f treaties where it acts as an estoppel. Article 45.2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of 
the Law o f Treaties provides that a State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating,
64 V. D. Degan, Opposable Situations in International Law, In M. P. Gonzales (ed.), Hacia un mievo orden 
internationaly europeo: estudios en homenaje al Profesor Don Manuel Die% de Velasco, (Madrid 1993), pp. 231-243, p. 
240.
65 I. McGibbon, “The Scope o f Acquiescence in International Law” (1954) 31 British Yearbook o f  
International Law 143-186, p. 143.
66 Ibid,, p. 145.
67 M. Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, (1999), p. 106.
68 See for instance, Island of Palmas case (United States v. The Netherlands), 2 Reports o f  International 
Arbitration Awards (1928) p. 829; Anglo-Nomegian Fisheries case (United Kingdom t>. Norway), ICJ Rep. (1951), 
p. 139; Minquiers and Ecrvhos case (France v. United Kingdom), ICJ Rep. (1953), p. 47; Right of Passage over Indian 
Territoiy (Portugal v. India), ICT Rep. (1960), p. 6 and Case Concerning the Temple ofPreah Vihear (Cambodia v. 
Thailand), ICJ Rep. (1962), p. 6.
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terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if, by reason of its 
conduct, it must be considered as having acquiesced in the validity o f the treaty or in its 
maintenance in force or in operation. This is the case because subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty counts as a means for its interpretation according to Article 
31.3.C. However, from a theoretical point o f view, it is difficult to assign the limits of the 
field o f acquiescence as any rights of States can be affected by the phenomenon of 
acquiescence.69
Acquiescence proceeds from the active or passive behaviour o f a State. In the latter case, 
the silence or the failure to protest has to be prolonged in time, and the reaction to the 
consolidation o f a right must be expressed after the elapse o f a prolonged period of time. 
Acquiescence also necessarily entails knowledge of the facts by tire acquiescing State.70
Acquiescence by a State or States whose legal rights are at stake in the continuous 
assertion o f a right by another State which endanger the legal rights o f the other State(s) 
constitutes an admission of this claim. In this circumstance, the acquiescence in unilateral 
acts o f others in any case creates opposable situations to the acquiescing State(s). In the 
Angk-Nonvegian Fisheries case, the ICJ decided that the system of straight baselines for 
measuring the breadth of the zone of exclusive fisheries rights applied by Norway along 
its Northern coast was in conformity with international law and had become opposable 
or constituted a legal claim against the United Kingdom because:
“The notoriety o f the facts, the general toleration o f the international 
community, Great Britain’s position in the North Sea, her own interest in
69 j. Barale, “L’acquiescement dans la jurisprudence Internationale” (1965) Annuaire Frangais de Droit 
International 389-427, pp. 406-407.
70 Ibid., pp. 393-406.
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tiie question, and her prolonged abstention would in any case warrant 
Norway’s enforcement o f her system against the United Kingdom”.71
An application o f the same principle is to be found in the case o f the Temple of Preah 
Viharf1 In this case, the International Court o f Justice decided that Thailand (previously 
Siam) could not deny the validity o f a 1907 Map, know as Annex 1, which was drawn up 
from a previous Franco-Siamese agreement, concerning the Temple o f Preah Vihear, 
even if the map contained a substantial error. The attitude o f Thailand, and particularly 
its failure to react to the practice which derived from the map, precluded her from 
objecting to the map on future occasions. As stated by the Court in one o f the most 
important passages o f the judgment:
“It has been contended on behalf o f Thailand that this communication of 
the maps by the French authorities was, so to speak, ex parte, and that no 
formal acknowledgement of it was either requested of, or given by, Thailand.
In fact, as will be seen presently, an acknowledgement by conduct was 
undoubtedly made in a very definite way; but even if it were otherwise, it is 
clear that the circumstances were such as called for some reaction, within a 
reasonable period, on the part o f the Siamese authorities, if they wished to 
disagree with the map or had any serious question to raise in regard to it.
They did not do so either then or for many years, and then must be held to 
have acquiesced.”73
71 Anglo-Nonvegian Fisheries case, note 68 above, p. 139.
72 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear), note 68 above, p. 6.
73 Ibid., p. 23.
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The process o f acquiescence is relevant to the analysis of the incentives which States not 
injured by a violation of international law can provide to the violator in order to avoid or 
facilitate the perpetuation o f other violations o f international law. What matters is not 
that through the passage o f time and the acquiescence of third parties a practice becomes 
legal and thus opposable but the fact that the process o f the enforcement o f a claim has 
been permitted through the general tolerance and apathy of another or other States. It is 
the attitude o f third States which has allowed the perpetuation and then led to the 
entrenchment o f a claim. A new right, especially if the violation is one o f a peremptory 
norm of international law, cannot be created. Nevertheless, some forms of continuous 
illegalities can be perpetuated to the extent that it is impossible to reverse their effects. 
The notion o f fa it accompli as formulated by the Court in relation to the construction of 
the wall and referred to in the previous chapter plays a crucial role in the definition o f 
obligations o f non-injured States.74 With the passage o f time combined with the apathy 
or acquiescence of the interested States, the situation created pursuant to the violation of 
international law might become irreversible. In this case, the illegality might not create 
rights for the violator but give rise to the creation of a legitimate claim when the effects 
o f the violation are irreversible on the ground.
The process o f acquiescence is very similar to that o f recognition. As put by Brownlie, 
“the failure to protest, the pattern generally described as acquiescence, and admission 
against interest (for example in the forms o f maps), are all juridical fellows with the 
group o f questions referred to loosely as, ‘the problem of recognition’”.75 Recognition 
can be the outcome of acquiescence. After the passage of time, a party that has 
acquiesced in the claims o f a right can give de facto legal substance to this new claim, thus
74 Advisory Opinion of the legality of the Walt, p. 184 (para. 121).
75 I. Brownlie, “Recognition in Theory and Practice” (1982) 53 British Yearbook o f  International Law 197- 
211, p. 201. See also, P. Chan, “Acquiescence/Estoppel in International Boundaries: Temple o f  Preah 
Vihear Revisited” (2004) 3 Chinese Journal o f International Law 421-439, pp. 422-425.
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recognising it as legal. However, acquiescence does not amount to recognition 
necessarily. There is a difference o f degree between the two —the same as there is a 
difference o f degree between positive encouragement and aid and assistance. By 
acquiescing, an international actor accepts a claim as legal but does not necessarily 
recognise it as such. It, thus, does not receive the “fruits” of the illegal act in its own legal 
system as if it had recognised it. However, its prolonged apathy to die claims o f the other 
State helps to entrench this latter claim.
5. Conclusion.
The notion o f obligation erga omnes, peremptory norms and previously crimes of States 
have characterised all States as constructively injured, and resulted in the fading of the 
notion o f third party in the traditional sense and its replacement by the ideal o f the 
international community.76 The International Law Commission in this respect has 
adopted a framework o f responsibility where the nature o f the obligations violated 
determines the obligations and rights of non-injured States. In the case o f an 
international crime and now a violation o f an obligation arising from a peremptory norm 
of international law, all States are considered ipso facto injured on an equal basis with all 
the consequences that this entails in terms o f reparation, countermeasures and so forth.77 
The obligations o f States formulated by the ILC find their raison d'etre in the restoration 
and the preservation of the international legal system. If  implemented together, the 
obligation o f non-recognition and the obligation to cooperate to put an end to a violation 
o f an obligation arising from a peremptory norm of international law are efficient means 
to restore legality.
76 C. Chinkin, note 59 above, p. 355.
77 A. Gattini, “A Return Ticket to ‘Communautarisme’, Please” (2002) 13 EJIL 1181-1199, p. 1182.
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However, apart from being negative obligations, aid and assistance and recognition are 
also two “attitudes” o f States that can contribute to a violation of an international 
obligation or to the perpetuation o f this violation. The present chapter has demonstrated 
that aside from recognition and aid and assistance, there exists a wide range o f possible 
contributions for a State to die violation o f international law by another State. Only three 
of them have acquired the status of an obligation in international law: the obligation not 
to aid and assist, the obligation not to recognise, and the obligation o f due diligence 
when it entails the responsible State preventing the commission o f a violation o f 
international law on its own territory. In all the cases presented in this chapter, the degree 
of possible contribution depends upon whether the State is close to the “sphere o f the 
violation”. In the case o f arms trade and arms control, the contractual ties between the 
exporting State and the importing State is the connection between the exporting State 
and the sphere o f violations o f international law and thus places on it a duty o f due 
diligence. In the Soering and non-refoulement cases, it is through the act o f extradition and 
the “refoulement”. In the Dutchbat case, the proximity to the sphere o f the violation of 
international law is the actual presence on the place where the massacre occured. In the 
case of acquiescence, it is the legal interest which a State has in the situation and the risk 
which it faces o f irreversible loss by the prolonged claim of another State which is of 
significance. This proximity to the violation of international law entails the expectation of 
a response to this violation or this claim to depart from international law. The 
formulation o f a response to this claim is crucial for preventing its entrenchment and 
perpetuation. A State can be careless when faced with such a claim and assists it without 
intending to. It can endorse the claim and then recognise it. It can also endorse the claim 
to the extent that it provides the violator with aid and assistance for prolonging the 
violation. A State can protest the claim. It can employ means to stop the claim from 
becoming entrenched.
123
The European Union has set as one its objectives of its external relations the promotion 
of international law, humanitarian law and human rights. A  priori, this gives the 
impression that the EU intents upon being vigilant in counteracting any claims of the 
right to depart from the rules o f international law and would act as its guarantor. The 
following chapter offers an overview of this “ethical” aspect o f EU external relations.
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Chapter Four
The Objective of the European Union to Uphold International Law. Human  
Rights and Humanitarian Law and the Implementation of this “Ethical Policy” 
towards Israel and the Palestinians.
The European continent has achieved the longest period o f peace and stability in its 
whole history. The “European project” is usually seen as the principal reason of this 
success. In the often-cited words o f Robert Schuman, Europe has accomplished the 
historic task o f making wars between its nations “not merely unthinkable but materially 
impossible”.1 In general, the European political elite sees Europe as a New Europe which 
has learned from the experiences o f its endless wars and which is freed from its past of 
internal violence amongst its peoples and against its minorities. In the historical narrative 
o f the European Union, the Europeans have achieved the unthinkable, something that 
was a dream in the minds of humanistic philosophers and visionaries just a century ago — 
as typified by the peaceful “United States o f Europe” imagined by Victor Hugo.2 Europe 
has entered a new era which is perceived as ending hatred and rivalry. New structures 
have been created in Western Europe, based on shared interests and founded upon 
treaties guaranteeing the rule o f law and equality between all countries and thus creating 
the conditions for a long and lasting peace among the European States.3 With the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, the member States of the European Union enshrined in the 
“constitutional instruments o f the Union”4 the elements contributing to its stability
1 See for instance the speech o f  Jose Manuel Barroso, President o f the European Commission, Fifty years of 
Europe: Honouring the Past, Inspiring the Future, 23 March 2007, Italian Senate, Rome.
2 See “Europe in 12 Lessons”, http://em~opa.eu/abc/121essons/lesson 1/index en.htm (last visited 15 
December 2008).
3 Ibid
4 Opinion 1/91 [1993] E CR  1-01061. See also P. Manin, L'lnfluence du droit international sur la 
jurisprudence communautaire Dmit international and droit communautaire: perspectives actuelles, (Univeirsite 
Montesquieu - Bordeaux TV 2000), pp. 153-168, p. 160
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which are the foundations of its own identity: freedom, democracy, respect for human 
rights and the rule o f law.5
The European Union believes that its model can be applied to the rest o f the world. It 
perceives itself as a model by means of which Europe can show internationally that it has 
broken away from its tradition of Euro-centrism, colonialism and imperialism whilst, at 
the same time, it is promoting a “counter-tradition of integrity and virtue” that is 
European in character.6 Europe sees itself as a force for good in the world, promoting its 
own values and the model o f its own success. The respect for the rule o f law and human 
rights which guides its internal policy is viewed in the sphere of the external actions of 
the EU as propagating respect and the promotion o f international law as well as 
promotion o f human rights and international humanitarian law. These elements are the 
essential components and objectives o f the external policy of Europe.
This attachment to the respect o f international law, human rights and humanitarian law is 
therefore inevitably to be found in EU ’s declarative policy on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Furthermore, at first sight, notwithstanding their European character, the EU’s 
objectives to uphold respect for the rules of international law, human rights and 
humanitarian law seems to parallel the exercise o f a scrutiny over the likelihood of the 
commission o f a violation o f international law by other States, the obligation to refrain 
from provoking a violation o f international law and the obligation not to give incentives 
which lead to the commission o f a violation of international law. This point is
5 Article 6.1 o f  the European Union: “The Union is founded on the principles o f  liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule o f  law, principles which are common to 
the Member States” . Article 2 o f the Lisbon Treaty states: “The Union is founded on the values o f  respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule o f  law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights o f persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society 
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail”.
6 A. Williams, E U  Human Rights Policy. A  Study in Irony, (Oxford 2004), p. 199.
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highlighted when the chapter examines the content o f the obligations set out in the 
human rights clause o f the EU-Israel Association Agreement and EC-PLO Interim 
Association Agreement.
This present chapter offers an overview of the European objective to promote 
international law (I). It contends that the “international law” to which the EU is referring 
to is international law viewed from its own perspective (II). It describes how this 
objective to promote international law has been devoted to the development of human 
rights external policy and more recently to the promotion of humanitarian law (III). It 
finally describes how the objective to promote international law, human rights and 
humanitarian law is interpreted vis-a-vis the lsraeli-Palestinian issue by a belief that 
compliance with universal human rights standards and humanitarian law is a central 
element for the resolution of the Israeli Palestinian issue and by the inclusion o f a human 
rights clause in the EU-Israel and EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement (TV).
1. The EU  and the Promotion of International Law: Europe, a Force 
for Good in the World.
On 12 December 2003, the European Council published the European Security Strategy 
Instrument (ESS) which identifies the different new forms of threats posed to Europe in 
the post-Cold war context and details the strategies to be developed to respond to this 
new security environment.7 The ESS is not a binding document but an expression of 
Europe’s aspirations on how it should meet these new challenges. In this sense, the ESS 
is the European counterpart o f the US National Security Strategy issued by the White
7 A  Secure Eutvpe in a Better World, European Security Strategy Document, 12 December 2003, Brussels.
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House in 2002.8 It offers a valuable insight on Europe’s international identity and vision 
o f today’s world.9
The ESS devotes two pages to the dependence o f Europe’s security and prosperity on an 
effective multilateral system. It states:
“The development of a stronger international society, well functioning 
international institutions and a rule-based international order is our 
objective. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The 
fundamental framework for international relations is the United 
Nations”.10
The upholding o f the rules o f international law has been reiterated in the Constitution 
for Europe (Article 1-3, para. 4) and in the Treaty of Lisbon. Although it is not clear 
whether the treaty o f Lisbon will enter into force or not, most of its provisions embody 
previous practice of EU institutions.
Article 21 o f the treaty o f Lisbon states:
1. “The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world:
8 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, September 2002. Hereinafter “NSS”.
9 For a detailed analysis and critics o f the ESS: A. Bailes, The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary 
History (SIPRI policy paper N . 10), (Stockholm 2005). Available at 
http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SlPRIPPlO.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008); S. Biscop, The TLumpean 
Strategy: A  Global Agenda For Positive Power, (Aldershot, Burlington 2005); A. Joje, “The European Security 
Strategy: A Critical Appraisal” (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 117-133; For a comparison 
between the ESS and the US NSS and G. Quille, “The European Security Strategy: Framework for EU 
Security Interests” (2004) 11 International Peacekeeping 422-438.
10 Emphasis added. ESS, p. 9.
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democracy, the rule o f law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
principles o f equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and international law.
2. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships 
with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations 
which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework o f the United Nations”.
The upholding o f international rules in the conduct o f its external relations is a feature of 
Europe’s identity on the international sphere. The EU sees itself as a positive force in 
world politics. This identity has been described as a “normative power”. European 
officials tend to see Europe as a “force for good” whose aims are linked to universal 
goods rather than being narrowly defined self-interests and which does not rely on 
military power to set the agenda and standards of international politics.11 The EU realizes 
its objectives in the framework o f its external relations by defining what should be 
accepted as “normative standards” which are determined by its constitutional norms: 
democracy, rule o f law, and respect for human fights and fundamental freedoms.12 The 
EU is founded on these norms and hence it has their consolidation as its foreign and
11 See Iain Manners’ seminal article on the topic: I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction 
in Terms?” (2002) 40 journal o f  Common Market Studies 235-258. For a response and critics o f  the article: 
T. Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’” (2005) 
33 Millennium Journal o f  International Studies 613-636. For an analysis o f  the relationship between the 
EU self conception o f  a normative power and Europe’s ability to transform conflicts, see T. Diez and M. 
Pace, Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation, 6th Pan European Conference on International 
Relationsi (Turin 2007). Available at http:/ /  archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Diez-
Normative%20Power%20Europe%20and%20Conflict%20Transformation%20SGIR%2020070830.pdf 
(last visited 15 December 2008).
12 I. Manners, lbid.> p. 241.
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development policy objectives. As a consequence o f Europe’s claim to be a force for 
good, the self-representation o f the EU as a normative power is facilitated and guided by 
the norms of international law which are supposed to set universal standards of 
behaviour and carry universal values.13 In a similar line, in the oft-cited article “Power 
and Weakness”, Kagan describes Europe as turning away from power, or “moving 
beyond power into a self-contained world o f laws and rules and transnational negotiation 
and cooperation”. For Kagan:
“ [Europe is entering] ... a post-historical paradise o f peace and relative 
prosperity, the realization o f Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’. Hence, Europeans 
generally favour peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation, 
diplomacy, and persuasion to coercion. They are quicker to appeal to 
international law, international conventions, and international opinion to 
adjudicate disputes. They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind 
nations together. They often emphasize process over result, believing that 
ultimately process can become substance”. 14
1.1. European International Law.
If  the upholding of rules of international law has become a central element o f the EU’s 
external policy, international law in this respect is a European perception o f universal 
values and a guarantee for respectability on the international plane. It is therefore, 
European international law. O n a more formal aspect, this point is exemplified by
13 M. Pace, “The Construction o f  EU Normative Power” (2007) 45 Journal o f Common Market Studies 
1041-1064, p. 1051.
14 R. Kagan, “Power and Weakness” (2002) 113 Policy Review 1-21, pp, 1-2 and 6. Kagan controversially 
asserts in this article that if  Europeans oppose unilateralism it is in part because drey have no capacity for 
unilateralism whereas when Europe was “powerful” on the internadonal scene, it would have recourse to 
unilateralism and violence.
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looking at the invocation and implementation o f international law in the case-law of the 
European Court o f Justice and the Court of First Instance. International law is always 
subject to the constraints of European law. In this case, it is also European international 
law or European law with international origins.
1.1.1. International Law and the European Union: the Language of 
Universality.
One can easily acknowledge the natural predisposition of Europe to promote the respect 
o f international law when its own modus operandi is based on collective-law making and 
respect for supranational laws. The legal constituencies of the Member States of the EU 
possess constraining supranational elements through their obedience to the EC legal 
order as well as their subscription to the binding nature of the decisions o f the European 
Court o f Human Rights.15
However, some might say also that it is easier for Europe to uphold rules o f international 
law when European States have written most o f them themselves and have retained a 
massive influence on the international law making process throughout their history.16 
This statement echoes Koskenniemi’s argument which contends that, when Europe 
speaks the language o f universal international law, international law is then seen by 
Europe at the image o f its own domestic legalism: multilateral treaties as legislation, 
international courts as an independent judiciary and the Security Council as the police. In 
turn, international law itself is merely a European language which is incapable of
15 E. Guild, Security and European Hu/nan Mights: Protecting Individual Rights in Times of Exception and Militaty 
Actions, (2007), p. 56.
16 A. Bayles, Beyond Europe, N ew  Means, New Resources, New Faces seminar on ESDP Seven Years On: Back 
to the Future, (Turin 2007), unpublished.
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expressing something universal.17 According to Koskenniemi, for a long time, Europe’s 
use o f international law was implemented from its position as an overwhelming power. 
Today, for Koskenniemi, Europe no longer speaks from such a position but it still speaks 
the language o f international law.18 Whether one believes or not that Europe is not 
anymore in a position o f being an “overwhelming power”, one cannot but acknowledge 
that Europe is still endowed with a sense of responsibility to promote its values across 
the globe.19 The articles o f the treaty mentioned above are illustrative o f the new mission 
Europe has set for itself and which is directed to the rest o f the world. The use of 
international law gives Europe a sense of respectability and a guarantee to the rest of the 
world that its ambitions are devoid of hegemonic objectives.
1*1.2. International Law in the Case-Law of the European Court o f  
Justice or International Law Subject to the Constraints of 
European Law.
Aside from the rhetoric o f international law in the conduct of the EU ’s external relations, 
the case-law o f the European Court o f justice (ECJ) is exemplary o f the fact that 
international law referred to by the European institutions is international law with 
European origins. The European Court of Justice has referred in many instances to 
international law and has implemented some of its principles and rules. However, when 
the judges o f Luxembourg apply or refer to international law, it is only because the
17 M. Koskenniemi, “International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal” (2005) 16 EJIL 113- 
124, pp. 115 and 117. For a counterargument, to Koskenniemi’s thesis and on the universal nature o f  
international law: P.-M. Dupuy, “Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to 
Universal Values: A Response to Martti Koskenniemi” (2005) 16 EJIL 137-141; O. Gerstenberg, “What 
International Law Should (Not) Become. A Comment on Koskenniemi” (2005) 16 EJIL 130-136 and A. 
Orakhelashvili, “The Idea o f  European International Law” (2006) 17 EJIL 315-347.
18 M. Koskenniemi, Ibid., p. 117.
19 B. Delcourt, La seduction du concept d’imperialisme liberal aupres des elites europeennes : vers une 
redefinition de la politique etrangere de FUnion europeenne, bnpmalisme et droit international en 'Europe et anx 
Etats-Unis, (Societe de legislation comparee, UMR de droit compare de Paris 2007), pp. 73-114.
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treaties from which they gain their authority and jurisdiction allow them to do so. They 
do so as judges o f European law. Therefore, when they implement or refer to 
international law, it is European law with international origins which guide their 
judgement.
The European Court o f Justice, in its early case-law, emphasised the autonomy of 
European law vis-a-vis international law. In the foundational decision of Costa v. 
EN EL?0, the ECJ qualified the European Communities as constituting a separate legal 
system integrated within the legal systems of the member States. In doing so, the Court 
tried to ensure the protection of the autonomy of European Community law both vis-a- 
vis national law and international law. It has refused to let the status o f Community law 
be determined by the sovereign decision of individual member States courts, as would 
have been the case under a classic international law approach.21 However, given the 
increase of external actions o f the European Communities, international law could not be 
ignored. The ECJ has thus, in its further case-law, integrated rules o f international law 
and detailed the rules which govern the relationships between international law and 
Community Law. It stated expressly that treaties which bind the Communities are 
superior to secondary Community legislation.22 More importantly, the Court expressly 
ruled that the Community must respect international law in the exercise o f its power.23 
The Tribunal o f First Instance of the European Communities referred to the principle of 
good faith codified by Article 18 of the First Vienna Convention and qualified it as “a
20 Case 6 /64 , Costa v. Enel, [1964] ECR 1141.
21 C. Timmermans, “The EU and Public International Law” (1999) 4 European Foreign Affairs Review 
181-194, pp. 182-183.
22 21-24/72 International Emit Company [1972] ECR 1219 and 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449.
23 Case C-286/90 Poulsen [1992] ECR 1-6048. See also Case C -l62/96 Racke [1998] ECR 1-3655.
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rule of customary international law whose existence has been recognised by the 
International Court o f Justice and is therefore binding on the Community”.24
However, even if European judges are inclined to apply and refer to rules o f customary 
international law and the general principles o f international law as an external source of 
European law, they remain subsidiary to the principles and rules o f Community law.25 
International law cannot take precedence over the provisions o f the EU ’s constitutional 
treaty. As stated by Advocate General Poiares Maduro in his opinion in the Kadi case, the 
ECJ, like the Tribunal o f First Instance, determines the effect o f international obligations 
within the Community legal order by reference to conditions set by Community law.26 In 
this respect, the ECJ has verified, on occasion, whether acts adopted by the Community 
for the purpose o f giving municipal effect to international commitments were in 
compliance with general principles of Community law.27 The Advocate General 
concluded that the relationship between international law and the Community legal order 
is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that 
legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles o f the 
Community.28 Therefore, the integration of international law into Community law is only 
possible to the extent that the prescription o f community law allows this integration. As 
stated by Gautron and Grard, the use o f external sources o f Community law is
2A Case T -l 15/94 Opel Austria v. Council [1997] ECR 11-39.
25 J.-C. Gautron and L. Grard, Le droit international dans la construction de l'Union europeenne, Droit 
international and droit communautaire, perspectives actuel/es, (Universite Montesquieu - Bordeaux IV 2000) pp. 11- 
152, p. 118.
26 Opinion o f  Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 16 January 2008, Case C-402/05 Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, para. 23, available at 
http: /  /c  uria.europa.eu /  jurisp /  cgi-bin /  form.pl?lanp;=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=C-402 /05  (last 
visited 15 December 2008).
27 Case C-l 22/95 Germany v. Council [1998] ECR 1-973.
28 Opinion o f  Advocate General Poiares Maduro, note 26 above, para. 23.
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dependent on their adequacy or coherence with the exigencies o f the EU structure and 
objectives.29
The European Court of Justice followed the Advocate General’s opinion in its 
judgement o f 3 o f September 2008. It set aside the judgments of the Court o f First 
Instance of the European Communities of 21 September 2005 in Yusuf and Kadi0 which 
decided that according to Article 103 o f the UN Charter which is binding upon the 
member States o f the EU31, it was barred from reviewing the compatibility of EC 
regulation giving effect to Security resolutions with the applicants’ fundamental rights as 
protected by the EC legal order. The Court o f First Instance however admitted that 
Article 103 could not override the operations of norms with peremptory status. In this 
landmark judgement on the relationship between EU law and international law, the 
European Court of Justice ruled that the obligations imposed by an international legal 
instrument cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles o f the EC 
Treaty, which include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental 
rights, “that respect constituting a condition o f their lawfulness which it is for the Court 
to review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies established by the 
Treaty”.32 Therefore, the Court decided that the lawfulness of any legislation adopted by 
the Community institutions in order to give effect to a Security Council resolution 
remains subject, to full review by the Court, regardless of its origin. Any judicial review
29 J.-C. Gautron and L. Grard, note 25 above, p. 25.
30 Case T-306/01 Ahmed A ll Yusuf an dA l Bara kaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, [2005] ECR 11-3533 and case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. 
Council of the Eutvpean Union and Commission of the European Communities, [2005] ECR 11-3649.
31 Article 103 o f  the U N  Charter: “In the event o f a conflict between the obligations o f  the member States 
o f the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”.
32 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, A l  Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council of the European Union, Commission of the European Communities , United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, para. 285. (Not yet published, available at http: /  /  eur- 
lex.europa.eu/Notice.doPval—478012:cs&lang=:ro&list=463008:cp.478Q12:cs.463008:cs.&pos=2&page—1 
&nbl~3&pgs:::::10&hwords—&checktexte=checlcbox&visu=  (last visited 15 December 2008).
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exercised by the Community judicature would not entail any challenge to the primacy of 
that resolution in international law.33
1.2 The Promotion o f Humanitarian Law and H um an Rights in 
E U ’s External Policy.
The promotion o f international law in the external actions of the European Union finds 
one o f its expressions in its reliance on international humanitarian law in its declarative 
policy but above all in the development o f its external human rights policy. This external 
human rights policy is the major “ethical” aspect of EU’s diplomacy and external 
relations. Initiated in the beginning o f the 1990s, the promotion o f human rights 
supposedly encompasses all the aspects of the EU external actions. It is only recently that 
the EU incorporated international humanitarian law into its declaratory policy 
independently from human rights.
1.2.1. The EU  H um an Rights External Policy.
The declarations o f the European Community, under the aegis o f the European Political 
Cooperation, have reiterated that the EC commitment to human rights and democracy is 
a principle which guides its foreign policy.34 The promotion of human rights as an 
objective of the external policy of EU was adopted by the beginning o f the 1990s.35 In 
1992, human rights were placed at heart o f the new Common and Foreign Security
33 Ibid. para. 288.
34 For an overview o f  the place o f  human rights in the European Political Cooperation, see T. King, 
“Human Rights in European Foreign Policy: Success or Failure of Post-Modern Diplomacy?” (1999) 10 
EJIL 313-337, pp. 316-324.
35 Conclusion o f  the Luxembourg European Council, 28 and 29 June 1991.
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Policy in the Maastricht treaty.36 For some authors, the collapse of the communist block 
and the triumph of liberal democracy set the scene for a new world order where human 
rights had a major role to play.37 The language o f human rights had become the guarantee 
for authentication o f any political institution. The objective o f the promotion o f human 
rights was to offer a seal for credibility and ethos for the European Union on the 
international scene.38 Furthermore, the promotion o f human rights and democracy is 
seen from Europe’s point o f view as a moral obligation. For European decision-makers 
the universality o f human rights is a fact which has become unquestionable.39 The 
member States o f the EU believe they are in a position to spread and promote these 
values to the rest o f the world. In this respect, the 2001 communication o f the 
Commission on the promotion o f human rights and democratisation stated:
“The European Union is well placed to promote democracy and human 
rights. It is continually seeking to improve its own democratic governance 
[...]. Uniquely amongst international actors, all fifteen Member States of 
the Union are democracies espousing the same Treaty-based principles in 
their internal and external policies. This gives the EU substantial political 
and moral weight”.40
36 Article J. 1.2. provided that one o f the objectives o f  die European Union is “to develop and consolidate 
democracy, the rule o f  law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.
37 T. King, “Human Rights in European Foreign Policy: Success or Failure o f  Post-Modern Diplomacy?” 
(1999) 10 EJIL 313-337, p. 324 and K. Smith, The European Union, Human Rights and Relations with 
Third Countries: “Foreign Policy” with an Ethical Dimension, In M. Light and K. Smith (eds.), Ethics and 
Foreign Policy, (Cambridge 2001), pp. 185-203, pp. 187-188.
38 A. Williams, note 6 above, p. 135.
39 See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 14-25 June 1993. Vienna Declaration and Programme 
o f Action, Para 1.1 “The universal nature o f  these rights and freedoms is beyond question”. The 
universalist approach to human rights is supported in many academic circles. See for instance, J. Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, (New York 2003). For “relativist” human rights perspective, see 
among others: M. Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviours: the Metaphor o f  Human Rights” (2001) 42 
Harvard International Law Journal, p. 201-245.
40 “The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries”, 
Commission Communication, 8 May 2001 COM (2001) 252 final, p. 3.
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Hence, the insertion of human rights into foreign relations has been understood as an 
assertion of public mind and public morals into a sphere once reserved for diplomacy 
alone.41 Naturally, die insertion o f these objectives did not escape the accusation o f being 
die imposition o f a universal view when it is the product o f Western domination and of 
being an emanation o f neo-colonialism.42 Be diat as it may, the EU human rights external 
policy is the quintessence of Europe’s ambition to act as a force for good in die world.
I.2.I.I. EU  External
Policy.
Human rights have become a mainstay o f EU external policy which is deployed by several 
means.43 Concretely, the EU adopted the commitment to mainstream human rights in all 
its cooperation and assistance programmes but also to ensure that in the formulation of 
other aspects o f its external policies, such as for instance, in the domain o f justice and 
home affairs, immigration and asylum and the environment, any negative effect on 
human rights and democratisation is always avoided. Wherever possible, policies are 
adapted to have a positive human rights impact.44 Furthermore, the EU has defined a 
series of priorities for action in several guidelines in areas on which the EU places 
particular importance. These guidelines concern the fight against the deatii penalty, the 
fight against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
41 E. Paasivirta, Human Rights, Diplomacy and Sanctions: Aspects to “Human Rights Clauses” in the 
External Agreements o f the European Union, In J. Klabbers and J. Petman (eds.), 'Nordic Cosmopolitanism: 
Essays in International EarnJorMartti Koskenniemi, (Leiden 2003), pp. 155-180, p. 169.
42 M. Koskenniemi, note IV above, p. 115 and A. Williams, note 6 above, p. 135 and 200.
43 B. Brandter and A. Rosas, “Human Rights and the External Relations o f the European Community: An 
Analysis o f Doctrine and Practice” (1998) 9 EJIL 468-490, p. 472.
44 “The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation”, COM 2001, p. 7-8. 
“Commission Staff Working Document, Implementation o f  the Commission Communication on the EU ’s 
Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries”, 30 July 2004, SEC(2004) 
1041, p. 3-12 and Council conclusions on the European Union's role in promoting Human Rights & 
Democratisation in third countries, Luxembourg, 25 June 2001.
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support for children in armed conflicts, human rights defenders and the rights of the 
child.45
The principal instruments deployed for the promotion of human rights and democracy 
are instruments of traditional diplomacy and foreign policy, such as declarations, 
demarches and political dialogue under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Member States o f the EU also intervene within international organisations such as the 
UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council, Council o f Europe and the 
Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe.46 The adoption o f resolutions is 
carried out after close coordination between the member States of the EU. Furthermore, 
EU diplomacy has initiated regular and institutionalised dialogues exclusively on human 
rights with China and Iran where it expresses its concerns on specific human rights issues 
and where interlocutors seek to bring about practical steps to improve the human rights 
situation on the ground 47 Finally, civil society and human rights defenders based in its 
partner countries are considered by the EU as major actors in the implementation o f its 
human rights policy. The EU supports financially the actions and projects o f human 
rights organisations in its partner countries since 1996 through the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) -previously called the European Initiative 
for Democracy and Human Rights until 2006.
45 EU Human Rights Guidelines. Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/human rights/guidelines/index.htm (last visited 15 December 
2008).
46 “The External Dimension o f  the EU’s Human Rights Policy: From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond”, 
Commission Communication, 22 November 1995 COM (95) 567, p. 3-5.
47 EU Human Rights Report 2007, pp. 21-22. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/extemal relations/human rights/doc/report07 en.pdf (last visited 15 December 
2008).
139
I.2.I.2. The Human Rights Clause.
The major instrument of the EU human rights external policy is the human rights clause 
which has been inserted systematically in all the cooperation and association agreements 
which the European Union has signed since 1995.
• Mereinff H um an Riehts and Trade.g y --  ..................................................             ■■
The insertion of the human rights clause in all trade and cooperation agreement results in 
the merging o f two different worlds: human tights and trade.48 The human rights clause 
is the principal basis upon which dialogue is conducted with third countries. It is said to 
be an essential element o f each individual agreement.
The origin of the human rights clause is to be found in the Balkan crisis in the beginning 
o f the 1990s. In 1991, the EU found itself in the uncomfortable position of having to 
suspend its agreement with Yugoslavia in response to grave human rights violations in 
spite of the fact that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not provide for 
the automatic termination or suspension o f treaties purely on the basis o f human rights 
violations. It relied however on the Vienna Convention articles on termination based 
upon “fundamental change o f circumstance” (Article 62) and invoked UNSC resolution 
713 (1991).49 The objective o f the insertion o f the human rights clause therefore was to 
offer a proper legal basis for suspending a cooperation agreement in the case o f violation 
o f human rights. This was confirmed by the European Court of Justice in "Portugal v. 
Council which ruled that an important function of the clause is to secure to right to
48 E. Paasivirta, note 41 above, p. 159.
49 Brandtcr and Rosas (1998), note 43 above, p. 474, note 24 and J. Rideau, Le concept dissociation dans 
les accords passes par la Communaute : essai de clarification, Actes dn colloqm organise, par le Centre de Droit 
Pnropten et Compare, (Universite Rene Descartes — Paris V 1999), pp. 139-195, p. 157.
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suspend or terminate an agreement if the other party to the agreement has not respected 
human rights.50
Apart from providing a basis for suspending its Association Agreements, the human 
rights clause allows the EU to raise issues of human rights violations with its partners 
without this amounting to an inadmissible interference in the internal affairs o f the State 
concerned.51 Nonetheless, the initiation o f bilateral dialogue on human rights issues 
based on the human rights clause reflects parameters o f power between the EU and its 
partners. Third countries are less likely to refuse to discuss human rights-related issues 
and retaliate against a Union that has considerable economic power.52 As put by Fierro, 
the insertion o f a human rights clause is an “EC initiative for internal use” — in the sense 
that given the imbalance o f power between the EU and its partners it can only be 
activated by die EU institutions.53
However, the Commission does not envisage it this way:
“The proposed system [the human rights clause] will promote positive actions, with 
human rights and democratic principles included as an ‘essential element’ of the 
agreements, a subject o f shared interest and an integral part of the dialogue between the 
parties. This approach should be seen not as imposing conditions, but in the spirit o f a 
joint undertaking to respect and promote universal values”. 54
50 Case C-298/94 Portugal v. Council [1996J ECR 1-6177, para. 27.
51 Nonetheless this assertion has been criticised by several countries and notably Mexico which rejected the 
inclusion o f  the clause in its trade agreement with the EC. See E. Fierro, The E U ’s Approach to Human Rights 
Conditionality in Practice (The Hague 2003), pp. 304-305.
52 E, Paasivirta, note 41 above, pp. 170-171 and T. King, note 37 above, p. 336.
53 E. Fierro, note 51 above, p. 379.
54 “The External Dimension o f  the EU’s Human Rights Policy” COM (1995), p. 11.
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• The Structure o f the H um an Rights Clause.
The human rights clause is actually an aggregation o f different clauses in the Association 
Agreement which are as follows:
The “essential element” clause which states that respect for the principles of 
human rights and democracy are essential element of the Agreement. The point 
o f reference is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the UN 
General Assembly in 1948.55
The “non-execution” clause which provides that “appropriate measures” may be 
taken in cases of a failure to fulfil the obligations in the Agreement, following 
consultation with the other party.
A provision defining these special cases and confirming that in all cases the 
“appropriate measures” must be “taken in accordance with international law”.56
Therefore, by a combined application o f these three provisions clauses, the EU is able to 
suspend the Association Agreement in case of a violation of human rights by its partner. 
Nevertheless, the language used in the non-execution clause encourages the parties to 
adopt “measures that least disturb the functioning of the Agreement” in order to avoid a 
full suspension or termination.
55 B. Brand ter and A, Rosas, note 43 above, p. 475.
56 On a detailed analysis o f  the clause see L. Bartels, A Legal Analysis o f Human Rights Clauses in the EU ’s 
Euro-Mediterranean Associations Agreements, Economic and Social Rights in the Emv-Mediterraman Area and 
the In/pact of the Enro-Meditetranean Free Trade Area, (European University Institute, Florence 2004). See also 
D.-C, Horng “The Human Rights Clause in the European Union’s External Trade and Development 
Agreements” (2003) 9 European Law Journal 677-701, p. 679.
142
• A Basis for Dialogue.
Although the suspension o f the agreement or the financial assistance involved is possible 
in theory in case o f a breach o f principles of human rights and democratic principles by a 
partner country, die EU has had recourse to such measures only in exceptional 
circumstances. So far, most o f the time, cases o f suspension have been directed to ACP 
countries (African-Caribbean-Pacific) and this only when flagrant disregard of 
democratic principles and the rule o f law have occurred, such as a coup d’etat or electoral 
irregularities.57 Contrary to ongoing violations of human rights, coups and electoral frauds 
are a clear step back from the situation which existed before and the cost factors for the 
EU in taking the decision to suspend its aid or agreements is very low.58 In general, the 
EU is very reluctant to impose negative measures and sanctions. Most o f the time 
commercial interests are at stake and individual member States have their own sphere of 
influence. Furthermore, such measures might harm those States which need the aid most 
and generate instability. For this latter reason, there is a general feeling o f scepticism 
about the effectiveness o f sanctions.59 As a consequence, positive measures and dialogue 
are preferred to sanctions. Riedel and Will have argued that the human tights clause has 
lost its point if  it has to be applied by way of treaty suspension60 and this theme is 
actually recurrent in EU official documents. For instance, the 2001 communication of 
the Commission on the European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and 
Democratisation in Third Countries states:
57 A. Paasivirta, note 41 above, p. 173 and E. Fierro, note 51 above, p. 309-310.
58 E. Paasivirta, Ibid
59 K. Smith, “The Use o f  Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How  
Effective?” (1998) European Foreign Affairs Review 253-274, p. 272-273 and Karen Smith, note 37 above, 
p. 196.
60 E. Riedel and M. Will, Human Rights Clause and External Agreements o f the European Union, In P. 
Alston (ed.), The European Union and Human Rights, (1999), pp. 721-754, p. 743.
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“The most effective way o f achieving change is therefore a positive and 
constructive partnership with governments, based on dialogue, support 
and encouragement. This should aim to improve mutual understanding 
and respect, and promote sustainable reform [...]. All avenues for 
progress are explored before the EU resorts to sanctions. [...] In many 
cases, the basis for a dialogue on human rights and democracy is the 
‘essential elements’ clause included in all third country Community 
agreements since 1992”.61
Furthermore, as will be detailed in the next chapter, the frameworks o f external relations 
of the EU, the Euromed Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy also 
contain strong human rights components aiming at favouring dialogue based on human 
rights and the promotion o f respect o f human rights and democratic principles.62
1.2.2. The Growing Concern for the Respect of Rules of International 
Humanitarian Law.
The progressive inclusion o f humanitarian law in the declaratory policy of the European 
Union dates from the beginning o f the 1990s. It started to develop in the context of the 
first Gulf war63 and the Balkans crisis.64 This late reference to this branch o f law can be
61 “The principal rationale for the clause is to form a positive basis for advancing human rights in third 
countries through dialogue and persuasion. In other words, the preference is to use positive action rather 
than penalties” in Furthering Democracy and Human Rights Across the Globe. European Communities, 
2007, p. 9. See also the specific EU guidelines on Human Rights Dialogue “Guidelines on Human Rights 
Dialogue”, Annex 15 to the EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2000, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2000en.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008).
62 See pp. 185-193 o f this dissertation below.
63 See for instance Declaration o f the European Council in Rome 14-15 December 1990.
64 The declarations on the ex-Yugoslavia crisis were subject to numerous references to humanitarian law. 
For an account, see Bulletin o f  the European Communities and the European Union from 1991 to 1995.
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understood by the long-term preference of die EU for the body of human rights law.65 
However, due to the rise o f customary international humanitarian law and the “advent” 
o f the interdependence o f the various instruments for the protection of the individual, 
notably the complementarity between international humanitarian law and human rights66, 
humanitarian law began to penetrate the declaratory policy o f the European Union.67 
When the EU issues a statement on a situation o f conflict, almost systematically it refers 
to humanitarian law. This takes place through general references to the laws of war68 and, 
more specifically highlights certain obligations o f humanitarian law.69 Notably at the 
occasion of the 50th Anniversary o f the four Geneva Conventions, in a declaration, the 
European Union recalled “the primary importance that it attaches to the four Geneva 
Conventions as the basic treaties of international humanitarian law” and its member 
States reaffirm “their commitment to respect and promote international humanitarian 
law”.70 The EU stressed the importance o f full compliance with the provisions o f the 
Conventions and stated that “the implementation o f the Conventions is o f paramount
65 Actually, international humanitarian law has been considered for long under the heading o f  human 
rights. For instance Council Regulation 975/1999 o f 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the 
implementation o f  development cooperation operations which contribute to the general objectives o f  
developing and consolidating democracy and the rule o f law and to that o f  respecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (OJEC L 120/1, 8 May 1999) stated in its preamble that references to human rights 
in article 177 o f the TCE (ex-130u) in relation to development and cooperation is to be understood as 
encompassing “respect for international humanitarian law, also taking into account the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols”.
60 In 1995, the International Court o f Justice stated in its advisory opinion on the use o f  nuclear weapons 
that the applicability o f human rights law and specifically the international covenant for civil and political 
rights did not cease in times o f war Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep. (1996), p. 240 
(para. 25). This principle has been restated in two more recent decisions and opinions o f  the Court. See 
Uegal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep. (2004), p. 177-178 
(para. 105-106) and Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Uganda), ICJ Rep. (2005), pp. 66-68 (para. 206-211). R. Degagne, European Union Practice in the Field o f  
International Humanitarian Law: an Overview, In V. Kronenberg (ed.), The E U  and the International Legal 
Order: Discord or Harmony?, (The Hague 2001), pp. 455-477, p. 477.
67 T. Ferraro, “Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique etrangere et de securite commune de 
l'Union europeenne” (2002) 84 International Review o f  the Red Cross 435-461, p. 436.
68 See for instance the Declaration on Croatia which calls on the parties to respect all the provisions o f  
humanitarian law set in the Geneva Conventions, Declaration o f  the Council in Brussels 4 August 1995.
69 The prosecution o f  the perpetrator o f  grave violations o f IHL (Declaration o f the Council in Berlin on 
Kosovo, 25 March 1999), the principle o f proportionality and distinction between civilians and combatants 
(Declaration o f the Council in Helsinki on Chechnya, 11 December 1999), the prohibition o f  reprisals 
against civilians (Declaration o f the Council in Brussels on Croatia, 4 May 1995). See T. Ferraro, note 67 
above, p. 442.
70 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf o f  the European Union on the occasion o f  the 50th Anniversary 
o f the Four Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1999.
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importance” and that “bridging the widening gap between existing international norms 
and respect for them should be the main objective and the issue should be put more 
forcefully on the agenda o f the international community”.
Nonetheless, reliance on IHL is not limited to the declaratory policy o f the EU. It has 
also penetrated obligatory acts o f the Common and Foreign Security Policy, such as 
Common Positions and Joint Actions. According to Article 14 o f the Treaty of the 
European Union, Joint Actions address specific situations where operational action by 
the Union is deemed to be required. They lay down their objectives, scope, the means to 
be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their 
implementation. Common Positions define the approach of the Union to a particular 
matter o f a geographical or thematic nature. According to Article 15 o f the Treaty of the 
European Union, member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the 
Common Positions. Hence, for instance, Common Positions on Afghanistan before 
September 2001 expressly refer to the importance the EU attaches to international 
humanitarian law and call on the parties to respect their obligations under IHL.71 In June 
2001, the Council adopted a Common Position on the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) where it stated that it was convinced that respect for rules o f IHL is necessary to 
preserve peace and consolidate the rule o f law and affirmed that the creation of the ICC 
constituted an essential means to promote respect for international humanitarian law.72
Finally, EU ’s commitment to IHL culminated in the European Union Guidelines on 
promoting compliance with international humanitarian law.73 The purpose of the 
Guidelines is “to set out operational tools for the European Union and its institutions
71 See for instance Common Position 2000/55/CFSP, 24 January 2000, OJEC L 021, 26 January 2000.
72 Common Position 2001/443/CFSP, 11 June 2001, OJEC L 155,12 June 2001.
73 OJEU C 327/4 o f 23 December 2005. Hereinafter “Guidelines”.
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and bodies to promote compliance with international humanitarian law. They are 
addressed to “all those taking action within the framework of the European Union to the 
extent that the matters raised fall within their areas of responsibility and competence”. 
Importantly, they state that the European Union is founded on the principles o f liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule o f law and 
that this includes the goal of promoting compliance with IHL. The Guidelines call for 
die responsible EU bodies to identify and to monitor situations where international 
humanitarian law applies. For instance whenever relevant, EU Heads of Mission, and 
other appropriate EU representatives such as the EU Special Representatives, should 
include an assessment o f the IHL situation in their reports about a given State or 
conflict. The guidelines list different measures to ensure respect and compliance with 
rules o f IHL. These include dialogue, public statements on issues related to IH L which 
should “whenever appropriate, emphasise the need to ensure compliance with IHL” and 
demarches. Restrictive measures and sanctions are also envisaged as a means o f action. 
The guidelines state that “the use of restrictive measures (sanctions) may be an effective 
means of promoting compliance with IHL. Such measures should therefore be 
considered against State and non-state parties to a conflict, as well as individuals, when 
they are appropriate and in accordance with international law”.74 The guidelines also 
mention, as a means to promote compliance with IHL, the collecting o f information 
which may be o f use for the International Criminal Court or in other investigations o f 
war crimes, prosecutions o f war criminals and training in IHL and, in relation to arms 
transfer, ensuring that the importing country complies with IHL before granting licenses 
to export to that country.75
74 Guidelines, p. 6.
75 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Code o f conduct on aims transfer is mostly concerned with 
violations o f  human rights, not humanitarian law.
147
The EU has placed respect for international law, human rights and humanitarian law as a 
central element of its external policy. Although it is a European objective that has to 
been seen from a European perspective, it seems to represent a commitment from the 
EU to address violations o f human rights and thus, a fortiori, not to allow the interference 
o f violations o f human tights and humanitarian law in its relation with its partners. This 
commitment is exemplified with respect to the human rights policy o f the EU vis-a-vis 
Israel and the Palestinians.
2. E U ’s “Ethical” Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Issue.
The European Union sees respect for the rules of international law as an element of 
stability in the world order and sets out to act as a guarantor for its respect. Its objective 
to promote rules o f human tights and democracy and rules of international humanitarian 
has the same purpose. These aspirations are features o f Europe’s identity in the 
international scene and their elements are to be found in the EU’s approach to the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue. The EU has long urged the parties to this particular conflict to 
respect the rules o f international law, humanitarian law and human rights through its 
regular Council declarations taken under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
However, as will be seen, this aspiration is not shared by one o f the principal actors, the 
State o f Israel. Notwithstanding any disagreement over respect for human tights in the 
context o f the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU has inserted a human tights clause in 
the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Such a clause is also to be found in the EC-PLO 
Interim Association Agreement.
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2 .1. The Calls for Respect for International Law in the E U  Declaratory
Policy vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
In its 2003 communication on “Reinvigorating human rights in the Mediterranean Area”, 
the Commission stated that:
“ There is an urgent need to place compliance with universal human 
rights standards and humanitarian law by all parties involved in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a central factor in the efforts to put the 
Middle-East peace process back on track” .76
The EU’s belief that respect for international law is a crucial step towards the resolution 
o f the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is apparent from the beginning o f the formulation o f its 
diplomatic declarations on this issue. The EC actually distinguished itself in the 1970s 
and 1980s by its position o f support for the national claims of the Palestinian people and 
the call for the respect for international law. By taking international law based positions, 
which emphasise the right to self-determination o f the Palestinians and typify the Israeli 
settlement policy as illegal and in contravention to the IVth Geneva Convention, the EU 
made the “unspeakable speakable”77, thus allowing some to say that the EU was the 
guardian o f international legality of the Middle-East Peace Process.78
The Venice Declaration o f 1980 is the keystone of Europe’s position on the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. It marks the foundation o f EU’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian
76 Commission Communication, 21 May 2003, COM (2003) 294 final, p. 5.
77 E. Aoun, “European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado about Nothing” (2003) 8 
European Foreign Affairs Review 289-312, p. 293.
78 V. Yorke, The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace-Process: The Need for a New Approach, (London 
1999), p. 13.
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issue which has remained broadly unchanged despite the successive member States 
accessions that took place afterwards. Through this Declaration, the EC was the first 
third party to acknowledge that the Palestinian people was entided to exercise its right to 
self-determination and that the Palestinian problem was “not simply a refugee one”.79 It 
called for the inclusion o f the PLO in any negotiation settiements, therefore, helping to 
legitimise its claims and help it achieve an international status. The Declaration went on 
to qualify settlements as illegal under international law and stressed that the Nine 
member States of die EC would not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change 
the status o f Jerusalem. The document provoked the ire of Israel who qualified the 
Declaration “a Munich surrender”.80 The Venice Declaration was a reaction to the US- 
sponsored Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty that the EU lukewarmly endorsed and which 
contained no mention o f Palestinian self-determination and made no mention of 
Jerusalem.81
Since then, the position of the EU has always revolved around two aspects: the call for a 
two-state solution and within the framework o f international law. However, the advocacy 
for respect o f international legality decreased at the time of die Peace Process when the 
parties were at the negotiating table in order not “interfere in the conduct o f the 
negotiations”.82 At this time, the declarations o f the EU were thus limited to supporting 
the negotiation process.
With the beginning of what can retrospectively be as seen as the collapse o f the Peace 
Process, die EU insisted on what the foundations for peace and its attainable objectives
79 Declaration by the European Council in Venice on the Situation in the Middle-East, 12-13 June 1980.
80 R. Miller, “The PLO Factor in Euro-Israeli Relations, 1964-1992” (2004) 10 Israel Affairs 123-155, p. 
137.
81 V. Yorke, note 78 above, p. 7.
82 N . Tocci, The Widening Gap between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict (Centre for European Policy Studies), (Brussels 2005), p. 3.
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should be. The Amsterdam Declaration of 1997, although it mentions a cautious 
“recognition o f the Palestinian people to self-determination, without excluding the 
option o f a State” and details what are in Europe’s view the ground rules for the 
attainment of an agreed and fair solution: namely the respect for the legitimate right of 
the Palestinians to decide their own future, exchange of land for peace, non acceptance 
of annexation of territory by force, respect for human rights, rejection o f terrorism, good 
relations between neighbours, compliance with existing agreements and rejection of 
counterproductive unilateral initiatives.83 In the Berlin Declaration o f the 24th and 25th of 
March 1999, the EU reiterated, explicitly this time, its support for Palestinian Statehood 
and stated that “the creation o f a viable and peaceful Palestinian State on the basis o f 
existing agreements and through negotiations would be the guarantee o f Israel’s security 
and that it was ready to consider the recognition o f a Palestinian State in due course”.84 
At the same time, it should be noted that the Declaration was designed to counteract an 
attempt by the Palestinian Authority to declare unilaterally the creation o f a Palestinian 
State and was drafted in close coordination with the US.85
Since the start of the Second Intifada, the EU has continued to advocate a two-State 
solution, the return to the negotiating table and the reaching o f an agreement within the 
framework o f SC resolutions 242 and 338.86 Furthermore, since EU ’s participation in the 
Quartet, the implementation o f the Road Map constitutes a recurrent call in any
83 Declaration o f  the European Council in Amsterdam, 16 and 17 June 1997, Annex III, “European Union 
Call for Peace in the Middle-East”.
84 Declaration o f the European Council in Berlin, 24-25 March 1999.
85 J. Peters, Europe and the Arab-Israeli Process: The Declaration o f Berlin and Beyond, In S. Behrendt 
and C. Hanelt (eds.), Security in the Middle-Easi:, (Munich 1999), pp. 25-41, p. 158.
86 See for instance: Declaration o f  the European Council in Goteborg, 15-16 June 2001, para. 73: “A 
‘cooling-off period’ should start as soon as possible in order to allow the implementation o f  additional 
confidence measures leading to resumption o f  full and meaningful negotiations for the Final Status 
Agreement on the basis o f  United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338” and Declaration o f  
the European Council in Barcelona, 15-16 March 2002, para. 9: “The European Union is determined to 
play its role together with the parties, the countries in the region, the US, the U N  and Russia in the pursuit 
o f a solution, based on UNSC Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397 and on the principles o f the Madrid 
Conference, Oslo and subsequent agreements, which would allow two states, Israel and Palestine, to live in 
peace and security and play their full part in the region”.
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declaration o f the European Council.87 The Road Map is mentioned since December 
2002 without exception in every declaration and this even after 2005 which was the 
deadline for the creation o f Palestinian State as scheduled in this planned course of 
actions.
Finally, the EU’s policy towards the Middle East has always been characterised by a 
concern for equidistance or a concern for treating the parties to the conflict on an equal 
footing. This concern is more obvious in EU declarations delivered since the beginning 
o f the second Intifada in September 2000 and more specifically since October 2003.88 
This concern has lead the EU to operate a parallel condemnation o f the violations of 
international law by the Israeli Defence Force and by the Palestinian militant groups. The 
declarations are designed in a symmetrical manner: a condemnation o f the settlement 
policy or o f the wall parallels a call to the Palestinian Authority to take its responsibility 
for the resumption o f violence and to condemn terrorism. On the one hand, references 
to international law are formulated in the form of calls for its respect directed at Israel in 
the exercise o f the right to self defence89, a condemnation of Israel’s settlement policy90 
and criticisms o f the construction o f the wall in the West Bank.91 On the other hand, the
87 For a definition o f  the Quartet and the Road Map, see p. 14 note 10 o f  this dissertation above.
88 It is to be found in a very visible manner in Declaration o f the European Council in Brussels, 16-17 June 
2005 or in Declaration o f  the European Council in Brussels, 15-16 December 2005.
89 See for instance, Declaration o f  the European Council in Brussels, 17 and 18 June 2004: “While 
recognising Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence, it recalls the obligation on Israel to exercise this right 
within the parameters o f  international law. It [...] calls on the Israeli government, in line with international 
law and U N  Security Council Resolution 1544, to cease demolitions and to take urgent action to alleviate 
the suffering o f Palestinians”.
90 See for instance, Declaration o f  the European Council in Copenhagen, 12-13 December 2002: “The
expansion o f  settlements violates international law, inflames an already volatile situation, and reinforces
the fear o f  Palestinians that Israel is not genuinely committed to ending the occupation”; Declaration o f  
the European Council in Brussels, 13-14 March 2008, (Declaration by the Presidency on behalf o f  the 
European Union on the Middle East): “The EU reiterates that setdement building anywhere in the 
occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law. Setdement 
activity prejudges the outcome o f  final status negotiations and threatens the viability o f  an agreed two-state 
solution.”.
91 Among other declarations and statements, in September 2003, the General Affairs Council urged Israel 
to “to freeze the construction o f the separation fence, which results in confiscation o f  Palestinian land, 
restricts the movement o f  people and goods and hinders a just political solution to the conflict”, 
Conclusions o f  the Council o f Ministers on the Middle East, 29 September 2003. While having expressed
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EU has regularly urged the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority to combat 
terrorism and to fully implement reforms.92
The victory o f Hamas at the Palestinian Legislative Council election in January 2006 and 
the resulting EU decision to suspend any direct aid to the Palestinian Authority have 
transformed the calls directed at the Palestinians. The demands for reform and the 
condemnations o f Palestinian terrorism have been replaced by the three conditions 
which the elected Hamas government needs to meet in order to restart the provision of 
the aid: non-violence, recognition o f Israel’s right to exist and acceptance of existing 
agreements and obligations.93 After the takeover of Gaza by Hamas and the 
“nomination” o f the Fayaad government in the West Bank, the EU resumed its contacts 
with the latter and since then, as it will be detailed in the last chapter o f this dissertation, 
the calls for respect of international law are limited to a condemnation o f the settlements 
policy and the firing of rockets from Gaza.
its scepticism about the procedure o f  requesting the ICj to deliver an advisory opinion on the topic, the 
EU went on with its condemnation o f the wall. See for instance, Declaration o f  the European Council in 
Brussels, 16-17 June 2005: “The European Council, while recognising the right o f Israel to protect its 
citizens from attacks, remains concerned by the continuing construction o f the barrier in the Occupied 
Palestinian territory, including in and around Jerusalem, which is contrary to the relevant provisions o f  
international law”.
92 See for instance Declaration o f  the European Council in Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002: “The reform of  
the Palestinian authority is essential. The European Council expects the Palestinian Authority to make 
good its commitments to security reform, early elections and political and administrative reform. The 
European union reaffirms its willingness to continue to assist in these reforms”; and Declaration o f  the 
European Council in Brussels, 16-17 June 2005: “The Palestinian Authority must in particular demonstrate 
its complete determination to combat terrorism and to continue with the reorganisation o f  all security 
sendees. The European Council calls on the Palestinian Authority to continue with the ongoing reform 
process, to intensify consolidation o f  the institutions and to set as soon as possible a date for the 
organisation o f  free and fair legislative elections”.
93 Declaration o f the European Council in Brussels, 15-16 June 2006 and Declaration o f  the European 
Council in Brussels, 14-15 December 2006.
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2.2. Competing Claims Regarding the Primary Importance for Respect for 
International Law vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian Issue.
The EU’s approach in relation to the need for respect of international law is espoused by 
the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Although there is 
no official and articulated line by the PA and the PLO on international law and 
humanitarian law, this can be deduced from the position of the PLO during the Peace 
Process. When both parties articulated the principles which they consider should provide 
the basis for an evaluation o f their prospective deals, the actual principles urged by the 
Palestinians tended to be defined in relation to international legal norms and notably 
Security Council resolutions and principles o f humanitarian law.94
Respect for international law is however considered by most officials in Israel as a 
European misconception. It does not concern Israel because abiding by rules of 
international law would endanger Israel’s security and fundamental values and, further, 
the rules o f international law are in a state of severe crisis and lag behind reality and need 
severe reforms.95 Therefore, Europe’s claim that Israel should abide by rules of 
international law is considered by many in Israeli policy circles to be irrelevant and naive. 
It ignores the political dynamics in the Middle East as well as the new global security 
dangers post-9 /11 stemming from the proliferation of fundamentalism and the capacity 
o f a few individuals to commit widespread and heinous acts o f violence— which require 
radical shifts of international norms.96 To the EU’s claims that Israel is breaching
94 See "Permanent Status Issues and Palestinian Positions”. Available at http://www.nad- 
plo.org/listing.php?view—nego permanent (last visited 15 December 2008). See also, O. Dajani, “The Role 
o f International Law in Palestinian—Israeli Peace Talks” (2007) 32 Yale Journal o f  International Law 62- 
124, p. 92.
95 Y. Dror and S. Pardo, “Approaches and Principles for an Israeli Grand Strategy towards the European 
Union” (2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 17-44, pp. 37-38.
96 G. Steinberg, European N G O s against Israel, In M. Gerstenfeld (ed.), Israel and Europe: A n  Expanding 
Abyss, (Jerusalem 2005), pp. 111-123, p. 112.
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international law, Israel has replied that the EU was breaching “international terror law” - 
by maintaining contacts with Hamas and Hizbollah.97 However, as seen in the first 
chapter o f this dissertation, Israel’s claim that it needs to depart from rules of 
international law predates the “War on Terror”. Since the beginning of its occupation of 
the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem, Israel has refused to implement de jure the 
provisions o f the Fourth Geneva Convention because it considers the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to apply only to territories that were sovereign prior to their occupation. 
Israel has claimed to be willing to conform to the humanitarian provisions o f the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, but has never specified which provisions it considers to be of 
humanitarian character.98 This scepticism about international law has been accompanied 
by a long distrust for the organisation o f the United Nations in which the State of Israel 
is constandy stigmatised, isolated and singled out.99 Bayefsky, in an article in the Israel 
Law Journal, has interestingly articulated the widespread resentment for the United 
Nations in Israel.100 According to her, for Israel’s foes, human rights are the rhetorical 
weapons o f choice and the forum for their campaign is the United Nations.
2.3. The Inclusion o f H um an Rights Clauses in the EU-Israel and EC- 
PLO Association Agreements.
As seen previously, the EU has included in all its external agreements a clause specifying 
that respect for human rights is an essential element of its relations with its partners and 
o f the agreement itself. Such provision was included in the Association Agreements it 
signed with Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.
97 S. Devi, Israel says EU is breaching international terror law, Financial Times, (13 December 2005),
98 On this issue, see chapter one o f  this dissertation, p. 33-34 above.
99 See One-Sided: The Relentless Campaign against Israel in the United Nations (The American Jewish 
Committee), (2004).
100 A. Bayefsky, “Israel and the United Nations' Human Rights Agenda: The Inequality o f  Nations Large 
and Small” (1995) 29 Israel Law Review 424-458, pp. 424-425.
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Article 2 o f the EU-Israel Association Agreement reads as follows:
“Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions o f the Agreement 
itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, 
which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an 
essendal element o f this Agreement”.
Article 2 o f the EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement is written in the same format 
but is slightly different since it makes reference to the Universal Declaration o f Human 
Rights:
“Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement 
itself, shall be based on respect o f democratic principles and fundamental 
human rights as set out in the universal declaration on human rights, which 
guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential 
element o f this Agreement”.
Much attention has been devoted to the human rights clause o f the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement. At the time of the ratification of the Association Agreement in 
the national parliaments, Palestinian and European non-governmental organizations 
worked together to obtain clarification of the content o f the obligations set in the human 
rights clause of the Association Agreement. Almost eight years after the ratification of 
the EU-Israel Association Agreement and more than ten years after the entry into force 
o f the EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement, it is possible to delineate with more 
precision the content of the obligations set in the human rights clause.
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2.3.1. Attempts to Clarify the Content o f the Human Rights Clause in the 
EU-Israel Association Agreement During the Parliamentary 
Debates Surrounding the Ratification of the Agreement. ................... .................... ...... ■".............   ■"................................... ........................................................................11 1 P   ............. ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ■  .  g
The EU-Israel Association Agreement was signed on 20 November 1995. It entered into 
force on 1 June 2000. During this period o f nearly five years, the EU and Israel 
implemented an Interim Association Agreement.
After it had been signed, the Association Agreement was ratified by the Finnish, 
Swedish, Austrian and Italian parliaments. Before it reached the agenda of other 
parliaments, Palestinian NG Os, notably the Centre for International Human Rights 
Enforcement and the Mattin Group with the collaboration of several other European 
human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, ICCO, Save the Children the 
French Platform of N G O s working on Palestine and Pax Christi Belgium launched a 
campaign inside the French, Belgian, UK, Dutch and Greek parliaments in order to place 
emphasis on Israel’s human rights practices at the time and to obtain some clarifications 
on several points regarding the functioning and implementation o f the human rights 
clause. Several points needed to be specified. The following paragraphs give an account 
o f the parliamentary questions that were posed to the EU member States governments at 
the initiative o f Palestinian and European NGOs.
• D oes Article 2 imply that respect for human rights and democratic 
principles by both parties is an established fact? Would the ratification of 
the EU-Israel Association Agreement imply acceptance o f Israel’s current 
standard of human rights practice?
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The human rights clause makes the assumption that the parties currently comply in toto 
with the human rights norms set out in the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights.101 
Therefore, “routine” ratification without establishing that the present human rights 
standards o f Europe’s partner does not respond to the human rights standards o f the 
clause would entail the implicit legitimization o f the current human rights practice. It 
would send the signal to Israel that it can expect the expansion o f its relation with the 
EU while continuing its human rights violations inside Israel and inside the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories.
•  Can the implementation of the human rights clause be expected to be 
subordinated to Article 79 o f the Association Agreement?
Article 79 mandates either party to “take appropriate measures” if it considers that the 
other party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Agreement and mandates unilateral 
action in cases o f special urgency. After the signing of all the Association Agreements 
with Mediterranean countries subsequent to the EU-Israel and EU-Tunisia Association 
Agreements, the EU and its partners issued a joint declaration in which they agreed that a 
case o f special urgency included a material breach of the Agreement by one party which 
could consist in a violation o f the essential elements agreed in the human rights clause.102 
The EU and Israel did not issue an equivalent document. It was thus necessary to clarify 
whether a violation of the human rights and democratic principles set out in the human 
rights clause by one party could entitle the other party to take unilateral measures, i.e. to 
suspend the Association Agreement, without seeking to resolve the matter first to the
101 L. Bartels, note 56 above, p. 17. According to Fierro, The human rights clause seems to be conceived as 
a tool aimed at keeping the status quo, or at improving it. E. Fierro, note 51 above, p. 97.
102 L. Bartels, Ibid., p. 8.
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Association Council.103 If  this was not the case, the matters had to be brought before the 
Association Council in accordance with Article 79 para. 2 of the Association Agreement 
which provides:
“If  either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under the Agreement, it may take appropriate measures.
Before so doing, except in cases o f special urgency, it shall supply the 
Association Council with all relevant information required for a 
thorough examination o f the situation with a view to seeking a 
solution acceptable to the Parties”.
•  Was a breach of the essential elem ent clause a material breach that will 
have to be handled under Article 76 (c) of the Association Agreement?
Article 76 (c) entitles the parties to subordinate their undertakings under the Agreement 
to national security imperatives. At first, Article 76 could render the duty to respect 
human rights under Article 2 derogable, i.e. subject to the appreciation o f one party of its 
security imperatives. It was thus important to clarify that the obligation under Article 2 
took precedence over Article 76.
• D oes the human rights clause embrace respect for provisions o f  
international humanitarian law?
103 The Association Council is a body set up at Ministerial level in charge o f  monitoring the 
implementation o f  the Association Agreement, malting the main policy decisions and settling disputes on 
the implementation o f the Agreement.
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The denial of the human rights o f the Palestinian people does not arise from a mere issue 
of bad governance or poor human rights culture within the confine o f a viable 
independent State. It is the product o f an ongoing occupation which fails to respect the 
rule of law and thus prejudices the exercise and protection o f human rights. It is 
therefore important to specify that respect for humanitarian law is also included in the 
human rights clause.
The members o f the Palestinian and European organisations cited above developed 
contacts with parliamentarians where they addressed these issues, initiated parliamentary 
debates, drafted parliamentary questions, and addressed the national executives. This 
campaign revolving around the ratification o f the Association Agreement in national 
parliaments was the opportunity to place the issue of human rights and the responsibility 
o f third parties into the debate on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the Middle-East Peace 
Process.
Several documents have been collected which can identify the opinions which were 
expressed during this campaign.104 In a plenary debate on 5 March 1997 in the Dutch 
parliament, the Dutch Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Van Mierlo stated that the human 
tights clause was not subordinated to the security clause (Article 76) in the sense that a 
party to the treaty could not invoke its security imperatives in order to derogate from 
Article 2 o f the Association Agreement. He also stated that the human rights clause does 
not refer to violations o f human rights arising from the conduct of trade and other types 
o f bilateral cooperation provided for in the Agreement only but to the human rights
104 Thanks to the courtesy o f  the Mattin group and Lynn Welchman, I have been able to go through 
several internal and public Mattin and CIHRE documents and exchanges o f faxes which all relate to this 
work. Unfortunately most o f  the relevant documents related to this advocacy work have disappeared or 
were destroyed as a result o f  a military incursion conducted inside the premises o f  the Mattin group in 
Ramallah in April 2002.
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practices o f the parties in general.105 In the United Kingdom, during the course of the 
Agreement’s passage through Parliament, the government clarified that assent to the EU- 
Israel Association Agreement did not imply acceptance by the Government or by 
Parliament o f Israel's current standard of human rights practice and that article 76 was 
subordinated to the enforcement of the human rights clause. Furthermore, the then 
Foreign Office Minister, Jeremy Hanley, stated that a breach of human rights would be a 
material breach o f the Association Agreement and as such could involve a decision to 
suspend or withdraw from the Agreement which would have to be taken by the 
unanimity o f the member States. However, it was not clarified whether respect for 
human rights included humanitarian law.106 In Belgium, the government specified that 
the breach o f the human rights clause by one party could lead the other party to take 
“appropriate measures” under Article 79 o f the Agreement and that the human rights 
clause only referred to human rights and not human rights and humanitarian law.107
Both France and Belgium delayed the ratification o f the Agreement because they wished 
to make its ratification conditional upon progress in the furtherance o f the Peace Process 
and in this respect were not satisfied with the policy o f the government headed by 
Benyamin Netanyahu. They saw the election of the Labour Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
as a signal that the Peace Process would be back on track.108
105 Country Report: The Netherlands, 14 May 1997 prepared by Deena Hurwitz (CIHRE project 
coordinator), Charles Shamas (CIHRE advocate) and Joe Stork (Human Rights Watch/Middle-East 
Advocacy Director). Interview with Charles Shamas, Ramallah, August 2006.
106 Second Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, Wednesday 19 February 1997, c.22 Cited in 
Appendix 7, Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report, “Foreign Policy and Human Rights”, 10 December 
1998, 1998-99, Memorandum submitted by the Centre for International Human Rights Enforcement. 
Available at http: /  /  www.parliament.the-stationerv-
office.co.uk/pa/cm l99899/cm select/cm faff/100/100ap08.htm (last visited 15 December 2008).
107 Question n. 205 de M. Moreels du 9 Decembre 1999 au Vice-premier ministre et ministre des Affaires 
etrangeres, Senat de Belgique, Bulletin 2-7, session de 1999-2000.
108 R. Miller, “Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel” (2006) 12 Israel affairs 642-664, p. 657.
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2.3.2. Obligations contained in the Human Rights Clause o f the EU- 
Israel Association Agreement and EC-PLO Interim Association  
Agreement.
Much attention has been devoted to the possibility o f the EU taking sanctions against 
Israel or suspending the Association Agreement on the basis of the human rights clause. 
The European Parliament on April 2002 adopted a resolution calling on the Commission 
and the Council to suspend the Association Agreement by 269 votes to 208.109 The basis 
for the demand to suspend the Agreement was not specified in the resolution and no 
reference was made to the human rights clause. In its fifth paragraph, the resolution 
states that the “insulting” treatment offered to the European diplomatic mission wishing 
to meet with President Arafat by the Israeli government marked a turning point in the 
relationship between the EU and Israel.110 Several NG Os across Europe seized the 
Parliament’s initiative and launched a campaign demanding the suspension of the 
Association Agreement.111 Nonetheless, the Commission and the Council never gave 
effect to the parliamentary resolution. The Commission does not support sanctions 
against Israel:
109 Resolution o f the European Parliament on the Middle-East, 10 April 2002, (P5 TA (2002) 173). 
uo The resolution was referring to the denial o f access o f  the Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique, and
the High Representative o f the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana to Arafat’s 
headquarters in Ramallah in April 2002. See chapter seven, p. 239.
111 See the “Common Declaration o f  N G O s” at the hearing at the European Parliament, 20 June 2002 on 
the theme: EU-IsmeI Bilateral Relations in the Framework of International and European Law. The case of the 
European Comnmnify-lsrael Association Agreement*, signed by APRODEV -Association o f  World Council o f  
Churches related Development Organisations in Europe, AVOCATS SANS FRONTIERES, C1DSE - 
International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity, ECCP -European Coordinating Committees o f  
N G O s on the Question o f  Palestine, FIDH -International Federation for Human Rights, OMCT -  
Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture, SOLIDAR and WCC -World Council o f  Churches. Available at 
http://www.aprodev.net/palestine-
israel /Files /  Statements%20to%20the%20EU /NGQs%20common%20at%20the%20European%20Parlia 
ment.%2020.06.02%20.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008); “Occupation : pas d’Accords ! L’Europe peut 
agir pour la paix au Proche-Orient”, Oxfam France/Agir Ici, 2002. Available at 
http://www.oxfamfrance.org/php/actions camp voir.php?IdCampagne=3 (last visited 15 December 
2008) and “N G O  Open Letter for the EU Concerning the EU-Israel Association Council”, Euro- 
Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) Press Release, 18 October 2002, Available at http 
http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/307/new s/ focus/8618 (last visited 15 December 2008).
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“EU policy is based on partnership and cooperation, not exclusion. It is the 
EU's view that maintaining relations with Israel is an important contribution 
to the Middle East peace process and that suspending tire Association 
Agreement, which is the contractual basis for EU-Israeli relations, including 
political dialogue, trade relations and cooperation activities, would not make 
the Israeli authorities more responsive to EU concerns. Keeping the lines of 
communication open and trying to convince our interlocutors is a better way 
forward”.112
Emmanuele Giaufret, the then Deputy Director o f the European Commission’s 
Delegation in Israel explained that all the Mediterranean partners o f the EU experience 
serious human rights issues, and that the EU does not want to create a precedent in 
suspending an Association Agreement with one of them on the basis o f the human rights 
clause. If  they suspend one, they will have to suspend them all. Furthermore, such an 
initiative would not have any impact on Israel and would ruin all the efforts o f the EU to 
ameliorate its relations with Israel.113 Against the tide o f the declarations o f the different 
national governments and parliaments at the time of the ratification, Esa Paasivirta, 
former member o f the Legal Service o f the European Commission, states that a 
unilateral suspension against Israel could pose difficult issues since it would involve a 
complicated balancing act between security and human rights aspects as the invocation 
of security interests under Article 76 o f the Agreement could come into play. On a 
political angle, he argues that EU sanctions targeting only one party (Israel or the 
Palestinian Authority) would simply fall out o f tune with the collective management
112 “The EU and the Middle East Peace Process - Frequently Aslted Questions”, updated 17 April 2008. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/mepp/faq/mepp faq en.pdf (last visited 15 
December 2008).
113 Interview with Emmanuele Giaufret, Tel Aviv, July 2008.
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efforts the EU has deployed.114 Therefore sanctions against Israel, -as well as against the 
Palestinian Authority-, are politically excluded from the European agenda.
The practice in relation to the implementation of the human rights clause of the 
Association Agreement with Israel and the Palestinian Authority is not different 
compared to the practice of any human rights clause in general. Negative measures are 
generally excluded and the human rights clause is essentially the basis for dialogue 
between the EU and its partners. It thus means that the human rights clause of the 
Association Agreement establishes a right for both parties to examine and address the 
human rights violations by its partner in the course o f the political dialogue they have 
established. Furthermore, the human rights clause sets the basis for taking positive 
measures, i.e., conditioning the development o f the relations between the parties to the 
improvement o f compliance with human rights obligations. The fact that negative 
measures in theory can be taken does not mean that the EU has to take sanctions when 
confronted with violations o f human rights by its partner country. Such an action is only 
a possibility and this possibility highlights the concern the EU has placed in the respect 
o f human rights by its partner country. Respect for human rights has become an issue of 
European interest. It is an essential element o f the Agreement which means that the 
parties have undertaken a commitment that their relations as well as the implementation 
o f the Agreement shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles 
and that respect for human rights guides their internal and external policies.115
Therefore, this suggests that the human rights clause lays down several expectations. 
First of all, if  the EU made the commitment that its relation with its partner will be based
1,4 E. Paasiviita, note 41 above, p. 179.
115 S. Rockwell and C. Shamas, A Human Rights Review o f the EU and Israel — Relating Commitments to 
Actions, 2003-2004 (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network) (2004), p. 19.
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on respect for human rights and that it will exercise a scrutiny over the human rights 
records of its partner country, a fortiori with the human rights clause, the EU made the 
commitment to act with diligence in its relations with its partner and refrain from actions 
or inactions that could give incentives to the commission of violations o f human rights. 
Furthermore, the human rights clause and the political dialogue it sets up becomes the 
specific environment where the claims o f the partners on the importance o f respect for 
human rights compete. Hence the importance for the EU to state at the time of the 
ratification that Israeli human rights practice did not correspond to what is expected by 
the EU. Finally, if the human rights clause places respect for human rights at the centre 
o f the relations between the parties, the furthering o f the relations between the parties 
without addressing the human rights violations of its partner is an infringement of the 
commitments taken initially.
As such, the commitments taken by the EU in including a human rights clause in its 
trade agreements with its partners call for the exercise of a scrutiny over the likelihood of 
the commission o f a violation o f international law by another States, the obligation to 
refrain from provoking a violation of international law and the obligation not to give 
incentives to the commission of a violation of international law detailed in the previous 
chapter.
3. Conclusion.
The present chapter has demonstrated that the European Union sees respect for rules of 
international law, human rights and humanitarian law as an element o f stability in the 
world order and wants to act as a guarantor for its respect. Its objective to promote rules 
of human rights and democracy and rules o f international humanitarian law are
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illustrative o f this belief. These are features o f Europe’s identity in the international scene 
and these features are to be found as well in its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. 
The EU has included in its Association Agreements with Israel and the PLO a clause 
which states that their relations are based on respect for human rights. As such, the EU 
not only granted itself the right to address the issues of human rights compliance with its 
partners but also undertook a commitment to do so. As the next chapter details, the EU 
has intended to export another feature o f its identity between Israel and the Palestinians: 
the exportation o f its own peace-building model, i.e. economic cooperation and 
exchange between former enemies.
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Chapter Five
Overall Account o f the Involvement o f the European Union in the Resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian Issue.
The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an issue o f primary importance for the 
external policy of the European Union. The European Security Strategy document stated 
that Resolution o f the Arab Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe.1 The study 
o f the involvement o f the EU in the resolution o f this conflict represents also a “test case 
for the CFSP” in the sense that it constitutes the ideal topic for the study o f the 
problems of political integration o f the EU and the adequacy and the effective 
deployment o f the instruments o f European foreign policy.2 Furthermore, it is an 
interesting case study which illustrates the deployment of the “European identity” 
(Article 2 of the Treaty o f the European Union) on the international scene. As the 
previous chapter has demonstrated, the European Union with its objectives to promote 
international law and human rights, not only wants to present itself as a credible and 
legitimate international actor but it also wishes to export its own model o f collective-law 
making and respect for supranational laws and its own foundational values. With respect 
to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, its strategy is a priori the same and it is coupled with the 
wish to implement in own peace-building model by fostering economic exchanges and 
cooperation between the parties. The present chapter aims at giving a broad account of 
the EU’s involvement with Israel and the Palestinians through a summary or compilation 
o f the academic literature on the topic and with reference to the relevant official EU 
documents. First o f all, it offers an overview of what can be described as the major 
constraints which prevent the EU from playing a prominent diplomatic role in the
1 A  Secure Eurnpe in a Better World, European Security Strategy Document, 12 December 2003, Brussels, p. 8.
2 S. Everts, The EU and the Middle East: A Call for Action, (Centre for European Reform), (London 
2003). p. 1 and B. Soetendrop, “The EU’s Involvement in the Israeli-Peace Process: The Building o f  a 
Visible International Identity” (2002) 7 EFA Rev. 283-295.
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resolution o f this conflict. Then, it offers a description of the involvement o f the EU vis- 
a-vis Israel and the Palestinians at several levels: its diplomatic declarations, its diplomatic 
and financial involvement and through its regional or Mediterranean policy. Finally, it 
offers a critical account o f the diverse solutions proposed in the academic literature in 
order to foster the involvement o f the EU in the region.
1. The EU  Relegated to a Secondary Role on the M iddle-East 
Diplomatic Scene.
There exists a general consensus on the causes of the limited political role of the EU in 
the Middle-East. The first section o f this chapter “sets the scene” which could be 
described in a nutshell in the following way: first of all, die EU is the sum o f its member 
States and each one o f diem has different sensibilities vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue; second, the Middle-East is the privileged domain of the United States which is the 
only credible third party for Israel and the Palestinians and; finally, despite all die efforts 
it can deploy, the EU will likely never gain the confidence of Israel. It does not tackle the 
general strengths and weaknesses o f the EU as an international actor such as its lack o f 
military power and the relevance o f European diplomatic “soft instruments”, although 
these must obviously constitute a hidden sub-plot.3
3 For an analysis o f the role o f the EU as a “civilian power” vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian issue, see E. 
Aoun, “European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado about Nothing” (2003) 8 EFA  
Rev. 289-312. For Aoun, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict confronts the EU with the enduring realities o f the 
international relations that are still characterised by possible use o f force and by issues o f  might and power 
and it questions the role o f  the EU as an international actor which is characterised by the choice o f  peace 
and persuasion and a positive repertoire o f actions. Her argument is presented in more detail at the end o f 
this chapter.
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1.1. The Divergence of Positions Am ong the Member States o f the 
EU.
At the time o f the European Political Cooperation in the early 1970s, the member States 
o f the European Community never managed to reach unanimity on a strategy to adopt 
vis-a-vis the Middle-East conflict because each one of them had its own views on the 
issue. Today, the European Union numbers 27 member States and thus this 
phenomenon is amplified. Naturally, the divergences between member States of the EU 
vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have affected the EU’s diplomatic actions in the 
Middle-East. The position of the individual member States o f the EU can be evaluated 
according to different factors which stem from their history as a colonial power or as an 
occupied nation, their participation or direct involvement in the genocide of the Jewish 
people during the Second World War and their degree of proximity with the United 
States. This last factor is reinforced with respect to the ex-communist countries which 
joined the EU in 2004 and, broadly speaking, see the PLO as an ancient ally of the 
former USSR and have operated a very close rapprochement to the United States.4
These discrepancies are also to be found among the most powerful member States o f the 
EU which constitute the decision-making heartland of the Union: France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom. France has always distinguished itself by a pro-Arab stance and a 
will to mark some form of independence from American politics. This has prompted 
France to undertake some “free-riding” diplomatic initiatives such as, for instance, 
Chirac’s tour in the region in 1996 which became world famous after his altercation with
A Interview with Jana Hybaskova, Member o f  the European Parliament, chair o f the European Parliament 
Delegation for relations with Israel, Brussels, August 2006.
169
the Israeli security services in the Old City o f Jerusalem.5 However, this traditional 
Gaullist position o f France has changed with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president 
in May 2007 who is much more sensitive than his predecessor to Israeli concerns.6 
Further, regarding Germany, any German initiative and position in the region is reflective 
of the burden of national guilt it carries as the source of the main perpetrators of the 
genocide o f the Jews from Europe. This inhibits Germany from exerting its diplomatic 
influence especially against Israel when, at the same time, Germany uses the EU as a 
platform which allows it to formulate stances that it would not adopt on its own.7 Finally, 
the close ties between the United States and the United Kingdom constrain the latter 
from pushing for a more independent European stance and diplomacy. Obviously, the 
UK cannot envisage a European policy towards the Middle-East without any form of 
coordination with the US.8 At the same time, the UK uses its close connection with the 
US to influence its foreign policy agenda on this issue, as Tony Blair did after the 
invasion o f Iraq in March 2003 when he praised the US for a re- engagement in Israel 
and Palestine.
Consequently, there is no proper European position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
European diplomatic statements on this issue are always the result o f  a compromise 
reached among the different member States. The result o f this process has been
5 J. Peters, Europe and the Middle-East Peace Process: Emerging from the Sidelines, In S. Stavridis et al. 
(ed.), The Foreim Policy of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990's, (1999), 
pp. 295-316, pp. 308-310.
6 For an illustration o f  this change, see the speech o f  President Sarkozy before the Knesset on 23 June 
2008. Available at http:/  / www.diplomade.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo 8 33 /israel-temtoires- 
palestiniens 4 1 3 /france-israel 1160 / visites 8647 / discours-prononce-par-m.-nicolas-sarkozy-devant- 
knesset-23-juin-2008 63849.html (last visited 15 December 2008).
7 Interview with Hannes Swoboda, Member o f  the European Parliament, Brussels, August 2006.
8 See for instance C. Musu, EU Foreign Policy and the Middle-East Peace-Process 1991-2002, PhD thesis, 
(London 2004), pp. 84-83 and pp. 94-97 and V. Yorke, The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace- 
Process: The Need for a New Approach, (London 1999), p. 15. On the individual positions o f  France, Ireland, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Greece: D . Allen and A. Pijpers (eds.), 
European foreign policy-making and the Arah-Israeli conflict, (The Hague, Lancaster 1984).
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described as the “smallest common denominator phenomenon”9 in the European 
declarative policy or the “policy o f converging parallels”. Musu’s reference to this 
geometrically-impossible figure illustrates how the attainment of a real convergence, 
capable o f producing a truly collective policy has been constantly hampered by the 
persistence of differences in the individual member States’ preferences, which remain 
clearly distinct from, and occasionally similar to, those o f other member States.10 
Furthermore, these divergences among member States result in a kind o f “sluggishness 
o f reactions” when EU member States have to elaborate political initiatives.11
1.2. European Dependency on American Politics.
The EU and the US share the same interests vis-a-vis the Middle-East: the necessity o f 
bringing about stabilisation of the region, the non-proliferation o f weapons o f mass 
destruction, energy supply and the fight against international terrorism.12 Nevertheless, 
the perceptions of these different threats and their methods in tackling them differ 
greatly between the two political entities.13 Given its geographical proximity to the region, 
the EU would seem to have even more interest in its stabilisation than the US but it will 
never take the risk o f endangering its relations with its ally. This is the predicament faced 
by the EU in its policy towards the Middle-East as this is already the privileged domain 
of the US for strategic, economic and notably energy reasons.14
9 E. Aoun, note 3 above, pp. 295-296.
10 C. Musu, note 8 above, p. 109.
11 E. Aoun, note 3 above, p. 296 and M. Ortega, “La paix est entre leurs mains” (2003) 62 Cahiers de 
Chaillot 55-67, p 58.
12 C. Musu, note 8 above, p. 179.
13 On this aspect, see K. Archick, European Views and Policies Towards the Middle East, Congressional 
Research Service (The Ubraty of Congress), (Washington 2005).
14 V. Yorke, note 8 above, p. 6.
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Being in the heart of the internal American political life, the Middle East, and with it the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue, is not an international concern but an internal issue. The electoral 
calculations of American politicians are always combined with a certain “ familiarity” with 
Israel. The allegiance to Israel is coupled in American political life and among the 
American population with a total ignorance o f the Palestinian grievance.15 American 
support for Israel has increased with time, but has also been counterbalanced by variable 
preoccupations related to the perceptions and stability of the Arab world given the 
necessity to guarantee energy supplies and the protection of the regimes standing against 
the USSR at the time of the Cold War.16 This alliance between Israel and the United 
States has all appearance o f permanence and it is being displayed principally through the 
American financial aid to Israel, the numerous US vetoes to any Security Council 
resolutions condemning Israel’s actions towards the Palestinians and, at the time o f the 
Peace Process, the close coordination between the US and Israel on the positions to 
adopt even before submitting them to negotiations.17 These ties have become deeper 
with Israel having successfully persuaded the US that its fight in the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories was part o f the overall “War on Terror”. These ties have become deeper with 
Israel having successfully persuaded the US that its fight in the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories was part of the overall “War on Terror”. This alliance has given more credit 
to “derogative interpretations” of international rules like for instance the perceived 
legitimacy of pre-emptive defensive action such as targeted assassinations. It has also 
contributed to the re-conceptualising o f counter-terrorism as a new species of 
international armed conflict with, as one consequence, the substitution o f foggier rules 
than those o f human rights and international criminal law. N ot only that, but the 
presentation by Israel o f its actions in the OPT in the context of the War in Terror has
15 G. Nonneman, “Le role des Etats-Unis dans le conflit israelo-palestinien: un point de vue europeen”
(2003) 62 Cahiers de Chaillot 36-49, p. 39 
l(i Ibid., p. 40.
17 Ibid., p. 42.
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led to an increased polarisation o f UN political bodies concerned with human rights 
around the Israeli-Palestinian issue,18
For the Palestinians and the Arab States, the US is therefore part of the problem and of 
the solution. It still represents the only credible peace-broker because o f its supposed 
leverage on Israel.19 This remains the case even after American invasion o f Iraq which 
has tremendously destabilised the region. The time when the EU was considered by 
some as a possible counterpower to American hegemonic position in the region after the 
end o f the Cold War is gone.20
The diplomatic pre-eminence o f the US in the region and its close ties with Israel is 
coupled with American and Israel fear o f greater EU involvement other than its usual 
financial assistance and its support to any American initiatives. After the First Gulf War, 
the US annihilated the EU ’s long-term idea of holding an international conference under 
the aegis of the UN in order to resolve the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
They set up their own framework o f negotiations in which the European Community 
was confined to being an observer but was nonetheless invited to play a participatory role 
in the multilateral talks that emerged from Madrid21 and to assume a role o f depositary of 
the progress made at the conclusion of the Taba talks in 2001. The participation of the 
EU in the Quartet officially on an equal status with the US does not negate European 
dependency on American external politics.22
18 J. Fitzpatrick, “Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights”, (2003) 14 EJIL 
241-264.
19 J. Peters, Europe and the Arab-Israeli Process: The Declaration o f Berlin and Beyond, In S. Behrendt 
and C. Hanelt (eds.), Bound to Cooperate — Europe and the Middle East, (Gutersloh 2000), pp. 151-170, p. 168.
20 See for instance F. Charillon, La strategic europeenne dans le processus de paix au Moyen Orient, In M.- 
F. Durand and A. de Vasconcelos (eds,), La PESC, Ouvrir PEurope au Monde (Paris 1998), pp. 195-225.
21 P. Patokallio, European Union Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict: from Payer to Player, (Durham 2004), 
pp. 8-9 and J. Peters, note 5 above, p. 158.
22 For a definition o f the Quartet, see p. 14 note 10 o f this dissertation above.
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For European decision-makers, this American supremacy is internalised.23 The EU has 
never dared to get into a confrontation with the US and is ultra-sensitive to any pressure 
from it. One o f the blatant examples o f this was the decision by the EU to suspend aid 
to the Palestinian Authority following the victory o f Hamas at the elections o f the 
Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006 -even though it organised and funded 
these elections. This has had, as a consequence, the direct loss o f influence o f Europe in 
the region and the immediate undermining of a long-term institution building and a loss 
o f the earlier confidence which existed between the EU and the Palestinians. It has 
allowed some commentators to state that the EU is following American interests in the 
region even though it is not in Europe’s own interests.24
1*3. Tense Relationships between the EU and Israel.
Israel’s allegiance to the US is counterbalanced by a widely acknowledged distrust for the 
EU.25 In many instances, Israel has interpreted EU ’s position and action as constantly 
biased in favour o f the Palestinians and the Arab States26 and will dismiss most o f its 
initiatives or the initiatives coming from its member States out of hand. This is the case 
despite the belief o f some Europeans that the position of the EU is objective and 
impartial and as such constitutes an asset for EU ’s political involvement in the resolution
23 E. Aoun, note 3 above, p. 306.
24 Interview with Veronique de Keyset-, Member o f  the European Parliament, Brussels, August 2006.
25 See for instance: M. Asseburg, “D e la rhetorique a la pratique? Les trois dimensions de la politique 
europeenne a I’egard du conflit” (2003) 62 Cahiers de Chaillot 11-26, p. 24; M. Ortega, note 11 above pp. 
63-67; E. Aoun note 3 above, p. 302; P. Patokallio, note 21 above, p. 18 ; J. Peters, note 5 above, p. 301 
and G. Steinberg, The European Union and the Middle-East Peace Process, Jerusalem Letter, (15 November 
1999).
26 For a good illustration o f  this position see for instance j. Alpher, “The Political Role o f the European 
Union in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: An Israeli Perspective” (1998) 33 The International Spectator 77- 
86; S. Avineri, Europe in the Eyes o f Israelis: The Memory o f  Europe as Heritage and Trauma, In I. 
Greilsammer and J. Weiler (eds.), Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours, (Berlin, New York 1988), pp. 31-39; 
A, Carmi and J. Carmi, The War of Western Europe Against Israel, Jerusalem, New York 2003); M. 
Gerstenfeld, “The EU Constitutional Crisis, the Middle East, and Israel” (26 June 2005) 4 Jerusalem Issue 
Brief; R. Lapidoth, The EU, Jerusalem and the Peace Process, (Munich Centrum fur Angewandte 
Politikforschung 2000), available at www.cap.lmu.de/download/ 2000/lapidoth.doc (last visited 15 
December 2008) and G. Steinberg, Ibid.
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of the conflict.27 Indeed, Europe’s attitude has always been characterised, from its own 
point o f view, by a desire for objectivity which has been translated by an equidistant 
stance which has set out to put the parties’ responsibility in the resolution o f the conflict 
on the same foot, therefore preventing itself from stigmatising either one of them. The 
parcel o f this supposedly-balanced attitude which sympathises with and supports the plea 
of the Palestinians is seen by official voices in Israel as an intolerable bias —inasmuch as 
the declaration of sympathy for Israeli grievance is seen as a European bias from the 
Palestinian side.28 In this respect, Europe’s position on the conflict is considered by Israel 
as full o f misconceptions such as when, for instance, Europe views the conflict as a 
major cause of Islamist terrorism and considers that Israel should withdraw from nearly 
all the Occupied Territories in which a Palestinian State would then be established, or 
that Israel must abide by international law and it is a normal Western State.29
Furthermore, most European countries adopt a low-profile attitude vis-a-vis Israel 
because they fear that any criticism against this State will be considered as reminiscent of 
anti-Semitism30 and Israel, with good or bad faith, has used this argument as a sword 
several times associating any criticisms against its policy as a manifestation o f anti- 
Semitism.31
27 M. Ortega, note 11 above, p. 62.
28 See video “Israel/Palestine: Initiating dialogue and reconciliation”, May 2005, Films on European Union 
external relations policies. Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/extemal relations/library/video/video 12 israel palestine.htm (last visited 15 
December 2008).
29 Y. Dror and S. Pardo, “Approaches and Principles for an Israeli Grand Strategy towards the European 
Union” (2006) 11 EFA Rev. 17-44, p. 35-41.
30 E. Aoun, note 3 above, p. 309-310 and N. Tocci, The Widening Gap between Rhetoric and Reality in 
EU Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Centre for European Policy Studies), (Brussels 2005), 
pp. 22- 23.
31 For instance, Prime Minister Netanyahu’ statement after the release o f the EU Berlin declaradon in 1999: 
“It is a shame that Europe, where a third o f  the Jewish people was killed, should take a stand which puts 
Israel at risk and goes against our interest”. Cited in J. Peters, note 5 above, p. 158.
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The interviews conducted for this research have shown that after 2004, there exists a will 
to ameliorate and deepen the relationships between the two parties and this from both 
the Israeli and European sides.32 This shift is mostly due to the influence o f new member 
States from Central and Eastern Europe and the will to improve relationships between 
the US and the EU after the Iraqi crisis. However, even if their relations deepen, it 
remains debatable whether the EU can influence Israel. It is more probable that Israel 
influences the role o f the EU in Middle-Eastern affairs, in particular in respect to the 
Israeli-Palestinian relationships, which as it is acknowledged in Israeli circles have in turn 
an impact on the global and regional standing o f the EU.33
The nature and the transformation o f the relationship between the EU and Israel is 
further developed in chapter seven and eight of this dissertation.
2. What Role for Europe ?
Despite these constraints, the EU has managed to increase its visibility and actions as a 
third party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its involvement has revolved around several 
axes. As detailed in the previous chapter, as part of its diplomatic arsenal, the EU has 
developed a declarative policy on the topic that has remained more-or-less constant 
throughout the years. The following section analyses other aspects o f its diplomatic 
involvement. First o f all, the EU has managed to develop diplomatic actions through the 
interstices left by the United States. Secondly, it has deployed huge financial efforts 
directed to the PA and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Finally, in parallel to the 
Middle-East Peace Process, the EU has built a regional framework o f relationships in
32 See pp. 248-9 o f this dissertation below.
33 Y. Dror and S. Pardo, note 29 above, p. 24.
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order to increase collaboration and exchanges not only between Israel and the 
Palestinians but also with the different countries o f the Mediterranean basin.
2.1. The Diplom atic Involvement o f the EU in the Bilateral and 
Multilateral Talks.
On the diplomatic level, the EU has worked its way through the gaps left by the United 
States by deploying all sorts o f efforts in order to increase its visibility on the ground. 
Consequendy, its diplomacy has resulted in selective diplomatic initiatives or 
interventions in order to solve crisis between the parties through the Special Envoy to 
the Middle-East, Miguel Moratinos and then Marc Otte, and the High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, as well as other European 
officials.
The appointment o f the EU Special Envoy in 1996 was a response to a desire to increase 
political involvement and visibility. The terms of his mandate were detailed in the 
conclusion o f the presidency of the European Council in Dublin, 5 October 1996 and 
were decided through a Joint Action.34 The first Special Envoy, Ambassador Miguel 
Moratinos was replaced by Ambassador Marc Otte who took up this position in July 
2003. His task was founded upon six broad objectives: to establish contacts with the 
parties, to provide them with advice and good offices, to contribute to the 
implementation o f agreements, to promote compliance with the basic norms of 
democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law and to monitor actions 
by either side which might prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations. The
34 96/676/CFSP, Joint Action o f  25 November 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis o f  Article J.3 o f  
the Treaty on European Union in relation to the nomination o f an EU special envoy for the Middle East 
Peace Process (OJEC L 315 o f 4 December 1996).
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Special Envoy fulfils Ms task in coordination with all the other institutional actors 
involved on the ground: the European Commission and the High Representative o f the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana.
The Special Envoy’s efforts in offering EU support, encouragement and ideas have been 
constant although his accomplishments have always been at the margins, thus mirroring 
EU’s diplomatic involvement on the ground. Nevertheless, the Special Envoy, notably 
Miguel Angel Moratinos, still managed to undertake some practical measures to help 
building confidence among the parties. One of the most cited example o f Ms successes is 
Ms mediation efforts with the US for the signing o f the Hebron Protocol of 17 January 
1997 wMch provided for the partial redeployment o f Israeli troops from the city and a 
timetable for future redeployments in the West Bank.35 The Special Envoy obtained from 
Arafat a letter stating that he would use all his political and moral weight to ensure that 
the agreement would be implemented. He also proposed a code of conduct in 1997 in 
order to help the parties to resume negotiations wMch received a positive welcome but 
was never implemented because of the lack o f final agreement.36
Furthermore, the EU was given an important role in the orgamsation of the multilateral 
track o f the Middle East Peace Process which was launched in January 1992. The EU 
was the gavel holder o f the Regional Economic Development Working Group and the 
co-orgamser of three o f the five working groups on water, environment and regional 
economic development. However, the more political groups on refugees and security and 
armaments escaped its control.37
35 See for instance P. Patokallio, note 21 above, p. 10 and J. Peters, note 5 above, p. 160.
36 A, Diaz-Martin, The Middle-East Peace Process and the European Union (Directorate General for 
Research, European Parliament) (Brussels 1998), pp. 44-45.
37 F. Charillon, note 20 above, p. 204 and A. Diaz-Martin, Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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Since the beginning of the second Intifada, European diplomatic efforts have been 
concentrated upon the tasks o f conflict management, notably the initiation o f dialogues 
with Palestinian militant groups, to convince them to renounce attacks against Israeli 
civilians. For instance, Alistair Crooke, the Middle-East adviser of Javier Solana, the High 
Representative o f the Common and Foreign Security Policy, successfully offered his 
mediation services to resolve the crisis o f the siege of the Church o f the Nativity in 
Bethlehem in April 2002.38 Further, after the implementation of the Gaza disengagement 
plan and the signature o f the Agreement on Movement and Access, in November 2005, 
the EU provided, in agreement with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, border 
assistance monitors who were entrusted with reinforcing Palestinian border management 
capacities at the Rafah border checkpoint between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. This latter 
aspect will be detailed in the next chapter o f this dissertation.39
Finally, the EU along with the US, Russia and the UN is a member o f the Quartet. In 
this respect, the EU was the main initiator of the Road Map, a peace plan for the region 
which was officially presented by the Quartet in April 2003.40 Although, the Quartet 
could represent a crucial policy vehicle in which the EU could play an important political 
role, it remains a channel for the US to control and pre-empt any other diplomatic 
initiatives of other third parties.41 As put by Alvaro de Soto, the former UN Middle East 
Envoy, in his confidential report when he left his office: “the Quartet is pretty much a 
‘group o f friends' o f the US and the US doesn’t feel the need to consult closely with the 
Quartet except when it suits it” .42
38 C. McGreal, UK Recalls MI6 Link to Palestinian Militants, The Guardian, (24 September 2003).
39 See page 208-211 o f  this dissertation below.
40 S. Everts, note 2 above, p. 27.
41 P. Patokallio, note 21 above, p. 8.
42 A. de Soto, “End o f Mission Report (confidential report)”, published by the Guardian, (13 June 2007), 
para, 63, p. 24.
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2.2. The First Donor o f the Palestinian Authority and to the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories.
The European Union and its member States have been by far the most important 
financial supporter o f the Palestinian Occupied Territories and the construction of a 
Palestinian State. In April 2006, following the election of Hamas at the legislative 
elections in January o f the same year, the EU decided to suspend is direct aid to the PA. 
This decision marks an important shift in the relationship between the EU and the 
Palestinians.
2.2.1. A Progressive Financial Involvement.
Europe’s assistance and involvement with the Palestinian people date from the early 
1970s when the EC started contributing to the UNRWA budget. After it issued the 
Venice declaration, and thus recognised the right of the Palestinian people to self- 
determination, Europe started to enact and enforce instruments in line with its political 
stance. It enacted in 1986 Regulation 3363/86 related to the tariff arrangements 
applicable to imports into the Community o f products originating in the Occupied 
Territories.43 The regulation allowed Palestinian products to be exported to the EC under 
the label “Made in West Bank and Gaza” thus being a concrete measure that dissociated 
the Occupied Territories from the State o f Israel.
After the signing o f the Declaration o f Principles in September 1993 in Washington, the 
EU decided to increase its involvement in the Peace Process through economic and
43 Council Regulation 3363/86 o f 27 October 1986, OJCE L 3 0 6 ,1st November 1986.
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financial means by supporting the nascent Palestinian Authority and to set the Palestinian 
economy on a course for development for the future. The commitment o f the EU in its 
financial support o f the Palestinian Authority and in aid and development programs 
directed to the Palestinian population was concretised through a Joint Action decided at 
the Council’s level in December 1993 after the Washington D onors’ conference in 
October 1993.44 From 1994 to the end o f 2005, the European Union committed 
approximately €2,3 billion in assistance to the Palestinians which makes it so far the most 
important donor o f the PA and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. O n top o f that, 
bilateral EU Member States’ assistance is estimated at a somewhat greater amount.45 The 
EU, for instance, financed the construction o f infrastructure such as the Gaza airport 
and seaport Finally, the EU is the chair o f the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee whose task is 
to coordinate the international aid to the PA and Palestinian Occupied Territories.
As it will be developed in the next chapter, the aid to the Palestinian population so far 
has helped to maintain the short-term survival of the PA and has prevented the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories from collapsing. It has had little impact on their 
development as a result o f the lasting occupation o f these territories by Israel.
2.2.2. The Suspension of the Direct Assistance to the Palestinian 
Authority in April 2006.
After the victory of Hamas at the legislative elections in January, the EU suspended its 
direct budget contribution to the PA — even though the elections were fully supported by 
the European Commission through its assistance to the Central Election Commission
44 Declaration o f the European Council in Brussels, “Middle-East Peace Process: Framework for Joint 
Action”, 10-11 December 1993.
45 Source EC Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza. Available at 
http://www.delwbg.cec.eu.int/en/eu and palestine/overview.htm#2 (last visited 15 December 2008).
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and monitored by a European Union Election Observation Mission supervised by 
Veronique de Keyser (MEP).46 Most o f the State-building and development programs 
whose funds went through the Palestinian Authority were suspended except for those 
which were conducted under the auspices o f the Office of the President.47 The 
programmes whose funds were channelled through NG O s or through the private sector 
remained in place. In June 2006, the EU put in place a mechanism o f emergency 
assistance, the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM), whose ambit was to provide 
essential services and financial support to vulnerable Palestinians, to help cover running 
costs, consumables and equipment for hospitals and schools and also to contribute to the 
continued supply o f essential public utilities, including access to electricity, water and 
sanitation for the 1.3 million people in the Gaza Strip.48 TIM was based on three 
windows: Window I helped cover running costs, consumables and equipment for 
hospitals and schools; Window II contributed to the continued supply o f essential public 
utilities, including access to electricity, water and sanitation for the 1.3 million people in 
the Gaza Strip; and Window III supported the provision o f essential services and 
financial support to vulnerable Palestinians. The suspension o f aid to the PA was 
actually accompanied by an increase in the humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories.49
46 “European Union launches 172-strong Election Observation Mission for the 2006 parliamentary 
elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, European Union Election Observation Mission for the West 
Bank and Gaza - Media Centre, 21 December 2005. Available at 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSP/3dl4c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eh/b3bR295ecld54fea852570d 
e00621275iQpenDocument (last visited 15 December 2008).
47 Interview with Mark Gallagher, Head o f  the Financial Cooperation and Institutional Reform Section, EC 
Assistance Technical Office for the West Bank and die Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, July 2007.
48 Source: www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu (last visited 15 December 2008).
49 The EC assistance amounted to €340 million for the year 2006. By the end o f  June 2007, the 
Commission had already committed €320 million for aid to the Palestinian Territories. For the year 2005, it 
provided € 260 million. Sources EC Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Available at www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu (last visited 15 December 2008).
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The decision to suspend direct assistance to the PA was far from unanimous in 
European decision-making circles. Actually, it was at first decided as a temporary 
measure by EuropeAid, the European Commission External Cooperation Programmes 
soon after the declaration o f the results o f the Palestinian legislative election. It then 
climbed up the EU hierarchy and was endorsed officially by the Council in Luxembourg 
on die 10th o f April 2006.50
The disagreements which revolve around this decision are die continuation of an 
ongoing debate on whether the EU ought to engage or not with Hamas. Already in 2004, 
the decision to put Hamas on die “terrorist list” had been the result o f a heated debate 
and the EU has failed to develop a consistent approach towards the Islamist group. For 
instance, secret talks between Hamas leaders and EU officials were ongoing while Hamas 
was put on the terrorist list.51 The EU faced a predicament in January 2006. O n die one 
hand, since 2004, the EU had set out to improve substantially its relationships with the 
State o f Israel. The EU believes that it can fulfil its role as a third party only if it is on 
good-terms with all the parties to the conflict. It considered that the acceptance by Israel 
o f European monitor borders at the Rafah crossing after die negotiation o f the 
Agreement on Movement and Access in November 2005 was the demonstration that 
Israel was ready to welcome the EU on the diplomatic scene o f the Peace Process and 
the EU wanted to maintain this momentum. Additionally, the EU did not want to take 
the risk o f endangering its relationships with its US ally which had already been suffering 
during the Iraqi crisis,52 O n the other hand, some voices inside the EU  alerted that 
inasmuch as this decision could provoke a humanitarian crisis, it would have as a
50 Interview with Alban Biaussat, Political Advisor at the EC Technical Office for the West Bank and 
Gaza, Jerusalem, August 2006.
51 R. Miller, ‘‘Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel” (2006) 12 Israel affairs 642-664, p. 653.
52 Interview with Emmanuele Giaufret, Deputy Director o f die EC Delegation for Israel, Head o f  the 
Political and Economic Section, Tel Aviv, July 2007.
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consequence the direct loss o f influence of Europe in the region and the immediate 
undermining of long-term institutional building and the relationship of confidence which 
existed between the EU and the Palestinians.53
Nonetheless, despite the assertions o f Solana and Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner 
responsible for External Relations, that the EU is not letting down the Palestinians54, the 
decision has been perceived as a sanction by the Palestinian population on the ground, 
and is not understood by them given the fact that the EU financed the 2006 elections 
and acknowledged and praised their democratic character. John Dugard, the UN special 
rapporteur for the Occupied Territories summed up these feelings in his 2006 report: 
“They [Palestinians] are ... subject to economic penalties designed to compel the Hamas 
government to change the ideological stance on which it was elected -the first time an 
occupied people have been so treated”.55
In March 2007, the EU also refused to recognise the entirety o f the national unity 
government formed by Hamas and Fatah leaders. Following the events that took place in 
Gaza in June 2007 and the establishment of a new interim government in the West Bank 
in June 2007, the EU renewed contacts, cooperation, and assistance to the Palestinian 
Authority represented by this new interim government. At the Paris conference in 
December 2007, the international donor community decided to set up a new 
international support mechanism, PEGASE (Mecanisme Pa/estino-Buropeen de Gestion de
53 Interview with Veronique de Keyser, Member o f  the European Parliament, Brussels, August 2006.
54 “Summary o f  Remarks to the Press by Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the 
situation on the Middle East and Iran, 20 February 2006”. Available at 
http: /  / ue.eu.int /uedocs / cms Data / docs / pressdata/en / declarations /  88466.pdf (last visited 15 December 
2008). See also D. Gow and C, McGreal, The EU Plans to Go it Alone with Aid to the Palestinians, The 
Guardian, (8 May 2006).
55 “Question o f  the Violations o f  Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories Including Palestine, 
Report o f the Special Rapporteur o f the Commission o f Human Rights, John Dugard, on the Situation o f  
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Occupied Since 1967”. U.N. Doc. A /H R C /2 /5 , 5 September 
2006, p. 3.
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PA.ide Socio-Hconomique) which would replace TIM and work in collaboration with the 
Palestinian Authority in implementing the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 
(PRDP) presented at the Paris Donor Conference. PEGASE began to be enforced in 
March 2008. PEGASE’s scope is broader than that o f TIM. It aims to support 
improvements in governance and areas such as health, education and infrastructure. It 
channels funds directly to an account controlled by Palestinian Prime Minister Salaam 
Fayyad and bypasses Hamas in the Gaza Strip.56
On June 24, 2008, foreign ministers and representatives o f over forty countries and 
international organizations met in Berlin for the “Berlin Conference in Support of 
Palestinian Civil Security & the Rule o f Law” . They pledged US$242 million that will be 
channelled to the Palestinian Authority (PA) over the next three years to finance 
development o f the Palestinian security and judicial systems in the West Bank.57
2.3. Independent Strategies: the Euromed Partnership and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy.
The EU has been willing to implement its own model of peace-building between former 
enemies through cooperation and economical exchanges. The EU established several 
“People-to-People” projects whose objectives were to instigate cooperation between the 
Israeli and the Palestinian civil societies in the fields o f environmental protection, water, 
economy and trade.58 However, the most ambitious scheme in this respect stems in the 
framework o f external relations the EU has designed with his Mediterranean neighbours
56 Source: http: /Avww.delwbg.ec.eutopa.eu/en/funding/pegas documents.htm (last visited 15 December 
2008).
57 See the website o f  the German Federal Foreign Office, http: /  /www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/NaherUndMitdererOsten/palsec.html (last 
visited 15 December 2008).
58 M. Asseburg, note 25 above, p. 15.
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and was supposed to accompany the efforts o f the Peace Process: the Barcelona Process 
or Euromed Partnership (EMP). The European Neighbourhood Policy which was 
decided after the EMP, responds to the needs to redesign the framework o f relations 
with the EU after the enlargement of 2004. It embraces all the countries at EU ’s 
periphery and must be read in connection with the European Security Strategy document 
in the sense that it is seen as the framework instrument which will allow the EU to be 
involved in crisis management at its borders.
2.3.1. The Euromed Partnership.
The Euro Mediterranean Partnership was launched in 1995 at a time when the chances 
for stability in the Middle East were seen as high. Its main objectives are to encourage 
the development o f a partnership between the States o f the two banks of the 
Mediterranean in three domains which constitute the three pillars o f the EMP: political, 
economic and cultural. The EMP was an initiative complementary to but separate from 
the Middle-East Peace Process. With the EMP, the EU has been willing to implement its 
own model o f peace-building between former enemies through cooperation and 
economical exchanges. The EMP was supposed to create a climate o f confidence among 
these parties and institutionalise their relationships in order to boost the efforts towards 
peace.59 It is based upon the assumption that economic development can only be 
achieved with functioning democratic institutions and accountable governments 
respecting basic standards o f human rights. The rationale o f the EMP was thus to make a 
link between the socio-economic challenges and the political and security issues of the 
region. Its outcome was supposed to be the generation in the long run o f a well-policed
59 E. Aoun, note 3 above, p. 292; A. Diaz-Martin, note 36 above, p. 18; F. Hutchence, The Middle East 
Peace Process and the Barcelona Process, In F. Attina and S. Stavridis (eds.), The Barcelona Process and Enrv- 
Mediterranean Issues from Stuttgart to Marseille, (Milan 2001), pp. 171-198, p. 174 and P. Patokallio, note 21 
above, p. 14.
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zone of regional security and prosperity.60 Therefore, a central theme of the EMP was the 
promotion o f respect for human rights and democratic norms through a constant 
dialogue between the EU and its Mediterranean partners in order to examine the most 
appropriate means and methods for implementing the principles adopted by the 
Barcelona Declaration.61 In terms of structure, the EMP is based on the one hand, on a 
regional dimension which consists in the regular convening of multilateral talks on the 
three pillars o f the EMP, and on the other hand, on a dense network of bilateral 
agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners.62 Each Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreement contains a human rights clause stating that the relationships 
between the parties is based on respect for human rights and democratic principles 
constitutes an essential element of the agreement.
Under the Barcelona Process, the EU established a contractual framework with Israel 
and the Palestinians which was complementary to the Paris Protocol (“economical 
protocol’’ or “Annex V of the PLO-Israel Interim Agreement”). The EU signed with 
Israel and the PLO two separate Association Agreements - the EC-PLO Association 
Agreement was signed by the PLO on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. Israel and the 
Palestinians were thus embraced with the EU into an economic triangular relationship as 
well as being integrated in the whole process o f regional community building designed by 
the Euromed Partnership. The objectives o f the EU-Israel Association Agreement are 
the promotion o f free-trade, political dialogue and economic cooperation. The scope of 
the EC-PLO is narrower: it does not contain any provision for political dialogue or any
60 F. Volpi, “Regional Community Building and the Transformation o f International Relations: The Case 
o f the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (2004) 9 Mediterranean Politics 145-164, p. 151.
51 “Reinvigorating Human Rights in the Mediterranean Area”, Commission Communication, 21 May 2003, 
COM (2003) 294 final.
62 On the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership:
http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/euromed/index en.htm (last visited 15 December 2008).
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obligations on establishment and services.63 This is due to the limited structure o f the PA 
as well as the limited capacity o f the PLO to negotiate on behalf of the PA.64 However, 
the initiative of the EU to give the PA the privileges it granted to any State at its 
periphery corresponded at the time with a will to enhance the prospects o f the creation 
o f a Palestinian State. As detailed in the previous chapter, both agreements contain a 
human rights clause.65
Nevertheless, while the implementation of the series of bilateral agreements have 
continued, the failures o f the Peace Process have, in the words o f the European 
Commission, “contaminated” die implementation of the Barcelona process in its 
multilateral facet.66 Certain parties cancelled their participation in the multilateral fora, 
issues related to the forum on politics and security spread inside other fora and some 
Arab States refused to hold meetings in some countries because of the presence o f Israeli 
officials. This combined series o f events has prevented the proper implementation of the 
EMP.67 The sensitivity o f the EMP to the “seismic tremors” o f the Middle East Peace 
Process has showed the incapability o f the EMP to act on the Peace Process and the
63 E. Paasivirta, “EU Trading with Israel and Palestine: Parallel Legal Frameworks and Triangular Issues” 
(1999) 4 EFA Rev. 305-326, p. 310.
64 According to article VI o f the Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement o f  28 September 1995, the PLO 
could negotiate on behalf o f  the Palestinian Authority on specific fields defined by the agreement.
Article VI. Powers and Responsibilities o f  the Palestinian Authority
“b. [...] the P.L.O. may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations 
for the benefit o f the Palestinian authority in the following cases only:
(1) economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex IV o f this agreement;
(2) agreements with donor countries for the purpose o f  implementing arrangements for the provision o f  
assistance to the Palestinian authority;
(3) agreements for the purpose o f  implementing the regional development plans detailed in Annex IV o f  
the Declaration o f  Principles or in agreements entered into in the framework o f the multilateral 
negotiations; and
(4) cultural, scientific and educational agreements”.
65 See Chapter 4 o f  die dissertation pp. 155-166 above.
66 “The Role o f  the European Union in the Middle East Peace Process and its Future Assistance”, 
Commission Communication, 16 January 1998, COM (1997), 715 final, p. 2.
67 F. Hutchence, note 59above, pp. 174-181 and J. Peters, Practices and Failures: Arab-Israeli Relations and 
the Barcelona Process, (Berkeley 2004), pp. 15-25.
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necessity for the resolution of the MEPP for the creation of an area o f peace and stability 
in the Mediterranean environment.
At die initiative o f President Sarkozy, EU member States and their Mediterranean 
counterparts launched in July 2008 the “Union for the Mediterranean” which aimed 
at upgrading the EU's relations with its neighbours from North Africa and the Middle 
East. The “Union for the Mediterranean” is not a EU initiative. The major focus o f this 
project will be on improving energy supply; fighting pollution in the 
Mediterranean; strengthening the surveillance o f maritime traffic and “civil security 
cooperation” ; setting up a Mediterranean Erasmus exchange programme for students; 
and creating a scientific community between Europe and its southern neighbours. The 
Union for the Mediterranean is supposed to strengthen and support the Barcelona 
Process.68
2.3.2. The European Neighbourhood Policy.
The EMP has been upgraded by a new framework, the European Neighbourhood Policy 
which is expected to offer a new dynamic to the Euromed relations.69 The EN P was 
designed by the EU during the enlargement process of 2004 as a framework of external 
relations to manage its new external borders. It must be viewed from the logic of 
enlargement. In this sense, it represents a reassessment of EU’s external relations with its 
new neighbouring States and o f the EU ’s qualities and capabilities in the light of the 
tremendous changes which have taken place within the EU itself following the
68 On the Union for the Mediterranean, see the website o f the French Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs:
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fi7fr/europe 828/union-europeenne-monde 13399/relations- 
exterieures 853/union-pour-mediterranee 17975/index.html (last visited 15 December 2008). 
f)9 E. Johansson-Nogues, “A 'Ring o f Friends'? The Implications o f the European Neighbourhood Policy 
for the Mediterranean” (2004) 9 Mediterranean Politics 240-247, p. 243.
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enlargement in 2004.70 Its main objective is to expand the zone o f prosperity, stability 
and security beyond EU ’s borders with the creation of a “ring of friends” from Morocco 
to Ukraine.71 The objectives o f the EN P are not specifically about tackling the socio­
economic issues o f EU’s new neighbours, as it was with the EMP, but rather stabilising 
and securing the borders around the EU ’s periphery by means o f cooperative agreements 
in order to avoid new dividing lines in Europe. The strategy o f the EN P is no longer 
regional: the EN P embraces all the countries at the EU’s periphery thus encompassing 
two distinctive regions, the Mediterranean and the Eastern European areas. Furthermore, 
the E N P’s approach is bilateral and differentiated. The EU offers concrete benefits and 
preferential relations within a framework, the Action Plan, which is tailored according to 
the economic development, rate of progress and democratic record o f the partner 
country. Technically, the partner countries are supposed to be offered in the long run a 
very similar status to the members of the European Economic Area.72 The mechanisms 
of implementation o f the EN P are:
The establishment of a dialogue between the EU and the partner country within 
the existing framework of the relationship.
The design o f an Action Plan containing benchmarks and common objectives.
An annual review of progress in implementing the Action Plan.73
The EN P is based on a double assumption. First o f all, as with the EMP, democracy, 
respect for human rights, civil liberties and the rule o f law are all essential prerequisites
70 R. del Sarto and T. Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European 
Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?” (2005) 10 EFA Rev. 17-38, p. 26.
71 B, Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU's Newest Foreign Policy 
Instrument” (2006) 11 EFARev. 139-142, p. 139.
72 R. Aliboni, “The Geopolitical implications o f  the European Neighbourhood Policy” (2005) 10 EFARev.
1-16, p. 2.
73 “Wider Europe -  Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours”, Commission Communication, 11 March 2003, COM (2003) 104 final, p. 18.
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for political stability, as well as for peaceful and sustained social and economic 
development.74 Second, the EU and its new neighbours possess shared values, which are 
the values codified in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and Council o f Europe standards.75 Thus, the 
deepening of relationships with the EU and the prospect for closer economic integration 
is subject to the demonstration of a commitment to respect democratic principles and 
human rights, and concrete progress in the implementation o f political, economic and 
institutional reforms, including aligning legislation with the acquis comnmnautaire.76 The 
human rights dimension o f the EN P is thus encapsulated in a system of positive 
conditionality according to which the achievement of reforms and progress in the field of 
human rights and democracy identified in each individual action plan are supposed to be 
reviewed annually and conditioned to the furthering of cooperation and extension o f the 
privileges granted by the EU.
The EN P corresponded entirely with Israel’s expectations. From the onset, Israel 
expressed its unhappiness with the EMP. Israel has always been willing to be offered a 
different treatment from the other Mediterranean partner countries due to its socio­
economic characteristics. However, the EMP was seeking to forge a Mediterranean 
identity for its Southern participants with which Israel has never identified itself.77 
Furthermore, Israel has always sought a detachment of the EMP from the Middle East 
Peace Process (MEPP) and the EN P has no connection with the MEPP. The ENP 
follows the logic expressed in the Essen declaration of December 1994 which stated that
74 Ibid., p. 7.
75 Ibid, p. 16.
76 Ibid., p. 9.
77 On this topic, see R. del Sarto, “Israel's Contested Identity in the Mediterranean” (2003) 8 Mediterranean 
Politics 27-58.
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Israel should enjoy special status in its relations with the EU on the basis o f reciprocity 
and common interest.78
Being the most developed country at the EU’s periphery, the EN P makes Israel the 
frontrunner in this new framework.79 The EU-Israel Action Plan is tailor-made to reflect 
Israel's political and economic situation. It has, as an objective, the deepening of Israel’s 
integration into the European market and die boosting of cooperation in scientific and 
cultural relations.80 The EN P may thus expose die Israeli market to European 
competition through further integration o f Israel’s economy into that o f the EU and may 
slowly change the nature o f Israeli law to bring it closer to that o f the EU ’s acquis.81
The EU and the PA have also agreed on an Action Plan in which the EU asserts its 
intention to transform its relationships witii the PA from mere cooperation to 
integration.82 The EU-PA Action Plan should be read in combination witii the 
Communication o f the Commission “EU-Palestinian Cooperation Beyond 
Disengagement: Towards a Two-State Solution” .83 The EU viewed the Gaza 
disengagement plan as an opportunity for boosting its involvement in the State-building 
capacities o f the future Palestinian State. It thus committed itself to promote the reform 
of the PA, to help improve die condition o f trade and investments in the Palestinian 
economy and to reconstruct the infrastructure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It 
also sent a mission o f observers, the EU Border Assistance Mission (EU BAM) to 
reinforce Palestinian border management capabilities at the Rafah border checkpoint
78 Declaration o f the European Council in Essen, 9 and 10 December 1994.
19 G. Harpaz, “Enhanced Relations between the European Union and the State o f Israel under die 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Some Legal and Economic Implications” (2004) 31 Legal Issues o f  
Economic Integration 257-274, p. 265. Israel: €19578 GDP per capita -with Lebanon second richest 
(€5284), in “Wider Europe” COM (2003), p. 7
so “proposed EU-Israel Action Plan”, European Commission, Brussels, 9 December 2004.
81 G. Harpaz, note 79 above, pp. 267-270.
82 “proposed EU-PA Action Plan”, European Commission, Brussels, 9 December 2004.
83 Commission Communication, 5 October 2005, COM (2005) 458 final.
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between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.84 However, the perspective o f integration and the 
implementation of EU strategy post-disengagement were completely annihilated by the 
decision to suspend its aid to the Palestinian Authority in January 2006, Direct aid and 
contacts with the PA were resumed in June 2007 On 19 May 2008, The Palestinian 
Authority and the European Union (EU) officially re-launched the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) process between the PA and the EU on the occasion of 
the meeting of the “Joint Committee”.85
Despite the evolution o f the EU structural framework of external relations and the 
developments on the ground and the EU’s responses to them, the EU-Israel and EC- 
PLO Association Agreement remain the main legal ties which link the EU with Israel 
and the Palestinians. They are the two instruments for the implementation o f the EU- 
Israel and EU-PA Action Plans. As such, they provide the legal basis for the 
development of further contractual relations.
3. Academ ic and Political Responses to the European “Weak” 
Involvement in the Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Issue.
The overall picture o f the involvement of the EU in the resolution of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict gives raise to a general feeling of frustration. O n the one hand, as has 
been shown in this chapter, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is an arena where the EU has 
deployed huge diplomatic and financial efforts. There is a general acknowledgement that 
die EU ’s diplomatic involvement has been growing during these last fifteen years and 
that it has increased its visibility, particularly since the beginning o f the Second Intifada at
84 This aspect is developed in die next chapter o f  this dissertation, pp. 208-211 below.
85 Source EC Technical Office for the West Bank and Gaza. Available at http://www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu 
(last visited 15 December 2008).
193
the end of the year 2000.86 The sending o f the first EU Special Envoy, EU’s 
participation— along with the United States, the United Nations and Russia— in the 
Quartet, and its considerable financial involvement in the Occupied Territories are signs 
of the importance the EU places in the resolution o f this issue. However, on the other 
hand, many regret that the EU is not playing a political role proportionate to its 
economic involvement in the resolution of this conflict and that it has been relegated to a 
secondary but nonetheless crucial role: the “donor of the Peace-Process”.87
These general feelings o f frustration provoked by the political incapacities o f the 
European Union have given rise to a series of proposals and calls designed by European 
think tanks to establish a constructive strategy to the Middle East. These 
recommendations remain very dependent upon the contemporary political context at the 
time they were formulated, whether it was before or after the start o f the second Intifada 
and the Second Gulf War. They all offer responses to the internal and external 
constraints which the EU is facing in order to exercise leverage on the situation. 
Therefore, unsurprisingly, the need to expand cooperation with the United States is a 
recurrent theme. It is now agreed, as expressed by Everts, that experience has 
demonstrated that when the EU and the US have pulled in the same direction, they are 
successful.88 However, in light o f the failure of American policy in the region after the 
invasion of Iraq, some have concluded that European dependency upon any American 
initiative cannot remain a reality.89 Furthermore, the deployment o f a EU peacekeeping 
force to police a final settlement is also an idea which is regularly submitted. In 
connection with the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, the Western European Union which
86 M. Ortega, note 11 above, pp. 55-56.and J. Peters, note 5 above, p. 158.
87 See on this aspect, for instance, P. Patokallio, note 21 above.
88 S. Everts, note 2 above, pp. 3 and 51, See also M. Asseburg, note 25 above, pp. 26-28 and V. Yorke, 
note 8 above, pp. 43-46.
89 G. Nonneman, note 15 above, p. 48.
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constitutes an integral part o f the EU elaborated its future tasks, known as the 
“Petersberg tasks” which comprises peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions and crisis 
management. Under such a framework, the EU could deploy a force to secure a 
negotiated peace after possible Israeli withdrawals from the Occupied Territories.90 
Nevertheless, this proposition does not take into account the constant refusal by Israel of 
any international peacekeeping force involved in this region as this would mean an 
“internationalisation” o f the conflict.91
Demands such as the need for the member States to overcome their differing approaches 
have been formulated.92 Regarding the attitude o f the EU towards the parties to the 
conflict, some authors have urged the EU to put pressure on the parties to the conflict to 
implement the Road Map93 or, in its relations with the parties, to “punish extremists and 
support moderates”.94 Regarding this latter aspect, the relationships with the Palestinians 
raises much less controversy than the ones with Israel. Given the considerable aid the 
EU provides to the Palestinian Authority and to the Occupied Territories, its leverage on 
the Palestinian leadership in attempts to reform the Palestinian political system or to 
prevent terrorist attacks on Israel is acknowledged.95 The attitudes the EU should adopt 
towards Israel range through several possibilities which stem from the exercise of 
positive conditionality96 to the accession of Israel to the European Union. This latter 
strategy was seen by some as offering the possibility o f exercising a strong policy of
90 A. Dieckhoff, “The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (2005) Inroads. Available at 
http://inroadsjournal.ca/archives/inroads 16/Inroads 16 front matter.pdf (last visited 15 December 
2008); S. Everts, note 2 above, pp. 28 and 51 and B. Moller, A Cooperative Structure for Israeli-Palestinian 
Relations. The Contour o f a Post-Conflict Peace Order (Centre for European Policy Studies), (Brussels 
2002), pp. 42-44.
91 J. Choprat, “Third Party Monitoring in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (2003) The International 
Spectator 33-45, p. 35.
9292 ]yp Asseburg, note 255 above, pp. 26-28.
93 Ibid. and S. Everts, note 2 above, p. 51.
94 S. Everts, ibid.
95 See for instance, M. Asseburg, note 255 above, pp. 26-28 and B. Moller, note 903 above, p. 46,
96 N. Tocci, note 30 above, pp. 28-29.
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conditionality on human rights and democratic standards and obliging Israel to abide by 
the Copenhagen principles.97 The more developed the level of integration with the EU, 
the more influence it can exercise on this partner. Accession o f Israel to the EU also 
corresponded to a political desire in some Israeli political circles.98 It is however not in 
today’s European agenda. Finally, none has raised the possibility o f using sanctions as a 
realistic course o f action. Some authors have adopted on this issue the official European 
position which states that sanctions against Israel would be detrimental to its political 
credibility as a legitimate interlocutor.99
On the academic front, authors have analyzed how the Israeli-Palestinian issue actually
tests EU’s international personality. For Aoun, the EU is acting outside the realm of
power politics. Europe is a civilizing power using ecmild tools” of international relations: 
it prefers using a positive repertoire o f actions (official statement, agreements o f 
economic cooperation and financial aid) rather than negative measures.100 However, as 
the EU attempts to export its own standards by way of negotiations and pledges of 
assistance, it speaks a language o f responsibility, of law and of reason, this language does 
not always make sense to the actors involved in lethal conflicts and who are not as 
“rational” as Europe would like them to be.101 Therefore, in relation to Israel and 
Palestine, as the Peace Process started to stumble, Europe’s good will has been 
repeatedly tested. Europe has been cautious not to use any symbolic violence but its 
attitude has weakened its credibility in the eyes o f the parties. Therefore, for Aoun, the 
EU would require a painful metamorphosis in order to contribute effectively to the
97 B, Moller, note 903 above, p. 46 and R. Aliboni, note 724 above, p. 8.
98 Y. Dror and S. Pardo, note 299 above, p. 30,
99 A. Dieckhoff, note 903 above. See also the official position o f the EU on this issue: Frequently Asked 
Question on the European Union and the Middle East Peace Process. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/mepp/faq/m epp faq en.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008).
100 E. Aoun, note 3 above, pp. 299-300.
101 Ibid., p. 311.
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Middle-East Peace Process —one that it does not seem ready to undergo- and the Iraqi 
and Israeli-Palestinian crisis are perfect opportunities for observing eventual changes in 
European attitudes and policies which could hint at any future transformation of the 
EU ’s identity as an international actor.102
In a similar vein, Pace tests the constructions of Europe as a normative power, its 
process, environment, mechanisms and goals, against its limits in the context o f its 
involvement in the resolution o f the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.103 Pace describes 
normative power as a self-construction establishing a European Union identity against 
the “others” (international actors) rather than an objective analytical concept.104 For Pace, 
the EU’s discursive practices act as compelling ideas which it seeks to export to conflict 
areas —adherence to human rights, democracy, rule o f law, good governance, social and 
economic development as the routes out o f poverty, violence and conflict and to which 
the parties o f the conflict can subscribe.105 Therefore, in relation to conflict 
transformation the EU’s chances o f acting as a mediator or transforming conflicts 
through economic cooperation and other forms of partnerships depend on the 
acceptance o f the notion o f the normative power o f Europe by the parties to the conflict. 
In the case o f the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not only there is no process of 
internalization by any of the parties to the European normative model but there is also a 
power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians which limits the processes and 
desired outcomes at which the deployment of the normative instruments are aimed.106 
Finally, the credibility o f EU ’s discourse and actions for the preparation o f a Palestinian 
Western-style democracy and the emphasis on the importance o f dialogue with all the
102 Ibid., p. 312.
103 M. Pace, ‘T he Construction o f EU Normative Power” (2007) 45 Journal o f Common Market Studies
1041-1064.
lCM Ibid, p. 1043.
I93 Jbid, p. 1054. 
m Ibid, pp. 1055-1056.
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conflict parties have been seriously undermined following the EU ’s suspension o f its 
direct financial aid to the Palestinian Authority after the election of Hamas.107
A separate and final note should be devoted to Tocci’s writings on the involvement of 
the European Union in the resolution o f the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a well 
researched and developed policy paper published under the auspices o f the Centre for 
European Policy Studies in 2005108, Tocci demonstrates tiiat the nature o f the EU ’s 
credibility problem in the Middle-East stems neither from inadequate instruments nor 
from its internal divisions but rather derives from the manner in which the Union has 
chosen to deploy the instruments at its disposal.109 Thus, Tocci analyses the limits to 
EU’s use of conditionality on Israel and die Palestinians. Regarding the Palestinians, the 
demands for reforms o f the institutions o f the Palestinian Authority, democracy and 
good governance have been hampered by the deteriorating status quo, i.e. the persisting 
and deepening Israeli occupation. Restriction on movement and the withholding o f PA 
tax revenues have weakened the attempts to empower the Authority and the functioning 
o f the PA institutions. Furthermore, the inability and unwillingness of President Arafat to 
modify his actions and who cultivated an autocratic image was a major hindrance to 
demands for reform to the Palestinian Authority. Finally, the demands on the PA to stop 
the violence caused by Palestinian militant groups have not taken into account the fact 
that, first o f all, die extent to which any moderate PA leader can use their power to quell 
violence is direcdy linked to Israel’s conduct and, secondly, conditionality was not 
targeted at the direct authors o f most violent acts perpetrated against Israel.110 In relation
107 Ibid., p. 1057.
108 ]\]_ Tocci, note 30 above. The paper has been reproduced as a chapter in N. Tocci, The E U  and Conflict 
Resolution Promoting Peace in the Backyard (New York 2007), pp 100-125. And summarized in N. Tocci, H. 
Darbouche, Michael Emerson, S. Fernandes, R. Hanau-Santini, G. Noutcheva and C, Portela, The 
European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor (Centre for European Policy Studies), (Brussels 
2008), pp. 19-22.
i°9 Tocci, Ibid., p. 1.
110 Ibid., pp. 14-18.
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to Israel, Tocci states that the EU has never exercised any form o f conditionality against 
Israel, positive or negative, and in turn has been accommodating with Israel’s illegal 
practices. She uses as a case-study the issue of the exportation of products coming from 
the settlements under preferential treatment.111 O n this point, Tocci draws heavily on 
interviews carried out with Charles Shamas from the Matdn Group.112 At the end o f her 
piece, Tocci interestingly advocates for the pursuance o f positive conditionality in the 
EU ’s strategy towards the two parties based on a shared acknowledgement o f the parties 
obligations under international law.
These three authors’ contributions all highlight the inconsistencies between the EU’s 
declared foreign policy objectives and the use or non-use o f its traditional external 
relations instruments (i.e. positive conditionality) in the specific case o f its relations with 
Israel and the Palestinians. While their work has informed the analytical arguments found 
in this dissertation, in the chapters that follow, I will attempt to demonstrate using case 
studies, interviews and textual analysis how the EU’s economic and aid policies have 
become interwoven with the violations o f international law in relation to Israel’s 
occupation o f the Occupied Territories and the consequences o f this for the EU’s legal 
integrity, formal EU human rights policy and the EU’s participative responsibility.
111 Ibid., pp. 19-22.
112 The seventh chapter o f this dissertation develops Tocci’s argument by tesdng EU’s attitude vis-a-vis this 
problem to its compliance with the obligation not to recognize.
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Chapter Six
European Union Policy towards the Palestinians: 
Building Blocks against Road Blocks?
Europe’s relationship to Palestine has an epic quality. Palestine has been coveted for 
centuries due to its geographical and religious centrality. It has been a focal point of 
conquests and rivalries.1 If  one has to look at the relationships between Europe and the 
Palestinians and not the land of Palestine and more specifically during the past century, 
these have gone through three phases. From 1920 to 1948, the first period was 
characterised by a colonialist stance. After the First World War, the United Kingdom was 
granted a mandate over Palestine and this after it had issued the Balfour declaration 
which promised a national home for the Jewish people and hence dramatically 
transformed the fate o f the Palestinian people. After a long period following the creation 
o f the State o f Israel where the Europeans considered the Palestinians to be a refugee 
problem only, they began by the mid-1970s to recognise the Palestinian’s national claims 
and thus started to deploy efforts to legitimise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation on 
the international scene and to integrate the organisation into the Israeli-Arab political 
process. The recognition o f the right o f the Palestinians to self-determination by the 
Europeans certainly helped to bring about international recognition o f the Palestinian 
national claim. Finally, the beginning o f the Peace Process marked a period o f strong 
economic dependency accompanied by a political support for the Palestinian leaders, 
notably Yasser Arafat until his death in November 2004.
The suspension of the aid directed at the Palestinian Authority after the election of 
Hamas in January 2006 represented a change in the relations between the EU as up to
1 B. Khader, UEnropc et la Palestine : des Croisades d msjours, (Paris 1999), p. 8.
200
that event the Palestinians who had viewed the Europeans as the only third party able to 
understand their plight.
However, even up to the present, the EU-Palestinians relations are still characterised by a 
strong economic or aid dependency and, consequently, they are o f an essentially 
unilateral nature. Furthermore, it is difficult to analyse and characterise the relationship 
between EU and the Palestinians without considering the relationships between the EU 
and Israel, Israel and the Palestinians, or the context of the Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories. The EU-Israel relationship considerably influences the 
relationships between the EU and the Palestinians as it is historically and politically 
complex as the next chapter demonstrates.
The focus o f this chapter is an investigation of how the violations o f international law 
committed by Israel and the Palestinians disrupt the implementation o f the unilateral and 
bilateral instruments directed at the Palestinians and how the EU reacts to this 
interference in light o f the principles developed in the second and third chapters o f this 
dissertation. The first section focuses on the inoperability o f the EC-PLO Interim 
Association Agreement; the second on the deployment o f humanitarian aid in the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories; and the third on the Palestinian State building policy 
with the specific example o f the training and funding o f the Palestinian civilian police.
1* The Inoperability o f the EC-PLO Association Agreement.
In 1986, the EC enacted Regulation 3363/86 on the tariff arrangements applicable to 
imports into the Community of products originating in the Occupied Territories which 
allowed Palestinian products to be exported to the EC market under the label “Made in
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West Bank and Gaza”. This was a concrete measure to promote the implementation of 
the right to self-determination o f the Palestinian people because it dissociated the 
territory o f the State o f Israel from the Palestinian Occupied Territories.2 In the same 
vein, with the conclusion o f an agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation3, 
the EU treated the Palestinians on an equal footage with all other members o f the Euro- 
Mediterranean partnership and thus took another concrete step towards the recognition 
o f the right o f the Palestinian people to self-determination. Furthermore, the EC-PLO 
Interim Association Agreement was conceived as an instrument which would enhance 
trade and economic cooperation, hence fostering the economic development o f the 
nascent Palestinian Authority.
However, the EC-PLO Interim Agreement has never been fully operational for two 
reasons. First of all, Israel has always refused to recognise it. Second, the curfews and 
closures imposed on the Palestinian population, especially during the Second Intifada, 
have seriously undermined the development of the Palestinian economy. As a result, 
Palestinian external trade scarcely exists, and the measures imposed on Palestinian 
exporters have diminished the competitiveness o f their products.4 In 1998, in its 
communication to the Council and the Parliament, the Commission stressed that Israeli- 
imposed restrictions on the Palestinian economy and the non-recognition policy of the 
EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement was inevitably leading to violations o f both the 
EC-PLO as well as the EC-Israel Interim Agreements because Palestinian exporters
2 Council Regulation 3363/86 o f 27 October 1986, OJCE L 3 0 6 ,1st November 1986.
3 The legal basis o f  the EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement is not article 310 o f  the EC Treaty 
(Association Agreements) but articles 133 (Commercial Policy) and 181 (Development). See E. Paasivirta, 
“EU Trading with Israel and Palestine: Parallel Legal Frameworks and Triangular Issues” (1999) 4 EFA 
Rev. 305-326, p. 309.
4 Oxfam accounts that the transaction costs for Palestinians wishing to export are up to 70% higher than 
for Israelis exporting the same product. Quoted in “Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories”, International Development Committee o f  the House o f Commons, Fourth Report o f Session 
2006-2007, HC 114-1, p. 20. Hereinafter “Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories”.
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tended to use Israeli channels of exportation and to export under the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement.5 More than ten years later, the situation remains unchanged.6 As 
a consequence, the EU is facing a situation in which on the one hand, one o f its 
international instruments is inoperable because a third State refuses to recognise one of 
its agreements and thus undermines its object and purpose and, on the other hand, the 
illegal actions of the same third State creates external circumstances which have as its 
consequence the undermining o f the object and purpose o f the treaty and its violation.
1.1. The Non-R ecognition o f the EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement 
by Israel.
Since its signing, Israel refused to recognize the EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement 
because, first of all, it contends that it is in contravention with the Paris Protocol which 
according to Israel, creates a “single customs envelope” while the EC-PLO Interim 
Association Agreement envisages the Israeli and Palestinian markets separately. Israel 
also considers that the Interim Agreement contradicts the terms o f the Paris Protocol 
which allows for a de facto cumulation o f origins between Israeli and Palestinian products, 
and the Israeli and Palestinian Association Agreements do not allow for a cumulation o f 
this kind.7
The EU has rejected these arguments. The EU considers the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories to be a separate trading entity and do not form with the territory o f the State
5 “Commission Communication on die Implementation o f  the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade- 
Related Matters between the European Community and Israel”, Commission Communication, 12 May 
1998, SEC (98) 695, p. 11-13. Hereinafter “Communication on the Implementation o f  the Interim 
Agreement”.
6 Interview with Mark Gallagher, Head o f  the Financial Cooperation and Institutional Reform Section, EC 
Assistance Technical Office for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, July 2007.
7 V. Yorke, International Agreements with Third Parties (Economic Policy Programme, London School o f  
Economics), (London 1998). Available at h ttp ;//w ww.m et.gov.ps/epp/EPPI/EPP WYQ W ork/6.pdf 
(last visited 15 December 2008).
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of Israel a single customs territory. According to the 1998 Communication o f the 
Commission, “the Paris Protocol leads to the conclusion that the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip constitutes a separate customs territory since the Palestinians can and do exercise 
their own trade regime”.8 Furthermore, besides this legal consideration, the EU has been 
deaf to Israel’s arguments because it is eager to include the Palestinians in the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and to offer them the same treatment as any other 
members of the EMP. Nevertheless, until now this disagreement has not been resolved.9
Practically speaking, Israel has the means to object to the existence o f the Interim 
Agreement and to render its non-recognition policy effective. Israel controls all the 
elements o f the implementation o f the Interim Agreement: it has control over all the 
trade outlets and makes Palestinians entirely dependent on transit through Israel. 
Consequently, for imports, in general terms, Israeli customs have a tendency not to 
accept imports marked as exempted from duty under tire EC-PLO Agreement. 
Importers are obliged either to alter the custom formalities to show that the products are 
exempted under the EU-Israel Agreement - which delays the import - or to pay duty to 
Israeli customs. For exports, some Palestinian products manage to be exported with 
EUR1 certificates o f origins.10 However, there still exists a tendency to contract Israeli 
exporters and export the products under tire EU-Israel Association Agreement because 
o f the numerous obstacles faced by Palestinian businessmen if they try to export their 
products directly to the EU.11 Therefore, this situation leads to the violation of both the 
EC-PLO and EU-Israel Association Agreement.
8 Emphasis added. “Communication on the Implementation o f the Interim Agreement”, p. 10.
9 Interview with Mark Gallagher, Jerusalem, July 2007.
10 Certificate EUR1 is the name o f  the certificate o f origin used by exporters established in countries 
signatory o f  an association agreement with the EU and which proves that the exported goods are entitled 
to duty free treatment because they comply with rules o f origin inscribed in the agreement.
11 E, Paasivirta, note 3 above, p. 320.
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I f  one looks strictly at the issue o f non-recognition, it is difficult to assess whether 
Israel’s non-cooperation in the implementation of the Interim Agreement amounts to a 
violation o f international law. O n the one hand, it could easily be advocated that Israel 
agreed in the Interim Agreement that the PA had rights to conclude international 
agreements or could be granted privileges but it does not have to recognise all the 
agreements it enters into or the privileges it benefits. On the other hand, it still can be 
advanced that Israel’s attitude constitutes an abuse o f rights. The principle of abuse of 
rights is described as the exercise by a State of a right either in a way that impedes the 
enjoyment by other States o f their own rights and then for an end different from that for 
which the right was created.12 Abuse o f rights is in the words o f Vaughan Lowe, an 
“interstitial norm”, that is a legal concept although not obligatory but which is necessary 
to help the legal reasoning to proceed.13 A right is abused when it disrupts the capacity of 
enforcement o f another right that normally coexists with the former. In the present case, 
the right of Israel not to recognize the privileges granted to the PA is abused, because as 
Israel possesses the means o f enforcement o f this Interim Association Agreement, it 
annihilates the right o f the PA to have the agreement implemented. Nonetheless, this 
could have been prevented if the EU and the PLO had negotiated a transit agreement 
with Israel when they concluded the Interim Association Agreement and this it neglected 
to do. Without a transit agreement, the EU has no legal right to challenge this practice 
and therefore the violation of its agreements. Israel always offered to recognise the EC- 
PLO Agreement in exchange for allowing settlements to participate in preferential trade
12 The principle o f abuse o f  right is considered to be part o f international law as a general principal o f  
international law or as part o f customary international law because o f the numerous references to it by 
States in litigation and arbitration, by the PCIJ and the ICJ although it has never been endorsed as such by 
the latter. See A. Kiss, Abuse o f Rights, In R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of International Earn, (Amsterdam 
1992) and M. Byers, “Abuse o f  Rights: An Old Principle, a N ew  Age” (2002) 47 McGill Law Journal 389- 
431.
13 V. Lowe, The Politics o f Law Making: Are the Method and Character o f  Norm Creation Changing?, In 
M. Byers (ed.), The Role of Eaw in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Earn 
(Oxford 2000), pp. 212-221. See also M. Byers, Ibid., p. 422.
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with the EU and the EU has always refused to link the two issues and dealt with the issue 
of the exports coming from the Israeli settlements in an independent way.14
1*2. The Disruption o f the Palestinian Economy.
On a broader perspective, the implementation of the EC-PLO Interim Association 
Agreement has been effectively “dormant” because o f the severe decline of the 
Palestinian economy and this has had, as a consequence, the drastic diminution of 
Palestinian exports.15 After giving a broad overview o f the obstacles to trade inside the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories, the following section analyses the ways the EU has 
tried to remedy this illegal interference in the implementation o f its agreement and ease 
the freedom of movement inside the Territories.
1.2.1. Obstacles to Trade inside the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
The closure system in the West Bank and along the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has 
fragmented the Palestinian economic space, raised the cost o f doing business and 
eliminated the predictability needed to conduct business.16 Furthermore, the obstacles 
placed on Palestinian importers and exporters under the guise o f “security” have 
tremendously altered the competitiveness o f Palestinian products. Palestinians have to 
rely on Israeli administration along the entire scale o f the chain of exports. The obstacles 
placed in the way o f Palestinian traders inside the West Bank as well as from the West 
Bank and Gaza to Israeli ports and airports, are all described by the Israelis as security
14 Interview with C. Shamas, senior partner o f the Mattin Group, Ramallah, July 2006.
15 The amount o f  exports o f goods and services was estimated at $467 millions in 2004. It was $657 
millions in 2000. Sources Paltrade. www.paltrade.org (last visited 15 December 2008).
16 Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment (World Bank), (2004), p. 13. 
Available at http: /  /  siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKG AZA/ResourcesAvbgaza- 
4vrassessment.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008).
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measures. Nevertheless, the increased costs caused by these, as well as their 
unpredictable and sometimes abusive nature, highlight their disproportionate and 
discriminatory character. Their direct and immediate effect serves to undermine the 
competitiveness of Palestinian products compared to Israeli ones rather than preserving 
the security o f the State o f Israel.’7 For instance, movement o f goods in and out of the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories depends on a system known as “back-to-back” transfer 
which increases the transport and labour costs and results in products often facing the 
risk of damage during these operations.18 Further, the security checks o f containers at 
Israeli ports, which are done randomly are at the expense o f Palestinian traders both 
causes delay and increases costs. The cost imposed is 250 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) for a 
20 foot container, 400 NIS for a 40 feet container and 600 NIS for a physical check. 
Sometimes, the Israeli custom authorities give inaccurate information about the nature of 
the check and Palestinian traders have to pay an undated amount of money.19
Therefore, obstacles to movements o f goods obstruct the implementation o f the EC- 
PLO Interim Association Agreement and also contribute to its violation — because 
Palestinian commercial operators tend to prefer to use Israeli channels o f export and 
import. This results in some Palestinian products being exported and imported under the 
EU-Israel Association Agreement.
17 For a detailed account: Trade Impediments (Paltrade), (2005). Available at 
http://www.paltrade.org/cms/images/enpublications/Trade Impediments - Issue 5.pdf (last visited 15 
December 2008); Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the 
Palestinian Economy (World Bank), (2007) and Potential Alternatives for Palestinian Trade: Developing 
the Rafah Trade Corridor (World Bank), (2007). Available at 
http://doi-nino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/85255db800470aa485255d8b0Q4e349a/bbc475552ab8cf22852572 
b3004f72ab !OpenD ocument (last visited 15 December 2008).
18 Traders who cannot obtain permits to carry their merchandise are subject to the “back-to-back” transfer 
system. It consists in the unloading the merchandise contained in a lorry at checkpoints and reloading the 
entire content into permit-carrying vehicles. The “back to back” transfer sometimes requires two or three 
vehicles. "Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, International Development 
Committee o f the House o f Commons, Second Report o f Session 2003-2004, HC 230-1, p. 40.
19 Interview widi M. Haj Khalil, Palestinian Shippers Council, Ramallah, August 2007.
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1*2.2. The E U ’s Efforts to Enhance the Freedom of M ovement o f Persons
and Goods— the Case o f the E U  Border Assistance M ission (EU  
BAM) at the Rafah Crossing.
The EU has opposed this situation and used diplomatic and material means to correct it. 
However, most of the time the solutions offered have been hampered themselves by 
violations of international law and the EU has done little in the face o f this, putting itself 
in a position of acquiescence to these violations. First of all, the EU has funded the 
construction o f Gaza’s airport and sea port, which were supposed to offer the 
Palestinians their own access for external trade and therefore avoid the Israeli channels. 
Both, however, were destroyed by the Israeli Defence Forces at the beginning of the 
second Intifada.20 Second, it has raised the issue several times in the EU-Israel 
Association Council.21 Third, in May 2005, it set up a trilateral dialogue group at a 
ministerial level focused on trade issues, which, at the behest o f Israel, was not to tackle 
issues o f security. However, some EC civil servants tried to deconstruct the issues on the 
agenda in order to show that they had nothing to do with security. The group stopped 
meeting after the victory o f Hamas in the legislative elections of j  anuary 2006, before any 
agreement could be reached.22 In November 2007, the EU announced its intention of 
restarting the work of its trilateral trade policy group.23
Finally, the EU played a prominent role as a third party during the Gaza disengagement 
plan of 2005, and was the promoter of the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA).
20 This issue is tackled in the next section o f  this chapter.
21 Interview with Mark Gallagher, Jerusalem, July 2007.
22 Ibid.
23 “State building for Peace in the Middle East: an EU Action Strategy”, Joint paper by EU High 
Representative Javier Solana and EU Commissioner for External Relations Benka Ferrero-Waldner 
endorsed by the EU Council o f Foreign Ministers ahead o f the Annapolis Mideast Summit 27 November 
2007.
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In order to help in the implementation o f the treaty, i.e., to allow the movement of 
people and goods but ensure the security o f Israel and preserve the customs union 
between Israel and the Palestinians, the EU committed itself to sending a monitoring 
mission. This mission was stationed at the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and 
Egypt in order to supervise and train Palestinian custom officers. The EU Border 
Assistance Mission (BAM) is considered to be a success of European diplomacy and the 
sign o f an evolution in the relationship between the EU and Israel.24 The EU observers 
are based at Ashkelon (Israel) and enter Gaza through Keren Shalom (Israel). Their entry 
into Gaza and the accomplishment of their mission at Rafah is entirely dependent on the 
approval o f the Israeli Defence Forces.25
Since June 2006, after the seizing o f an Israeli soldier by Palestinian activists, the Rafah 
crossing has been opened only intermittently -a form o f collective punishment26- and as a 
consequence the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has worsened27 and the EU BAM has been 
unable to operate. The procedures negotiated in the protocol and put in place through 
the EU BAM, if implemented as they were until June 2006, are enough of a guarantee to 
ensure the security o f the State of Israel since Israel itself agreed to these conditions. The
24 Interview with Emmanuele Giaufret, Deputy Director o f the EC Delegation for Israel, Head o f the 
Political and Economic Section, Tel Aviv (Summer 2007), EU BAM is a European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) mission created by the Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP, 12 December 2005 OJEU L327, 14 
December 2005.
25 Philippe Georges Jacques, Head o f the Section on Infrastructures and UNRWA, EC Technical 
Assistance Office to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, August 2006.
26 The organisation BTselem notes that, according to a report o f the IDF, the IDF's Planning Division 
argued that the Rafah crossing “should be opened on occasion only after the kidnapped soldier is released 
and the shooting from the Gaza Strip stops [...]. The Israeli General Security Service opposed opening the 
crossing “even for a few hours, (so long as the matter o f  the abducted soldier remains unchanged. Pressure 
on this matter must remain in place at this stage)”. The representative o f the Coordinator o f  Government 
Operations in the Territories also believed that the crossing should remain closed until Shalit is released, 
Such action constitutes a collective punishment o f  the civilian population in the Gaza Strip, in violation o f  
international humanitarian law. Article 33 o f the Fourth Geneva Convention provides: “Collective 
penalties and likewise all measures o f  intimidation or o f terrorism are prohibited”. Article 33 also states 
that, "Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited”. See “30 Aug. 2006: B'Tselem 
to Defense Minister: Stop Using Rafah Crossing to Pressure Gaza Civilians”, Briefing Note, B’Tselem, 30 
August 2006.
27 The Gaza Strip, One Big Prison (B’Tselem) (2007). Available at 
http://www.btselem .org/Download/200705 Gaza Insert Eng.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008)
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refusal o f Israel to open the crossing under these conditions raises serious doubts as to 
the legitimacy o f the security concerns which have led to the crossing point being closed. 
In November 2006 and May 2007, the EU nevertheless decided to renew the mandate of 
the EU observers for six months without any changes.28
In July 2006, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights issued a press release in which it 
condemned the EU for being complicit in the collective punishment imposed on the 
population o f Gaza, i.e., the closure of the passage, and urged EU observers to return 
immediately to the Rafah Crossing Point in order to allow thousands o f Palestinians to 
travel to and from the Gaza Strip.29 This claim is an overstatement. The mandate of the 
EU clearly did not allow the EU observers to reach the Rafah crossing point at their own 
will. As in the case o f Dutchbat in Srebrenica, EU BAM officers do not have the 
mandate to intervene. Furthermore, like in the case o f Dutchbat in Srebrenica, EU BAM 
is not any third party to the violation of international law.30 One aspect, however, 
differentiates the case o f Dutchbat from the one o f EU BAM: in the case o f EU BAM, 
the violation of international law is a prolonged one whereas in Srebrenica it was limited 
in time. This means that the EU has had opportunities to protest to the commission of 
this collective punishment and this particularly when the mandate o f EU BAM was 
renewed. Therefore, renewing the mandate without considering the possibility of 
stationing EU monitors on the Egyptian side of the border, or in Gaza, and neglecting to 
negotiate measures which would allow for the opening of the crossing has led to the
28 Joint Action 2006/773/CFSP, 13 November 2006, OJEU L 313/15, 14 November 2006 and Joint 
Action 2007/359/CFSP, 23 May 2007, OJEU L 133/51, 25 May 2007.
29 “e u  Contributes to Collective Punishment o f  Palestinians”, Press Communique, Palestinian Centre for 
Human Rights, 3 August 2006. Available at http:/Avww.pchrgaza.org/files/PressR /English/2006/88- 
2006.htm (last visited 15 December 2008).
30 This dissertation analyses the violations o f international law that happened in Gaza and in Srebrenica as 
objective facts and does not aim at comparing their gravity.
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EU’s acquiescence with Israel’s violations o f humanitarian law in this regard.31 It 
amounts to an endorsement o f the present situation because, when it renewed the 
mandate, the EU was in a position to demand measures that would ensure the maximum 
effectiveness o f the Rafah border crossing. Therefore, although the EU is concerned 
about the effect o f the closures on the Palestinian economy and people, its involvement 
on the ground and first-hand knowledge of the situation puts the EU in a different 
position from any other third party to these violations of international law, reinforcing its 
duty to oppose them. Consequently, with its repeated silences when it had the 
opportunity and the legitimacy to contest, the EU has crossed the threshold of 
acquiescence to Israel’s violation of international humanitarian law.
In June 2007, after Hamas took total control of the Gaza Strip following several months 
of fighting between Hamas and Fatah, the EU BAM stopped its activities and Israeli and 
Egyptian troops closed the Rafah terminal.32 Since then, Israel has enforced a siege on 
the population o f Gaza. Its implications on the provision o f humanitarian aid by the 
European Union to the Gazan civilian population are set out in the following section of 
this chapter.
31 See question by M. Moore MP to M. Beckett, 29 Mar 2007, Written Answer, Column 1773W, Commons 
Hansard.
32 “Temporary suspension o f  operations”, EU BAM Rafah, press release, 15 June 2007.
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2. European Aid to the Palestinian Occupied Territories and the Israeli 
Occupation.
In the 1990s, when the EC deployed its humanitarian aid to die Occupied Territories to 
improve the living conditions o f the Palestinian population, it was part o f a general policy 
o f support o f the Middle-East Peace Process and this aid was coupled with financial 
assistance to build self-governing structures and support projects for regional and 
bilateral Israeli-Palestinian cooperation.33 With the absence of genuine progress in the 
Peace Process and the deterioration o f the economic situation on the ground due to the 
worsening of the closure policy and other aspects o f the Israeli “ security” policy, the aid 
gradually focused essentially as a response to the humanitarian needs o f the Palestinian 
population and increased continuously, even after the suspension o f die direct aid to the 
PA in 2006. It is to be noted that the suspension o f the aid to the PA had a financial cost. 
The use of a parallel channel to provide financial assistance to the Palestinian population 
is actually costlier than the direct aid to the Palestinian government. Oxfam, in February 
2007 claimed that more than one million euros has been paid each month to HSBC for 
the bank to process European Union aid to impoverished Palestinians and key workers.34 
The head o f die management TIM unit, Mario Mariani, does not contest the figures 
asserted by Oxfam but contends that the management cost of TIM does not exceed 5 % 
of the overall budget - for NGOs, the cost of management is around 25%. Mariani 
asserts that TIM is getting close to one million transactions and this service has a cost.
33 M. Asseburg, The EU and the Middle-East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacles to Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership In A. Jiinemann (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean delations after September 11, International, 
Regional and Domestic Dynamics, (London, Portland 2004), pp. 174-193, pp. 176-177.
34 See R. McCarthy, EU's attempt to avoid Hamas costs £2m  in bank charges, The Guardian, (7 February 
2007).
212
Therefore, in operational terms, none can contest that TIM in the words o f Mariani is 
“super efficient” and “super accountable”.35
Inevitably and progressively, the humanitarian aid directed at the Palestinian population 
has become integrated into the “picture” o f the Israeli occupation o f the Palestinian 
Territories and as such, the violations of international law entailed by this occupation 
have an impact on the provision o f this aid. The following paragraphs first detail the 
terms o f the debate that accompanies EU’s humanitarian policy to the Palestinians and 
then, analyse how the EU is confronted in the implementation o f its aid policy with the 
violations of international law occurring on the ground and how it reacts to them.
2.1. European Aid to the Palestinians Under Criticism.
The aid to the Palestinian people has never been immune from criticism. Apart from the 
fact that some suspect that the EU ’s aid finances Palestinian terrorism36, the EU is also 
accused o f financing and entrenching the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories.
In the 1990s, when the EU deployed large amounts of money to support the Peace 
Process, there was on its part as well as on the part of any donors, a genuine will to 
accompany the efforts towards the creation o f a Palestinian State. At present, the 
international assistance is becoming a safety net to avoid a large scale humanitarian 
catastrophe.37 At the same time, the EU has tried for some time to maintain medium-
35 Interview with Mario Mariani, Jerusalem, 18 July 2007.
36 This point is developed below.
37 Twenty Seven Months- Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis (World Bank) (2003), p. 51. 
Nowadays, some 85 percent o f  Gav.ans are already dependent on partial food aid for basic nutritional 
needs. See Oxfam International Jerusalem Spokesman Michael Robin Bailey quoted in “Continued 
commercial closure o f  Gaza will cause complete humanitarian dependency” Press Communique, Oxfam, 
15 July 2007. Available at
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term development projects which would match its political commitment to assist in the 
creation o f a Palestinian State, whereas the feasibility o f its creation has been completely 
hampered during the past decade. The idea that prevailed was to create infrastructure and 
projects that would be useful when the time comes. Nevertheless, the current strategy o f the 
EU is to be reactive to the present humanitarian crisis, i.e. to mitigate the socio-economic 
impact of the Israeli policy in the Palestinian Occupied Territories38— and this strategy 
became more evident after its decision to suspend the aid to the PA. This description of 
the EU’s involvement parallels the legal argument that international aid helps relieve 
Israel from its obligation as an Occupying Power to ensure the welfare o f the Occupied 
Population.39 According to humanitarian law, the Occupying Power bears the primary 
responsibility to ensure the “welfare” o f the occupied population (Article 43, 1907 Hague 
Regulations)40 and is responsible for providing medical supplies and food to the 
population, as well as maintaining those institutions in charge o f the provision of 
education and care for children (Articles 50, 55 and 56 Fourth Geneva Convention).41 
Humanitarian agencies can offer their services to help the Occupying Power to provide 
the protected persons with food, medical supplies and medical services (Article 59,
http://www.gisha.org/index, php?infLanguage=2&intItemId—498&intSiteSN=113 (last visited 15
December 2008).
38 On the general issue o f  the deployment o f aid in the context o f the Israeli Occupation o f the Palestinian 
Territories, see M. Keating, A. le More and R. Lowe (eds.), Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground. The Case of 
Palestine, (Bristol 2003). Furthermore, according to Le More, the shift o f  the international assistance to the 
Palestinians from development to humanitarian aid does not start with the beginning o f the second 
Intifada as it is widely acknowledged but has gradually started since the beginning o f the Peace Process. A. 
Le More, “Killing with Softness: Funding the Demise o f a Palestinian State” (2005) 81 International Affairs 
981-999, pp. 982 and 992.
39 A. Meyer and D. Shearer, The Dilemma o f Aid under Occupation, In M. Keating, A, L. More and R. 
Lowe (eds.), Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine, (Bristol 2005), pp. 165-176, p. 170.
40 Article 43 obliges the Occupying Power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and life in 
the occupied territory and unless absolutely prevented to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory.
41 Article 50 provides in its first paragraph that the Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation o f the 
national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working o f all institutions devoted to the care and 
education o f  children. Article 55 exhorts the Occupying Power to the fullest extent o f  the means available 
to it to ensure the food and medical supplies o f  the population and particular, to bring in the necessary 
foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if  the resources o f the occupied territory are inadequate. 
Article 56 urges the Occupying Power to the fullest extent o f  the means available to it, to ensure and 
maintain, with the cooperation o f national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments 
and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory.
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Fourth Geneva Convention).42 However, they cannot do it in place o f the Occupying 
Power (Article 60, Fourth Geneva Convention).43
There is an acknowledgement from the EU ’s side and especially the humanitarian aid 
office ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office), that closures increase the 
cost o f availability o f the resources and therefore have a direct impact on the household 
economy.44 These are the root cause of deterioration of the humanitarian indicators and a 
disproportionate response to the security concerns o f Israel and if they are removed, the 
humanitarian situation will improve. Therefore, the ECHO expert interviewed explicidy 
stated that the deterioration o f the humanitarian situation is due to the non-applicability 
by the Occupying Power o f the rules applicable to the circumstances, i.e., humanitarian 
law. However, he considers that challenging the security measures employed by Israel is 
something to be done at the political level. ECHO fulfils its general mandate which is to 
provide assistance to people in distress and is driven by the fundamental humanitarian 
principles o f humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.45 Its objectives are to 
mitigate the effects o f the chronic crisis caused to the civilian population and to decrease 
the pressure applied by the crisis on the household economy. The aid it has provided has 
prevented the total collapse of the socio-economic situation in the Occupied Territories. 
Without donor funding, poverty would be 40% higher.46 This is not to say that concerns 
for the implementation o f humanitarian law are completely out of the picture. In the case
42 Article 59 provides that if the whole or part o f the population o f an occupied territory is inadequately 
supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf o f  the said population, and shall 
facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States or 
by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee o f  the Red Cross, shall 
consist, in particular, o f  the provision o f  consignments o f foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing.
43 Article 60 provides: “Relief consignments shall in no way relieve the Occupying Power o f  any o f its 
responsibilities under Articles 55, 56 and 59”.
44 The following paragraph substantially draws upon an interview with Alberto Oggero, ECHO expert, EC 
Technical Assistance Office to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, August 2007.
45 “Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid”, Commission Communication, 13 June 2007, 
COM (2007) 317 final, p. 3.
46 A. Meyer and D . Shearer, note 39 above, p. 168.
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of ECHO, in all the sectors in which it intervenes (food aid, water sanitation, health...), 
it has included a strategy in order to protect the civilian population from deliberate harm. 
For instance, when a spring source is being polluted by settlers, ECHO will do its best to 
protect the source. Furthermore, a large part of the budget of ECHO is dedicated to 
contribute financially to the budget of the ICRC.
2.2. European Humanitarian Aid Policies in the Face o f the Violations of 
Humanitarian Law in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
Despite the claims for impartiality and independence, donors and humanitarian agents 
are not just any third party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the humanitarian 
imperative does not absolve them o f any form of responsibility. Their involvement on 
the ground and their connections with the parties place them in a different position from 
any other international third party to this conflict. Their actions are not unaffected by the 
violations of international law which result from the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
territories. This is especially the case when they evolve in an environment where facts on 
the ground are diminishing the development capacities of the Palestinian people.47 This 
section details cases in which European humanitarian aid has faced the risk of becoming 
an integral part o f Israel’s malpractices or, when European humanitarian policies may be 
interpreted as incentives for the perpetuations o f violations of international law.
A1 The legality o f  the Israeli settlement policy in the Palestinian Occupied Territories is detailed in the next 
chapter o f this dissertation, pp. 256-258 below.
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2.2.1. Funding Palestinian Violence?
First o f all, European aid to the Palestinians has been alleged to support the funding of 
indiscriminate attacks against Israeli civilians as well as being diverted for the private use 
o f representatives o f the Palestinian Authority. Under the request o f a group o f Euro- 
parliamentarians, OLAF, the European Anti-Fraud Office launched in 2003 an 
investigation on the alleged use of the European funds to the PA for supporting 
indiscriminate armed attacks against Israeli civilians. It concluded that there was no 
evidence for support o f such attacks being financed by the European Commission’s 
contributions to the budget. However, it stated that the possibility o f misuse o f the 
Palestinian Authority’s budget and other resources cannot be excluded, due to the fact 
that the internal and external audit capacity in the Palestinian Authority is still 
underdeveloped.48 In the face o f these criticisms, the TIM at the time, guaranteed to 
respond to an imperative o f political accountability which ensures that the EU does not 
provide financial assistance for these illegal acts.49 Like TIM, PEGASE offers a secure 
monitoring, verification and control system to provide a guarantee covering the use of 
donor funds. Furthermore, individual beneficiaries are routinely checked against 
international sanctions lists.50
The possibility o f European funds being used for the preparation or commission of 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians or for terrorist attacks clearly opens the door for 
accusations o f aiding and assisting in the commission o f a violation o f international law.
48 “Investigation into EU budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority Budget”, Press Communique, 
Office Europeen de Lutte Anti-Fraude (OLAF), Brussels, 17 March 2005, O L A F/05/03. Available at 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/fd807e4fi661e3689852570d00069e918/6f34Q4d7blf6e39185256fd 
20059ad24!QpenDocument (last visited 15 December 2008).
4 9 Interview with Mario Mariani, Head o f  the Management Temporary International Mechanism Unit, 
Jerusalem, July 2007.
50 On PEGASE, see http://www.deIwbg.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/pegas documents.htm (last visited 15 
December 2008).
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The European Union has a duty of due diligence to guarantee that its funds are not 
diverted for such a purpose. Like in the case of the arms sale analysed in the third 
chapter o f this dissertation, the likelihood o f the use of such funds for the commission of 
a violation o f international law entails the exercise o f a form of vigilance on the part of 
the European Union when delivering this aid to the Palestinian Authority.
2.2.2. The “M itigation Projects”.
The wall, the settlements and the settler roads are physical instruments which helps 
enforcing the setdement policy of Israel in the Occupied Territories. In its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Wall o f 9 July 2004, the International Court o f Justice ruled 
that the wall and its “associated regimes”, the setdements and the setder roads create a 
fa it accompli on the ground that may become permanent and as such are tantamount to a 
de facto annexation.51 When a humanitarian project interferes with these constructions in 
order to mitigate their impact on the lives o f the Palestinian population, it may well face 
the risk o f entrenching the expansionist agenda and maintaining the permanence o f the 
illegal constructions. These issues have come to the agendas o f international donors with 
the development o f projects aimed at mitigating the impact of the wall among the 
Palestinian population affected by this construction in the years 2003 and 2004.52 The 
Ministry o f Planning (MoP) o f the Palestinian Authority issued a document aimed at 
inviting donors in their project to make sure contacts and accessibility between the local 
populations o f both sides o f the wall are maintained and that they sustain Palestinian 
efforts to remain in their houses and on their lands. After the release o f the Advisoiy
51 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep. (2004), p. 184 
(para. 121). Hereinafter, “Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Wall”.
52 By May 2004, donors had spent an estimated o f  $22,616,811 on wall projects designed to moderate the 
negative effects o f  the barrier on surrounding Palestinian communities A. Meyer and D. Shearer, note 39 
above, p. 172
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Opinion on the Legality of the Wall, these efforts were taken over at the donors level in order 
to tackle their responsibility in the face of the wall. The Local Aid Coordinating 
Committee (LACC), the institution which supports the work of main donor liaison body 
in the West Bank and Gaza, published at the end o f January 2005 a document which 
consists o f guidelines directed at international donors considering undertaking mitigation 
projects in areas affected by the wall.53 The document sets up a traffic light system: “Red 
Light” projects conflict with the prescription o f the Advisory Opinion, “Green Light” 
projects are consistent; and “Orange Light” requires a case-by-case scrutiny. The 
document advocated the creation of a “Clearing House” inside the Ministry o f Planning 
(MoP) dedicated to evaluating wall mitigation projects or, for donors who do not channel 
proposals through the MoP, to include a Project Impact Assessment to evaluate the 
compatibility o f their project with the ICJ Advisory Opinion and MoP guidelines. 
Unfortunately, there has never been any follow up to this project because o f the lack o f 
agreement on its relevance among donors.54
With respect to the mitigating projects, the position of the European Union has been
very cautious. It has refused to undertake any mitigation projects and preferred to limit
its actions to humanitarian efforts o f a temporary nature, in addition to offering 
assistance in the field o f advocacy and support to N G O s’ legal action against the wall.55 
Today the EU still follows the same policy regarding the populations affected by the 
construction of the wall with the proviso that priority is given for humanitarian aid 
directed at the population living west o f the wall.56 There is also a policy from certain EU
53 J . A. Azzam and A. Hampson, Wall Mitigation: Implications for Donors and Implementing Agencies 
Operating in Areas Affected by the Separation Barrier (Local Aid Coordinating Committee), (2005). 
Available at http: /  /  www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDocLJNIDFileName/DPAS- 
6NBJO8-lacc-pse-30jan.pdf/$File/lacc-pse-3Qian.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008). LACC is a 
coordination mechanism aiming at supplementing the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee at local level.
54 Interview with Paul Prettitore, legal expert, World Bank, Jerusalem, July 2007.
55 J. A. Azzam and A. Hampson, note 53 above, pp. 7 and 24.
56 Interview with Alberto Oggero, Jerusalem, August 2007.
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humanitarian agents not to request permits for entering certain zones because it is “a 
right under the Fourth Geneva Convention” and the Israeli authorities seem to have 
accepted this claim.57 Indeed, this line o f action prevents the EU from facing the risk of 
undertaking any kind of projects that might entrench the illegal situation created by the 
wall. I t  is a policy o f minimal action where the EU takes no risk o f having its 
responsibility engaged. In this instance, the EU has acted with diligence and preserved 
itself from recognising the construction of the wall.
Other donors have decided to go a step further and implement development projects to 
help Palestinian farmers to work on their lands on the other side o f the wall by 
readjusting the work of these people on these lands and thus sustain the efforts of the 
local population to keep their lands. For instance, the Islamic Development Fund (a 
branch o f the A1 Aqsa Bank) has promoted the plantation of olive trees in the region of 
Deir Lassoun and Asharawieh (Tulkarem) instead o f the previous greenhouses because 
this form of agriculture does not need as much intensive service and as such those who 
cultivate this plantation do not have to request regularly permits to access their lands.58
2.2.3. Reconstruction after Destruction.
The destruction o f infrastructure and houses is a common pattern o f Israeli policies in 
the Occupied Territories. In May 2004, the ID F launched a large-scale military operation 
in Gaza, “Operation Rainbow”, leading to the destruction of 298 houses leaving 3800
57 Ibid.
58 Interview with D r Abdel Atef, Head o f the Programs and Projects Department. Palestinian Agricultural 
Relief Committees (PARC), Ramallah, August 2007.
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people homeless.59 Israel argued that such military action was necessary in order to 
prevent the construction o f tunnels for smuggling arms under the border. However, the 
large-scale destruction o f property which took place in this operation created some 
emotion in the donor community. When donors were about to issue a letter stating that 
they would not pay for the reconstruction o f the houses, the US refused to sign this and 
insisted that a warning be written at the beginning stating that they refused to sign this 
letter. The letter has never been sent. Finally, the donor community agreed to pay for the 
reconstruction o f the destroyed houses.60 After UNRWA issued an appeal for U .SJ 
15.84 million for Rafah by the end o f May, on August 11, the EC allocated €1.35 million 
specifically for victims of house demolitions in Rafah and more precisely for temporary 
accommodation, cash assistance, shelter repairs, and key infrastructure, including the 
rehabilitation o f water supply networks, sewage systems, and two schools.61 
Commenting on the decision, the European Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid at the time, Poul Nielson reminded Israel that “these funds do not 
absolve the occupying power of its responsibilities to uphold international humanitarian 
law.” He added: “As reiterated by the European Union and the United Nations, house 
demolitions are disproportionate acts that contravene international humanitarian law, in 
particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, and show a reckless disregard for the lives of 
civilians”.62 Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations stated that the
59 Rafah Humanitarian Needs Assessment: Submission to the Local Aid Coordination Committee 
(OCHA/UNRW A), (2004), p. 3, available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/news/um-wa ocha reportpdf 
(last visited 15 December 2008).
60 Interview with Paul Prettitore, Jerusalem, July 2007.
61 Details o f  the amounts o f  financial assistance and quotation in Razing Rafah: Mass Home Demolitions 
in the Gaza Strip (Human Rights Watch), (2004), p. 97. Available at
http://w w w .hrw .org/en /n o d e/1 1963/section /l (last visited 15 December 2008).
62 “Commission provides a further €1.35 million in aid for victims of house demolitions in Rafah (Gaza 
Strip)”, Brussels, 11 August 2004, IP /04/1027.
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EC should seek certain guarantees from the Israeli military forces that they will not 
destroy again what it builds.63
Furthermore, the cases of protests by the EU to the destruction o f civilian infrastructure 
have decreased. The bombing o f the power station in Gaza is a example which illustrates 
the same pattern of behaviour in the face of commission of grave breaches o f 
humanitarian law. On the 26th o f June 2006, IDF planes targeted the power station of 
Gaza leaving Gazans with six to eight hours o f electricity per day.64 In a declaration, the 
Commissioner for External Affairs, Benita Ferrero Waldner stated that she was disturbed 
(emphasis added) by reports o f interruption o f electricity supply, including to vital 
services such as hospitals and asked Israel to act with prudence.65 Later on, the European 
Union decided through the Temporary International Mechanism to provide fuel bought 
from Israel to hospital generators and water wells to ensure the continued availability of 
essential medical care and drinking water. Over 5 million litres of fuel have been 
delivered under the emergency fuel supply programme. Since its repair in November 
2006, the electricity generated by the Gaza Power Plant has been exclusively financed by
63 “Chris Patten on the Middle East Peace Process”, European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 21 
April 2004. Available at http://www.chrispatten.org.uk/speeches/me210404.htm (last visited 15 
December 2008).
M The bombing o f  the Gaza power station constitutes a violation o f humanitarian law under ardcle 52 (2) 
o f Additional Protocol I which provides: “Attacks shall be limited stricdy to military objectives. In so far as 
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military o f advantage”. 
The rule contained in this article belongs to customary international humanitarian law. L. Doswald-Beck 
and j.-M, Henckaerts, Customaiy International Humanitarian Law. Volume 1: Rules, (Cambridge 2005), pp. 25- 
26 and 29. Specifically on the bombing o f the Gaza power station, see Reprisals against Civilians. Report 
on Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) violations against Palestinians civilians in die Gaza Strip for the period 
from the paramilitary operation on 25 June 2006 till 31 July 2006 (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights), 
(September 2006); Gaza Strip Situation Report (United Nations Office for the Coordination o f  
Humanitarian Affairs), (10 October 2006) and Act o f  Vengeance: Israel's Bombing o f  the Gaza Power 
Plant and its Effects (B’tselem), (September 2006).
65 “Benita Ferrero Waldner on current situation in Gaza”, News from the Communication Directorate 
General’s Midday Briefing, Brussels, 28 June 2006. available at 
http:// europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEX/06/0628&format=HTML&aged=:0&la 
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited 15 December 2008).
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the European Commission through the TIM.66 Israel has never been held accountable 
for this damage.
In this instance, the European Union deliberately refused to protest against the 
commission o f an illegal act when it had the opportunity and the legitimacy to do so 
because it paid for the reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructure. The absence of 
protest in this case clearly represents a case o f acquiescence on the part o f the European 
Union.
2.2.4. The Case o f Destruction of Infrastructures Financed by the EU.
Another case at point is the EU’s attitude towards the destruction o f the Palestinian 
infrastructure by Israel which had been financed by the European Union. In early 
February 2001, the EU forwarded to Israel a list o f damages caused by its military 
incursions in the Palestinian Occupied Territories estimated at approximately €17.29 
million. This included damage to Gaza international airport and seaport, the Palestinian 
Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), the Palestinian police headquarters, two schools, a 
research laboratory, and a water treatment and pumping plant.67 The destruction of these 
corresponded to a violation of humanitarian law because their destruction did not 
constitute an effective contribution to a military action in the circumstances ruling at the 
time.68 Israel never paid the bill and the EU never dared to ask for anything afterwards, 
content with the finding of a legal enquiry which stated that the infrastructure was a 
donation to the PA and therefore, no legal channels were available to ask for
66 Sources: European Commission Technical Office for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Available at 
http:/Avww.delwbg.cec.eu.int/en/ tim/tim in.htm (last visited 15 December 2008).
67 R. Miller, “Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel” (2006) 12 Israel Affairs 642-664, p. 662, note 16.
68 See article 52 (2) o f  Additional Protocol I, note 64 above.
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compensation.69 Even in this case, no legal aid has been offered to the PA to ask for 
compensation. In 2005, at the time of the Gaza disengagement plan, the European 
Commission committed itself to disburse €40 million in order to, among other things, 
rebuild Gaza international airport and seaport.70 The Commissioner Ferrero Waldner 
stated that this time, the EU will ask for guarantees from Israel not to destroy this new 
infrastructure.71 Nonetheless, the estimated total cost for EU and Member States funded 
projects for physical infrastructure, destroyed by the IDF between August 2001 to May 
2007, amounts to €43 974 563 out if which €27 395 751 was from EU funding.72 No 
legal action is planned to obtain compensation for this material destruction. Like in the 
previous case-study, the EU was in a position to contest and ask for the payment of the 
destroyed infrastructure but it refused to do so. This attitude constitutes another 
incentive for the perpetuation of violations o f IHL and entrenches Israel’s claim to 
depart from rules o f international law.
2.2.5. Compensating for the Retention of Taxes and Custom Duties.
Since the election o f Hamas in 2006 until June 2007, Israel has retained the entirety of 
the taxes and custom duties owed to the Palestinian Authority and which accounts for 
$475 million73, as a way o f preventing these sums of money to be used for the 
commission of terrorist acts on its territory. This is Palestinian income and, in normal 
circumstances, it is the main source for the payment o f salaries o f the PA employees and
69 Philippe Georges Jacques, Jerusalem, August 2006.
70 “Synopsis Euromed, Lettre d’information hebdomadaire sur le Partenariat Euro-Mediterraneen et le 
Programme M EDA”, Edition n° 335,17 November 2005.
71 "Chronological Review o f Events Relating to the Question o f Palestine”, UN1SPAL, February 2005. 
Available at 
http://domino.un.org/lJNISPAL.NSF/e9abb7dfh6e319c90525675900535dba/3d752elf646122b985256f 
b90Q6a5f2Q!OpenDocument (last visited 15 December 2008).
72 Sources: EC Technical Office for the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza and UNRWA, 3 May 2007. 
Cited in S. Rockwell and C. Shamas, Third Annual Review on Human Rights in EU-Israel Relations. 
Accommodating to the "Special” Case o f Israel. 2005-2006, (2007), p. 41.
73 Israel has released $100 m in 2006 but a large part o f this sum will be used to support security' 
operations. “Poverty' in Palestine: the Human Cost o f the Financial Boycott”, Briefing Note, Oxfam, April 
2007, p. 6. Available at http://www.oxfam.de/download/Palestinian Aid Crisis.pdf (last visited 15 
December 2008).
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accounts for one third o f Palestinian income. The European Union offered Israel the 
opportunity to use TIM  as a channel to distribute this money so that the Palestinian 
population could benefit from it.74 Israel refused and its decision has lead to the 
aggravation o f the humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The 
millions o f euros transferred through TIM have helped prevented a humanitarian 
catastrophe which would have been mainly due to the retention o f these taxes and 
custom duties.75 As stated by the House o f Lords EU Committee, the TIM cannot be a 
substitute for the full transfer o f withheld Palestinian revenues by the Israeli 
government.76 At the same time, TIM cannot be a substitute for the fulfilment by the 
Occupying Power of its obligations to the Occupied Population. According to de Soto, 
while the international community demanded from the Palestinian government that it 
should accept “previous agreements and obligations”, Israel deprives the PA of the 
capacity to deliver basic services to the Palestinian population in violation o f one such 
“previous agreement” as well as its IHL obligations regarding the welfare o f population 
whose land its occupies.77
Since the Fayyad government took over in June 2007, Israel resumed payments of tax 
and customs duties, including back payments, and is now up to date with all payments
1A Quartet declaration o f  20 September 2006, “The Quartet encouraged Israel and the Palestinian Authority to 
consider resumption o f  such transfers via the Temporary International Mechanism to improve the 
economic and humanitarian conditions in the West Bank and Gaza.” (emphasis added). See also Council 
Conclusions on the Middle-East, 2776th External Relations Council Meeting, Brussels, 22 January 2007 and 
2756th Council Meeting General Affairs and External Relations, Luxembourg, 16-17 October 2006.
75 Dr Asseburg cited in “Poverty in Palestine: the Human Cost o f  the Financial Boycott”, Briefing Note, 
Oxfam, April 2007, p. 6.
76 “The European Union and the Middle East Peace Process”, European Union Committee, House o f 
Lords, 26th Report o f Session 2006-07, 24 July 2007, HL Paper 132-1, p. 43.
77 A. de Soto, “End o f Mission Report (confidential report)”, published by the Guardian, (13 June 2007), p. 
20, para. 52. When mentioning “the capacity to deliver basic services to the Palestinian population” by the 
Palestinian Authority according to “one such ‘previous agreement’”, de Soto refers to the spheres o f  
authority that were transferred to the Palestinian Authority in accordance with the Declaration o f  
Principles (Article VI.2), notably the fields o f education, health and social welfare.
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owed. However, continued payments are conditional on an administration that accepts 
the Quartet principles.78
This case-study represents undoubtedly a case o f acquiescence on the part o f the
European Union to Israel’s decision to retain PA custom and duties. One can advance
that it constitutes a case o f recognition because the EU has integrated Israel malpractice 
in its policy in compensating for the retention of taxes and custom duties.
2.2.6. Obstruction to the Conduct of Humanitarian Work.
Israel interferes with the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in complete 
contravention o f the relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding 
humanitarian assistance, notably article 61 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which 
provides that relief consignments shall be exempt in occupied territory from all charges, 
taxes or customs duties unless these are necessary in the interests o f the economy of the 
territory. It adds in fine that the Occupying Power shall facilitate the rapid distribution o f 
these consignments.
First o f all, the cost o f humanitarian assistance is increased due to charges and taxes on 
stock, surcharges due to delays, and transit. The Euromed Human Rights Report on the 
EU-Israel relationship during 2003-2004 reports one case where the EU explicitly 
requested Israeli compensation for additional costs. The UN Italian representative, on
78 “Development Assistance and the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, International Development 
Committee o f the House o f  Commons, Eleventh Report o f Session 2007-2008, HC 522-1, p. 16.
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behalf o f the EU, asked Israel to pay for all additional costs o f the delivery o f goods to 
UNRWA’s office in 2003 but his attempts were not successful.79
Furthermore, Israeli security measures (permits, closures, etc.) in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories delay the distribution o f the aid. The ECHO office for the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories keeps a database o f all incidents related to the delays of 
goods and persons.80 Delays are measured according to several points of reference: the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, the Bertini Commitment and, for Gaza, the Agreement on 
Movement and Access. ECHO estimates that 20 percent of its $35 million budget is lost 
through obstruction o f its operations.81 Despite the declarations requesting Israel not to 
obstruct the delivery o f humanitarian aid, no action has been undertaken to challenge 
these policies.
The absence of protest when the EU could have legitimately contested the obstruction 
o f its humanitarian work in the Occupied Territories amounts inevitably to a case of 
acquiescence if not to a case o f recognition o f these illegal acts because the obstructions 
to its humanitarian work have become integrated in the enforcement o f the humanitarian 
policy o f the EU in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
2.2.7. Complicity in Collective Punishment: the Case o f the Cuts o f Fuel 
Supply in Gaza.
On 28 October 2007, as part of its policy to impose a blockade on the Gazan population 
that began to be implemented in June 2007, Israel decided to limit the amount of fuel it
79 S. Rockwell and C. Shamas, A Human Rights Review o f  the EU and Israel -  Relating Commitments to 
Actions, 2003-2004 (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network), (2004), p. 32.
80 Interview with Alberto Oggero, J erusalem, August 2007.
81 A, Meyer and D . Shearer, note 39 above, p.169.
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would permit the EU to send to Gaza to no more than 250,000 litres per day— even 
though die plant now needs up to 500,000 litres per day. By early January 2008, Gaza's 
power plant reached the “red line” of its fuel reserves and was forced to cut electricity 
production by 30 percent, causing rolling blackouts throughout Gaza o f up to eight 
hours per day on average.82 Benita Ferrero Waldner acknowledged in a declaration on 
January 21st that the blockade on Gaza was a collective punishment and urged Israel to 
restore the supply of fuel to its previous levels and open the crossings for the passage of 
humanitarian and commercial supplies.83 The use of the qualification “collective 
punishment” was not followed by the Council. In its declaration on the Middle East one 
week later, it called on Israel in an elliptic formula to respect its obligations to Gaza 
(emphasis added). One can only speculate that it refers to its obligations under 
humanitarian law. The Council stated its grave concern at the humanitarian situation in 
Gaza and called for the continuous provision o f essential goods and services, including 
fuel and power supplies.84
The continuous provision o f humanitarian aid to the population of Gaza corresponds to 
the fulfilment o f the humanitarian imperatives to which the EU has committed itself. 
However, when such provision is disrupted by the Occupying Power itself, which is 
normally responsible for the provision o f this aid, and when this disruption is part of a 
policy o f collective punishment o f a civilian population, this situation puts the EU in a 
different position from that o f a mere humanitarian actor subject to a duty o f neutrality.
82 “Israel's Fuel Cuts Cause 30% Reduction in Gaza Power Plant Production”, Briefing Note, Gisha, 
January 2008. Available at
http://www.gisha.org/index.php?intLanguage~2&intItemId~744&lntSiteSN~l 13 (last visited 15
December 2008).
83 “EU slams Israel's 'collective punishment' in Gaza”, Robustness (21 January 2008). Available at 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1200916924.77/  (last visited 15 December 2008).
84 Declaration o f  the Council on the Middle East in Brussels, 28 January 2007.
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By providing aid to the Palestinians, it has entered the “sphere” o f the violation of 
international law.
How should this case-study be translated into legal terms? First o f all, it is not a plain 
case of aid and assistance in the commission of an unlawful act in the sense that it is not 
the material humanitarian assistance that is necessary for the commission of the violadon 
of humanitarian law.85 There is no causal link between the aid provided and the violation 
o f the humanitarian law. Second, it is inevitably a case o f acquiescence because it consists 
o f an assent to the violation o f international law. It however goes a step further because 
the EU is giving effect to the illegal act by allowing this act to alter the way its policy is 
implemented. As such, it can be conceived as a case o f recognition because it amounts to 
the acceptance by the EU of the opposability o f the act and that is the endorsement of 
the legal consequences arising from the illegal act.86
The analysis o f the last three case-studies have demonstrated instances where the EU has 
recognised illegal Israeli practices in the conduct o f its humanitarian policy in the 
Occupied Territories. However, as developed in the last chapter, the enforcement o f the 
duty of non-recognition knows exceptions when it competes with another imperative or 
another obligation o f international law. In the present cases, one can wonder whether the 
enforcement o f the duty does not clash with the humanitarian imperatives of the 
Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories and that those imperatives do not 
prevail over the enforcement o f the duty not to recognise. Nonetheless, one could object 
that humanitarian imperatives do not absolve the EU to find alternative ways in order 
not to step on the path o f acquiescence like, for instance, requesting Israel to pay for the
85 J. Crawford, The International Taw Commission on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and Commentaries, 
(Cambridge, N ew  York 2002). pp.148-150.
86 See Chapter Two o f  this dissertation, p. 78 above.
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additional cost on the provision of humanitarian relief incurred as a result o f the illegal 
restrictions to movement and access imposed by Israel in the Occupied Territories, or 
find ways to ensure the provision o f all the fuel needed for the power station to function 
properly. Otherwise EU ’s humanitarian work helps perpetuating a “cost-free” 
occupation or in other terms, EU ’s behaviour amounts to a form of “complicity in 
alleviating the pain” or in “killing with softness” to paraphrase Le More.87
3. The European State Building Policy, the Israeli Occupation and the 
Autocratic Drift o f the Palestinian Authority.
The European State-building strategy was suspended after the election o f Hamas at the 
legislative elections of January 2006. All the State-building, development projects and 
the people-to-people projects have been halted. After the designation o f the emergency 
government o f Salam Fayyad on 15 June 2007, the EU gradually resumed its contact 
and its aid to the Palestinian Authority. At Annapolis, 27 November 2007, Benita 
Ferrero Waldner announced that the State-building and development strategy was now 
officially back on track and she detailed the priorities o f the European Union: support 
for the establishment o f modern and democratic police forces, support for institution 
building and sustainable PA finances and good governance, support for sustained 
growth of the Palestinian economy by focusing on private sector activities, and 
supporting the PA's efforts to develop its trade policy and custom institutions.88
87 A. le More, note 38 above.
88 “Institutional Reform and Capacity Building in the occupied Palestinian Territory” - Speech by EU 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner at the Annapolis International Conference on the Middle East, 27 
November 2007, available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doPreference—SPEEC H /07/762 (last visited 15 December 
20081.
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The previous peace-building efforts o f the European Union have been poisoned by the 
widespread corruption inside the Palestinian Authority. For a long time, in order not to 
“upset” its partner and maintain the negotiation process on track, the EU remained silent 
about this widespread corruption when at the same time it was undermining the 
confidence o f the EU towards the PA and exasperated the staff of international donors 
working on the ground.89 It was only with the outburst of the second Intifada, in 2000, 
that the EU decided to tackle seriously the issue of good governance and started to 
condition its aid to the implementation o f reforms by the Palestinian Authority, such as 
enacting the Basic Law and the Law on Independence o f the Judiciary, ensuring 
transparency of public finances, restructuring the security sector.90 In order to improve 
the management o f PA public finances, since April 2004, donors decided that all the 
international assistance directed at the PA be channelled through the Public Financial 
Management Reform Trust Fund established and managed by the World Bank.91 
Nevertheless, it remains ironic to see that the response o f the Palestinian people in 
sanctioning the corruption inside o f the Palestinian Authority ruled by Fatah, i.e. the 
election o f Hamas, has in effect been sanctioned by the EU itself. The new financial 
mechanism PEGASE which marks the reestablishment of the direct financial assistance 
to the Palestinian Authority is supposed to offer a comprehensive and secure monitoring, 
verification and control system to provide reassurance over the use o f donor funds.92
89 Interview with Lynn Hastings, Legal Advisor and Alex Costy, Head o f  Coordination, United Nations 
Special Coordinator Office for the Middle-East (UNSCO), Jerusalem, July 2007.
90 For an account on the urge for reforms to the PA and the limits o f  its success, see N . Tocci, The 
Widening Gap between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinlan Conflict (Centre 
for European Policy Studies), (Brussels 2005), p. 15-17
91 See West Bank and Gaza, The Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund At a Glance (World 
Bank), (2004), Available at
http://  siteresources.worldbank.orp-/INTWESTBANKGAZ A/Overview/20374462/AAG% 20Reform% 2 
0Fund%20Status%20Report.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008).
92 "PEGASE and Donors Contribution”. Available at
http: /  /  europa.eu/ rapid/pressReleasesAction.doPrefercncc—MEMO / 08/49&format—HTMTAtagcd—O&la 
nguage= EN&guiLanguage~en (last visited 15 December 2008).
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3.1. Reactivating the State Building Enterprise or the “Scandal o f the 
International Community”.
The EU is confident that Annapolis creates a momentum in the political dialogue between 
the parties and enhances the chances o f finding a peaceful solution to the current conflict.93 
To support the dialogue launched at Annapolis, at the Paris Donor Conference of 17 
December 2007, the EU and its member States made public their intention to terminate 
the Temporary International Mechanism. The conference proposed that, by February 
2008, the mechanism would be replaced by PEGASE which will support a broad array of 
activities in the four priority sectors o f the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 
which was agreed at Paris (governance, social development, economic and private sector 
development and public infrastructure development in areas such as water, environment 
and energy). With the establishment o f PEGASE, the EU aims to shift from mere 
emergency assistance to a sustainable Palestinian development process by supporting 
Palestinian economic recovery and to help build institutions for a future state. The 
European Commission announced also it will pledge €440 million assistance for 2008.94
Finally, in April 2008, the European Commission announced its intention to revive the 
EU-PA Action Plan and commended the PA government’s efforts to produce the 
Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010, which sets out the vision o f the 
future Palestinian State.95
93 Remarks by Mr SOLANA at a joint press conference with Dr Qurei in Ramallah: “It [the Annapolis 
conference] is an opportunity that must be seized. The alternative to Annapolis is failure”, in “Javier 
SOLANA, EU High Representative for CFSP says Annapolis must not fail”, Ramallah, 13 November 
2007, S324/07, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours Z97119.pdf (last
visited 15 December 2008).
94“Overview o f  PEGASE, the new European Mechanism for support o f  the Palestinian people”, 
www.deiwbg.ec.europa.eu (last visited 15 December 2008).
95 “European Neighbourhood Policy -  THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY”, Brussels, 3 
April 2008, M E M O /08/213. Available at:
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The European Union officially acknowledges that the deployment o f its development 
strategy and the economic development in the Palestinian territories is contingent upon 
Israel allowing movement and access.96 However, the EU continues its usual strategy of 
building capacities that could be useful “when the time for peace” comes, without 
acknowledging the fact that the fragmentation of the Palestinian land which results from 
the construction o f the wall and the settlement policy renders the construction of a viable 
Palestinian State impossible.97 Added to this is the fact that the State building efforts are 
only directed at the West Bank and not Gaza because o f its control by Hamas.
The adoption by the member States of the EU o f die European Action Plan for the 
Middle East, drafted by the Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier at the Informal 
European Council o f Lisbon, on 18-19 October 2007 is very telling in this respect. The 
illegal obstacles to peace are not mentioned at any point in the document. The action 
plan addresses the axes o f priority for the EU policy towards the Palestinians as follow:
• We have to help the Palestinians to become less dependent on 
development aid again. This can only be achieved by strengthening the 
Palestinian private sector. [...]
www. eutopa.eu /  rapid/pressReleases Action.do?reference=MEMQ /  08 /213&format—PDF&aged=l&langu 
age=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited 15 December 2008).
96 See for instance, “Institutional Reform and Capacity Building in the occupied Palestinian Territory” - 
Speech by EU Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner note above and Council Conclusions on the Middle East 
Peace Process, 2870th External Relations Council, 26 and 27 May 2008, para 5: “The EU calls for the 
progressive removal o f  Israeli restrictions on movement and access in order to improve the situation on 
the ground and living conditions in the West Bank and revitalise the Palestinian economy. The EU 
welcomes as a step in the right direction the decision to remove a limited number o f roadblocks but 
underlines the fact that much more remains to be done”.
97 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Wall, p. 184 (para. 121) and Question o f  the Violations o f  Human 
Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories Including Palestine, Report o f the Special Rapporteur o f the 
Commission o f Human Rights, John Dugard, on the Situation o f Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories Occupied Since 1967. U.N. Doc. A /H R C /2 /5 , Sep. 5, 2006, p. 16.
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• Modem and democratic security forces in Palestine can provide the 
Palestinian population with die protection from crime and gangs diey 
deserve and safeguard Israel from suicide bombers and terrorist threats.
[...]
• A well-trained population is the best guarantor o f democracy and 
economic progress. The emigration of talented young people must be 
halted. [...]
• A new Palestinian state needs functioning and transparent state institutions.
But time is o f the essence. The EU therefore has to step up the efforts it 
has already begun on reforming state structures, including the development 
o f democratic parties.98
The action plan is not an official document but it illustrates the rationale behind EU’s 
policy in the Occupied Territories which are exemplary o f what Henry Siegman describes 
as the “scandal o f the international community” :
“ [...] it knows what die problem is but does not have the courage to speak 
the truth, much less deal widi it. It will deal with everything except the 
problem primarily responsible for the impasse” .99
N ot only is the EU not ready to tackle the major obstacles which prevent the 
construction o f a viable Palestinian State while implementing its State-building strategy, 
but it is also currendy shutting its eyes to the human rights abuses committed by the
98 “European Action Plan for the Middle East”, 15 October 2007, available at http: / / www.auswaeitiges- 
amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Interview /2007 /071015-BM-Artikel-Hbl-EUAktPhNO.html (last 
visited 15 December 2008).
99 H. Siegman, Tough Love for Israel, The Nation, (17 April 2008).
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Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The EU ’s efforts in building a Palestinian civil 
police capacity are particularly illustrative o f this situation.
3.2. The EUPOL COPPS Mission: A Case-Studv.
O n 14 November 2005, the Council established an EU Police Mission in the Palestinian 
Territories under the European Security and Defence Policy.100 The operational 
phase started on 1 January 2006 for an initial duration o f 3 years and under the code 
name EUPOL COPPS. It provides training and equipment to the Palestinian civil police. 
The establishment o f EU POL COPPS is, in the words of the 14 November 2005 
Council Joint Action “an expression o f the EU’s continued readiness to support the 
Palestinian Authority in complying with its Roadmap obligations, in particular with 
regard to ‘security’ and ‘institution building’ (.. ,)” .101 Although it is never expressly stated, 
the security referred to in the Joint Action, is the security of the Palestinian population 
but also the security of the State o f Israel. EUPOL COPPS participates in the EU 
objectives o f strengthening EU-Palestinian Authority co-operation on the fight against 
and prevention o f terrorism as stated in the EU PA Action Plan.102 In his declaration 
after the Berlin conference in Support o f Palestinian Civil Security and the Rule o f Law, 
24 June 2008, Javier Solana was more explicit in this respect:
“We are interested in creating security forces accountable to the law, not to a
faction or a party. We want police forces that serve the community. This is in
100 joint Action 2005/797/CFSP, 14 November 2005 OJEU L 300,17 November 2005
101 Ibid., p. 1.
102 “Proposed EU-PA Action Plan”, European Commission, Brussels, 9 December 2004, p. 4.
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the best security interests o f Israel. The security of Israel will derive from a 
secure and violence-free Palestinian society”.103
Because policing is a prerogative o f the President o f the Palestinian Authority and the 
police forces are under the orders o f Mahmoud Abbas, the EUPOL COPPS programme 
has not been interrupted after the election o f Hamas in January 2006, although it 
functioned in a slower pace following the change in power structure. Its activities 
experienced a new impetus during the summer o f 2007. In the months o f July and 
August 2007 members o f EUPOL COPPS visited every facility belonging to tire 
Palestinian Civil Police in the West Bank in order to assess their most urgent needs. 
EUPOL COPPS has organised two Public Order training courses for 88 Palestinian Civil 
Police officers at Jericho in September and December 2007. It has also organised a 
Palestinian-Israeli Traffic Police Workshop which took place on tire 31st October 2007. 
Finally, so far, EUPOL COPPS has handed over equipment worth more than €150 000 
in order to build up the capacities of the Palestinian civilian police.104
At the Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and the Rule o f Law, 
member States o f the EU proposed the extension o f the EUPOL COPPS Mission with a 
criminal justice component and agreed to increase their financial participation in the 
mission by several millions of euro.105
103 “Summary o f remarks by Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for the CFSP, at the Berlin 
Conference in support o f  Palestinian Civil Security and Rule o f Law”, Berlin, 24 June 2008, S228/08, p. 1. 
Available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueD ocs/cm s Data/docs/pressdata/EN / discours /102904.pdf (last 
visited 15 December 2008).
iot “EU Council Secretariat Fact Sheet, European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories 
(EUPOL COPPS)”, January 2008, p. 2. Available at
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070907-EUPQL COPPS.pdf (last visited 15 December 
2008).
105 “EUPOL COPPS welcomes support, both political and financial, at Berlin Conference”, press release, 
Ramallah, 24 June 2008. Available at http: /  / www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs / cmsUpload/080624- 
Berlin Conference.pdf (last visited 15 December 2008).
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3.2.1. The Funding of the Palestinian Civil Police and the Israeli 
Occupation.
The Palestinian civil police operates in the context of the Israeli occupation which is 
more than a mere constraint on the implementation of its mission. The occupation 
means the superposition o f another power holder over the Palestinian Authority in the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories which itself exercises a form o f authority over the 
Palestinian Authority and its police.106 Therefore, the possibility o f establishing an 
independent police entirely capable o f implementing its mission over a territory where it 
exercises full jurisdiction are null. While the EU expressed its satisfaction at the work 
done by the Palestinian police in Nablus,107 and it encourages the strengthening of the 
cooperation between the Palestinian police forces and the Israeli security forces.108
In a recent interview, the police commander o f Nablus, Fawaz Daoud explained the 
terms of this cooperation:
We're working as a Palestinian police from 6 am until midnight, and that 
authorisation has been given by the Israelis themselves, the ID F and from 
midnight until 6 am, it's an open night for the Israelis and for the ones who 
are above the law to do their job inside the city and this makes our job 
difficult sometimes. It makes it also difficult for the continuity o f doing our
!06 As stated in the introduction o f  this dissertation, the Peace Process o f the 1990s did not end the Israeli 
occupation but only added the Palestinian Authority below the structure o f  the occupation. See p. 14 
above.
107 “Javier SOLANA, EU High Representative for CFSP, says Annapolis must not fail”, note 93 above, p. 
2 .
108 “u n Etat palestinien democratique doit disposer d'une police formee et disciplinee, d'instances 
juridictionnelles et de centres penitentiaires. L'Europe aide. C'est aussi 1'interet d'Israel”, Breve par Javier 
Solana, La JJbre Belgique, (23 June 2008).
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jobs properly. [...] We have a Palestinian district coordination office which 
has a relation with the Israeli DCO (District Commander Office) but 
according to the incursions themselves, sometimes we're informed that there 
is some military action so we have to remove all the police and security 
personnel from the streets and vehicles but sometimes we are not and 
sometimes we confront each other — the Israelis, IDF, with our police and 
they tell us to go back to our [bases].109
This statement confirms a common pattern already testified during the fieldwork 
conducted for this dissertation: the Palestinian police leaves the streets o f the cities in the 
West Bank at night just before any Israeli military incursion. It also exemplifies the tight 
margin of manoeuvre o f theses police forces. All the EU’s efforts put into its training 
and capacity building will not grant it the full sovereignty it needs to exercise properly its 
mission. Actually, on the contrary, the EU by not tackling the obstacles to the 
implementation o f the State building policy is acquiescing in the situation. It has 
accommodated the implementation o f its State-building policy to the perpetuation of the 
Israeli occupation. As such, its silence contributes to its entrenchment as an established 
fact and therefore helps diminishing the chances of the construction o f a viable 
Palestinian State.
3.2.2. The Funding of the Palestinian Civil Police and the Autocratic Drift o f  
the Palestinian Authority.
109 Interview with Fawaz Daoud, police commander o f Nablus by Arthur Neslen, March 2008. This 
interview is actually an extract from a forthcoming book about Palestinian identity by Arthur Neslen, 
generously provided by the author.
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Furthermore, after the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, the President o f the PA promulgated 
a number o f decrees, by virtue of which he dissolved the Palestinian unity government 
which was formed in March 2007, declared a state of emergency throughout the OPT, 
and suspended the application of Articles 65, 66, 67 and 79 of the Palestinian Basic Law, 
thereby effectively removing certain powers o f the elected Palestinian Legislative Council 
with regard to the formation o f its government.110 As pointed by the Palestinian human 
rights organisation A1 Haq, the state o f emergency would enable some executive officials 
to bypass controls regulating human rights and freedoms, especially those pertaining to 
detention, freedom of expression, and the sanctity of private life and property.111 
Furthermore, on 27 August 2007 the PA government announced that the Minister of 
Interior had signed a decision to dissolve 103 charitable associations and civil society 
organisations. Although the decision was taken after having ascertained that these 
associations and organisations had contravened the relevant laws regulating the 
administrative and financial functioning of charitable organizations, it seems to be 
politically motivated since these organizations were registered by supporters o f the 
Hamas movement.112 Actually, since June 2007, PA institutions have progressively been 
cleaned o f their Hamas elements and the PA government reigns over the West Bank by 
silencing Hamas opposition and imposing a repressive security policy and rigorous “law 
and order” agenda in the territory.113 The death o f Hamas cleric Majed Al-Barghouti in a 
prison cell in Ramallah operated by the Palestinian Authority apparently after being
no “A] i-iaq position on the State o f Emergency and the Presidential Decrees [translation o f original Arabic 
text published 24 June 2007]”, Briefing Note, Al Haq, 24 June 2007. Available at 
http: /  /  www.alhaq.orp-/pdfs /POSITION%20QN%20THE%20STATE%20QF%20EMERGENCY.pdf 
(last visited 15 December 2008).
111 Ibid, p. 1.
112 “Al-I4aq Posidon Paper on the Ministry o f Interior’s Decision to Dissolve 103 Civil Society 
Organisadons [translation o f  original Arabic text published 19 October 2007]”, Briefing N ote, Al Haq, 19 
October 2007. Available at
http:/  / www.alhaq.org/pdfs/Position%20Paper%20on%20Dissolved%20CSQs%20-%20English.pdf (last 
visited 15 December 2008).
113 A. Neslen, Inside a failed Palestinian police State Rootless Cosmopolitan, (26 February 2008). Available at 
http:/  /tonykaron.com/2008/02/26/inside-a-failed-palestinian-police-state/  (last visited 15 December 
2008).
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tortured sheds light over the abusive practices o f the intelligence services against the 
opponents o f the government.114
The training and financing o f the Palestinian civil police is necessarily taking place within 
the context of the autocratic drift o f the Palestinian Authority. Because o f its close 
involvement and support o f the Palestinian Authority, the European Union is in a 
position to address the human rights abuses committed under its jurisdiction even if the 
civilian police is not involved in these activities. However, as in the case o f the 
deterioration o f the humanitarian situation o f Gaza following the siege imposed on the 
population, the EU has adopted a position whereby it intends to minimize the impact of 
the illegal policies on the population. One example illustrates this point. In October 
2007, violent clashes erupted between the police and Palestinians protesting at the talks 
between the PA and Israel held in Annapolis across the West Bank. One person died in 
Hebron.115 To prevent this tragic event occurring in the future, the EU organized a 
twelve-day training programme in riot control. The objective of the training was to teach 
police agents how to “intimidate” demonstrators but without using firearms.116 The 
newly-trained police was dispatched to the towns of the West Bank, and notably in 
Ramallah during the visit of President George W. Bush. Several people were arrested, a
114 Palestinian Authority: Punish Imam’s Death in Custody (Human Rights Watch) (4 April 2008). 
Available at http://www.hrw .org/legacy/english/docs/2008/04/04/isrlpal8425.htm  (last visited 15 
December 2008). The organisation Human Rights Watch has also reported systematic torture by the 
Palestinian Preventive Security and the Palestinian General Intelligence Service on detainees affiliated to 
Hamas. See “Occupied Palestinian Territories: Donors Should Press Security Forces to End Abuse”, press 
communique, Human Rights Watch, Berlin, 23 June 2008, available at 
http: /  /  www.hrw.org/en /n ew s/2 0 0 8 /0 6 /2 2 / occupied-Palestinian-territories-donors-should-press-security- 
forces-end-abuse (last visited 15 December 2008).
115 I. Kershner, Palestinian Is Killed in Hebron as Police Disperse Protest Over Mideast Peace Talks, New 
York Times, (28 November 2007).
116 “EU Council Secretariat Fact Sheet, European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories”, 
note 104 above and S. Weizman, Palestinian Police Get Training in Riot Control, Associated Press, (28 May 
2008). Available at http://www.cnsnews.com/public/Content/Article.aspx?rsrcid~19191 (last visited 15 
December 2008).
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few injured but no deaths occurred this time.117 While the Palestinian Authority severely 
restricts freedom of expression and governs the West Bank with an iron fist, the EU 
attempts to minimise the visible aspects o f this autocratic drift but does not address them 
in its relationships with the Palestinian Authority with a view to eliminating its 
malpractices.
The main obstacle to an effective implementation of EU’s economic and humanitarian 
policy to the Palestinians has been the Israeli occupation. However, the EU has never 
properly addressed this major obstacle to the success o f its economic policy and the 
interference o f Israel illegal actions in the conduct o f its humanitarian actions. As such, it 
is offering Israel incentives to continue its illegal actions in the Occupied Territories 
because it remains silent vis-a-vis violations o f international law when one would expect 
that it would react given its involvement and its own interests on the ground. 
Furthermore, while it decided to revive by mid 2007 its State building programmes, the 
EU implements its strategy without addressing the impediments to the construction o f a 
viable Palestinian State which result from the occupation and which actually renders its 
creation impossible and it remains silent on the human rights abuses o f the Palestinian 
Authority. As stated by Asseburg, the European approach has not taken this sufficiently 
into account: it has been one o f post-conflict peace-building as if there were no 
continuing conflict, occupation 01* mobility restrictions hampering economic 
development, reconciliation and institution-building.118 This dissertation agrees with 
Asseburg’s argument and also asserts that by trying to maintain and continue the 
enforcement o f its strategy without addressing the obstacles to its success, it contributes
117 Testimony from fieldwork conducted in the Occupied Territories in December and January 2007-8. See 
also A. Paq, Mr Bush’s Trip to Ramallah, Electronic Intifada, (17 January 2008). Available at 
http: /  /electronicintifada.net/v2/article9232.shtml (last visited 15 December 2008).
118 M. Asseburg, note 33 above, p. 177.
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to the annihilation of the objective behind its strategy, i.e. the construction o f a viable 
and democratic Palestinian State and to the perpetuation o f the illegal occupation.
The next chapter examines the relationships between the EU and Israel and considers 
whether the same degree o f compromising with the violations o f international law on the 
ground in the implementation of their economic and cooperation policy is to be found.
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Chapter Seven 
The Relationships between Israel and the EU or 
the Impossibility o f Separation between Israel as an Econom ic and Scientific 
Partner and Israel as an Occupying Power.
Israel is a by-product o f European history. Many historical and political aspects which 
accompany the construction o f the State o f Israel find their origins in Europe’s history. 
The Zionist movement elaborated in Austria by Theodore Herzl takes root in the 
European nationalist trends o f the end o f the 19th Century and is a response to Europe’s 
anti-Semitism. Furthermore, the establishment o f the first Jewish setders in Palestine 
became possible after it appeared certain that the British government obtained a mandate 
on Palestine during WWI. This followed the negotiation of the Sykes Picot agreement 
and the British Prime Minister Lord Balfour issued a declaration, in 1917, granting the 
Jewish people a national home in Palestine. The emigration o f Jewish people to mandate 
Palestine accelerated with the ongoing anti-Semitic persecutions in Europe during the 
first half o f the twentieth century, the rise o f Nazism in Germany and the Second World 
War. Finally, the creation o f tire State o f Israel became an inevitability for the Western 
powers after the world discovered the atrocities of the Holocaust where six millions 
Jewish individuals perished.1
Since the creation o f the State o f Israel, connections between the European States and 
Israel have been strong. Support for the State o f Israel has taken many stances including 
the Suez crisis in 1956 where the United Kingdom, France and Israel launched a military 
attack against Egypt after its president, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal.
1 For a non exhaustive literature review on the history o f  Zionism and the construction o f  the State o f  
Israel: B, Morris, Righteous Victims: A  History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York 2001); I. 
Pappe, A  Histoty of Modem Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge, New York 2006); G, Piterberg, The 
Returns of Zionism: Myths, Politics and Scholarship in Israel (London, New York 2008); T. Segev, One Palestine 
Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (London 2001); A. Shlaim, The Iron wall: Israel and the Arab 
World, (London 2001).
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However, the creation o f the European Community marked the beginning o f a new 
trend in the relationships between Israel and the European States. Since the early 1970s, 
the member States o f the European Community have attempted to promote and 
implement a common foreign policy through their various statements on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the Palestinian issue2 as this has long remained the most contentious issue 
between the EU and Israel. Since the 2004 enlargement o f the EU, one can testify a 
“shift” towards an appeasement in their relationships.
Nonetheless, although EU-Israel relationships have been poisoned by politics and 
mutual misunderstandings, it has never affected the continuation and progressive 
deepening of their economic ties.3 After the signature o f the Rome Treaty, Israel saw, in 
the emerging common market, an outlet for its agricultural and industrial production and 
hence a chance for its own economic development. Since the beginning o f the external 
commercial policy, Israel has been a privileged partner of the EU. However, as this 
chapter demonstrates, it has always been impossible to operate a detachment of the 
status o f Israel as a trading entity and a scientific partner from its status as an Occupying 
Power. Violations o f international law, notably Israel’s settlement policy, have interfered 
in the EU ’s economic and commercial relations with Israel and as this chapter 
demonstrates, the way in which these relations are implemented can engage the 
international responsibility o f the EU. Therefore, after having described the nature o f the 
relationships between Europe and Israel and the framework o f the relationships between 
the two parties, the present chapter dedicates a long section to the issue o f the products 
coming from the settlements. Finally, it outlines other elements in the relationships
2 For an account on the focus o f  the European Political Cooperation vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian issue 
see I. Greilsammer and j . Weiler, E imps's Middle-Easi Dilemma: The Quest for a Unified Stance, (London 1987).
3 R. Miller, “Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel” (2006) 12 Israel affairs 642-664, p. 655.
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between the EU and Israel and other cooperation agreements where the same 
problematic has been identified or potentially can be raised.
1. Europe and Israel: A H eated Relationship.
The EU is made o f 27 member States, all of which have different views on the Israeli- 
Palestinian issue. Even inside the constituency o f the member States, there is a wide 
range o f differences o f opinion on the topic. Israel is a small State o f 7.5 million 
inhabitants and in Israel itself, the left wing and right wing movements differ in their 
attitude towards Europe. Nonetheless, there are general trends and consistent patterns 
that come out in die history o f die relationship between Israel and Europe which the 
present section outlines.
In Chapter Four, this dissertation highlighted the divergent positions between Israel and 
Europe on the importance o f the respect for international law, particularly within the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. This difference of views is actually accompanied 
by a major divergence in their respective views on the threats to security in today’s world, 
the instruments to bring about a sustainable peace, the use o f violence and war in 
international politics. Instead of power balances, deterrence and the use o f force, the 
European approach highlights reconciliation and compromise.4 Violence and wars are in 
general seen as being the consequences of structural issues, social and economic. In the 
case o f the Middle East, the current instability is seen by the EU as the result o f poor 
governance, poor human rights records, marginalization o f women, low participation of
4 G. Steinberg, Kantian Pegs into Hobbesian Holes: Europe's Policy in Arab-Israeli Peace Efforts, The E U  
in Regional and Bilateral Dispute Settlement” organised by the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration in 
cooperation with the Friedrich Na/mann Foundation, The EU-Israel Forum, The German Innoration Center &  The 
Interdisciplinary Center, (Herzliya 2004), p. 8.
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civil society and poor economic and social performance.5 Europe wants to bring the 
countries of the Middle East closer to its model o f governance. As seen in Chapter Five 
o f this dissertation, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Euro Mediterranean 
Partnership before it form essential elements in the implementation o f this policy.
In Israel, this approach is seen as being unrealistic because it fails to take into account 
those issues with which the Middle East is confronted and more precisely the unique 
geostrategic position o f Israel “as a border country between the Arab world on one side 
and Europe on the other” . 6 This situation, Israel contends, poses existential dangers and 
requires security measures which are incomprehensible for the European States. This 
makes Israel believe that the EU is incapable o f grasping its security concerns.
At the same time the political foundations o f the European Union based on “perpetual 
peace”, cooperation with neighbours and attenuation o f national identities have no echo 
in the foundations of the State o f Israel itself. The multilateralism which is prevalent in 
the European system of decision malting contrasts severely with the common “trust no 
one” or “few against the many” themes developed among the Israeli society. The 
principle o f self reliance, except for the US, is with Zionism, the Holocaust and the 
Jewish nature of the State one o f the defining themes of the State o f Israel.7
Israel is also the historical product of two movements which have characterized 
European history in the nineteenth and twentieth Century: colonialism and more
5 “Reinvigorating Human Rights in the Mediterranean Area”, Commission Communication, 21 May 2003, 
COM (2003) 294 final. Hereinafter “Reinvigorating Human Rights”.
6 Y. Dror and S. Pardo, “Approaches and Principles for an Israeli Grand Strategy towards the European 
Union” (2006) 11 EFA Rev. 17-44, p. 37.
7 Self reliance can be defined as the ability for a State to respond autonomously to its security threat. This 
principle in Israel is the product o f the trauma o f  the long history o f persecutions and hostile environment 
surrounding it. R. del Sarto, “Israel's Contested Identity in the Mediterranean” (2003) 8 Mediterranean 
Politics 27-58, p. 35.
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specifically UK ’s ambition and then presence in Palestine through its mandate which 
allowed the setdements o f Jewish population in tiiis territory and nationalism which gave 
rise to Zionism. Consequently, on the one hand, due to the dominant social climate in 
Europe o f “post-colonialism”, “post-nationalism” and “post-conflict” and of 
multiculturalism, the Europeans in general perceive the claims o f Israel and its 
foundations as being hardly understandable and anachronistic.8 On the other hand, any 
claim o f the EU that Israel should respect the right o f the Palestinian people to become a 
State is perceived as an illustration of Europe’s double standard when it comes to self- 
determination and national claims.9
Furthermore, any criticism of the disproportionate use of violence by the Israeli Defence 
Force against the Palestinian civilian population is countered with accusations of 
hypocrisy focused on Europe’s claim o f a higher morality in today’s world. This is mosdy 
because o f Europe’s main responsibility in the Holocaust.10 Europe and the Holocaust 
are inseparable in the Israeli psyche.11 Hence, one finds the general belief that Europe has 
a moral commitment to support Israel in its quest for security and also the general
8 G. Steinberg, European N G O s against Israel, In M. Gerstenfeld (ed.), Israel and Europe.: A n  Expanding 
Abyss, (Jerusalem 2005), pp. 111-123, p. 112.
0 A. Carmi and J. Carmi, The War of Western Europe Against Israel, (Jerusalem, N ew  York 2003), p. 102. 
“Nationalism is generally associated with chauvinism, intolerance, racism and violence, and is eschewed. 
(Exceptions are made for nations considered to have been victims o f  European colonialism, for whom  
nationalism is considered to be part o f  the process o f  recovering a lost identity, as in the case o f the Arab 
world, in general, and [...], for the Palestinians, in particular. This dispensation is not granted to jews and 
to Israel, however.)”, in G. Steinberg, note 4 above, p. 8.
10 Y, Dror, The EU and Israel: Radically Different Worldviews, In M. Gerstenfeld (ed.), Israel and Europe: 
A n  Expanding Abyss, (Jerusalem 2005), pp. 25-35., pp. 33-34,
11 As an illustration o f this mental association, after the Berlin declaration in 1999 in which the EU 
formally expressed its support for the creation o f  a Palestinian State, PM Benjamin Netanyahu stated that it 
was “regretful that Europe where a third o f  the Jewish people perished, would see it fit to attempt to 
impose a solution that endangers the State o f Israel and its interests”. Cited in J. Peters, Europe and die 
Arab-Israeli Process: The Declaration o f  Berlin and Beyond, In S. Behrendt and C. Hanelt (eds.), Security in 
the Middle-East, (Munich 1999), pp. 25-41, p. 29.
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perception that any criticism of Israel is a demonstration of anti Semitism.12 Strong anti- 
European feelings and bias are widely widespread among the right-wing public in Israel.13
This general resentment and distrust is counterbalanced by a strong feeling o f guilt for 
the Shoah from the European States that were under Nazi Germany occupation during 
WWII and collaborated actively or passively in the genocide o f the Jewish people.
Consequently, Euro-Israeli relationships have been characterized by a flow o f hectic 
crises and hard times characterised by “crunchy”14 or even surrealistic exchanges.15 One 
example among many can be found in the denial o f access of the Spanish Foreign 
Minister Josep Pique, and the High Representative o f the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Javier Solana to Arafat’s headquarter in Ramallah in April 2002 was a direct snub 
to Europe and a rebuttal o f its policies.16
Since 2004, there has existed a genuine political will to ameliorate the relationships 
between both parties which many considered had been at their worst during the fourth 
first years o f the second Intifada.17 In the words o f Jana Hybaskova MEP, Chairman of 
the EU-Israel parliamentary delegation, the European institutions focus their efforts on 
pragmatic initiatives such as the deepening o f the scientific cooperation with Israel — 
which she sees as more important than the description o f the suffering o f the Palestinian
12 Y. Dror & S. Pardo, note 6 above, p. 34.
13 One finds for instance in the Jerusalem Post a litany o f anti-European attacks and expressions o f  anti- 
European feelings. A selected quote among many: “The Europeans only wish to “beautify the world” and 
we are not esthetically beautiful enough in their eyes to justify our existence as a nation, a State or either a 
faith”, Berel Wein, Jerusalem Post, 24 August 2002, quoted in A. Carmi and J. Carmi, note 9 above, p. 147.
14 Interview Emmanuele Giaufret, Deputy Director o f the EC Delegation for Israel, Head o f the Political 
and Economic Section, Tel Aviv, July 2007.
15 Informal conversation with Michael O ’Ryan, former Head o f the Israel Desk, D G  Relex, European 
Commission, Brussels, September 2005.
16 R. Miller, note 3 above, p. 647.
17 Interview with Jana Hybaskova MEP, Member o f  the European Parliament, chair o f  the European 
Parliament Delegation for relations with Israel, Veronique D e Keyset-, Member o f the European 
Parliament and Charles Tannock Member o f the European Parliament, Brussels, August 2006. See R. del 
Sarto, “Changes in EU-Israeli Relations?” (2006) 7 Internationale Politik Transatlantic Edition 92-103.
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people. According to her, European institutions also tend to “depoliticise” the bilateral 
cooperation from the Middle-East Peace Process and the human rights situation in the 
Occupied Territories.18 This shift is due to die enlargement of the EU to Eastern 
European states which are inclined to preserve privileged relationships with the United 
States and to support the efforts of the “War on Terror” campaign. European decision­
makers also believe that if they want to influence the course of the Peace Process, it is 
better to maintain a good relationship with all the parties to the conflict.19
2. Econom ic Dependency of Israel on the European Union.
If  one does not look at Europe in the large sense, i.e. as an historical, cultural, 
geographical and political entity, but instead only at the European Union and particularly 
the economical project it encompasses with the European Community, things are very 
different. Despite the political discrepancies and the tensions, the bilateral economic and 
scientific cooperation between the EU, its member States and Israel have been 
consistently strong and have increased and developed with time.20 In only very rare 
instances, the EU has used its economic instruments to exercise pressure on Israel 
regarding the human rights violations in the Occupied Territories.21
From the very beginning o f its creation, Israel has developed an interest in the European 
Community project. In October 1958, PM Ben Gurion instructed Gideon Raphael, the 
new ambassador to Belgium, to focus his efforts principally on the Commission o f the 
European Economic Community in Brussels. The latter established a diplomatic mission 
with full ambassadorial status. Israel thus became out o f the first States along with the
18 Interview with Jana Hybaskova, Brussels, August 2006.
19 Interview with Emmanuele Giaufret, Tel Aviv, July 2007.
20 R. Miller, note 3 above, p. 655.
21 See Chapter Eight o f  this dissertation, p. 299 note 39 below.
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United Kingdom and the Republic o f Ireland, with observer status in the European 
Communities.22 The primary reason for the development of this strategy to the EC is 
obviously economic. Israeli decision-makers saw, in the wakening o f the EC economical 
giant, a way out o f the drastic effects o f the economic and trade boycott enforced by the 
Arab States which started even before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.23 
For Israel, the EU market is not only the largest and the most lucrative market but it is 
also the nearest. As a small isolated State, it needs to integrate into a wider regional 
market. The EC is the premier trading partner o f Israel with a total trade amounting to 
€23.5 billion in 2006. In the same year, the EU ranked number one in Israel’s import and 
number two in its exports, the first being the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Israel 
ranks 30th in EU ’s import and 22nd in EU’s exports.24
To a lesser degree, cultural and developmental reasons explain these close ties. Although 
Israeli society is the result o f the emigration o f Jewish population from all over the world 
, Israel shares lots of commonalities with Europe’s economic and political make up, at 
least more than with its Middle Eastern neighbours.25 Furthermore, Israel maintains 
complex and intense relationships with the Jewish communities living in the EU member 
States. Israel believes it has a natural responsibility to act against anti-Semitism in Europe 
because o f its responsibility for the safety o f the Jewish people. It is worth also noting 
that one fifth o f the Israeli adult population has EU citizenship (6%) or is intending to 
apply for it (14%) following the 2004 enlargement.26
22 H. Sachar, Israel and Europe. A n  Appraisal in History, (New York 1999), p. 212.
23 Interview with Emmanuelle Giaufret, Tel Aviv, July 2007 and C. Yaacov, Israel and the EEC, 1958- 
1978: Economic and Political Relations, In H. Giersch (ed.), The Economic Integration of Israel in the E E C , 
(Tubingen 1980), pp. 13-37, p. 13.
2A Source http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/September/tradoc 113402.pdf (last visited 15 
December 2008).
25 Israel’s Finance Ministry repeatedly stressed that it would prefer a divide within the EMP “16 and 11” 
rather than “15 and 12” (EU member States/southern Mediterranean countries), in R. del Sarto, note 7 
above, p. 33.
26 Y. Dror and S. Pardo, note 6 above, p. 29.
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This proximity and the development of these ties have opened the debate in Israel on its 
accession to the EU. This idea is supported by the Israeli public as well as by some Israeli 
leaders. Benjamin Netanyahu, Silvan Shalom and Shlomo Ben Ami have expressed such 
views.27 It is nonetheless very unlikely that Israel will be one day be a member State o f 
the EU as there are many contradictions between the European project, which is an open 
space with freedom of circulation and establishment for its citizens and residents, and the 
very nature of the State o f Israel, a State for the Jewish people as it is encapsulated in the 
Law o f Return.28 However, Israel is committed to further its integration into the 
European Union. Europe is important for Israel. Many politicians in Israel understand 
this.
3. The Framework of the Relationships between Israel and the EU.
The efforts which Israel devoted to the strengthening o f its relations with the European 
Community lead at first to the conclusion of a modest deal but one which made official 
the establishment o f a relationship between the two partners. In 1964, the two parties 
signed an agreement which granted reduced duties on certain agricultural products such 
as grapefruits, avocados and plywood. The accord confirmed that Israel would share 
whichever duty reduction might later be extended to other Mediterranean nations such as 
Spain or North African countries.29 The agreement was upgraded by another one 
concluded in 1970. In 1975, Israel and the EC signed an agreement far wider in scope 
than the predecessor according to which duties were reduced by 70 to 90 percent on an
27 For an interesting account o f  the benefits and disadvantages o f Israel joining the EU, see A. Tovias, 
Mapping Israel's Policy Options Regarding its Future Institutionalised Relations with the European Union, 
Centre for European Policy Studies Working Paper, (2003).
28 Y. Dror and S.Pardo, note 6 above, p. 31.
29 H. Sachar, note 22 above, p. 213.
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extensive range o f agricultural products.30 Further, by 1977, the EC committed itself to 
the gradual elimination o f custom duties on manufactured products.
In 1994, in a declaration, the European Council at Essen referred to the need for greater 
cooperation and the granting of a special status for Israel.31 One year later in the context 
o f the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the EU and Israel signed an Association 
Agreement whose objectives are the promotion of free-trade, political dialogue and 
economic cooperation. Nonetheless, the Association Agreement does not mark a big 
change in the relationships between the two because Israel had already been granted a de 
facto status o f associate member. However, although ambitious and far reaching in its 
scope, most o f the features o f this agreement, except from the free trade area aspects, 
have not been exploited. The Association Agreement was signed in 1995 but came into 
force only in 2000 because o f France and Belgium’s delay in its ratification.32
The expansion of free trade with the European Community had to be implemented 
obviously with the parallel elimination o f trade barriers on the Israeli side. Therefore, the 
Israeli market had been progressively opened to a wide influx o f industrial and 
agricultural products alike and has deepened, over the years, Israel’s trade imbalance with 
the EC.33 Israeli decision-makers were very aware of this fact when they started to open 
their borders to EC products but they thought that in the long run it would produce a 
rationalizing effect on Israeli nascent high-tech industry.34 By the early 1990s, this 
industry blossomed — and this mainly because o f the arrival o f highly qualified migrants
30 Ibid.
31 Declaration o f the European Council in Essen, 9 and 10 December 1994.
32 See Chapter Four o f  this dissertation, p. 162 above.
33 Israel’s trade deficit with the EC rose from $3.5 billion (102% o f Israel’s trade deficit) in 1990 to $6.9 
billion (159% o f Israel’s trade deficit) in 2000 in T. Sadeh, “Israel and the Euro-Mediterranean Market” 
(2004) 9 Mediterranean Politics 29-52, p. 31.
34 Interview with Abraham Rami Gutt, former Israeli diplomat, Tel Aviv, September 2008 and H, Sachar, 
note 22 above, p. 218.
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from the old Soviet bloc who channelled their skills in the creation o f several thousands 
of start-up companies. Despite an important economic recession in the beginning of the 
2000s, Israel has managed to maintain its status as a global technology leader. By the 
beginning o f 2005, Israel had the highest rate of research and development (R&D) 
investment per GD P in the world and spent 5% of GDP on R&D.35 The developments 
and achievements in this sector made Israel a very attractive partner. In 1996, it became a 
full participant in the EU Research and Development Framework Program allowing 
Israeli institutes and companies full access to EU research and development funding. So 
far, Israel has participated in the fourth, fifth and sixth Framework Program and is a 
member o f the seventh. In July 2004, due to its significant technological capabilities on 
space programs and global navigation satellite system applications, equipment and 
technology, Israel and die EU reached final approval and agreement on the European 
satellite navigation program, GALILEO. Israel’s association in the research and scientific 
programs and advancements is therefore what grants Israel the special status the Essen 
declaration was promising.
So far, the existing framework o f relations with the EU has revolved essentially around 
trade in goods and manufactured products and research and development cooperation. 
Israel thus welcomed the EU-Israel Action Plan agreed in December 2004 which at first 
seemed to offer a real opportunity to broaden the scope and level o f these relations.36 
The EU-Israel action plan addresses six different topics: political dialogue and 
cooperation; economic integration with a view to prepare Israel to participate in the EC 
market; cooperation in justice and home affairs issues; environmental cooperation; 
people-to-people contacts; cooperation in the fields of transport, energy, science and 
technology. The European Commission has published the first progress report on Israel
35 R. Miller, note 3 above, p. 658.
36 “Proposed EU-Israel Action Plan”, European Commission, Brussels, 9 December 2004.
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in 2006. Israel showed interest in participating in several programs and agencies such as 
Custom 2013, Fiscalis 2013, Marco Polo, etc... 37 Since November 2007, Israel is a 
member o f the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) under which the 
Commission promotes innovation, entrepreneurship and growth of small and medium­
sized enterprises.38 Furthermore, due to its highly developed economy, Israel has been 
allocated €8 million only for support o f the Action Plan activities. O n the 27th of 
December 2006, the European Investment Bank announced that it would renew its 
cooperation with Israel with two loan-contracts. The first contract is o f €200 million and 
will serve the funding o f environmental projects; the second is o f 75 million and will be 
directed to the funding o f small and medium size enterprises in the field o f tourism, 
health and education.39
On 16 June 2008, at the Eighth meeting o f the Association Council, the European Union 
decided to upgrade its relationship with Israel in various fields o f cooperation. The 
nature and the process of the upgrade are discussed in the following chapter.40 
Nonetheless, whatever the nature or the content of the upgrade will be, past experience 
has shown that it has been impossible to operate a detachment between the status of 
Israel as an economic and scientific partner and Israel as an Occupying Power. Israel 
implements all its international agreements without making a distinction between its 
territory and the territories it occupies. Therefore, with respect to the implementation of 
its free-trade agreement with the EU, Israel has always exported products originating 
from its settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories as if they were products
37 “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy. ENP Progress Report Israel”, Commission 
Communication, 29 November 2006, COM (2006) 726 final.
38 Israel joins EU competitiveness programme, Brussels, 1st o f November 2007, IP /07/1643.
39 “European Investment Bank (EIB) resumes activities in Israel after an 11 year break”, available at 
http://www.delisr.ec.europa.eu/newsletter/english/default.asp?edt id~22&id=475 (last visited 15 
December 2008),
40 Statement o f  the European Union at the eight meeting o f  the EU-Israel Association Council, 
Luxembourg, 16 June 2008, General Secretariat o f the Council. Available at 
http://www.delisr.ec.europa.eu/english/ specialftr.asp?id~ 59 (last visited 15 December 2008).
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originating from Israel proper. The issue has been raised before the European 
Commission after the signature o f the 1995 Association Agreement. Since then the issue 
has constituted a “stone in the shoe” o f the relationships between the EU and Israel 
despite the fact that the financial weight of the issue is minimal.41 The issue o f the 
products coming from the settlements is an interesting case where, first o f all, an issue of 
humanitarian law has found itself in the heart o f a commercial treaty and, second, where 
violations of human rights and international law cause violations o f EU law,
4. The Export to the EU of Products com ing from the Settlements Under 
Preferential Treatment.
The third chapter o f this dissertation has demonstrated that the situations envisaged by 
the International Court o f Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Wall and by 
the International Law Commissions articles on State responsibility did not embrace all 
the possible actions and inactions of a non-injured State in its participation in the 
commission o f a violation of international law. The case of the provision o f humanitarian 
aid by the European Union to the Palestinians and the implementation o f its Palestinian 
State-building policy has demonstrated this theory. However, the case o f the products 
coming from the setdements represents an issue which is relevant to analyse in the light 
of the duty o f non-recognition. The prohibition o f settlements contained in Article 49.6 
o f the Fourth Geneva Convention finds its raison d'etre in the prevention o f the risk o f
41 Actually, the volume o f  Israeli exports to the EC market that directly originate from setdements only 
amounts to €100 millions per year and custom liability for such exports is estimated at €7 millions per year. 
G. Harpaii, “The Effectiveness o f  Europe's Economic and ‘Soft’ Power Instruments in its Relations with 
the State o f  Israel” (2005) 7 Cambridge Yearbook on European Legal Studies 159-185, p. 183.
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annexation.42 Therefore, the violation o f the prohibition on settlements falls per excellence 
within the scope o f the duty o f non-recognition.
4.1. Israel’s Settlement Policy.
The setdement policy started in 1967 just after the Six Day war and while the Labour 
government was in power. It was based at the time on security reasons although the legal 
adviser for the Israeli minister o f Foreign Affairs, Theodor Meron, concluded that the 
project was illegal.43 In 1977, when Likud formed its government, the security concerns 
gave room to an ideological claim based on historical and religious grounds. Since then, 
the setdements have expanded unabated even at the time of the so-called Peace Process. 
In 2007, about 450000 Israeli setders lived in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.44 
The Gaza disengagement plan in 2005 did not actually alter the dynamics of the 
settlement policy in the West Bank.
This policy consists in the dispossession o f Palestinian lands which takes place either by 
registering it as “state land”, seizing it for military needs and playing extensively on the 
absentee law provisions.45 Once acquired by the Israeli government, Israeli citizens 
establish residence on this land thanks to a sophisticated governmental system designed 
to encourage Israeli citizens to live in the setdements by increasing their standards of 
living.46 The setdements have become an essential feature in die de facto annexationist
42 Article 49, paragraph 6 o f  the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that “the occupying power shall not 
deport or transfer parts o f its own civilian population into the territory it occupies”.
43 G. Gorenberg, Occupied Territories: The Untold Story o f Israel's Settlements, (London, New York 
2007), p. 99-102.
44 Source OCHA,
http://domino.un.orp/unispal.nsf/3822b5e39951876a85256b6e0058a478/b42d43070242hf018525734c00 
45ed8c!OpenDocument (last visited 15 December 2008).
45 For a detailed explanation o f  these administrative practices, see Land Grab. Israel's Settlement Policy in 
the West Bank (B'Tselem) (May 2002), pp. 47-63, hereinafter “Land Grab”.
46 Ibid., pp. 73-84.
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project of the Israeli occupation o f the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Israel unlawfully 
extends its jurisdiction to the territories it occupies and consequently, settlements have 
become completely integrated into the economic life o f the country. Its economic actors 
are thus as equally associated with commercial operations as are any other economic 
operator in Israel proper.47 The setdement policy is a subject o f heavy debate and huge 
controversy in Israel itself. It is the major source o f resentment and distrust for the 
Palestinian population. One o f the plausible explanations for its maintenance across the 
last four decades by any government, Labour or Likoud, is that it is a strategic way of 
maintaining the divide between the secular and religious components of Israeli society. 
According to Neslen:
“The settlements united religious and secular Israeli Jews around a self- 
concept that merged faith and security and held out the prospect o f an 
integrated Israeli Jewish identity”.48
The Israeli settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories are a violation of 
international humanitarian law. The ICJ ruled in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Wall that settlements contravene Article 49.6 o f the TVth Geneva Convention and might 
constitute with the regime associated to the wall a de facto annexation.49 De facto because 
even if the State o f Israel does not recognise the settlements as part o f its territory, it 
extends part o f its legislation to them through military orders in order to eradicate any 
significance o f the Green Line in the everyday life of the Israeli citizens living in the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories.50 Furthermore, the prohibition o f transfer of civilian
47 Ibid., pp.
48 A. Neslen, Occupied Minds. A  Journey through the Israeli Psyche, (L°n<Ion, Ann Arbor, MI 2006), pp. 240-241.
49'Advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ICj 
Rep. 2004, p. 180 (para. 120).
50 “Land Grab”, note 45 above, pp. 65-66.
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population in occupied territory amounts to a war crime pursuant to the statute of the 
International Criminal Court (article 8.2 (b) (viii) of the Rome Statute) -even though 
Israel is not a party to the Statute.
The settlement regime is associated with a network o f closures and by-pass roads which 
aim to separate and protect Israeli settlers from the Palestinian population and, according 
to Israel, to prevent die commission o f terrorist attacks in Israel proper. This network o f 
closures represents a stranglehold which tightens or gets loser according to the evaluation 
by the Israeli authorities o f the risks for the security of their citizens. Finally, the 
settlements policy is being sealed by the construction o f the wall which penetrates into 
the West Bank so as to encompass 76 % o f the West Bank settlers’ population and 
gradually whittles away 10% of the West Bank territory.51
4.2. Historical Overview o f the Issue o f the Export o f Products Coming 
from the Settlements.52
The Association Agreement concluded between the EU and Israel provides for the 
establishment o f a free trade area between the Community and the State o f Israel and 
grants preferential treatment to products exported from the EU to Israel and from Israel 
to the EU. This preferential treatment is only granted to products originating from the 
territory o f the parties to the Association Agreement that is, products “wholly obtained 
or substantially transformed” in the territories o f the member States o f the EU and the 
territory o f the State o f Israel (Protocol 4).
51 Question o f  the Violations o f Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories Including Palestine, 
Report o f the Special Rapporteur o f the Commission o f Human Rights, John Dugard, on the Situation o f  
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Occupied Since 1967. U.N. D oc. A /H R C /2 /5 , Sep. 5, 2006, p. 
2 .
52 The following two sub-sections draw substantially upon several interviews with Charles Shamas, senior 
partner o f the Mattin Group conducted in Brussels and Ramallah from September 2004 to August 2007.
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For the purpose o f the application o f this rule, the agreement provides in Article 83 that:
“This agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in 
which the Treaties establishing the European Community and the 
European and Steel Community are applied and under the conditions 
laid down in those Treaties and, on the other hand to the State of 
Israel”.
Since the signing o f the agreement, Israel has been exporting products originating from 
the settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories to the EU under preferential 
treatm ent Israel pretends that World Trade Organisation rules or rules related to 
international trade apply to administered territories and therefore to the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories in order to include its settlements in its trade agreements.53 The 
issue was brought to the attention of the EU at the time of the signing o f the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement by Palestinian and European non-governmental organisations— 
in the knowledge that Israel has always extended the implementation o f all its trade 
agreements to the settlements. The European Commission has considered that this issue 
constituted a difference o f interpretation o f the treaty. In 1998, in the communication on 
the implementation o f the interim EU-Israel Association Agreement, the Commission 
stated that Israel was suspected of breach o f the treaty for exporting goods into the 
Community which did not originate in Israel.54 Its reasoning was in line with the EU’s 
diplomatic stance on the settlements that the application o f the Association Agreement
53 S. Pardo and L. Zemer, “The Qualified Zones in Transition: Navigating the Dynamics o f  the Euro- 
Israeli Customs Dispute” (2003) 8 EFA Rev. 51-75, p. 52.
54 “Commission Communication on the Implementation o f  the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade- 
Related Matters between the European Community and Israel”, Commission Communication, 12 May 
1998, SEC (98) 695, p. 5. Hereinafter “Communication on the Implementation o f  the Interim Agreement”.
259
to the settlements constitutes a de facto extension of Israel’ sovereignty to the Occupied 
Territories. The territorial scope o f die Association Agreement has to be limited to the 
1967’s borders because the Israeli setdements in the Occupied Territories constitute a 
violation of international law and cannot be considered as part of Israeli territory.
In 2000, several member States’ customs authorities launched a procedure of verification 
requesting the Israeli customs authority to check the origin o f products suspected to 
originate from the Occupied Territories.55 The national customs services were working 
from a small list o f settlements products and evidence provided by the Commission. 
They addressed 4000 verification enquiries to Israeli customs between August 2000 and 
July 2001, to which they received the answer that the products in question originated in 
Israel. Then, they asked for guidance from the Commission and, as they were given 
none, accepted Israel’s responses. N o duties were recovered even in cases where Israel’s 
answers specifically named the settlements in which the products were produced.
Finally, the Commission confirmed its supposition that Israel was violating the 
agreement and issued a notice in November 2001 warning European importers that the 
products originating from the settlements, which obtained a preferential treatment, could 
be subjected to a custom duty.56 A second cycle o f verification was launched and it 
failed.57 The Custom Cooperation Committee, the body specially set up to solve this
55 Member States were not verifying uniformly. Hence, that created a distortion o f  the market and the 
Commission had to redress that situation. Sweden considered it was a Community competence, not a 
national one. Spain inverted the burden o f  proof and conducted broad investigations. France did the same
-the French custom authorities presumed that every product carried some doubt. Germany tried to make
the system o f  verification work. They aggressively investigated to recover duties and they tided to find their 
own cases o f  fraud. Interview with Charles Shamas, Ramallah, August 2006.
56 “Notice to Importers”, OJEC C 328, 23 November 2001.
57 Attempts at recovery are based on article 32 o f  the Fourth Protocol o f the EC-Israel association 
agreement which provides that if  the verification responses provided by the exporting country’s authorities 
do not “contain sufficient information to determine the authenticity o f the document in question or the 
real origin o f  the products”, the importing country’s authorities “shall refuse entitlement” to preferences 
irrespective o f the real origin o f the product in question. It entails the exporting country to issue a response
260
issue was originally convened in July 2001. It similarly failed to find a solution. The 
matter was referred to the Association Council, which was not successful either. Since 
then, every year, the matter has been referred to the agenda o f the Association Council 
and this came out always with the same conclusion that the EU and Israel must find a 
“technical solution” to this issue.
The European Commission refused to employ the means provided by the Association 
Agreement which would have forced Israel to stop the violation o f the treaty, the use of 
which would have entailed initially convening an arbitration panel (Article 75). Instead it 
continued to rely on die Member States’ customs authorities requirement o f Israel’s 
cooperation in order to verify the origin o f the suspected products and recover duties 
whenever the Israeli custom authorities were not cooperative or failed to provide 
adequate evidence.
4.3. Recent Developments: the Olmert Arrangement and the Amendment 
of the Association Agreement for the Purpose o f the Euro 
Pancumulation System o f Origin.
Over the last three years, the issue has seen two important major developments. The first 
was when the Israeli government offered a technical arrangement to the EU; the second 
when it decided to amend the protocol on origins to include Israel in the Euro med 
pancumulation system o f origins.
that the importing country will not find sufficient. It is not necessarily suited to the present case where the 
member States formulated a verification inquiry concerning the precise location o f a product’s production 
and Israel answered that the product was produced in the Occupied Territories and asserted its eligibility 
for preferential treatment under the agreement.
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In 2003, the European Commission pressed Israel to find a solution to the issue o f the 
products coming from the settlements. For the Commission, as long as no solution has 
been found to this issue, the protocol on origins could not be amended for the purpose 
of including Israel in the paneuromed system o f cumulation of origins. The paneuromed 
system of cumulation o f origins is the technical name for the establishment o f a free- 
trade area between the new neighbouring countries of the EU and it is designed to allow 
goods produced jointly in two or more o f the countries o f the region to maintain their 
preferential access to the EU market.58
In November 2004, the Israeli Minister of Trade and Industry at the time, Ehud Olmert 
offered the European Commission the expected “technical solution” to this problem, 
referred to as the Olmert arrangement. According to the offer, settlements goods can be 
identified separately from proper Israeli goods. Israeli exporters shall indicate the name 
o f the cities, villages or industrial zones where production has taken place on all 
preferential proofs o f origin issued in Israel for export to the EU.59
The arrangement originally proposed is a compromise. On the one hand, it enabled the 
EU to recover duties for products coming from the settlements and at the same time, it 
allows Israel to continue applying the Association Agreement to the Occupied Territories 
and issue proofs o f origin accordingly. It alleviates the administrative burden of the 
member States custom authorities, which are now empowered with a list o f the Israeli 
settlements and can distinguish between products coming from Israel proper and 
products coming from the settlements. O n the other hand, it allows Israel to continue
58 Source 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/customs/customs duties/rules origin/preferential/article 783 en 
■htm (last visited 15 December 2008).
59 For a detail o f the terms o f the arrangement:
http:/ /customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channeIsPortalWebApp/downloadFilePcont.cn tlD^H M CE PROD1 02362 
.8 (last visited 15 December 2008).
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applying the Association Agreement to the Occupied Territories and issue proofs of 
origin accordingly. It does not need to acknowledge in any official documents that 
products coming from the settlements are not products from Israel and it allows Israel 
by stating for example, "Israel-Barkan”, to continue to maintain a customs link between 
the Territories and itself.60
The EU was cautious with the arrangement because it realised that the way in which it 
would endorse it was crucial for the preservation of its rights under the treaty. According 
to Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, a State loses its right for 
invocating a ground o f the suspension o f a treaty if by its conduct it has acquiesced to 
the unlawful implementation o f the treaty by its partner. Furthermore, according Article 
31.2.a. of the VCLT, it means that if the arrangement was to be applied and interpreted 
in connection with the Association Agreement, die Association Agreement shall be 
interpreted in a manner diat renders the malpractice permissible.
At first die Commission was willing to refer the arrangement to the Association Council 
for endorsement and was ready to accept the arrangement as an acceptable solution in 
order to amend the protocol on origins. I f  this decision had been put into practice, it 
would have definitely amounted to acquiescence o f the EU to Israel’s violation of the 
agreement. Consequently, the EU would have lost its right to suspend the agreement and 
accepted the alteration o f the meaning o f the treaty. After a while, aware o f the risk 
which the EU was facing, the Council took all necessary steps to avoid a formal 
acceptance of the Olmert arrangement by the EC institutions which could be interpreted 
as having legal effect in European and international law. This was demonstrated by the
60 R. Frid and G. Harpaz, "Israel : Exported Products to the EU — An Agreement reached Over the 
Treatment o f Products Exported to the EU From the Golan Eights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip (the Territories)” (2004) 10 International Trade Law and Regulation 32-33, p. 32.
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fact that neither the Association Council, nor the Association Committee have endorsed 
the arrangement. All the measures referring to the arrangement were taken by the 
Custom Cooperation Committee. It was put into practice in February 2005.
In December 2005, the Commission decided with Israel to amend the protocol on 
origins for the purpose o f enabling Israel to participate to the Euromed pancumulation 
system of origins and this without having solved properly the rules o f origin issue.61 This 
decision could have had very serious consequences that the EU tried to prevent. First of 
all, it could have amounted to spreading the violation o f international law among all the 
pancumulation system. Practically speaking, it means that products from the settlements 
would have been able to comingle with Turkish or Jordanian products and be exported 
with preferential treatment to the EU. It would have been be extremely difficult to detect 
which product is originating from where with the risk that the whole system would have 
been tainted. The EU was very much aware o f those risks and has been trying to avoid 
them. Before it entered into agreements enabling third countries participating in the 
pancumulation system of origins, it made sure that they concluded an arrangement with 
Israel in order not to grant preferential treatment to products coming from the 
settlements -which is a copycat o f the Olmert Arrangement.
61 Emmanuele Giaufret talked about the arrangement as an asttm (fr) “  a trick or astuteness (en). Interview 
with Emmanuele Giaufret, Tel Aviv, July 2007. Furthermore, two MEPs asked whether the EC institutions 
considered that the implementation o f the Olmert arrangement provides a satisfactory solution to the 
issue. The Council stated that the new Protocol will be accompanied by a statement in which the EU will 
reaffirm its position as to the territorial scope o f  the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The Commission 
described the arrangement as a practical way o f  handling the problem o f exports o f  goods from the 
setdements, Written Questions by Caroline Lucas (Verts/ALE) to the European Commission, 6 July 2005, 
P-2496/05 and Oral Question by Said El Khadraoui to the Council, 22 June 2005, H-0544/05. 
Respectively available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getPoc.doPpub Ref—-
//E P//T E X T +W O +P-2005-2496+0+D O C -I-X M L +V 0//E N  and
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides /getDoc.do?type~OT&reference=H-2005-0544&language—EN  
(both links last visited 15 December 2008).
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It is interesting to note that the conclusion of the Olmert arrangement has been seen as 
an illustration o f Israel’s gradual change o f perception o f the EU’s importance as a "soft” 
power global player.62 Harpaz considers the arrangement as an imposition by the EU of 
its own solution and an illustration o f the EU’s economic and political pre-eminence. 
Israel was backed by some legal opinions stating that the convening of an arbitration 
panel could have provided in Harpaz’s words, Israel with “an objective, legal immunity 
from strong, subjective, economic and political pressures” exerted by the EU. Harpaz 
has a point if one considers that the arrangement is seen in Israel, and particularly in 
Israeli traders and right-wing circles, as a defeat because it weakens the well-established 
position that the settlements are an integral part o f Israel. It is nonetheless important to 
note that the arrangement does not fix the issue. It remains a compromise rather than 
imposed solution.
4.4. Is There a Duty not to Recognise the Certificates o f Origins Coming 
from the Settlements?
To sum up, Israel is still extending the implementation of the Association Agreement to 
the settlements and the EU is trying to avoid the endorsement o f the consequences o f 
this illegal extension. Therefore, from a point o f view of international responsibility, is it 
possible to advance the opinion that the EU has breached its duty o f non recognition, 
that it has recognised the unlawful practice?
This dissertation has already advanced in its second chapter that recognition amounts to 
the acceptance for a subject to international law o f the opposability o f an act and the
62 On this aspect see G. Harpaz, “The Dispute over the Treatment o f  Products Exported to the European 
Union from the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. — The Limits o f Power 
and the Limits o f  the Law” (2004) 38 Journal o f  World Trade 1049-1058. See also, G. Harpaz, note 41 
above p. 182.
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breach o f the duty not to recognition consists in the endorsement o f the legal 
consequences arising from the illegal act. That is, the State that recognises an illegal act 
waives of its own rights to contest the illegality o f the act or situation.63 While there is 
obviously an obligation not to recognise Israeli settlements, the answer to the question 
whether the acceptance o f certificates of origins of products coming from the 
settlements amount to a breach of the duty of non-recognition is not clear-cut and 
requires a study of international practice on non-recognition.
The ICJ stated in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia64 that certain acts “such as, for instance, the registration 
of births, deaths and marriages, the effects o f which can be ignored only to the detriment 
of the inhabitant o f the territory” were not subject to the duty o f non-recognition65 as 
otherwise, it would clash with another competing imperative which is the respect and the 
acknowledgement o f the existence and interests other than economic o f the inhabitants 
of the territory. As detailed in the second chapter o f this dissertation, other 
considerations or interests can over-ride the enforcement o f the duty. The question 
remains whether certificates o f origin fall into this exception.
In the 1994 Anastasiou case66, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) expressly ruled that 
member States of the EU should not accept certificates of origins and phytosanitary 
certificates issued by the authorities o f an entity which was not recognized, the Turkish 
Republic o f Northern Cyprus (TRNC).67 In a preliminary ruling procedure, the ECJ had
63 See Chapter Two o f  the dissertation, p. 79 above.
64 Isegal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), IC) Rep. (1971), p. 16.
63 Ibid., p. 56 (para 125).
66 Case C432/92, R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Anastasiou (Pissouri) L td  [1994] ECR I- 
3087, at 3116.
67 In 1974, the Turkish armed forces intervened in the Northern part o f Cyprus and thus partitioned the 
island into two distinct parts. On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot community declared an
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to answer five questions from the High Court o f Justice (Queen’s Bench Division), all of 
which related to the interpretation o f the Association Agreement between the then EEC 
(European Economic Communities) and die Republic of Cyprus68 and the Plant Health 
Directive.69 More precisely questions were asked whether die terms o f the direcdve and 
die agreement could allow the acceptance by the custom authorities o f the member 
States of the EC certificates issued by authorities other than the ones of the Republic o f 
Cyprus (i.e. by the TRNC) and whether the answer to these questions would be different 
if certain circumstances related to the situation o f the island of Cyprus were established. 
The UK and the Commission contended that, in view of the special situation of the 
island o f Cyprus, the authorities of the member States are bound to accept certificates 
issued by the authorities situated in the Northern part o f the island and not by officials 
authorized by the Republic o f Cyprus, in order to prevent discrimination between 
nationals and companies of Cyprus as provided by article 5 o f the Association 
Agreement. They argued that accepting those certificates does not amount to recognition 
of the TRNC but was in the interest o f the inhabitants o f the Northern part o f the island 
because it was almost impossible for them to obtain certificates other than by the 
authorities of the TRNC. They thus used the “Namibia exception” argument.
The Court rejected these contentions. The system of verification o f the authenticity of 
the origin o f a product as established by the 1977 Protocol to the Association Agreement 
is based upon cooperation and mutual reliance between the competent authorities o f the
independent State, the Turkish Republic o f Northern Cyprus. SC Resolution 541 (1983), the SC called 
upon “all States not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the Republic o f  Cyprus”, and in SC 
Resolution 550 (1984), the SC reiterated the duty o f  all states “not to recognise the purported State o f the 
Turkish Republic o f  Northern Cyprus’ and ‘not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist 
entity”.
68 Agreement o f the 19 D ec 1972 establishing an association between the EEC and the Republic o f  Cyprus, 
annexed to Council Regulation 1246/73, OJEC L 133, 14 May 1973.
69 Council Directive 77/93, OJEC L26, 31 Jan 1977. The Plant Health Directive contains measures to be 
adopted by member States o f the EC in order to prevent the introduction into, and spread within, the 
European Community o f  serious pests and diseases o f  plants and plant produce.
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importing State and those o f the exporting State.70 Such cooperation is excluded in cases 
where the authorities o f an entity are recognized neither by the Community nor by the 
member States. The only Cypriot State they recognize is the Republic of Cyprus.71 In 
those circumstances, the acceptance of movement certificates not issued by the Republic 
of Cyprus would constitute, in the absence o f any possibility o f checks or cooperation, a 
denial o f the very object and purpose of the system established by the 1977 Protocol.72 
Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the acceptance o f movement 
certificates fell into the Namibia exception. It followed the Advocate General in his 
Opinion that the situation o f Namibia and Cyprus were not comparable from either a 
legal and factual point o f view.73
Therefore, although the main legal argument o f the Court is based on an interpretation 
o f the agreement - die system of cooperation set up by the 1977 Protocol cannot 
function properly if the movement certificates are not issued by the authorities o f the 
Republic of Cyprus- it is corroborated by elements o f international law, i.e. the non­
recognition policy o f the member States of the EU of the TRNC pursuant to SC 
resolutions 541 and 550.74 In this sense, the Court clearly endorsed the non-recognition 
principle as formulated by the ICJ in the Namibia opinion by inferring that administrative 
cooperation is excluded with the authorities o f an entity which is not recognized either 
by the Community or the member States.75 It maintained the same position in the 
Anastasiou i f 6 and Anastasiou III77 judgments.
70 Para. 38 o f  the decision.
71 Para. 40 o f the decision
72 Para. 41 o f  the decision
73 Para. 49 o f  the decision
74 For a view that the Court exclusively ruled by reference to Community law and disregarded the 
international legal order as not being applicable to Community situation, S. Shaelou, “The European Court 
o f Justice and the Anastasiou Saga: Principles o f Europeanisation through Economic Governance” (2007) 
18 European Business Law Review 619-640.
75 This principle guided the legal service o f the Council which had to give their opinion on a proposal for a 
Council regulation issued by the Commission on the 24 April 2004, with the view o f  putting an end to the
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Therefore, when drawing a parallel with the issue o f the products coming from the Israeli 
setdements, one can learn from this case that a movement certificate does not fall into 
the Namibia exception.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as the circumstances in Anastasiou were different from the ones in 
the Namibia Advisory Opinion, they also differ with the ones around the issue o f the 
products coming from the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. In the Cypriot 
case, the Turkish custom officers were not the legitimate ones under the EC-Cyprus 
Association Agreement who were designated to cooperate with the European customs 
administration. Moreover, the Northern Turkish Republic o f Cyprus could not claim to 
be the successor o f the Republic of Cyprus in the rights and obligations granted by the 
treaties previously signed by the Republic of Cyprus prior to the invasion o f the Turldsh 
troops. In the Israeli case, even if the settlements are not recognised, the Israeli 
authorities are the legitimate authorities to deal with the functioning o f the customs and 
excise over the Occupied Territories. Actually, the Israeli military authority has the duty 
to do so.78 However, the exercise of this prerogative should be exercised for the benefit 
of the occupied population. In the present case, Israel is clearly in breach o f international
economic isolation o f  the Turkish Cypriot community by facilitating trade between the Northern part o f  
Cyprus and the EC Customs Territory (Proposalfor a Council Regulation on special conditions for trade with those 
areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of Cyprus does not exercise effective control, COM (2004) 466 
final). This proposal was censured by the legal service o f the Council which stated that designating a body 
in the areas for die purpose o f issuing certificates o f  origins and carrying out the necessary controls 
without the consent o f the Republic o f  Cyprus would constitute explicit recognition o f another authority in 
the areas other than the government o f  the Republic o f Cyprus, which would be contray both to international law 
and European I.e/w (emphasis added). (Doc 11874/04, 25 August 2004, non public version) Cited in T. 
Christiakis, L’obligation de non-reconnaissance des situations creees par le recours illicite a la force ou 
d’autres actes enfreignant des regies fondamentales In T. jean-Marc and T. Christian (eds.), The Fundamental 
Rules of the International Legal Order. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, (Leiden, Boston 2005), pp. 126-166, 
p. 156.
76 Case C219/98 , Anastasiou and Others [2000] E C R 1-5241.
77 Case C l40/02, Anastasiou and Others [2003] ECR 1-10635.
78 A belligerent occupant possesses the right to collect the taxes and custom duties imposed by and for the 
benefit o f the occupied population in accordance with article 48 o f the 1907 Hague Regulations : “If, in the 
territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for tire benefit o f  the State, he 
shall do so, as far as possible, in accordance with the rules o f assessment and incidences in force, and shall 
in consequence be bound to defray the expenses o f  the administration o f  the occupied territory to the 
same extent as the legitimate government was so bound”. See, G. von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy 
Territory. A  Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, (Minneapolis 1957), p. 150.
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law because the extension o f its national custom authorities is coupled with its illegal 
practice o f transferring part of its population to the territories it occupies. Israel extends 
its national customs jurisdiction to the territories it occupies for the benefit of the 
settlers.
Therefore, the connection between the Israeli and Cypriot cases stems from die principle 
that a product cannot be granted preferential treatment under EU law if the origin it 
claims in order to be allowed the preferential treatment contradicts international law.
4.5. D oes the Attitude o f the E U  Amount to Recognition?
In the present case, the EU has not recognised the illegal settlement policy. Even if it still 
has not solved the problem o f the violation o f the Association Agreement, the EU has 
refused the normal consequences o f recognition, that is, it has taken all precautionary 
measures not to give to the illegal situation the rights that its own law would require the 
EU to give. First of all, it has tried to find ways to tax products coming from the 
settlements. The Olmert Arrangement represents a way for the EU to de facto enforce of 
its non-recognition policy o f the Israeli settlements as being part o f the Israeli territory. 
Second, the last precaution it took by pressing the countries associated to the 
pancumulation system o f origins to make sure that they do not grant preferential 
treatment to the products coming from the settlements illustrates all the care it devoted 
not to have its system of external relations and trade tainted by the malpractices o f its 
partner.
However, the shield built by the EU to prevent its legal system to being altered by the 
violations o f international law o f its commercial partner is very fragile and the
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developments o f its relationship with Israel always puts it on the edge o f recognition. An 
article in the Israeli newspaper “Globes” dated 27- 28 February 2006 stated that the 
Israeli government has allocated NIS 30 million to the Export Institute in order to 
compensate operators across the Green Line whose products would be subject to export 
duties from European customs officers.79 First o f all, this is a proof that Israel is willing 
by any means to maintain an economic link between the Territories and itself. Second, it 
is a violation o f the rules o f the World Trade Organisation80 and hence o f the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement (Article 6.1) which prohibits the parties to subsidise the 
exportation o f their products. This new episode of the saga proves that the present 
situation is not tenable but it has so far not been addressed by the Commission which 
claims it has not received any confirmation that it was operational.81
It is important to note that recently, the UK government has announced that it was 
willing to search for cases o f violations of the EU-Israel Association Agreement that 
have been brought to light, notably the exportation o f agricultural products grown in 
West Bank settlements under the label “Made in West Bank” and which has caused the 
loss o f millions o f pounds in revenue.82 According to the Alternative Information Centre, 
British officials have tabled a proposal at the European Council, calling for discussion on
79 S. Peretx, Lying on the Fence, Globes, (27-28 February 2006).
80 See article 3 o f the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:
“3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning 
o f Article 1, shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact(4), whether solely or as one o f several other conditions, upon 
export performance, including those illustrated in Annex 1(5);
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one o f several other conditions, upon the use o f 
domestic over imported goods.
3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in paragraph 1.”
81 Interview with Emmanuele Giaufret, Tel Aviv, July 2007.
82 T. Franks, Concern over EU-Israel Trade Abuses, BBC Radio Four, (1st November 2008) (radio 
broadcast).
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means to tighten the policing o f the rules on import duty, so consumers can make an 
informed choice between Palestinian and settlement goods.83
There are no reasons not to welcome this initiative. However, the measures offered do 
not constitute a solution to the problem because they do not compel Israel to 
differentiate between its territory and the setdements when it implements the Association 
Agreement. A solution to this problem can only be found only if the EU establishes a 
way to shift the burden of proof in differentiating products originating from the 
settlements and products originating from Israel proper on the Israeli side. However, the 
risk is that time passes and the EU does not solve properly this problem. In this case, the 
continuous inaction from the EU in the face o f Israel’s uninterrupted practice in issuing 
certificates o f origins for products coming from settlements might change the balance o f 
the zero sum game created by the arrangement and place the EU on the slippery slope of 
recognising Israel’s extension of the implementation of the Association Agreement to its 
settlements in the Occupied Territories,
Finally, it is important to note that other European partners also illegally extend their 
jurisdiction to territories they occupy. One notable case is the illegal annexation of 
Western Sahara by Morocco. In 1976, Morocco partly invaded the territory o f Western 
Saharan after it was relinquished by Spain and entirely annexed it in 1979. Since then, 
Morocco has exploited, exported and facilitated the exploitation o f Western Sahara 
resources such as its fish, phosphates and sand. The EU and Morocco signed in 1996 an 
association agreement which entered into force in 2000 and which is devoid of any 
mention to the territory of Western Sahara and any provision excluding Western
83 A, Hackbarth, Israeli Government Criticizes UK Government’s Move to Clearly Label Settlement Made 
Products, Alternative Information Center, (17 November 2008), Available at 
http: /  /  www.alternativenews.org/news /  english /  israeli-govemment-criticizes-uk-governments-move-to- 
clearly-label-settlement-made-products-20081117.html (last visited 15 December 2008).
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Sahara.84 Furthermore, in May 2006, they signed a fisheries agreement, which entered 
into force in February 2008, establishing the right for European fishing vessels to access 
the Moroccan fishing zones in exchange for a financial contribution, including Western 
Sahara waters into the scope o f the agreement.85 The inclusion o f Western Sahara in the 
scope o f both agreements constitutes for Chapaux and Koury a breach by the European 
member States and the European Commission o f their duty o f non-recognition.86 
According to an article in the EUObserver, the European Commission explained that it 
considers Morocco as the de facto administrator o f Western Sahara.87 As much as this 
assertion is objectionable, it can explain the difference of position and strategy o f the EU 
institutions in comparison to the case of bilateral relationships between the EU and Israel 
since the EU considers Israel as an Occupying Power therefore subject to the obligations 
prescribed by International Humanitarian Law.
5. The Participation o f Settlements in Community Programmes.
The settlement policy in the Occupied Territories is offering challenges to which the EU 
must respond. The extension o f the implementation of the Association Agreement to the 
setdements is the issue the EU has been the most adamant to tackle. However, as Israel 
does not differentiate between its territory and the settlements, this problem is to be
84 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, o f the one part, and the Kingdom o f Morocco, o f the other part, OJEC L 70/2 , 18 
March 2000.
85 Council Regulation (EC) N o 764/2006 o f  22 May 2006 on the conclusion o f the Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom o f Morocco; OJ LI 41 o f 29/05/2006, 
P-1
86 S. Koury, The European Community and Member States’ Duty o f Non-Recognition under the EC- 
Morocco Association Agreement: State Responsibility and Customary International Law In K. Arts and P. 
P. Leite (eds.), International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, (2007), pp. 165-198 and V. Chapaux, The 
Question o f the European Community-Morocco Fisheries Agreement, In K. Arts and P. P. Leite (eds.), 
International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, (2007), pp. 217-237.
87 A. Balzan, Commission under fire over Morocco fisheries agreement, E UObserver.com, (9 March 2006). 
Available at http://euobserver.com /9/21092 (last visited 15 December 2008).
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found in an actual or potential manner in the entire spectrum o f the EU-Israel 
relationships.
During the year 2005, the problem has been raised inside the European Parliament that 
entities located in the Palestinian Territories have participated in the Vth and VIth 
Framework Programmes.88 This news provoked a certain embarrassment in the 
European Commission because, once again, it is clearly not in line with the official 
position o f the EU that the settlements do not form part of the State o f Israel and 
therefore it contradicts the conditions of participation o f Israel to the Framework 
Programme. The Commission promised that it would be very “vigilant” in monitoring 
the future use o f the EU’s research budget, which amounts to €50 billion over the next 
seven years.89
This vigilance has been translated into an operational procedure with the Israeli 
authorities in charge o f implementing the programme. The Directorate General Research 
of the European Commission checks the address o f those entities about whom it may 
have reasonable doubts against a list o f settlements based in the Occupied Territories. If  
suspicion remains, they refer the issue to the Israeli authorities. According to Emmanuele 
Giaufret, the solution found is certainly the most appropriate because the problem is 
minimal and is too difficult for the Commission to detect. It cannot afford to verify all
88 In response to a question to the Commission by MEP Graham Watson (ALDE) inquiring about the 
reported participation o f  Israeli settlement-based entities in FP5 and FP6, Commissioner Ferraro-Waldner 
replied that "the Commission is looking into suggestions that settlement-based entities have participated in 
bilateral co-operation programmes with the State o f  Israel, in the light o f  die contractual obligations 
entered into”. 12 December 2005, E-4633/05. Available at
http: /  /  www.europarl.europa.eu /  sides /getDoc.doPpubRef—- /  /PIP /  /TEXT+W O +E-2005- 
4633+0+D Q C +X M L+V0//BN& language—BG (last visited 15 December 2008).
89 D. Cronin, Europe: Heading for a new Security Deal with Israel International Press Service News Agency, (22 
February 2008).
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the applications sent to the D G  Research in Brussels to participate in the Programme. 
Only the best projects are selected and this not based on national or ethnic criteria.90
Nonetheless, as pointed at by the EuroMed Network of Human Rights, the “screening 
arrangement” falls short o f preventing any entity based in the settlements from 
participating in the programme. First o f all, it cannot prevent an entity using an address 
in Israel but with a core or affiliated setdement facility from taking part in the 
programme, neither can it detect the participation o f a minor subcontractor— a minor 
subcontractor being one which receives less than 25% of the funds allocated to the 
contractor which signs the project agreement with D G  Research. Further, the Israeli 
Ministry o f Industry, Trade and Labor’s technological and Research & Development 
cooperation organisation (MATIMOP) was a contractor to a number o f FP6 projects. 
MATIMOP’s companies list contains settlement enterprises and some o f the MATIMOP 
R&D centres are located in settlements. It does not seem that the “arrangement” agreed 
with the Israeli authorities extends to MATIMOP’s companies.91 The “arrangement” 
thus fails to provide a proper filter to protect the EU’ system. It can only prevent visible 
annoyances and thus political scrutiny o f the European Commission. Furthermore, the 
main issue with the arrangement is that it does not offer a proper disincentive for the 
participation o f entities based in settlements in the Programme. Entities based in 
settlements officially can still participate in it. The Commission has not thoroughly 
modified the rules o f the programme in order to prevent their participation.
Furthermore, so far, no precautionary measures have been taken in order to prevent 
entities based in settlements to participate in the Competitiveness and Innovation
90 Interview with Emmanuele Giaufret, Tel Aviv, July 2007.
91 S. Rockwell and C. Shamas, A Human Rights review on the EU and Israel - Mainstreaming or Selective 
Extinguishing o f  Human Rights? (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network), (2005). p. 38.
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Programme (CIP) Israel joined in November 2007 and to benefit from loans granted by 
the European Investment Bank. Finally, as stated earlier in this chapter, the EU and 
Israel agreed on June 2008 to upgrade their relationships and the EU raised the prospects 
o f Israel’s participation in several community programmes. It remains to be seen if the 
EU will take precautionary measures to effectively prevent the participation o f entities 
based in settlements in these programmes.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusions. Perspectives for the Near Future and Recommendations: 
Towards a Law-Based Involvement o f the European U nion  
in its Relationships with Israel and the Palestinians.
The Israeli occupation o f the Palestinian territories poses a claim for exceptionality which 
is directed at third parties, i.e. those outside this factual situation. In this respect, third 
parties have a responsibility to object this claim in order not to render it legitimate or 
acceptable. As it has been detailed in this dissertation, the EU has been confronted widi 
this claim for exceptionality throughout the deepening o f its relations with the parties 
involved with the conflict. By increasing its presence on the ground and its ties with 
Israel and the Palestinians, it has entered the “sphere” of violations o f international law. 
N ot only it has enhanced its responsibility to protest to die claim but also it has increased 
the risks o f compromising itself with the violations o f international law happening on the 
ground. First of all, through a summary o f the previous chapters of this dissertation, this 
chapter demonstrates that parallel to the process of continuous international law 
violations pursuant to the occupation o f the Palestinian territories, through repeated 
silence and inactions in tackling the disruption o f its peace-building instruments by 
violations of international law occurring on the ground, the EU has entered a process of 
acquiescence which has led in some instances to progressive compromising and 
recognition o f violations o f international law and has breached its initial commitment to 
base its relationship with Israel and the Palestinians on respect for human rights. 
Secondly, this chapter exposes critically die recent developments and future perspectives 
of the EU’s involvement with Israel and the Palestinians. Finally it formulates 
recommendations for a better directed involvement of die European Union in the 
resolution o f the Israeli Palestinian issue, notably the mainstreaming o f international law 
in its relation with both parties.
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1. Towards Acquiescence and Compromising.
The former deputy director o f the European Commission Technical Assistance Office to 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in an interview he gave a few months before he left his 
office in August 2007, used this very evocative image to describe EU’s policy and 
involvement in the Palestinian Occupied Territories:
“Imagine you have a block of concrete in the middle o f the road which has 
been there for years and blocks the traffic. Our [EU’s] strategy has consisted 
so far in fixing the holes in the road, adding a layer o f macadam from time to 
time, mow the grass on the sides. Nonetheless, we have never tried to 
remove the concrete block and undermine its foundations”.1
The EU regularly condemns the illegality o f some aspects o f the Israeli occupation such 
as the settlements policy, extra-judicial killings and Palestinian attacks against Israeli 
civilians in its declaratory policy.2 However, the EU has never acknowledged the 
structural aspect o f the occupation which is characterized by power asymmetry and a 
settlement policy which amounts to a de facto annexation of the West Bank. The EU’s 
deployment o f its strategy towards the parties to the conflict is necessarily confronted by 
this structure which interferes with the implementation of its policy. Nonetheless, the 
EU maintains its economic, State-building and humanitarian policy with its partners 
while failing to address these interferences and therefore contributes to the entrenchment 
of the illegal occupation. Furthermore, so far, since it decided to revive its State building
1 Interview with Philippe Georges Jacques, Head o f  the Section on Infrastructures and UNRWA, EC 
Technical Assistance Office to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, August 2006.
2 This dissertation considers the illegal acts o f violence against Israeli civilians by Palestinian groups as 
repugnant and illegal. See p.13 note 6 above. It sees them as well as a development and emotional response 
to the ongoing and violent occupation and the denial o f the right to self-determination o f  the Palestinian 
people.
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policy, the EU has been silent on the human rights abuses of the Palestinian Authority 
and therefore contributes to the diminishment o f the possibility o f the construction o f a 
democratic Palestinian State.
As detailed in the fourth chapter o f this dissertation, the promotion o f international law, 
humanitarian law and human rights is a primary objective o f the external policy o f the 
European Union. In this respect the EU has included in all its external agreements a 
clause which specifies that respect for human rights is an essential element o f its relations 
with its partners. This clause was included in the Association Agreements which the EU 
signed with Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. By doing this, the EU 
undertook the commitment that respect for human rights was a central element in the 
conduct and development o f its relations with Israel and the PLO. As a consequence, the 
cases of acquiescence and recognition o f human rights violations recounted in this 
dissertation consist of a violation o f the commitment which the EU undertook when it 
inserted the human rights clause in its Association Agreements with Israel and the 
Palestinians.
1.1. The Entrenchment of the Occupation in the Developmental. 
Humanitarian and State-Building Policies which the EU  Directs at 
the Palestinians.
By the beginning o f the 1990s, parallel to its humanitarian aid, the EU had deployed 
financial assistance to foster the development of the Palestinian territories. In line wida 
Regulation 3363/86 on the tariff arrangements applicable to imports into the
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Community o f products originating in the Occupied Territories,3 it signed an interim 
association agreement with the PLO whose objective was to foster the economic 
development o f the Occupied Territories. The implementation o f this agreement has 
been hampered by the violations o f international law on the ground, notably the curfew 
and closure policy. When the EU intended to correct the situation, the efficiency of the 
measures adopted was hampered by its equidistant approach to the conflict, i.e., its denial 
o f the power asymmetry which characterizes the relation between Israel and the 
Palestinians4 and also by the violations of international law 011 the ground generated by 
the structure o f the occupation. First of all, in the case of the trilateral groups on 
transport, energy and trade set in place by the EU, the supposedly exercise o f dialogue 
and divestment from the issues o f the conflict by the parties represents a case of 
cynicism when it was agreed from the beginning that these groups would not consider 
issues related to “security”. Secondly, in the case of EU BAM and the destruction o f the 
infrastructure financed by the European Union, the interference caused by these 
violations o f international law in the implementation of the EU’s policy obviously placed 
the EU inside the “sphere of the violation of international law” and thus increased its 
duty to protest. By failing to claim compensation for the destruction o f the infrastructure 
it financed and by renewing the mandate o f EU BAM while failing to protest at the 
disruption to the implementation o f its mission, the EU acquiesced in these violations o f 
international law and thus gave incentives for the perpetuation of the illegal occupation.
Furthermore, in order to respond to the worsening of the economic situation in the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories and in the absence o f immediate results o f its 
development policy, the EU gradually migrated its efforts towards humanitarian aid. This
3 Council Regulation 3363/86 o f  27 October 1986, OJEC L 3 0 6 ,1st November 1986.
4 M. Pace, “The Construction o f  EU Normative Power” (2007) 45 Journal o f Common Market Studies 
1041-1064, p. 1055.
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dissertation has demonstrated that the European Union has integrated the constraints o f 
the occupation and the violations o f international law it entails in its humanitarian policy 
except in some instances like the case of the “mitigation projects” against the effects of 
the construction o f the wall. The EU demonstrated its readiness to pay for the 
reconstruction of infrastructure illegally destroyed by the IDF such as the case o f the 
house demolitions in Rafah in 2004 or the reconstruction of die power station in Gaza in 
2006.The EU was also ready to compensate for the retention o f tax and custom duties by 
Israel and not to ask for compensation for the cost o f the obstruction o f its humanitarian 
operation. Finally, the most obvious example o f the integration of the structure o f the 
occupation and its related violations o f international law in the enforcement of its 
humanitarian policy is the case of the EU ’s provision o f fuel while Israel enforces a siege 
over the population o f Gaza. In this case, the EU has recognised Israel’s illegal actions by 
allowing this act to alter the way it implements its policy. The occupation and the 
violations o f international law it generates are then integrated into the implementation of 
the humanitarian policy of the EU and these interferences are never properly questioned, 
contested or tackled. Therefore, through its humanitarian policy, the European Union is 
helping the occupation to entrench and perpetuate. To paraphrase the words o f Philippe 
Georges Jacques, the EU has “taken note o f the concrete block”.
The same pattern o f acquiescence and entrenchment exists in relation to the 
implementation o f the EU ’s State-building policy. After the takeover by Hamas o f the 
Gaza Strip in June 2007 and the nomination o f the government o f Salam Fayyad by 
President Abbas, the EU decided to relaunch its State-building policy. This policy is 
directed at the West Bank only and contains a strong focus on security-related aspects. 
This dissertation has taken the example o f the implementation of EUPOL COPPS to 
illustrate how the EU maintains and implements its strategy as if the occupation did not
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exist and by turning a blind eye to the human rights abuses committed by the Palestinian 
Authority in die West Bank. First, the Palestinian civil police cannot properly implement 
its mission because o f the presence of a foreign entity on the territory over which it 
exercises jurisdiction and furthermore, the civil police is part o f the apparatus of an 
authoritative government whose human rights abuses are progressively being denounced. 
By failing to address these issues while it is in a position to do so because o f its strong 
involvement on the ground and deep ties with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the 
EU contributes to the rendering o f the objective of its State building policy unattainable.
1-2. On the Verge o f Recognition o f the Israeli Settlement Policy.
The previous chapter o f this dissertation has demonstrated that the illegal settlement 
policy permeates all aspects o f the economic relationships between Israel and the EU and 
as such it poses a legal challenge to the European Union which faces the risk to have its 
international responsibility engaged.
The most illustrative example of this issue is Israel’s exports o f products which originate 
from its settlements in the Occupied Territories to the European Union under the EU- 
Israel Association Agreement as if they were coming from Israel proper. Since the 
signing o f the Agreement, several N G O s brought this problem to light and have 
managed to mobilise forces inside the European institutions to keep the debate on this 
issue alive. The huge amount of attention attracted by the problem is mostly due to the 
fact that the export o f products coming from the settlements under preferential 
treatment constitutes a violation of EU law. It was a detectable issue o f “hard law” and 
therefore, given EU’s attachment to the rule o f law and EU’s legalistic culture, it was 
supposed to provoke a long and intense debate.
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As noted by die Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network Review on the EU and 
Israel:
[...] in the EU’s institutional culture there is a great difference between its 
tolerance for conducting EU affairs in a de facto legally wrongful manner, and 
its tolerance for persisting in wrongful action or inaction once legal impropriety 
has been made evident, placed under scrutiny and debate within the 
institutions, and taken up by elements of the European public. For very 
strong reasons o f general self-interest and institutional self-interest, the EU 
remains attached to its own rule o f law. There is broad EU political 
consensus regarding the importance o f not weakening the presumption o f 
rule o f law within the Community and as a European Union by 
conspicuously acting in contempt o f it.5
In 2005, Israel and the EU agreed on a “technical solution” to overcome this problem. 
However, as detailed in the previous chapter, this “technical solution” is a simple 
“astuteness” which still allows Israel to encompass the settlements within its territory 
when it implements the Association Agreement. Furthermore, Israel is trying to find 
ways to bypass the arrangement by compensating economic operators located across the 
Green Line.
The only solution to this issue is for the EU to press Israel to distinguish between its 
territory and the settlements in the implementation o f the Association Agreement. The 
same applies for the participation o f Israel in any Community programmes. Otherwise, if 
the EU remains silent in the face o f Israel’s attempt to overcome the terms o f the 2005
5 S. Rockwell and C. Shamas, A Human Rights Review o f  the EU and Israel — Reladng Commitments to 
Actions, 2003-2004 (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network), (2004), pp. 20-21.
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arrangement, if, with the passage o f time, it fails to tackle Israel’s persistent practice of 
issuing certificates o f origin for products coming from the settlements —even though it 
intends to tax them when they enter the EC market, and if it does not employ measures 
to prevent or create strong disincentives for the participation o f settlements in its 
programmes, then the EU likely breach its duty not to recognise the settlements as legal
1.3. M issed Opportunities in the E U  Declaratory Policy to Promote 
Respect for International Law.
The EU’s accommodation or acquiescence to Israel’s claim to depart from international 
law can also be illustrated by instances where the EU silenced condemnations of 
violations o f international law, failed to repeat condemnations in successive declarations, 
and to hold Israel accountable for conditions which it previously enounced. The 
following examples detail two o f these cases.
First of all, after Israel announced its intention to disengage from Gaza, i.e. to dismantle 
its settlements in the Strip, the EU declared that it welcomed the initiative provided that 
it was implemented in accordance with five conditions laid down by the European 
Council in March 2004 and reiterated in October 2004:
“it took place in the context of the Roadmap; 
it was a step towards a two-state solution;
it did not involve a transfer o f settlement activity to the West Bank;
there was an organised and negotiated hand-over o f responsibility to the
Palestinian Authority;
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and Israel facilitated the rehabilitation and reconstruction o f Gaza”.6
Israel announced that the Gaza disengagement plan absolved it from its responsibility 
over the Strip and ends the occupation of Gaza.7 However, Israel stated as well that it 
would guard the perimeter o f the Gaza Strip, continue to control Gaza air space, and 
continue to patrol the sea off the Gaza coast.8
It can now be contended with confidence that the Gaza disengagement plan never ended 
the occupation o f the Strip. Operation Summer Rain in June and July 2006, and the 
subsequent military incursions of Israel in the Strip, are enough evidence that Israel never 
pulled out o f Gaza. 9 Furthermore, so far the Gaza disengagement plan has been a means
6 Declaration o f the European Council in Brussels, 25-26 March 2004 and 11 October 2004, (Middle East 
Peace Process- Council Conclusions). These conditions were actually “whispered” by Henry Siegman to 
Javier Solana. Informal conversations with Henry Siegman, November 2006.
7 The primary implication o f  the disengagement plan was set out in Principle Six (Political and Security 
Implications) o f  the revised disengagement plan which provides: “the completion o f the plan will serve to 
dispel the claims regarding Israel’s responsibility for the Palestinians within the Gaza Strip”. Originally, the 
first version disengagement plan stated that “there would be no basis for die claim that the Gaza Strip is 
still an occupied territory” but this was deleted in the final version o f  the disengagement plan. See I. 
Scobbie, “An Intimate Disengagement: Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza, the Law o f  Occupation and o f  Self- 
Determination” (2004-2005) Yearbook o f Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 3-31.
8 “Israel’s Disengagement Plan: Renewing the Peace Process”, 20 April 2005. Available at 
http://www.mfa.Pov.il/M FA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israels+Disengagement+P  
lan-+Renewing+the+Peace+Process+Apr+2005.htm (last visited 15 December 2008).
9 The disengagement plan gave rise to an academic and political debate whether the disengagement plan 
ended the occupation o f  Gaza. For Scobbie, the disengagement from Gaza fails to observe the 
requirements o f  the process aspects o f  self-determination and threatens to breach the substantive aspects 
o f the occupant’s duty to maintain the integrity o f the territory it occupies. Furthermore, Scobbie notes 
that after the deployment o f  the Operation Summer Rain in June and July 2006, it is enough to note that 
the re-entry o f  Israel ground forces demonstrates that the disengagement plan did not end the occupation. 
The ease with which the Israeli Defence Force re-establish a physical presence on the ground in Gaza 
clearly fulfils the ruling in Pmsecufor v. Naktilic and Martinovic that a guideline to determine whether “the 
occupying power has the capacity to send troops within a reasonable time to make the authority o f the 
occupying power felt” (Prosecutor v. Na/etilic and Martinovic, ICTY, judgment, 3 May 2006, Case No. IT-98- 
34-A, p. 74, (para. 217)) See I. Scobbie, note 7 above, pp. 25 and 31. Stephanopoulos contends that Israel 
still occupies Gaza for two reasons: first it retains effective control over the territory, and second, because 
agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) prohibit unilateral changes to the legal status 
o f Gaza and the West Bank. N. Stephanopoulos, “Israel’s legal obligations to Gaza after the Pullout.” 
(2006) 31 Yale Journal o f  International Law, 524-528. Shany argues that the three pronged test for the 
existence o f  occupation set out in the 1948 Nuremberg Hostages case should be applied - actual presence 
o f hostile forces in the territory; their potential to exercise effective powers o f government in the area; and 
the inability o f the legitimate government o f  the area to exercise its sovereign authority over the territory. 
(United States v. Wilhelm, in 11 Trials o f War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under 
Control Council Order n. 10, at 1230, 1243) Y, Shany, “Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status o f Gaza After 
Israel’s Disengagement”, 8 Yearbook o f International Flumanitarian Law, (2006) 369-383
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to consolidate Israel’s grip over a large proportion o f the West Bank. At the time the 
disengagement plan was announced, in 2004, Dov Weisglass, the Prime Minister’s aide, 
“pragmatically” stated that the significance of the Gaza disengagement plan was the 
“freezing of the peace process” . According to him, when the international community 
had given its assent to the disengagement plan and consequendy, Israel had succeeded in 
“freezing the peace process”, then Israel could pursue its setdement policy in Jerusalem 
and the rest o f the West Bank without having to fear any pressure from the outside. 10
Nonetheless, the EU never repeated the conditions it enunciated in 2005 and it never 
challenged Israel’s contention that the Gaza Strip is no longer occupied and consequendy 
that Israel still has to abide by its obligation under die Geneva Convention. Actually, 
more precisely, the EU ’s position on the issue over whether Israel should abide by its 
obligations under humanitarian law has been extremely ambiguous and, from the point 
o f view of this dissertation, has given rise to a case of acquiescence to Israel’s claim that 
it did not have any responsibility for the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip. As it 
was mentioned in the sixtii chapter o f this dissertation, despite the fact that on January 
21st 2008, Benita Ferrero Waldner condemned the siege on Gaza as a collective 
punishment, the Council did not use this legal qualification afterwards and in an elliptic 
formula referred to Israel’s obligations without specifying if they were obligations under 
humanitarian law.11
Furthermore, in April 2008, while the Council urged regular and unrestricted delivery of 
fuel supplies to the Gaza Strip in order not to aggravate further the humanitarian crisis, 
the Presidency o f the EU (Slovenia at the time) even implied that the collective
10 Ari Shavit, Top PM Aide: Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the Peace Process, Hactrefy (6 October 2004) cited 
in N. Tocci, The Widening Gap between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict (Centre for European Policy Studies), (Brussels 2005), p. 11.
11 See Chapter Six o f  this dissertation, p. 227 above.
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punishment on the population o f Gaza could legitimately be expected to worsen if 
Palestinians conduct acts o f violence:
“Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza have their share in aggravating 
the humanitarian situation, including through carrying out the attacks on the 
Nahal Oz and Kerem Shalom crossings” .12
In this instance, this dissertation takes the stance that the absence o f repetition of the 
conditions attached to the Gaza disengagement plan, the refusal to use the term 
“collective punishment” while condemning the blockade on Gaza and the declaration 
which placed on Hamas a responsibility in provoking the aggravation of the blockade on 
Gaza consist in a very equivocal response to Israel’s claims that it does not have any 
responsibility for the population o f Gaza and to an attitude o f acquiescence to Israel’s 
illegal practices.
The decision o f the Council in 2005 not to publish a report on the situation of Jerusalem 
constitutes another case o f acquiescence. In November 2005, the British newspaper, the 
Guardian, leaked a report on East-Jerusalem drafted by the EC Technical and Assistance 
Office for the West Bank and Gaza.13 This report was initiated by the political councillor 
o f the British embassy at the time the UK presidency of the European Union. The ten- 
page document demonstrated the clear Israeli intentions to turn the annexation o f East 
Jerusalem into a concrete fact through the implementation of several inter-linked policies 
which are reducing the possibility o f reaching a final status agreement on Jerusalem.
12 EU Presidency Statement on Fuel Shortage in Gaza, 24 April 2008.Available at 
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nRf/9a798adhB22afO8525dl7h006d88d7/6halffl9f48d584f852574.86n04a5 
8dO?OpenDocument (last visited 15 December 2008)
13 N. Watt, EU shelves East Jerusalem report over fear o f  alienating Israel, The Guardian, (13 December 
2005).
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“Israel's main motivation”, the report asserts, “is almost certainly demographic - to 
reduce the Palestinian population of Jerusalem, while exerting efforts to boost the 
number of Jewish Israelis living in the city - East and West” .14
At the last minute, the Council refused to publish this report under the pretext of the 
ongoing elections in Israel. European leaders wanted to avoid a confrontation with Ehud 
Olmert whose party Kadima was likely to win the elections and was considered pro- 
Europe.15 Javier Solana, the head of the Common Foreign and Security Policy stated 
expressly that he thought the report was very one-sided and unhelpful.16 In this situation, 
the EU made it clear that it had knowledge o f an illegal situation and that it was ready to 
contest it but finally decided not to act publicly. By withdrawing its protests over the 
illegal situation, the EU demonstrated that it acquiesced in Israel’s de facto annexation of 
East Jerusalem and its claim to depart from international law.
1.4. The H um an Rights Aspects of the European Neighbourhood  
Policy in the Case o f Israel and the Palestinian Authority: Another 
Case o f Acquiescence?
The pattern of acquiescence o f the EU towards Israel’s claim to be exempt from rules o f 
international law and human rights protection and towards PA human rights abuses can 
also be seen in the developments of the EU human rights instruments with Israel and the 
PA within the context o f the European Neighbourhood Policy.
u Jerusalem and Ramallah Heads o f Mission, Report on East Jerusalem (EC Technical Office to the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip), (Jerusalem 2005), p. 8 (para. 20). The report is available at 
http:/ / www.waromvant.org/?lid=l 1418 (last visited 15 December 2008).
15 Interview with Philippe Georges Jacques, Jerusalem, August 2006.
16 N . Watt, note 13 above.
288
As stated in the fourth chapter, in its Communication on Reinvigorating EU actions on 
Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners, the Commission 
acknowledged that:
“There is an urgent need to place compliance with universal human rights 
standards and humanitarian law by all parties involved in the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict as a central factor in the efforts to put the Middle 
East peace process back on track. This will require a special effort by the EU 
and the setting up o f an appropriate strategy”.17
However, when die EU designed its European Neighbourhood Policy action plan with 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the EU missed an opportunity to implement this 
“appropriate strategy” for the promotion of respect for human rights and international 
law.
• The EU-Israel Action Plan.
First o f all, when they drafted the EU-Israel Action Plan, Israel and the EU failed to 
agree on the establishment o f a human rights sub-committee whereas such a committee 
has been set up in other Mediterranean partners Action Plans such as Jordan’s and 
Morocco’s. Instead, with Israel, human rights issues were supposed to be tackled during 
meetings of the sub-committee on political dialogue and cooperation. As a consequence, 
in order to adopt a “balanced” approach with the parties, the Commission did not 
include a human rights sub-committee in its action plan with the Palestinian Authority
17 “Reinvigorating Human Rights in the Mediterranean Area”, Commission Communicadon, 21 May 2003, 
COM (2003) 294 final, p. 5.
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and therefore considerably reduced its ambitions to promote compliance with human 
rights standards and humanitarian law by the parties to the conflict.
Furthermore, instead o f establishing a human rights sub-committee, in February 2007, 
the EU and Israel agreed on the establishment o f two informal working groups 
respectively on human rights and on International Organisations. It is important to note 
that no public record is kept of their meetings.18 The establishment o f the human rights 
informal working group was considered as a little victory on the EU ’s side “because of 
the difficulty o f tackling human rights issues with Israel”.19 Nonetheless, the 
establishment of this informal working group falls short of the EU’s initial commitments 
to promote human rights and to place compliance with human rights as an essential 
element o f its relations with Israel.
Additionally, the EU-Israel Action Plan makes only brief mention o f human rights, and 
this in contrast o f other Action Plans agreed with its Mediterranean partners.20 Under the 
heading “Shared Values”, the sub-heading “Democracy, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” includes the general commitment:
18 The EU-Israel Action Plan within the European Neighbourhood Policy: What is the impact o f  the EU- 
Israel Action Plan on Human Rigts in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories?, Training and Seminar, 
'Euro-Mediterranean Human 'Rights Network, (Tel Aviv and Ramallah 2007), p. 4.
19 Interview with Emmanuele Giaufret, Deputy Director o f the EC Delegation for Israel, Head o f  the 
Political and Economic Section, Tel Aviv, July 2007.
20 For instance, the EU-Morocco Action Plan contains one specific section on human rights with four sub­
headings: Ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to international Standards; Freedoms 
of association and expression; Further promote and protect the lights of women and children; Implement fundamental social 
rights and core labour standards, in Proposed EU-Morocco Action Plan, European Commission, Brussels, 17 
December 2004, pp. 4-5. The EU-Jordan Action plan contains also one specific section on human rights 
with five sub-headings: Support the freedom of the media and strengthening freedom of expression; Promote Freedom of 
association and Development of Civil Society; Ensure respect of human rights andfundamental freedoms in line with Jordan’s 
international commitments; Promote Equal Treatment of women; Promotion of fundamental social rights and core labour 
standards; in “Proposed EU-jordan Action Plan”, Brussels, European Commission, 9 December 2004, pp. 
4-5.
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- Work together to promote the shared values of democracy, human rights, 
rule o f law and respect for human rights and humanitarian law
- Explore the possibility to join the optional protocols related to 
international conventions on human tights
- Promote and protect rights of minorities, including enhancing political, 
economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens and lawful 
residents
- Promote evaluation and monitoring o f policies from the perspective o f 
gender equality
- Promote a dialogue on policies for the physically and mentally disabled.21
Finally, in the Action Plan, the status of Israel as an Occupying Power, its responsibility 
under humanitarian law and its human rights obligations towards the occupied 
population are not mentioned. Instead, the Action Plan makes only an implicit reference 
to the obligation for Israel to respect the principle o f necessity and proportionality in its 
military operations in the Occupied Territories. For instance, under the heading 
“Regional and international issues”, the sub-heading “Situation in the Middle-East”, the 
Action Plan encourages the parties to strengthen political dialogue and intensify areas for 
further cooperation and states:
“While recognising Israel’s right o f self-defence, the importance o f 
adherence to international law, and the need to preserve the perspective o f a 
viable comprehensive settlement, minimising the impact o f security and 
counter-terrorism measures on the civilian population, facilitate the secure
21 “Proposed EU-Israel Action Plan”, European Commission, Brussels, 9 December 2004, p. 4.
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and safe movement of civilians and goods, safeguarding, to the maximum 
possible, property, institutions and infrastructure”.22
•  The EU-PA Action Plan.
The EU-PA Action Plan sets up several objectives designed to intensify political, 
security, economic and cultural relations between the parties.23 In this document, the EU 
and the PA acknowledged that there were a number o f constraints and limitations 
resulting from the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the continuing occupation, 
including settlement activity, restrictions to movement as a result o f the closure policy 
and the separation barrier preventing these objectives to be attained.24 However, neither 
in the drafting o f the EU-PA Action Plan nor in the designing o f the EU-Israel Action 
Plan, has the EU proposed measures to tackle these “constraints and limitations” .
For instance, in the EU-PA action plan, the EU and the PA have agreed to take concrete 
measures to implement the EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement on Trade and 
Cooperation. However, the two measures envisaged to fulfil these objectives are to:
“Examine possibilities of greater use o f the institutional framework o f the 
Interim Association Agreement (e.g. Joint Committee meetings, working 
groups etc.)
Examine prospects o f negotiation o f a full Association Agreement”.25
22 Ibid., p. 6.
23 “Proposed EU-PA Action Plan”, European Commission, Brussels, 9 December 2004.
24 Ibid., p. 1.
25 Ibid., p. 11.
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The illegal measures which prevent the proper implementation o f the EC-PLO Interim 
Association Agreement are not mentioned in any place either in the EU-PA or in the 
EU-Israel Action Plans.
As seen in the fifth chapter o f this dissertation, the human rights dimension o f the EN P 
is encapsulated in a system of positive conditionality. The achievements o f reforms and 
progress in the field o f human rights and democracy identified in each individual action 
plan are supposed to be reviewed each year and they condition the development o f 
cooperation and the granting of privileges by the EU.26 The quasi-absence o f reference to 
the human rights issues which are endemic to the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the silence 
on the status and responsibility o f Israel as an Occupying Power in the EU-Israel Action 
Plan represents another case o f acquiescence by the EU to the violations o f human rights 
and humanitarian law which result from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The lack o f 
consideration o f such issues points towards a future dissociation between the 
development o f the integration of Israel in the European market and the improvement 
o f the human rights situation in Israel and in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
Furthermore, despite the fact that the Commission decided not to establish a sub­
committee on human rights with the PA, the EU-PA action plan contains references to 
several human rights aspects which all form part of a common commitment between the 
EU and the PA to build the institutions o f an independent, democratic and viable 
Palestinian State. In the Action Plan, the PA is invited to “strengthen legal guarantees 
for freedom of speech, freedom o f the press, freedom o f assembly and association in 
accordance with international standards” and “ensure the respect o f human rights and 
basic civil liberties in accordance with the principles of international law, and foster a
26 Chapter Five o f  this dissertation, p. 190 above.
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culture o f non-violence, tolerance and mutual understanding” .27 However, since it 
revived its ties with die PA, the EU is not adamant to address these issues with the PA 
government whereas the same government has conducted a “muscled” policy in the 
West Bank conducive to human rights abuses in order to install “law and order” in the 
territories and clear diem of the induence o f Hamas.
2. Perspectives for the Near Future: Reactivation of the EU-PA Action Plan 
and Upgrade o f the EU-Israel Relations.
As seen in the sixth chapter o f this dissertation, in April 2008, the EU decided to revive 
the EU-PA Action Plan and in June of that year it agreed to increase die capacities of 
EUPOL COPPS and to extend its mission with a criminal justice component. The 
implications o f this decision vis-a-vis the EU’s commitments to promote respect for 
international law and human rights have been detailed in the same chapter.
Furthermore, during the last EU-Israel Association Council on 16 June 2008, the EU 
officially announced its intention to upgrade its relationships witii Israel as requested by 
Israel itself and agreed one year before.28 At the EU-Israel Association Council on 5 
March 2007, a “Reflection Group” was established in order to consider ways to upgrade 
the relationships between the two parties.29
Israel is impatient to see the EU fulfilling the commitment it formulated at the Essen 
Council in December 1994 according to which “Israel, on account o f its high level of
27 “Proposed EU-PA Action Plan”, note 23 above, p. 6.
28 Statement o f  die European Union at the eight meeting o f  the EU-Israel Association Council, 
Luxembourg, 16 June 2008, General Secretariat o f the Council. Available at 
http://www.delisr.ec.europa.eu/english/specialfti-.aspPid^:^ (Last visited 15 December 2008)
29 Interview with Emmanuele Giaufret, Tel Aviv, July 2007.
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economic development, should enjoy special status in its relations with the European 
Union”.30
As a consequence o f this common intention, the ambitions o f Israel were very high. In 
the view of the proposal for upgrading it submitted before the convening of the 
“Reflection Group” set for the 9 October 2007, the status Israel aspired to was very 
close to one o f a member State but “without the institutions”.31 Naturally, Israel 
demanded a significant integration in the European Single Market and in European 
agencies, programs and working groups with participation of Israeli ministers in charge 
o f specific areas o f activity in relevant meetings o f the European Council “in those areas 
which will be jointly identified as areas o f full participation within the process of 
European integration”. In order to strengthen political cooperation with the EU, Israel 
demanded, for instance, an annual meeting between heads o f State of the EU and from 
Israel, a meeting o f Israel and EU Foreign Ministers during each EU presidency, an 
Israel-EU strategic dialogue twice a year. Israel wishes to “have a say” and be associated 
with EU actions and involvement in the region. The most striking aspects are the 
demands to be involved in the formulation o f the European diplomacy in a manner 
which is even not granted to candidate members o f the EU. Israel expressly requested 
fixed consultations in Brussels prior to the issuing of declarations by the foreign 
Ministers o f the EU and, in return, a readiness for alignment on Israel’s part with 
European declarations in agreed-upon areas of the CFSP.
30 Declaration o f  the European Council in Essen, 9 and 10 December 1994. See declaration o f  Oded Eran, 
Israel’s ambassador to the European Union: “Despite past declaration, Israel does not enjoy any EU 
preference”, 23 March 2007, http:/ / \vw\v.ejpress.org/atticle/ voices/15353 (last visited 15 December 
2008)
31 Unpublished document. Provided by the courtesy o f the Flemish Peace Institute (Brussels).
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The nature o f the upgrade was supposed to be decided at the Association Council in 
2008.
In its final declaration after the Association Council of 16 June 2008, the EU officially 
acknowledged the upgrade o f its relations with Israel. Nonetheless, the nature and 
content o f the development o f the relationships between the two partners is much less 
substantial than that Israel aspired to. The approach chosen seems to be a gradual and 
slow integration in the EU market while at the same time maintaining its declaratory 
policy condemnatory o f Israel’s illegal actions.
In the declaration, the EU announced the readiness of Israel to participate in several 
Community programmes, such as the EU Health programme 2008-2013 and Intelligent 
Energy-Europe programme. According to the document, the EUROPOL and Israel 
were planning to negotiate an operational agreement. Furthermore, horizontal 
negotiations covering air transport and in view of the signing o f an agreement between 
the EU and Israel have been finalised.
However, in its declaration, the EU is careful to linking the upgrade with Israel to the 
resolution o f the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The EU states expressly:
“The process o f developing a closer EU-Israeli partnership needs to be, and 
to be seen, in the context o f the broad range of our common interests and 
objectives which notably include the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict” .32
32 Statement o f  the European Union, note 28 above, para. 6, p. 2.
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The document is scattered with references to the situation in the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories. It condemns the building o f settlements as illegal, as prejudging the outcome 
of final status negotiations and as threatening the viability of an agreed two-state 
solution.33 It calls for the progressive removal of Israeli restrictions on movement and 
access in order to improve the situation on the ground and living conditions in the West 
Bank and to revitalise the Palestinian economy.34 It also expresses its concern at the 
unsustainable humanitarian situation in Gaza.35 Finally, it declares that any measures to 
prevent and combat terrorism must comply with international law, in particular 
international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.36
Finally, the EU also calls for the creation of a Subcommittee on Human Rights to replace 
the informal Working Group on Human Rights.
3. Recommendations.
The EU’s deep involvement with Israel and the Palestinians necessarily requires that it 
exercises a form o f diligence in the implementation o f its policy and directs its actions 
towards Israel and the Palestinians with a certain level of diligence. Absent such an 
approach, the EU compromises itself with the violations o f international law emanating 
from the ground to the extent that it offers incentives for the perpetuation o f the illegal 
situation created by the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and also in some 
cases even “receive the fruits” of the illegal occupation. Its repeated silences and 
inactions, when confronted in the implementation o f its policy towards the parties with 
violations o f international law and human rights only, helps the illegal occupation to
33 Ibid., para. 18, p. 4.
34 Ibid., para. 20, p. 4.
35 Ibid., para. 21, p. 5.
36 Ibid., para, 31, p. 6.
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perpetuate or, in the words of Philippe Georges Jacques results in “entrenching the 
concrete block”, i.e., the occupation. Therefore, a form of diligence or concern not to 
encourage or offer incentives for the commission and perpetuation o f violations of 
international law should be mainstreamed in all the aspects o f EU’s policy and actions 
directed towards Israel and the Palestinians. Such an approach should be also coupled 
with efforts to maintain the claim that respect for international law, human rights and 
humanitarian law is a central aspect o f the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
Therefore, first o f all, it is important that the EU maintains the position it expresses in its 
declaratory policy and regularly condemns all violations o f human rights and 
humanitarian law occurring on the ground.
Secondly, the “security first” approach adopted in the context of the Palestinian State-
building, without addressing the human rights abuses committed by the Palestinian
government, accelerates the process towards the creation of a failed Palestinian State
which is clearly not in the interest o f the EU, Israel and especially the Palestinians
themselves. EUPOL COPPS is planning to include a course on human rights in the
training o f the roughly 800-member public order unit of the civil police.37 While this is
obviously a positive initiative, the EU should go a step further in its policy directed to the
Palestinian Authority. It should, first of all, exercise a duty o f due diligence by ensuring
that its aid and policy do not assist the entrenchment and perpetuation o f illegal policies
and human rights abuses. Furthermore, the re-establishment o f the State building
strategy and the efforts to build up a Palestinian civilian police should naturally be
accompanied by an equal focus and similar efforts by the donor community on the
mainstreaming of human rights and the rule o f law in all the aspects of their State-
37 “Palestinian Civil Police, Connect, Train, Build, Equip, Mobilise”. Funding request submitted for your 
consideration, Palestinian Ministry o f Interior, Berlin Conference 24 June 2008, pp. 5 and 8.
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building policy.38 Finally, the EU should set up a sub-committee on human rights and 
condition its financial and technical assistance to the Palestinian Authority on respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms by the PA government.
Nonetheless, regarding this last point, it is important to note that the PA is a non-State 
actor and as such, it has limited capabilities. Much of the reforms which need to be 
implemented call for the cooperation o f Israel, notably in the trade and security sector. It 
is thus fundamental to condition the development of the Palestinian State building policy 
to the efforts and achievements of Israel in eliminating the obstacles to construction o f a 
viable a Palestinian State and to its cooperation in these sectors. This might initially be 
seen as an unbalanced approach because it requires conditioning the granting o f 
privileges to one party on the achievement o f another actor but it is the only way to 
tackle properly the obstacles to the implementation o f a Palestinian State and to render 
its creation possible and sustainable.39
Furthermore, in a context such as the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, 
humanitarian aid cannot possibly play a neutral and impartial function. It is crucial in a 
context like this one that the EU also exercises a form of diligence in the conduct o f its 
humanitarian policy in order not to entrench the illegal policies o f the Occupying Power.
38 While the EU was bypassing the PA government, the projects that were managed through the 
President’s office have not been interrupted. As such, it lead to the situation where State-building projects 
related to police and security were still funded but projects related to the strengthening o f the Palestinian 
judicial system were interrupted. This necessarily has an impact on the situation on the ground and it 
makes it difficult to relaunch the entirety o f the State-building project. Interview with Mark Gallagher, 
Head o f the Financial Cooperation and Institutional Reform Section, EC Assistance Technical Office for 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, July 2007.
39 Actually the EU has once linked the development o f the relationships between the EU and Israel to 
Israel’s obstruction o f  EC’s economic and developmental instruments directed at the Palestinians. In late 
1987, the European Parliament postponed the final ratification and approval o f  the trade protocols 
attached to the 1975 EC-Israel trade agreement until Israel allowed Palestinian citrus growers to market 
their goods directly to the Community via Israeli ports without a change in certificates o f  origin in 
accordance with regulation 3363/ 86. Interview with Charles Shamas, senior partner o f the Mattin Group, 
Ramallah, July 2006. See also R. Miller, “Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel” (2006) 12 Israel affairs 
642-664, p. 654 and I. Greilsammer, “The Non-Ratification o f the EEC—Israeli Protocols by the European 
Parliament (1988) “ (1991) 27 Middle Eastern Studies 303-321.
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Such an approach is inevitably difficult to implement because it necessarily poses a 
dilemma between the imperatives o f aiding a population in need and the risk of 
perpetuating the “cost free” occupation. However, it can still be undertaken at different 
levels. First o f all, this approach implies a day-to-day implementation and therefore a 
form of strong resilience from humanitarian workers who, for instance, have to insist 
with the Israeli authorities that they do not have to request “special permits” which Israel 
imposes for certain zones which are actually areas coveted for its settlement policy.40 It 
necessarily requires a strong coordination among donors and a common will to face 
these issues. Nevertheless, things can already be achieved on the EU side only. At least, 
the EU should demand the reimbursement o f all the additional cost on the provision o f 
humanitarian relief incurred as a result o f the illegal restrictions to movement and access 
imposed by Israel in the Occupied Territories. It should also state regularly that its 
humanitarian assistance does not relieve Israel from its obligation as an Occupying 
Power. It should finally claim from Israel the reimbursement o f the destroyed 
infrastructure which was initially financed by the EU.41
Furthermore, the EU should take precautionary measures in order to prevent the 
participation of settlements in the programmes Israel will be associated with. Such an 
initiative would require the adoption o f several different steps. First o f all, all the relevant 
General Directorates o f the European Commission which manage the programmes to 
which Israel is or will be associated should be informed o f the possibilities of 
participation o f entities based in settlements. Secondly, the EU should establish clearly 
with Israel that its association in Community programmes precludes the participation of
110 Interview with Alberto Oggero, ECHO expert, EC Technical and Assistance Office, Jerusalem, July 
2007.
1,1 Veronique de Keyser, Member o f  the European Parliament, has requested several times the adoption by 
the EU o f  the principle “destructor-payer” on the same model o f  the principle “polluter-payer” 
implemented in environmental law. Interview with Veronique de Keyser, Member o f the European 
Parliament, Brussels, August 2006.
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any entities based in settlements. Finally, all financial instruments and public 
procurements tenders should specify that entities whose location has been established in 
contravention to international law are not entitled to participate.
Regarding the participation of settlements to the EU-Israel Association Agreement, the 
EU should restate that the Olmert arrangement does not solve the problem of the 
exports o f products originating from the settlements. It also should address Israel’s 
practice o f refunding settlement businesses through illegal subsidies for any import taxes 
paid by these businesses in their export to the EU in the EU-Israel Association Council 
and take the necessary steps under the Association Agreement accordingly to solve this 
issue i.e. convoking an arbitration panel.
Furthermore, the exclusion in community programmes of entities based on a territory 
whose acquisition contravenes international law, as well as the exclusion o f territories 
occupied or annexed from the scope o f EU’s agreements, should form part o f a general 
policy of the EU in order to implement its international obligation o f non-recognition. 
Efforts in this sense have already been initiated by APRODEV and the Mattin Group in 
their advocacy work. In 2005, they called for the introduction o f “Safeguard Provisions” 
in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)42 that would 
ensure first o f all that all agreements concluded, and all measures financed, under the 
EN PI are implemented by each contracting party in accordance with the requirements of 
general international law and second, that no contracts enabling privileged participation 
o f Community-financed programmes or measures are concluded with any political 
authority, public institution 01* private actor directly participating in, actively facilitating or
A2 The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument is die financial instrument which supports 
the implementadon o f the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Action Plans decided with the 
countries associated to the ENP.
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actively deriving benefit from the commission o f internationally wrongful acts.43 These 
measures could have targeted the activities performed in the settlements based in 
Palestinian Occupied Territories but also in Western Sahara on behalf o f Morocco. 
Unfortunately these amendments were not adopted. Such provisions would have 
enhanced die value o f the EN PI as an instrument o f positive conditionality and would 
have helped ensure that the EU ’s objective o f promotion o f human rights and 
international law are respected and promoted through the engagements concluded under 
the ENPI.
Finally, the EU should exercise positive conditionality on Israel. I f  negative conditionality 
and sanctions against Israel are not conceivable at the moment, the EU should at least 
link the expansion o f its relationships with Israel to Israel’s respect and implementation 
o f human rights and humanitarian law in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. N ot doing 
so amounts to an implicit acknowledgment o f Israel’s human rights abuses against the 
Palestinian population. The EU’s declaration following the EU-Israel Association 
Council in June 2008 demonstrated an intention not to bend over Israel’s claim to detach 
the EU-Israel relationships from the situation in the Occupied Territories. In drafting the 
new EU-Israel Action Plan by the first term o f the year 2009, the EU should go a step 
further and clearly condition the development o f its relation with its partner to the 
improvement o f the human rights situation in the Occupied Territories. In this respect, it 
should respect its commitment to place human rights as an essential element of its 
relationship with Israel. The expression o f its will to establish a sub-committee on human 
rights in its declaration following the EU-Israel Association Council could be interpreted 
as a move in the right direction. However in order to improve the EU ’s commitment to
43 "Non-paper on the ENPI: A Recommendation for the Introduction o f ‘Safeguard Clauses”’, Mattin 
Group, September 2005 .1 would like to thank the Mattin Group and APRODEV for sharing the material 
on the “Safeguard Clauses” with me.
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base its relationship with Israel on respect for human rights and to implement proper 
positive conditionality with Israel, the EU should previously determine clear human 
rights benchmarks which will be assessed in each session of the human rights sub­
committee and will help to standardise current performance and give incentives to the 
development of the EU-Israel relationships. Finally, as part of the implementation o f its 
positive conditionality policy towards Israel, the EU should condition the development 
of its relations with Israel to Israel’s cooperation and their implementation o f the EU’s 
instruments and policies which are directed at the Palestinians, notably the EC-PLO 
association agreement.
4. Concluding remarks.
The present dissertation has demonstrated that the European Union is progressively 
acquiescing and accomodating with the violations o f international law that derive from 
the occupation of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. In this respect it has used a 
framework based on an empirical approach to international law in order to explain how 
States or international actors can contribute to the commission or the perpetration o f 
violations and which draws upon international jurisprudence and several concepts of 
international law such as the duty o f due diligence, the notion of acquiescence and the 
duty o f non-recognition.
Furthermore, this dissertation has exposed that through this process o f acquiescence and 
compromising, the EU has also breached the commitment to base its relations with 
Israel and the Palestinians on respect for human rights it took when it included a human 
rights clause.
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